

**From Southern Africa to the Great Lakes Region: Challenges
to Tanzanian Foreign Policy and Conflict Resolution in Sub-
Saharan Africa**

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degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Newcastle,
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Statement of Originality

I hereby certify that the work embodied in this thesis is the result of original research and has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other University or Institution, and to the best of my knowledge, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where reference has been made. I give consent to the final version of my thesis being made available worldwide, when deposited in the University's Digital Repository, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968.

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Abstract

The study is about Tanzanian foreign policy and its participation in conflict resolution. The survey goes back to the 1950's when Tanganyika's nationalist leader Julius Nyerere and Ghana's leader, Kwame Nkrumah led the liberation struggles and promoted the pan-African unity. The main assumption is that over fifty years, the nation's role and outlook in conflict resolution has remained the same despite changes in circumstances and the shift of emphasis. Tanzania's participation in conflict resolution is divided into two phases: from the mid 1950's during decolonisation to the 1990's when the focus shifted to the Great Lakes Region (GLR) conflicts. The "security" concept as reflected in Tanzania's traditional response to conflict in Southern Africa has by the early 1990's evolved to address specific problems in the neighbourhood. This also entailed the regional's and international community's response to those problems.

Given that Tanzania's security is connected to that of its immediate neighbours the Regional Security Complex Theory has been adopted to assist in the explanation of Tanzania's experience in resolving conflicts in Mozambique, Rwanda and Burundi. The model focuses on the domestic, state-to-state relations – which produces a security region, relations with the neighbouring regions; and the relationship between the international community and regional security structures. Mozambique has been selected partly because it is the only country in whose conflict resolution from the liberation struggles to the end of the civil wars Tanzania participated. Mozambique's experience required Tanzania to focus on the link between decolonisation and development as well as develop a regional and pan-African policy. Rwanda and Burundi have been selected because they depict the post-colonial and post-Cold War case studies that required concerted regional and international responses.

The study found that Tanzania's nation-building process largely contributed to its understanding and handling of intra-state conflicts. Nationalist struggles both served as a basis for minimising the factors that in the long run would cause conflicts and informed the country's initiatives at the regional level. The study further found that Tanzania's involvement in managing the conflicts in the neighbouring countries was informed by the immediate impact of the conflicts on the region and the threat they pose to Tanzania's national security. Being involved in resolving Mozambique's, Rwanda's and Burundi's conflicts for a longer period than the other countries, Tanzania also worked with regional and the international actors. The actors include the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the UN as well as other individual countries. In some instances Tanzania was even ahead of the other actors in responding to conflicts such as Rwanda's 1990 conflict.

Finally, Tanzania's foreign policy and the participation in conflict resolution have largely been successful in the struggles against colonialism and apartheid as well as in the mediation and facilitation of peace talks. The involvement in peacekeeping missions has been an increasing trend, with a shifting emphasis on peace enforcement.

Abbreviations

AAPC	All African Peoples Conference
ACA	American Committee on Africa
ACRF	African Crisis Response Force
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
ADF	Allied Democratic Force
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
ALC	African Liberation Committee
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ASF	African Standby Force
ASP	Afro-Shirazi Party
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BBTG	Broad-Based Transitional Government
CCM	<i>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</i>
CDR	<i>Coalition pour la Défense de la République</i>
CEPGL	<i>Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs</i>
CFA	Cease-Fire Accord
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNDD	<i>Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie</i>
CNDD-FDD	<i>Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie</i>
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CONCP	Conference of Nationalist Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies
CUF	Civic United Front
DIA	Department of International Affairs
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community for Central African States
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEC	European Economic Community
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EO	Executive Outcomes
EPG	Eminent Persons Group
ESR	Education for Self-Reliance
EU	European Union
FAB	<i>Forces Armées Burundaises</i>
FAR	<i>Forces Armées Rwandaises</i>
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDLR	<i>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</i>

FLS	Front Line States
FNLA	<i>Frente Nacional Libertação de Angola</i>
FRELIMO	<i>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</i>
FRODEBU	<i>Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi</i>
FRONASA	Front for National Salvation
GLR	Great Lakes Region
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICARA	International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IDAF	International Defence and Aid Fund
IFI	International Financial Institution
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOR	Indian Ocean Region
IUEF	International University Exchange Fund
KBO	Kagera River Basin Organisation
MANU	Mozambique African National Union
MDR	<i>Mouvement Démocratique Républicain</i>
MNF	Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation
MNR	Mozambique National Resistance (also RENAMO)
MONUA	<i>Mission d'Observation des Nations Unies à l'Angola</i>
MONUC	<i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo</i>
MPLA	<i>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</i>
MRND	<i>Mouvement Republican National pour le Développement</i>
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NEC	National Executive Committee
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NESAM	<i>Nucleo dos Estudantes Africanos Secundarios de Moçambique</i>
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIBMAR	No Independence Before Majority Rule
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NMOG	Neutral Military Observer Group
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRM	National Resistance Movement
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
ONUB	<i>Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi</i>
ONUC	<i>Opération des Nations Unies au Congo</i>
OMM	Mozambique Women's Movement
OPDSC	Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SADC)
PAC	Pan-African Congress

PAFMECA	Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa
PAFMECSA	Pan-African Freedom Movement for Eastern, Central and Southern Africa
PALIPHEUTU	<i>Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu</i>
PALIPHEUT-FNL	<i>Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu-Forces Nationales de Libération</i>
PARENA	<i>Parti Pour le Redressement National</i>
PARMEHUTU	<i>Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation des Bahutu</i>
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PDD 25	Presidential Decision Directives 25
PDC	<i>Parti Démocrate Chrétien</i>
PIDE	<i>Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado</i>
PL	<i>Parti Libéral</i>
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PMC	Private Military Company
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
PSD	Parti Social Démocrate
PTA	Preferential Trade Area
RANU	Rwandese Alliance for National Unity
RENAMO	<i>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana</i> (also MNR)
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
RRWF	Rwandese Refugee Welfare Foundation
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
RTD	Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam
RTLMC	<i>Radio Télévision Libre de Mille Collines</i>
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SACP	South African Communist Party
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SAPSD	South African Protection Support Detachment
SOMAFCO	Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College
SPUP	Seychelles People's United Party
SWAPO	South-West Africa People's Organisation
TAA	Tanganyika African Association
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TAZARA	Tanzania-Zambia Railway
TBC	Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation
TNA	Transitional National Assembly
TPDF	Tanzania People's Defence Force
UDENAMO	<i>União Nacional Democrática de Moçambique</i>
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNAMI	<i>União Nacional de Moçambique Independente</i>
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda

UNAVEM	United Nations Verification Mission in Angola
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNESCO	United Nations Education and Scientific Commission
UNITA	<i>Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola</i>
UNLF	Uganda National Liberation Front
UNOMOZ	United Nations [Peacekeeping] Operations in Mozambique
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Namibia)
UPRONA	<i>Union pour le Progrès National</i>
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WB	World Bank
ZANLA	Zimbabwe National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZNP	Zanzibar Nationalist Party

Introduction

Since the first President of Tanganyika, Julius Nyerere, hosted the Mwanza Conference that launched the Pan-African Freedom Movement in 1958; Tanzania has been playing a vital role in conflict resolution in Africa. The period of involvement ranges from that of decolonisation of the southern African region and of the continent in general, which by and large occurred during the Cold War, to the post-Cold War period when most of the conflicts occurred between states. This thesis makes an analysis of Tanzanian foreign policy with a particular focus on conflict resolution in Mozambique, Rwanda and Burundi. The hypothesis advanced here is that, Tanzanian foreign policy embeds long-standing conflict resolution strategies, which suggest extensive understanding of the domestic, regional and international concerns. These strategies have not changed significantly in the post-Cold War era.

In the wake of the collapse of the Cold War order, the bipolar and conventional paradigm has undergone much revision. What has emerged is a focus on asymmetric threats such as terrorism and intrastate conflicts. What is new in this paradigm is the response of the West to this security challenge, which has shaped initiatives in Africa. Tanzania has found itself being caught between the traditional response to conflict, the response of the West to it and the specific problems on its doorstep. This thesis traces the historical record and then draws on conclusions that might inform Tanzanian foreign policy in this critical area.

Tanzania has continuously been involved in conflict resolution in various forms from diplomacy (usually negotiations and mediation), to military and logistical support.¹ From the mid 1950's to the late 1980's, the emphasis was on the liberation of the states on the continent, whereas from the 1990's onwards

¹ Rodger Yeager, *Tanzania: An African Experiment* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), 102.

it changed to the resolution of domestic conflicts.² By the 1980s most African states had been liberated from colonialism and in its place, forces unleashed by globalisation had become particular concerns. The evolution at the international level has shaped Tanzania's domestic environment. In particular, Tanzania's commitments with donors, particularly the international financial institutions caused a shift of the foreign policy focus and subsequently conflict resolution strategies. At the regional level, the outbreak of civil wars in some of the neighbouring countries and the subsequent increase in both conflicts and the resolution process influenced the country's involvement in conflict resolution.

The role of individuals in foreign policy decisions during the Cold War period and afterwards has been a subject of debate. Throughout the Cold War, the international community's emphasis has been on individual leadership as the primary factor in the conduct of the foreign policy. The issue has been on the question of rationality of the decisions made by either national leaders or citizens. Goldstein and Pevehouse herein argue that values and beliefs influence decisions by individual leaders. Recent literature by scholars such as Nye, however, stress that the individual is an inadequate criterion for analysis. As Nye argues the nature and the conduct of international relations are more associated with the structure of the international system rather than individuals.³ Even when eminent personalities resolve the conflicts, internal and external dimensions of the international system remain influential.

The period that this study covers, from the late 1950's to the present, is important in the nation's history and trends in terms of foreign policy and conflict resolution. The essential issue is that Tanzania has been resolving

² For this study, the two periods will be referred to as the first and second phases of Tanzania's participation in conflict resolution respectively. Also, it should be noted that some of the second phase conflicts spilled over from the first phase.

³ For a discussion on this, see Joshua S. Goldstein and John C. Pevehouse, *International Relations: 2006-2007 Edition* (New York: Longman, 2007), 143-144. See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr. *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 2003), 29.

conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa and more recently in Mozambique, Rwanda and Burundi. Two reasons explain a shift on emphasis from the Southern Africa Region to the Great Lakes Region (GLR)⁴ and other sub-Sahara African countries. First, by the late 1980's, since most of the Southern African countries were already independent, Tanzania's objective of supporting liberation had already been achieved. Second, while the international community took longer to respond to the outbreak of intra-state conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, Tanzania had little choice other than to take unilateral action.

And Tanzanians live in a dangerous neighbourhood. Africa South of the Sahara herein has been categorised as the mostly affected in the world with conflicts.⁵ Famine, poverty, economic dependence, internally displaced persons and refugees; diseases and political instability have wracked the region. While conflict seems to have been the region's key feature, historically, the nature and character of these conflicts have changed over time although some conflicts have been featuring since the pre-colonial times persist to the present. The conflicts that arose in the late 1950's and early 1970's have resulted largely from the liberation struggles. Others such as those in Angola and later Mozambique were against the backdrop of the Cold War. After the Cold War, however, conflicts have resulted from leadership crises, the re-distribution of resources, identity in terms of ethnicity, gender or the colour of the skin, and of recent, electoral processes.

⁴ The GLR comprises the countries surrounded by lakes Albert, Edward, Kivu, Tanganyika and Victoria. The countries include Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The term was developed in the Nineteenth Century by European explorers such as Richard Burton. In the Twentieth Century German researchers on East Africa named it *Zwischenseengebiet* meaning the territory between the lakes and later formed the basis of French adjective, *interlacustre* and in English translation, interlacustine region. See Jean-Pierre Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History*, Scott Straus (Trans.) (New York, Urzone Inc., 2003), 22-23. See also Richard Francis Burton, *The Lake Regions of Central Africa: A Picture of Exploration*, 2 vols. (London: Longman, Green Longman and Roberts, 1860).

⁵ Gaudens P. Mpangala and Bismarck U. Mwansasu, eds., *Beyond Conflict in Burundi* (Dar es Salaam: The Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, 2004), 3.

Conflicts in one country cause instability in the neighbouring countries and in the whole sub-region; they are at the end confined to specific regions such as the Horn of Africa, GLR, Central, East or West. Regions in transition such as the Great Lakes and the Southern Africa have spawned different types of conflicts at various times. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for instance, the early 1960's conflict was centred on the secessionist movements, but that of the 1990's resulted from struggles by various factions to control the government and resources. Regional actors such as Rwanda and Burundi in turn supported the latter.

Evolution of conflict resolution

The late Seventeenth Century was the beginning of contemporary conflict resolution. Kriesberg refers to the early works of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) and Adam Smith (1723-1790) as the precursors of conflict resolution. Kriesberg further divided the evolution from the Twentieth Century into four periods: preliminary developments from 1914 to 1945; followed by the growth of international institutions between 1946 and 1969; thereafter the expansion and institutionalisation from 1970 to 1988; and lastly the period of diffusion and differentiation from 1990 to 2008.⁶

The development of conflict resolution mostly took place between 1919 and late 1980's. One of the early agencies that attempted solutions to conflict was the League of Nations in 1919, which sought worldwide membership.⁷ The organisation was expected to bring stability to the world by preventing conflicts between the members, and in the case of conflict, would seek an arbitrated resolution. Sanctions and use of armed force against any member, which broke the Covenant, were lawful. A lack of international support, however, crippled

⁶ See Louis Kriesberg, "The Evolution of Conflict Resolution" in the *SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, ed. Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and William I. Zartman (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2009), 15-32.

⁷ Some of the major powers such as the U.S. refused to join. Germany was later admitted to the organisation.

the League and undermined the overall approach to resolving conflict. The League furthermore, faced a number of challenges, including lack of effective power to enforce its recommendations and an unclear mandate between its principal organs – the Council and the Assembly.⁸ Generally, the League was more successful in economic and social work – important precedents for the potential role of the United Nations (UN) internationally, and in the developing countries and regions.

The second attempt to develop international machinery to promote collective security and to prevent conflict was the formation of the UN, which was established in 1945 after the Second World War. Its aims were the maintenance of international peace and security as well as protecting and promoting human rights. The Organisation's major practical objective was to overcome the challenges of the League, particularly assigning the roles that the UN organs would perform. Due to the fact that most of the conflicts were influenced by the Cold War competition, conflict resolution was mainly on the prevention of large-scale conflicts such as nuclear war. A Charter was thus designed to address inter-state rather than intra-state conflicts. Article 2 (1) and (7) of the UN Charter provides for the principles of sovereign equality of states and non-intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of any state respectively. As an exception, the latter principle would not be observed when it is necessary to apply the forcible means under Chapter VII.⁹ The non-interference principle was upheld so as to prevent conflict among states.

⁸ The organs were empowered to make unanimous recommendations, but not binding resolutions. See David Armstrong, "The evolution of international society" in *The Globalisation of World Politics. An introduction to international relations 4th ed.*, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 38-52; Paul Taylor and Devon Curtis, "The United Nations" in *The Globalisation of World Politics*, 314-328. See also Christopher Hamer, *A Global Parliament: Principles of World Federation* (New South Wales: Fast Books, 1998), 34-37.

⁹ See Charter of the United Nations. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/> [Accessed on 28 September 2009].

During the first years of the UN, peace and security issues were treated separately from human rights. While the Security Council was mandated to maintain the former [including settlement of international disputes], the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was charged with the latter, especially economic and social development.¹⁰ This could partly be explained by the nature of the international system whereby; human rights were a concern for developmental affairs than conflict resolution. With the increasing economic and social causes of conflicts, progressively the Security Council assumed the responsibility of addressing human rights violation.¹¹

Significantly the UN had to cope with an upsurge in conflict not just between states, but also from the process of rapid decolonisation. In Africa, from the 1950's, conflict resolution concentrated on liberation struggles. The attainment of independence for some countries in the 1950's set the ground for the coordination of nationalist movements across the sub-regions. As will later be discussed, Ghana's independence in 1957, for example, stimulated decolonisation struggles and paved the way for the nationalist leaders to get more organised. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963 to support the liberation of the African countries and promote pan-Africanism among the member states. Its mission was to promote peaceful resolution of conflicts. Although the OAU was a regional body, other organs were established at the sub-regional levels. Some of them are the East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). Their main goal, as distinct from that of the OAU, was to promote economic

¹⁰ The General Assembly and ECOSOC were responsible for economic, social, cultural and other related matters. See Chapter X of the UN Charter.

¹¹ Claire Breen, "The Necessity of a Role for the ECOSOC in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security," *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 12 (2) (2007): 261-262.

cooperation among independent member states. Conflict resolution was not, however, emphasised in the same manner as it was at the regional level.¹²

From the late 1970's, the concept of "security" gradually began to shift. It changed from state-centric conception whereby state's security was related to protecting the state from external threats to incorporating the critical and natural resources, population growth, environmental degradation and social inequalities. This shift has given rise to "environmental security" concept, which was subsequently integrated into development agenda. In this context, human security was interpreted as forming part of state security through the protection of human rights and promotion of human development.¹³

The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 were the turning points in the development of conflict resolution. Inter-state conflicts and the balance of power seemed, at least for the immediate future, to fade from the nature of conflict resolution. Attention was now paid to the internal dynamics, including the management of intra-state and intra-group conflicts. The issues which dominated African conflicts included the scramble for resources and power amongst warlords, regional hegemons and international powers.¹⁴ Nevertheless, although many conflicts were domestic, external actors played role in influencing them.

¹² In Southern Africa for instance, this could be explained by the fact that SADCC co-existed with the Front Line States (FLS) whose objective was to support liberation movements. The former's main objectives were to reduce economic dependence, mobilise the national, inter-state and regional policies thus creating an equitable regional integration, and to secure economic co-operation with the framework for economic liberation strategy. See Rasul Ahmed, "A Regional Framework for Promoting Security: The Case of Southern African Development Community in Southern Africa" (M.A. dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 2003).

¹³ Philippe Le Billon, "Economic and Resource Causes of Conflicts," In *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, 214; R.L. Brown, *Redefining National Security*, (Washington D.C: World Watch Institute, 1977). For a detailed discussion see Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security*, 8 (1) (1983): 129-153. See also Andre du Pisani, "Democratic Governance and Security: A Conceptual Exploration," *Security and Democracy in Southern Africa*, Gavin Cawthra, Andre du Pisani and Abillah Omari eds., Johannesburg: Wits University Press 2007, 15-19.

¹⁴ Billon, "Economic and Resource Causes of Conflicts" 215.

Security had, therefore, evolved from that of the state to the protection of human beings from conflicts, diseases, poverty and natural calamities. Furthermore, African peace and security became a global concern and drew the international community's attention on the continent as demonstrated in the war on terrorism and the establishment of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007. Indeed, the transformation of conflict became central with more emphasis on the prevention rather than on the resolution of conflicts.

Regional and sub-regional organisations were now challenged with a much expanded notion of security, which included not only the focus on the state, but also the intra-state dynamics of conflicts. The majority of the organisations herein had to re-define their objectives so as to cope with the changes. The OAU, for instance, evolved into African Union (AU). SADC shifted its objectives from collective security to conflict prevention and management. The SADC security objective specified the need to co-operate in politics, diplomacy and peace issues. The emphasis was on the peaceful settlement of disputes, promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.¹⁵

Sources of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa

The causes and nature of conflicts and even the methods to resolve them are inter-related and have been evolving over time. Consequently the choice of an appropriate conflict resolution mechanism is determined by an understanding of its nature and/or causes. As Zartman argues, the sources of African conflicts can invariably be categorised into either domestic and external or primary and secondary.¹⁶ There is, however, a thin line separating the two

¹⁵ Ahmed, "Regional Framework for Promoting Security," 13. See also Articles 4 and 21 (3) (9) of the SADC Treaty, 1992.

¹⁶ Zartman clusters the sources of conflict into primary and secondary while Ojo et al. divide them into internal and external sources of conflict. See I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 2-14. See also Olatude J.C.B. Ojo, D.K. Orwa and C.M.B. Utete, *African International Relations* (1985). The sources can be sub-summed in three theories that explain the causes of conflict. Primordialism perceives conflict to be rooted in heterogeneous societies where people are arbitrarily grouped together to form a sovereign state. Instrumentalism focuses on the social-cultural factors (such as religion, identity and ethnicity) within the domestic political structures and how individuals

since one source may fall in either one or both categories. Moreover, historical factors, domestic governance, economic circumstances and international relations may be manipulated to cause conflict.¹⁷

While colonial powers were the common enemy for most of the nationalist movements, liberation movements themselves became a source of conflict when they were not incorporated in the post-independence government. As a result after the attainment of independence some of the movements factionalised while others merged into a single political party. Consequently, two forms of conflict emerged. Conflict over political space as could be seen in Angola, the DRC and Shaba; and over the control of power and participation in decision-making. In circumstances where a single political party was formed, leaders controlled both the resources and the decision-making process. As a result, a centralised government, which sometimes paved the way for dictatorship as in Central African Republic, Somalia and Sudan, was formed.

Another factor occasioned by decolonisation was the fact that newly independent states challenged the boundaries drawn during colonial times, resulting into conflicts. The Moroccan-Algerian conflict that broke out into a war in 1963, for example, resulted from the territorial problems of boundaries and borderlands inherited from the French administration agreements of between 1830 and 1912. While the government of Morocco claimed the historic rights, the Algerian government, contested for the ownership right of all territories controlled by the French.¹⁸

manipulate the factors for their interests. The political ecology and conflict goods theory focuses on the structure and fragility of most post-colonial economies. In the latter the basic assumption is on competition to control the natural resources, which prolongs conflicts. See Kenneth C. Omeje. "Understanding Conflict Resolution in Africa" in *Peace and Conflict in Africa*, 68-91.

¹⁷ Le Billon, "Economic and Resource Causes of Conflicts" 210.

¹⁸ Alf Andrew Heggoy, "Colonial Origins of the Algerian-Moroccan Border Conflict of October 1963," *African Studies Review* 13 (1) (1970): 17.

Related to the issue of boundaries was conflict over resources which constituted a potent source of current and possibly future conflicts.¹⁹ The current conflicts are related to the pursuit or possession of critical materials in the sense that they provide a convenient way to sustain rebel movements and help governments fund armies. Such critical materials include petroleum, minerals, timber and cocoa. Future conflicts over “increasingly scarce resources”²⁰ imply that conflicts would be caused by increasing global interdependence as demonstrated by the interaction between environmental and economic factors.

There has also been conflict based on identity, whether ethnicity, race, religion, gender, language or culture.²¹ Mamdani identifies political, cultural and market-based identity.²² This conflict occurs when groups rebel against what they interpreted as exclusion or discrimination in terms of recognition, marginalisation or cultural extermination and in some cases, physical elimination. Unlike other sources of conflict, identity gave rise to deeply rooted psychological and social meaning to the individual within the context of group dynamics.

¹⁹ Referred to as “resource wars” concept, was coined in the late 1970’s to describe the conflict between the U.S and the Soviet Union over the control of resources in the Middle East and Southern Africa. See Le Billon, “Economic and Resource causes of Conflicts” 214.

²⁰ The combination of population and economic growth will give rise to the demand for raw materials therefore, arguably, resource shortages and contested resource ownership causing future conflicts.

²¹ Francis Deng, *War of Visions: Conflict and Identities in the Sudan* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 1. See also Cordula Reimann, “Engendering the Field of Conflict Management: Why Gender Does Not Matter! Thoughts from a Theoretical Perspective” in *Common Ground or Mutual Exclusion? Women’s Movements and International Relations*, ed. Marianne Braig and Sonja Wölte (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2002), 103.

²² Political identities resulted from the way the state was formed and provided by law. In the same way, economic identities resulted from the history of markets development, while cultural identities emerged from the communities that share a particular way of life. See Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2001), 21.

After the Cold War the discussion of conflict resolution shifted to the analysis of the combination of sources. It was a necessary shift for, as Porto argues, single-factor explanations of the causes of conflict might be irrelevant since they may impede the development of appropriate resolution mechanism.²³ A better understanding of the sources of conflict arguably results from a blend of factors and can be found in more than one location. This proposition suggests that, the multi-level analysis of the causes of conflict is particularly relevant in the African context. During the Cold War the cause of conflicts was centred on the state system as the main actor. Thereafter it shifted to other actors within the states following the increased interconnectedness.²⁴

Although Porto suggests that the combination of the levels of causation as the more reliable way of understanding the causes of conflict, his categorisation overlooks an important level that lies between the state and other systemic levels. This is particularly important in contemporary Africa where the sub-region is increasingly becoming crucial in the analysis of the causes and resolution of conflicts.

Conflict resolution in Africa

Contemporary conflict resolution in Africa is partly a product of the pre-colonial methods. Prior to colonial rule, African societies developed a number of resolution mechanisms dealing with all phases of conflict – prevention, management and termination. Most of these methods were more or less similar to the ones practiced elsewhere, but some were indigenous to Africa.²⁵ While the judicial and non-judicial means of conflict resolution were employed in some

²³ Joao Gomes Porto, "The mainstreaming of conflict analysis in Africa: contributions from theory" in *Peace and Conflict in Africa*, 57.

²⁴ See Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

²⁵ Edmon Kwam Kouassi, "Negotiation, Mediation and other Non-Judicial Ways of Managing Conflicts in Pre-Colonial West African Societies," *International Negotiation*, (13) (2008): 233.

parts of Africa, elders and/or chiefs in a public setting handled both.²⁶ Mediators did not need to have formal training, but were rather known to the disputants through life experience. External intermediaries as currently emphasised in contemporary conflict resolution were unimportant, playing a role only when internal mediator has been unsuccessful. Conflict resolution was therefore perceived to be concerned with the re-establishment of harmonious relationships in terms of action taken within and by the local community.²⁷ To a large extent the indigenous mechanisms succeeded in resolving conflicts because they were taken as a measure for peaceful co-existence through collective responsibility and consensus building.²⁸

It was during the colonial period and Africa's interaction with the rest of the world that the frameworks to deal with conflict resolution were re-invented. Whereas the indigenous adjudication mechanisms fostered reconciliation and re-building of social trust, formal courts regulated and managed the conflicts. Despite the fact that Western mechanisms of conflict resolution were perceived in Africa to be universal and could easily be transported to other societies, they sometimes proved to be unsuccessful. Moreover, unlike the previous experiences, the neoliberal political and economic models influenced contemporary conflict resolution models and processes.²⁹ These models had been designed within a standardised formula that ranges from conflict

²⁶ *Gacaca* in Rwanda is one of the traditional judicial courts, which were later incorporated in the official legal system.

²⁷ Molly Wallace, Review of *Conflict Resolution and Peace Education in Africa*, by Ernest E. Uwazie, ed., *African Studies Review*, book review, (48) (1), 226.

²⁸ Tim Murithi, "African indigenous and endogenous approaches to peace and conflict resolution," in *Peace and Conflict in Africa*, (London: ZED Books, 2008), 18-19. See also Derry M. Yakubu, "Conflict resolution in traditional African societies and present day realities: the Tiv experience," (paper presented at a seminar organised by the Centre for Nigerian Cultural Studies, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. July, 1995).

²⁹ Patricia Daley, "Challenges to Peace: Conflict resolution in the Great Lakes Region of Africa," *Third World Quarterly*, 27 (2) (2006): 303.

prevention to post-conflict peace building, with mixed outcomes when applied to Africa.

The problem here was that the Western approaches often overlooked the local contexts of African conflicts, and as such often missed the options for different perspectives in conflict resolution. Most of the countries that experienced an outbreak of civil wars in the early 1990's, for example, were compelled as part of the resolution process to have the parties to the conflict negotiate and sign peace agreements, regardless of the nature and context of the conflict. Eventually they sometimes failed to address the underlying causes of conflict and left in place the seeds of future trouble.

The current international efforts to resolve conflict in Africa constitute high-level diplomacy which concentrated more on promoting dialogue between the leaders of the warring parties, assuming that they are the legitimate representatives of the people. This practice leads to potential exclusion of local populations; hence ignoring the reality on the ground. The upshot is that conflicts are left unresolved, as the protagonists' interests may not necessarily comply with those of the broader group members.³⁰

Besides the fact that traditional mechanisms largely set the ground for contemporary conflict resolution, the practice showed a lack of interface between the traditional and contemporary mechanisms. Most of the current interventions seem to be devised by the international community. Albert argues here that imposed solutions focus more on how the international community can derive mechanisms that would keep peace on the continent, which sometimes promote and protect Western economic interests in Africa, resulting often in the perpetuation of conflict.³¹ Indigenous-generated solutions on the other hand seem more appropriate for African circumstances given that they

³⁰ Murithi, "African indigenous and endogenous approaches" 16-30.

³¹ Isaac O. Albert, "Understanding peace in Africa" in *Peace and Conflict in Africa* (London: ZED Books, 2008), 31-45.

are based on what the people can do for themselves. This approach in any event resembles that of the traditional African approaches. It was here, as Mensah argues that the combination of the traditional and contemporary mechanisms would result in a new perspective of resolving African conflicts.³²

Literature review: Tanzania's participation in conflict resolution

Yeager in 1964 was one of the first to argue that Tanzania's active participation in the liberation struggles laid the foundation of the country's traditional foreign policy principles, including those relating to participation in conflict resolution. The involvement in the liberation struggles, he argued, was in the form of mobilising the masses and coordinating nationalist organisations. The transformation of Tanganyika African Association (TAA) as a welfare agency to Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1954 resulted in a nationalist political party that brought not only political independence to Tanganyika but also support to other movements in the sub-regions. It should be noted, however, that with the exception of the Republic of South Africa, most of the territories in the Southern African region were still under colonial rule.³³

Ajala's focus was on the the late 1950's, when TANU leaders collaborated with their counterparts in the neighbouring countries of East and Central Africa to effect the liberation of the region. The mechanism for this movement was the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA), which was conceived in 1957 and became operational in 1958. The conference to launch the movement was convened in Mwanza by Nyerere in 1958.³⁴ The movement's aims were, as Okwudiba went on to argue in his study

³² Ben K. Fred-Mensah, "African conflict 'medicine' an emerging paradigm shift in African conflict resolution?" in *Conflict Management and African Politics: Ripeness, bargaining and mediation*, ed. Terrence Lyons and Gilbert M. Khadiagala (New York: Routledge, 2008), 135-144.

³³ Tanganyika united with Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964. See Yeager, *Tanzania: An African Experiment* 15.

³⁴ A. Ajala, *Pan-Africanism: Evolution, Progress and Prospects* (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1974), 41.

of self-reliance in Tanzanian foreign policy, to foster the spirit of Pan-Africanism in order to liberate the East and Central African territories, and coordinate nationalist programmes, tactics, projects and efforts for the speedy liberation of the colonies. PAFMECA was then, in 1962, transformed into the Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA). Ethiopia, Somalia, Lesotho, Botswana, South Africa and Namibia also joined. It was created as an instrument that would coordinate and assist in the unification of various nationalist movements and foster non-violent approaches in the independence struggles.³⁵

While much has been written about Tanzania's involvement in conflict resolution as a member of the Southern Africa region, little systematic or independent study has focused on Tanzania's role in the GLR.³⁶ In similar vein, despite a good number of publications on Tanzania's involvement to liberate the Southern African region, the post-liberation period has received little academic attention. Furthermore, studies conducted during the nationalist struggles investigate Tanzania's participation in conflict resolution within the contexts of the Front Line States (henceforth FLS)³⁷ and/or the liberation struggles alliance.

Omari's work focusing on the rise and decline of the FLS from the mid 1970's to 1991, analyses the nature of the intra-state conflicts in Southern Africa. Omari concludes in this work that states' behaviour is shaped towards

³⁵ Okwudiba Nnoli, *Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania: The Dynamics of the Diplomacy of a New State 1961 to 1971* (Lagos: NOK Publishers, 1978), 30.

³⁶ There are studies on Tanzanian foreign policy during the second and third phases of government. See A. Komba, "The Role of the Party (*Chama Cha Mapinduzi-CCM*) in Foreign Policy Making in Tanzania: A Case Study of Trade and Aid 1977-1989" (M.A. dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 1989); Bernadeta Killian, "Factors Informing Changes in Tanzania's Foreign Policy: 1980-1995" (M.A. dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 1994) and Lucy Shule, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy During the Third Phase Government" (M.A. dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 2004; Charles Silas Masanyika, "Foreign Policy Challenges for Tanzania in a Post Apartheid Period" (M.A. dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 2006).

³⁷ FLS included Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The alliance also coordinated and provided support to the liberation movements in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia on behalf of the OAU.

regional cooperation or isolation.³⁸ His main finding, however, is that the nature of the intra-state conflicts is determined by whether it is a colonialist or majority-ruled state. Intra-state conflict in South Africa is shaped by apartheid policies while in the majority-ruled FLS members it is a result of the failure by the regimes to form a post-independence government of national unity. These conflicts shape state's behaviour towards regional conflict and/or cooperation.³⁹ Omari also analyses Tanzania's role as the FLS founding member as well as the various levels of support the country provided to the other liberation movements. That support included logistics and training; provision of the transit route, land and mobilisation of the international opinion towards liberation struggles and racism. While he concludes that most of the post-1980's conflicts tend to result from governance issues, his study did not extend beyond 1991, the time when elements of the shifting trends could be identified in the intra-state conflicts.

Khadiagala, on the other hand, did cover the early Post-Cold War period in his assessment of the role of the FLS in the security of the Southern African region – from the mid 1970's to 1993 – concentrated on the contribution of small-state alliances such as the FLS to conflict resolution and structural transformation within their geographical proximity.⁴⁰ He analysed the role of regional economic cooperation in regional security after the decolonisation, and argued that the founding of SADCC was an attempt to create an alternative security system and a means of mobilising external assistance to counter FLS's dependence on South Africa.

³⁸ Abillah Harrid Omari, "The Rise and Decline of the Front Line States (FLS) Alliance in Southern Africa: 1975-1990" (Ph.D. dissertation, Dalhousie University, 1992).

³⁹ Omari gives examples of Zimbabwe and Angola, where the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) were supported by Zambia and Mozambique respectively; while in Angola the conflict between Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was intensified by the Cold War rivalries.

⁴⁰ Gilbert Khadiagala, *Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security, 1975-1993* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994).

Although not a central issue in his work, Khadiagala analysed Tanzania's influential role in the creation of and support for the FLS alliance as well as the facilitation of bilateral arrangements with Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. He identified two forms of security challenges facing the Southern African countries after the liberation struggles. The first was brought about by Western economic intervention imposed by the policies of international financial institutions. The second was domestic insecurity arising from pressure to democratise, which sometimes resulted in civil war. He concluded that instead of developing comprehensive conflict resolution frameworks, countries should rather develop manageable and focused means of conflict resolution, by cooperating in the areas such as management of small arms, refugees, diseases and natural calamities.

Khadiagala's work concentrated on small state economic and security co-operation, resulting in a failure to adequately analyse the influence of existing international agencies on Tanzania's policies. Furthermore, while his work is concluded after the Cold War, Khadiagala did not examine the domestic dynamics that shape Tanzania's participation in conflict resolution.

One of the issues that Khadiagala does raise is the lack of studies on Tanzania's role in the mediation of intra-state conflicts in the neighbouring countries. His focus herein in a number of his post-Cold War works is on Tanzania's mediation of Rwanda's conflict between 1992 and 1993; and Nyerere's mediation in Burundi from 1995 to 1999.⁴¹ In Rwanda's case he assesses the opportunities and challenges that the Tanzanian mediators faced during the negotiations that culminated in the August 1993 Arusha Peace Accord. Khadiagala concludes that Tanzania's credibility in Rwanda's conflict resolution was a result of the success in nation-building and regional cooperation in the eastern Africa region. He underlined the fact that Rwanda's

⁴¹ See "Tanzania Mediates Rwanda's Civil War, 1992-1993 in Gilbert M. Khadiagala, *Meddlers or Mediators? African Interveners in Civil Conflicts in Eastern Africa* Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007, 57-106.

conflict resolution demonstrates intra-state conflicts with an impact on the region. The negotiations stood greater chances of external pressures, which Tanzanian mediators succeeded to overcome.

In Burundi's conflict, Khadiagala examines the abilities and setbacks that African non-state mediators face.⁴² His main argument is that while the influence of an elder statespersons such as Nyerere had an impact on the conflicting parties, the success of mediation was determined by a combination of factors found at the national, regional and international levels. He adds that the success of the elder statespersons' mediation was largely determined by their ability to mobilise pressures and resources from numerous actors. In his analysis of Nyerere, Khadiagala concludes that his ability lay first in his mobilisation of regional and international support for an economic embargo on Burundi. Second he was able to choose a suitable mediation strategy. For Khadiagala, the roles of African elder statespersons are relatively "new, untested and contested" as demonstrated by mixed assessments and conflicting perspectives of Nyerere's mediation of Burundi's civil conflict. Nevertheless, for him Nyerere largely succeeded to regulate criticisms on his mediation from the national, regional and international actors.

Khadiagala did little, however, to determine a link between Tanzania's internal environment and its influence on the country's involvement in Rwanda and Burundi. Consequently, apart from the analysis of the institutions that were directly involved in the mediation, Khadiagala's works did not extend to an analysis of issues such as the role of the parliament and public opinion in Tanzania's mediation efforts. Moreover, concentrating on Rwanda's 1992-1993 conflict and Burundi's 1995-1999 Khadiagala's work leaves aside important epochs of Tanzania's involvement in conflict resolution such as the Rwanda genocide and the post-2000 period for Burundi. The present study, therefore, sets out to fill that gap.

⁴² For a discussion on this see "Nyerere Mediates Burundi's Civil War, 1995-1999" in Khadiagala, *Meddlers or Mediators?* 107-163.

In his analysis of Tanzania's support in conflict resolution in Southern Africa, Mpangala⁴³ divides his work in two parts: from the liberation struggles to 1975 and from 1975 to 1994. He emphasises that peaceful means were used in the independence struggles and majority rule and when they failed, armed liberation struggle was adopted. Mpangala demonstrates Tanzania's support for Southern Africa in terms of the commitment, international support and in providing a rear base. He traces the origins of the country's commitment since 1958 when Nyerere addressed the TANU conference about Tanganyika's and other African territories' independence. Furthermore, he refers to Nyerere's speech of 1963 to Heads of State and Governments meeting in Ethiopia as the cornerstone in the crafting of the OAU Charter.

At the international level, Mpangala shows draws attention to Tanzania's hosting the OAU Liberation Committee's headquarters in Dar es Salaam, which became the centre for the coordination of support for both independent nations and liberation movements.⁴⁴ Tanzania here had an important coordinating role since it acted as something of a rear base. Most of the liberation movements in the region had their offices in Dar es Salaam. Logistical and military training support was in two forms. In the first place, humanitarian and military support from abroad was transported to the liberation movements through Tanzania. Second, Tanzania provided military training facilities for the guerrilla fighters. This was extended to the provision of social services such as education and health to the military training camps and

⁴³ Mpangala describes the military assistance given to Mozambique and Angola as some form of the armed struggle, while for South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia as coercive diplomacy in terms of sanctions and isolation by the international community. He further highlights the events that transformed the armed liberation struggle in Southern Africa during in the second phase. They are the 1976 Soweto killings that intensified the struggles; and the achievement of independence in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau, which inspired the efforts. See Gaudens P. Mpangala, "Tanzania's support to the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa" in *Sites of Memory: Julius Nyerere and the Liberation Struggle of Southern Africa*, ed. Haroub Othman (Dar es Salaam: ZIFF, 2007), 8-23.

⁴⁴ Mpangala further contends that Tanzania was provided the Chairperson of the FLS with Nyerere serving in this position until his retirement in 1985.

settlements. Such support, Mpangala explains, ensure a prominent role for the capacity of Tanzanian leaders' to mobilise international public opinion against racism and colonialism. He reveals in particular the country's influence on other Commonwealth members in supporting measures such as the suspension of South Africa's membership. But he also looked beyond colonial Europe, pointing to Tanzanian attempts to enlist Scandinavian support for Africa's liberation movements.

Mpangala reviewed the contribution of Tanzania in conflict resolution from 1961 to 1994, a period which revealed the role of Tanzania and Nyerere's stance against colonialism and apartheid. While he points to Tanzania's role in shaping opinion and events within and outside Africa, he does not adequately analyse the external events at the international level that shaped Tanzania's support of the liberation struggles. There was an important context here which included Cold War politics as well as the choice and support for the Non-Alignment Movement.⁴⁵

Even though the second phase of the study focused on the period between 1975 and 1994, Mpangala did not offer an analysis of Tanzania's participation in conflict resolution after the Cold War, attainment of majority rule and the end of apartheid regime in South Africa. Furthermore, his study of the later period again failed to consider the state's domestic environment, which partly informed the participation in conflict resolution.

In his other study done after the Cold War, Mpangala analyses Tanzania's involvement in conflict resolution as a GLR member state.⁴⁶ He reviews the country's facilitation of the 1992 Arusha Agreement to end the civil wars in Rwanda and the mediation and facilitation of Burundi peace

⁴⁵ Even though Mpangala traces the origins of Tanzania's support to liberation struggle back to 1958 TANU meeting, these commitments could, arguably, date back to the mid 1950's when TANU leaders informally cooperated with their counterparts in the region resulting in the launching of PAFMECA in 1957.

⁴⁶ Gaudens Mpangala, *Ethnic Conflicts in the Region of the Great Lakes: Origins and Prospects for Change* (Dar es Salaam: Institute of Kiswahili Research, 2000).

negotiations through the facilitation of the UN appointed mediator, Nyerere. Using a historical approach, he concentrates on the nature of ethnic divisions as a cause of Rwanda's and Burundi's conflicts until the year 2000. His work, however, does not indicate any link with the study on Tanzania's support to the liberation struggles leaving a gap on the relationship between the two to be investigated.

Maundi adopts a different approach from Mpangala's, and assesses the conditions for a successful initiation of entry into the mediation of the conflicts within Burundi and Rwanda.⁴⁷ Focusing on mediator's access to mediation, Maundi evaluates the factors motivating the third party's involvement in the resolution of internal conflicts and the motives behind the parties' acceptance of particular mediators.⁴⁸ Maundi further analyses government's support in the resolution of Burundi conflicts by investigating the role of mediation in the Mwanza and Arusha peace negotiations.⁴⁹ In the case of Rwanda, he considers the role of Tanzania as one of the first countries to respond to the conflict, followed in turn by other GLR countries.

Maundi found that in introducing entry into mediation, the mediators were largely motivated by self-interest, regardless of whether they had nominated themselves, or had been nominated by third parties or by the parties to the conflict. He found, herein, that the degree of a conflict's impact on national interests was a function of the state's physical proximity to the conflict and to the nature of its bilateral relations with the disputants.

⁴⁷ The Sudanese conflict was the third case study. The analysis was for the period between May 1983 and May 1993. See Mohammed Omar Maundi, "Initiating Entry into the Mediation of Internal Conflict" (Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2000). The dissertation has also been published. See Mohammed O. Maundi, I. William Zartman, Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Kwaku Nuamah, *Getting In: Mediators' Entry into the Settlement of African Conflicts*, (Washington D.C: Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, 2006).

⁴⁸ In the Burundi conflict Maundi focuses on the period between October 1993 and June 1998; and October 1990 and June 1992 for Rwanda.

⁴⁹ Maundi examines the government's support to Mwalimu Nyerere in the mediation process on behalf of the GLR and the OAU.

Maundi did not consider, however, the role of the global environment and how it might influence Tanzania's efforts to resolve conflicts, nor did he consider the role of Tanzania's domestic environment and whether or not it had impacted on the participation in conflict resolution. His study, like that of Mpangala, does not go beyond the year 2000, when further developments in conflict resolution have taken place in sub-Saharan Africa. For example as will be discussed in Burundi's conflict, by 2005 some sections of the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, which gave room to the other movements to go on with the conflict, was yet to be implemented.

Apart from analysing the third party's acceptance into the resolution of Burundi's and Rwanda's conflicts, Maundi documents the various forms of diplomacy that Tanzania has been employing in conflict resolution since independence.⁵⁰ He categorises these into four tracks, one military and three diplomatic. "Track one" was the formal facilitation of the Arusha peace negotiations that resulted in the 1991 Peace Agreement for Rwanda. "Track-two diplomacy" took the form of Nyerere's personal involvement in the mediation of the Burundi dispute. The other diplomatic track is the support of negotiations that resulted in independence and the majority rule in Southern Africa. The military track comprised both support for armed liberation struggles and Tanzania's conflict with Uganda. He argued, for example, that Tanzania's support to the armed liberation struggle is a form of conflict resolution through military track.

Maundi, however, did not offer an in-depth analysis of Tanzania's role and impact on the resolution of conflicts during these various times; nor did he evaluate such forms of diplomacy employed after the Cold War.

Conceptual Framework

Conflict and conflict resolution are concepts whose meanings have been evolving. Most scholars argue that conflict has been a result of differing

⁵⁰ <http://tanzania.fes-international.de/doc/conceptualising-conflict-resolution> [Accessed on 16 April 2009].

interests, opinions, ideologies, outlooks, identity and values between and/among parties at the individual, community, state, regional or international levels.⁵¹ Others characterise conflict as an inevitable and natural part of social construction. For changes to take place in a group there should be some degree of the competing interests which results in misunderstanding. From this perspective, conflict performs a productive role by identifying characters of the members of the same or different groups hence conflict and cooperation are seen as inseparable processes.⁵² For the case of the Southern African region as Omari argues, conflict and cooperation have always coexisted and sometimes acted as catalysts for cooperation. The relations between Tanzania and Zambia accelerated the liberation struggles and the two could convince other neighbours to join in conflict resolution through the FLS.⁵³

Zartman sees conflict as a competition between groups at any system level. The aim is to benefit from power, resources, interests, values or needs, whereby at least one of the groups believes that the dimension of its relationship is based on certain mutually contradicting goals.⁵⁴ His conceptualisation of conflict can further explain the North-South contentions; the countries of the North benefit economically from the countries of the South and the latter do not equally benefit from such relations. This results in conflict in the sense that the North, which dominates the world system, absorbs the wealth.

There are varied explanations as to why parties participate in conflict resolution. The general assumption is that they do so in order to promote peace and security. It is also clear that humanitarian, national security and regional

⁵¹ K. Jehn, "Enhancing Effectiveness: An Investigation of Advantages and Disadvantages of Value-Based Intragroup Conflict," *The Journal of Conflict Management* 5 (3) (1994): 223.

⁵² Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 16.

⁵³ Omari, "The Rise and Decline" 46-47, 68.

⁵⁴ William I. Zartman, ed., *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 12.

concerns provide motivation for participation in conflict resolution. But there are also specific causes that may prompt the action. Olonisakin argues that states participate in conflict resolution due to the spill over effect in terms of refugees and security threats, such as the circulation of small arms and light weapons. He notes that most African countries took measures to resolve intra-state conflicts but did so because, if left unchecked, they could result in the internationalisation of these conflicts. In other words they would pose a security threat to the neighbouring countries.⁵⁵

Maundi alternatively, suggests that parties participate in conflict resolution because they are motivated by self-interest. The geographical location or relations, he argues, will determine the conflict's impact on state's national interest, with the country in conflict. He gives the example of the historical and bilateral relations between Rwanda on one hand, and Belgium, France and Zaire on the other, which offered an analysis of the early response to Rwanda's conflict.⁵⁶

There is not a generalised assumption as to what conflict resolution includes or excludes. The meaning can be drawn from the nature of the conflict, its context and the processes employed to resolve it. Indeed it may include all processes involved in the prevention, management and post-conflict reconstruction.⁵⁷ According to Reyhler the nature and the intensity of the conflict determine the choice of either long or short-term measures in the resolution of such conflicts.⁵⁸ He suggests that the long-term conflict prevention

⁵⁵ Funmi Olonisakin, "African 'homemade' peacekeeping initiatives" *Armed Forces and Society* 23 (3) (1997): 349-365.

⁵⁶ See Maundi, "Initiating Entry into the Mediation of Internal Conflict," 2000.

⁵⁷ For Kriesberg conflict resolution can refer to a specific stage of the resolution process such as mediation; or joint efforts to ensure the parties reach mutual agreement; or it can even apply to all stages of conflict and the measures taken to reconstruct them to equitable relations. See Kriesberg, "The Evolution of Conflict Resolution" 16-17.

⁵⁸ Luc Reyhler, *Democratic Peace Building and Conflict Prevention: The Devil is in the Transition* (CPRS: University of Leuven, 1998), 5-7.

strategies have not always been applied in sub-Saharan Africa. Experience has shown that short-term measures, as will be clear later, in Rwanda and Burundi were taken to manage the conflict after it has erupted. The long-term measures, as Weeks suggests, would then be adopted to address the root causes of the conflicts, after they have been managed.⁵⁹ There is, however, no agreed pattern as to the beginning or end of the long and short-term measures.

One of the processes involved in conflict prevention is early warning intervention. As an aspect of preventive diplomacy, it entails communication channels and institutions as well as activities undertaken to prevent disputes at three levels. The early stage involves prevention of a dispute from escalating into a major conflict and limiting expansion, if it has already occurred.⁶⁰ Although Boutros-Boutros Ghali's emphasis was on conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy could even be employed after the outbreak of the conflict. In Rwanda and Burundi, for example, preventive diplomacy was applied at the same time with the mediation.

Given that some of the post-Cold War conflicts tended to recur, conflict prevention has recently been broadened to include post-conflict reconstruction. As Breen observes, it implies that after the conclusion of a conflict, the economic and social sources of conflict are identified and addressed.⁶¹ This has been taken as a standard formula for many of the conflict resolution projects supported by the international community.

It is not always the case, however, since in the long run the resolution of a particular conflict would fail if the process were not extended to the post-conflict transformation stage. This is particularly so when the parties to the

⁵⁹ Diamond Weeks, *The Eight Essential Steps to Conflict Resolution* (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1994). These activities may involve social, political and judicial processes.

⁶⁰ Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (2nd ed.) (New York: UN Publication (s), 1995, 10.

⁶¹ Breen, "The Necessity of a Role for the ECOSOC," 272.

conflict perceive the process to be fair.⁶² From this proposition, the post-conflict reconstruction would be counterproductive if the resolution process is not properly handled.

Conflict management as an aspect of conflict resolution entails a variety of ways through which the parties handle grievances. As Reinmann argues, conflict management is complex and multidisciplinary in nature drawing from fields such as international law, psychology, philosophy, international relations, political science, economics and social anthropology.⁶³ It is also transdisciplinary since resolution of conflict is influenced by the focus on processes and skills, with more emphasis on sequencing of the conflict management mechanisms.⁶⁴ Most of the analyses, for example, have been on the right time for the third party to intervene to resolve the conflict, or on who are to be involved in the negotiations and ultimately the signing of the ceasefire agreement. Other analyses have been on whether peace enforcement should always be preceded by peacekeeping.

Procedures for conflict resolution and management can be categorised as either pacific or the diplomatic and forcible, or coercive. Forcible measures do not essentially imply the resolution of conflict through war. Kouassi further subdivides the procedures into settlement by coercion and peaceful means.⁶⁵ The former is related to settlement by using violence and force, while the latter is related to diplomacy and negotiation. It is assumed that initially diplomacy and negotiations are employed and when they fail, force is adopted. In this

⁶² Using Mozambique as one of the case studies, Llyod demonstrates how a series of negotiations resulted in the political settlement to end confrontation, establish constitutional basis for elections and the creation of the new government. All these were carried through voting processes. See Robert B. Llyod, "Conflict Resolution or Transformation? An Analysis of the South African and Mozambican Political Settlements" *International Negotiation* 6, (2001) 303-329.

⁶³ Reinmann, "Engendering the Field of Conflict Management" 100.

⁶⁴ Some of the mechanisms include peacemaking and peacekeeping; peace enforcement, negotiation, adjudication, mediation and intervention.

⁶⁵ Kouassi, "Negotiation, Mediation and other Non-Judicial Ways," 233.

context, diplomacy and conflict are not only treated as the opposite but also as two linked processes. Where diplomacy fails, conflict begins and where conflict begins, diplomacy can be employed to resolve the dispute.⁶⁶ This has been the traditional perception on the relationship between conflict resolution and diplomacy. One such way is the use of diplomacy by Tanzania during the liberation of the Southern African region. When negotiations did not prove successful, military means were adopted. Conversely, from early 1990's, Dar es Salaam has mostly been using diplomacy instead of the military approach to resolve most of the intra-state conflicts, particularly in Rwanda and Burundi.

An *ad hoc* arrangement made after the conflict has already erupted is referred to as peacekeeping.⁶⁷ During the Cold War UN peacekeeping operations were military in character but from the late 1980's the operations have become multifunctional, in the sense that they are authorised to assist the parties to the conflict in implementing the peace agreement. The process, however, has not been used in all UN operations.

Although peacekeeping has become a common approach in post-Cold War Africa, more attention has been paid to the evaluation, whether it has succeeded or failed in managing a particular conflict. There has been less concern on the politics behind the deployment of such forces.⁶⁸ Moreover, despite the fact that the process is almost as old as the UN itself, there has been no established standard of what the peacekeeping force entails. This

⁶⁶ Coercive diplomacy can also be employed in the form of use of threats or limited force to either compel or deter the conflicting parties. See Christer Jönsson and Karin Aggestam, "Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution" in *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, 35.

⁶⁷ Peacekeeping refers to the deployment of the civilians and the military in the field. The parties in conflict should consent to the establishment of the international organisation's presence being the UN, regional or sub-regional organisations. It is done as a monitoring mechanism for the implementation of the agreed peace while negotiations are underway for a comprehensive peace. See Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* 11.

⁶⁸ After the Cold War Tanzania has participated in UN Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone, Sudan, Eritrea; in African Union (AU) and ECOMOG in Liberia, as well as in the DRC through the SADC.

study, therefore, investigates the determinants of Tanzania's involvement in such arrangements in the context of international and regional settings.

Third party intervention to facilitate negotiation is another form of conflict resolution.⁶⁹ On the one hand, parties to the dispute are expected to accept the mediator, and the mediator on the other, is required to be impartial, neutral and without authoritative decision-making power. It is one of conflict resolution mechanisms that date back to pre-colonial Africa. Unlike the traditional mediators, modern mediators are trained or appointed and not necessarily known to the disputants; and are expected to be neutral and formal.

Although most of the publications on conflict resolution focus on the mediators' skills and the outcome of the process,⁷⁰ some have considered the timing of the mediation initiatives. In other words, the studies do not adequately analyse how that contributed to a particular outcome. Furthermore, in situations where the mediators are states or the mediation is supported by states, researchers of conflict resolution do not examine the domestic and international environment factors that may impact on the outcome of the process. This study will therefore consider such factors.

Related to mediation is the use of good offices whereby, the third party – an individual or individuals, a state or group of states or international

⁶⁹ Mediators may be eminent individuals, state or group of states, or international organisations that actively participate in the negotiation process, including the persuading the conflicting parties to enter into negotiations. In societies guided by customs and traditions, official and unofficial elders are involved in resolving the conflict including learned people, general leaders or anyone older than the disputants. See J. Paden, "National system Development and Conflict Resolution in Nigeria" in *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, ed. J. Montville (New York: Macmillan, Inc., 1991), 411.

⁷⁰ See Zartman's theory of 'ripeness' in William I. Zartman, "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond," in *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*, ed. Paul C. Stern and Daniel Duckman (Washington: National Research Council, 2000), 225-250. See also Alan J. Kuperman, "Ripeness revisited. The perils of muscular mediation" in *Conflict Management and African Politics: Ripeness, bargaining and mediation*, ed. Terrence Lyons and Gilbert M. Khadiagala (New York: Routledge, 2008), 9-21.

organisation – attempts to convince the conflicting parties to come to the negotiations table.⁷¹ Disputants are not obliged to offer or accept good offices or mediation from other states or parties but may instead sign a treaty specifying the good offices to be used. In this case, the third party only provides the occasion for negotiations without itself being involved in the dialogue. Tanzania offered good offices to facilitate negotiations between Presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Joseph Kabila of the DRC over the Lake Albert dispute.⁷² In the end, an agreement was reached to establish a joint boundary commission to define the DRC-Uganda border through the lake as well as jointly conduct oil exploration around the lake.

Intervention for conflict resolution is an organised and systematic external involvement through institutions such as the United Nations or regional organisations to resolve conflict in another state. Intervention can take place through preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace building, all of which aim at resolving the conflict. Since the end of the Cold War humanitarian reasons are often cited as a justification for intervention.

There has indeed been an assumption that there is a “duty to protect” groups within nations.⁷³ The growing concerns on intervention for human

⁷¹ Good offices are used as a precursor to direct negotiations or mediation, and the third party is normally neutral and trusted by the conflicting parties. Depending on the context, one might not be in a position to demarcate between mediation and good offices. See Martin Dixon, *Textbook on International Law*, 4th edition, New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 2000: 264. See also Malcom N. Shaw, *International Law* 4th edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998), 723.

⁷² Following the international pressure to negotiate, Arusha was agreed on by the parties to be the venue. The negotiations resulted in the signing of the Ngurdoto Agreement of 2007. See <http://o-proquest.umi.com.library.newcastle.edu.au/pqweb> [Accessed on 14 August 2009]. See also *Daily News*, “Uganda, DRC leaders to meet in Arusha” 27 August 2007; *The East African*, “Lake Albert attacks raise spectre of oil wars” 13-19 August 2007, 1, 6.

⁷³ The “responsibility to protect” concept entails three aspects of conflict resolution, which are the duty to prevent, manage or rebuild that is, addressing the root causes and assist in post-conflict reconstruction. For more discussion on this see Jeremy Sarkin, “Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect” in *Africa’s Human Rights Architecture*, ed. John Akokpari and Daniel Shea Zimble (Pretoria: Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd., 2008) 52.

security have challenged the traditional meaning of sovereignty in the sense that states have the right to intervene in situations of gross violation of human rights. Some contradictions, however, exist between the legal aspect of state sovereignty and intervention.⁷⁴ In the international system, states are considered to be equal, and are prohibited from intervening in other states' internal affairs. There are circumstances in which governments mistreat their citizens or become unable to manage domestic conflicts. As a moral obligation, the international community has to intervene. This overrules state's sovereignty principle. The contestation that remains is who is to determine and what circumstances would define "gross violations of human rights."

Africa's first experiences in conflict resolution were the Algerian-Moroccan border conflict in the early 1960's and the OAU peacekeeping operation in Chad in 1981. The former conflict started in the colonial era. The OAU managed to successfully intervene in the conflict following the failure of bilateral negotiations between individual statesmen. It should be noted that it was the extraordinary Council of Ministers meeting on the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute resolution that established the special committee to resolve the dispute. The Committee later evolved and became the OAU Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.⁷⁵ Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and the then Tanganyika were appointed members of the special committee.

⁷⁴ Bellamy and Holsti interrogate the way states interpret sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. For example, they enquire when and what conditions will determine a legitimate exception to the non-intervention rule. See Alex J. Bellamy, "Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in International Society," *Review of International Studies* 29 (3) (2003): 322. See also Adam Jones and Kal Holsti, "Interview with Kal Holsti," *Review of International Studies*, 28 (3) (2002): 624.

⁷⁵ Patricia Berko Wild, "The Organisation of African Unity and the Algerian-Moroccan Border Conflict: A Study of New Machinery for Peacekeeping and for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes among African States," *International Organisation* 20 (1) (1966): 25.

The OAU, in collaboration with the African countries, designed the Chad peacekeeping operation.⁷⁶ The force's mandate was originally based on the Nairobi Accord signed by the then OAU Chairperson, Secretary and the President of the Transitional Government of National Unity. The Accord mainly provided for the use of force in providing defence to the country during the integration of the government forces. To a large extent, the operation resembled the UN force. Like any other traditional peacekeeping force, the soldiers were mandated to use force for self-defence only. Olonisakin argues, however, that the Chad operation was unsuccessful because the conflict was influenced by Cold War politics as the major powers were also involved. Nonetheless, the OAU largely managed to address the humanitarian disaster. This is due to the fact that the conflict entailed fighting between the professional/organised and the guerrilla forces.

Tanzania's role in conflict resolution in this thesis will broadly mean the country's involvement in both the liberation struggles and post-independence conflicts in the GLR. It will specifically refer to the country's intervention at any stage of conflict, that is, conflict prevention, management or post-conflict reconstruction. In this context, it means that the specific conflict resolution method that the country has employed [in cooperation with the other actors] such as mediation, facilitation of the negotiations, hosting refugees, peacekeeping forces deployment; and the use of the forcible measures such as sanctions or peace enforcement. As mentioned earlier, conflict resolution does not mean absence of conflict; it can be achieved even when a particular conflict has been successfully managed.

Theoretical framework

There is no consensus on theories of conflict resolution. Studies have long remained within disciplinary boundaries such as international relations, strategic studies, sociology, history and peace studies. The result was the

⁷⁶ At the beginning six countries volunteered troops: Benin, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo and the then Zaire. Later on, it was Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire that managed to send troops. See Olonisakin, "African 'homemade' peacekeeping initiatives," 350.

development of exclusive theories that focused on specific issues hence, lack of multidisciplinary approaches. Moreover, unlike international relations, conflict resolution is not explained by paradigms that largely reflect the current international strategies for resolving conflicts. After the Cold War, conflict resolution transcended disciplinary boundaries although still largely influenced by the mainstream international relations theories.⁷⁷

The current theories of conflict resolution can generally be divided into those that focus on the causes of conflict, and others that identify procedures for resolving them. The basic assumption of the first category is that, in order to effectively resolve the conflict it is necessary to understand and address the causes of conflict. Such are historical factors, issues of ethnicity and identity, the availability of resources especially arms. Deng, for example, sees that the conflict of identity in Sudan is largely a result of the inability to compromise an inclusive identity.⁷⁸ The issue here is how identity could be manipulated either as an inclusion or exclusion factor in resources distribution. The second category focuses on the processes involved in conflict prevention, management and post-conflict peacebuilding. Both categories, however, consider actors in conflicts such as individuals, rebels, foreign government intervention and civil society. Kriesberg suggests that some theories explain specific conflict arenas or

⁷⁷ International relations theories were concerned with the nature, sources and impact of the relations between states, which, as a result influence the study of conflict resolution in the sense that the focus was on the causes of war, and peace promotion. The realist Porto adds that the post-Cold War's analysis of conflict was still influenced by realism since the focus was on large-scale wars and their impact on the international system. The concern was on international security, balance of power as well as the incidence, frequency and duration of the inter-state conflicts. Lesser attention was paid to intra-state conflicts that required complex humanitarian interventions such as the 1994 Rwanda genocide. As a result there was a shift from the systemic level to the local actors and contexts. See Jones and Holsti, "Interview with Kal Holsti," 624. See also Porto, "The mainstreaming of conflict analysis in Africa" 46-67.

⁷⁸ The South represents African identity and the North reflects the Arab-Islamic identity with some African and Arab-Islamic elements. See Francis Deng, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995) 24-25, 394; Mpangala, *Ethnic Conflicts* 1-10.

particular level of conflict while others provide an analysis of the broad range of conflicts.⁷⁹

Realism and behaviouralism focus on the causes of conflict. The basic assumption is that human behaviour, institutions and states are motivated by self-interest.⁸⁰ Incompatible interests among actors inevitably result in conflicts and may use coercive means to pursue their interests. For realists, violent conflicts result from rational choices of rational actors in situations where there are limited resources and competitive interests. For behaviouralists the nature of human beings largely informs their psychological tendency to resort to conflict.

Behaviouralists and realists believe that violent conflicts are inevitable and impossible to resolve due to the competition for resources and existing power structures in societies. For them conflict resolution is unrealistic as conflicts can only be contained, mitigated or managed. As Zartman argues, conflicts can occasionally be prevented and managed, but cannot be totally eradicated.⁸¹

Critical Theorists, like realists and behaviouralists, agree that conflicts are part of social relations but offer an alternative view. They argue that conflict resolution is necessary and desirable for change, emancipation and transformation. They differentiate, therefore, between conflict resolution and conflict transformation.⁸² For Critical Theorists, conflict resolution is appropriate

⁷⁹ Kriesberg, "The Evolution of Conflict Resolution" 18-19.

⁸⁰ Omeje, "Understanding Conflict Resolution in Africa" 68-91.

⁸¹ See I. William Zartman, "Conflict reduction: prevention, management and resolution" in *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, ed. F.M. Deng and I.W. Zartman (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 299.

⁸² Conflict resolution refers to addressing the causes and seeking to build new and lasting relationships between the parties, while conflict transformation denotes the process of engaging the social, political and economic structures that caused the conflict. See A.B. Fetherson, "From Conflict Resolution to Transformative Peace building: Reflections from Croatia," Centre for Conflict Resolution WP 4, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, April 2000.

for resolving open conflicts, while conflict transformation addresses the underlying root causes of conflicts that are not necessarily clear. By emphasizing conflict transformation as a necessary process, the Critical Theorists however, ignore the fact that in other situations there is an overlap between the two processes.

Suggesting a multidimensional approach, Constructivists offer a social explanation of conflict resolution by pointing out the factors and processes that realists did not consider.⁸³ Referred to as post-Cold War theory of conflict resolution, Constructivism's basic assumption is that in order to effectively resolve conflicts it is crucial to identify their nature and causes. Constructivists' main argument is that, ethnic and/or identity factors cause most of the conflicts; and the social, economic, political, cultural and normative structures are insufficient on their own to cause conflict. There needs to be agents or conflict entrepreneurs to transform the structures into the manifestation of violence. Therefore, for Constructivists, interests and identities are shaped by particular histories and cultures; domestic factors as well as by the interaction between the actors.

Western perspectives on conflict resolution largely influence most of the theories as they pay more attention to either the causes or the processes involved. On the one hand, such perspectives tend to correlate the assumptions on the causes and their resolution approach, which do not sufficiently explain the African context. On the other hand, these theories provide an analysis of specific processes such as negotiation, mediation and other forms of third party intervention including peacekeeping and conflict management. The theories

⁸³ The factors include the history and nature of structures and the role of conflict agents in manipulating identities, the socially constructed nature of identities, interests and structures, the role of political language, ideas, norms, symbols, history and culture in the initiation and reproduction of conflict. See Richard Jackson, "Constructivism and Conflict Resolution" in the *SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, 172-189. See also Christian Reus-Smit, "The Constructivist Challenge after September 11" in *International Society and its Critics*, ed. Alex J. Bellamy, Oxford University Press, 2003-2007, www.oxfordscholarship.com [Accessed on 19 September 2009].

further offer explanations on the right time to intervene in conflict and which skills a mediator or negotiator should possess.

The current theories overlook the fact that in certain circumstances, the impact of conflict may compel neighbouring states and actors to immediately take initiatives. There is, therefore, a need to consider adopting a multi-level approach of conflict resolution that would address this gap. Although Porto's argument is on the need to adopt a multi-level analysis only on the causes of conflicts, the same should be applied in the resolution process. This would suit sub-Saharan Africa's context since most of the conflicts are explained in the level that is between the state and systemic levels.⁸⁴ It is important to develop an approach to conflict resolution beyond the process, which will also consider how structures operate between the various levels.

To this end, this study employs the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT).⁸⁵ The theory was originally developed by Barry Buzan and later advanced by Ole Wæver. The theory has been chosen because it provides a broader explanation of the post-Cold War security environment in particular regions.⁸⁶ Drawing to some extent on the levels of analysis framework, the RSCT emphasises the level that lies between the world and the state – a [security] region that is formed by a combination of two or more states. Tanzania and the other sub-Saharan African countries are found at this middle level. Tanzania's security is determined largely by that of the other countries in

⁸⁴ The same perception is supported by Zartman who categorises Africa as a "subordinate system" that possesses a set of regional dynamics which shaped relations above the state level but below the global international system. See I. William Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations," *International Organisation* Volume 21, Number 3, (1967): 545-564.

⁸⁵ A security complex is a set of interconnected and interrelated units whose processes of securitisation and/desecuritisation cannot be studied or resolved in isolation. See Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (New York: Cambridge University press, 2003), 491.

⁸⁶ During the Cold War, security was defined in terms of state's security with little attention paid to the people. Currently it has been broadened to include other sectors such as identity, economy and the environment, which to a larger extent reflect the security of an individual.

the GLR, EAC or Southern Africa and *vice versa*. In other words, there is a high degree of security interdependence among countries in the sub-regions.

While the levels of analysis theory focus on three levels, RSCT focuses on four.⁸⁷ The levels include the country's internal environment, for example Tanzania's domestic level, including issues such as the role of parliament and public opinion. The other level comprises state-to-state relations, which in totality produce a region and regional structures. In Tanzania's context this level involves Tanzania's relations with the neighbouring countries within the frameworks such as the EAC or the GLR. The region's interaction with neighbouring regions forms the other level of relations such as between the EAC and the SADC, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) or the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) sub-regions. The fourth level comprises the relationship between the global powers and regional security structures. Here, the relationships between individual countries such as the U.S or China, and how they relate to the GLR, EAC or individual countries such as Tanzania and Mozambique in conflict resolution are examined.

The theory's basic assumption is that security interdependence is patterned into regionally based groupings or "security complexes", due to the fact that most security threats travel more easily over short than long distances. Buzan's theory holds that conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa have a greater impact on neighbouring countries than in the other sub-regions. Miall further argues that with increased interdependence among the neighbouring countries, contemporary conflicts firstly affect the neighbours in the sub-region and latter other regions.⁸⁸ This assumption will further guide the analysis of the post-Cold War relations between the countries of the north and those of the South,

⁸⁷ The levels of analysis theory focus on individual, state and the international system. See Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: Introduction to Theory and History*, 2nd ed., (New York: Longman, 1997), 30.

⁸⁸ Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers Inc, 2001), 33-37.

particularly the international community's response to the sub-Saharan African conflicts.

The theory also provides for a flexible meaning of a region, depending on the context. According to the theory, the region may change over time and may or may not coincide with the geographical description. This conceptualisation of the region will better guide the understanding of Tanzanian foreign policy and its role in conflict resolution. Defined geographically, the country forms part of the GLR, eastern and Southern Africa regions. In terms of support for the liberation struggles such as in Mozambique, Tanzania identified herself more with the Southern African region territories than with the EAC countries. Nevertheless, Tanzania's perception towards the liberation and unification of Africa as well as the resolution of post-Cold War intra-state conflicts depicts Tanzania as an African country beyond geographical or any other description. The RSCT framework links the conventional international relations theories by assuming the realist view that states are the dominant actors, although the theory is not state-centric.⁸⁹ The theory further offers an interpretation of the international system by analysing the global dynamics, particularly the major powers' operations in relation to the developing countries. Furthermore, the RSCT facilitates the use of a historical perspective in analysing Tanzania's current involvement in conflict resolution, while at the same time relate to both the pre-Cold War and Cold War aspects at the international, regional, sub-regional and state levels.

⁸⁹ There has been an intra-paradigm debate, particularly after the Cold War, between the neo-realists and neo-liberals (neo-neo debate) on the role of state as an actor in international relations. Even though both agree on the important role of state, they differ in the composition of the international system and the degree of interactions between the actors. This will be discussed later. See Steven L. Lamy, "Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism" in *The Globalisation of World Politics*, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, 124-141. See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr, *Understanding International Conflicts*, 42-43. See also Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics, Trend and Transformation*, 7th edition (New York: Worth Publishers, Inc. 1999), 32-35.

Methodology

This study bridges the gap between the two phases by examining the trends of and shifts in Tanzanian foreign policy and the involvement in conflict resolution. The questions of this study are drawn as an attempt to explain the forces behind Tanzanian foreign policy and conflict resolution efforts from late 1950's to the present.

The general research question that the study addresses is examination of the impact of Tanzania's involvement in conflict resolution in the sub-Saharan Africa Region. This general question is investigated in two ways. First, the focus is on how the national/domestic environment informs Tanzania's foreign policy and its involvement in conflict resolution. This question is used to assess Tanzania's role in both the Southern African region and the GLR conflict resolution. Second, we direct our attention on the international drivers to Tanzania's foreign policy and the region at large, especially their commitment to conflict resolution.

From the general question, the following specific research questions are drawn: What were the drivers of Tanzanian foreign policy around conflict resolution in sub-Saharan Africa? How have the regional cooperation frameworks complemented Tanzania's participation in conflict resolution? What have been the successes and/or failures of the country's foreign policy and its involvement in conflict resolution in sub-Saharan Africa? Are there any gains for Tanzania to be involved in conflict resolution in the region?

This thesis evaluates Tanzanian foreign policy and its historical participation in conflict resolution. The selection of Mozambique, Rwanda and Burundi is based on proximal geographical location given that these countries are among the eight that border Tanzania. The others are the DRC, Kenya, Malawi, Uganda and Zambia. With the exception of Malawi and Zambia, Tanzania has been involved in conflict resolution in the DRC, Kenya and

Uganda.⁹⁰ In Uganda, Tanzania's involvement has been extensively covered in the first phase studies.

Since Rwanda and Burundi form part of the GLR and East Africa, and that Mozambique is a Southern African region country,⁹¹ the conflicts in these countries have had an immediate impact on Tanzania. Rwanda and Burundi have been selected because Tanzania has been involved in both, in terms of mediation and facilitation of peace talks from the early 1990's onwards. Whereas Rwanda's conflict resolution ended in the 1990's, Burundi's peace talks extended to the late 2000's. In addition, the nature and the causes of the conflicts in the two countries were and are more or less similar and at various points linked. As will be discussed in chapters four and five both countries have similar ethnic composition of Hutu approximately between 85 and 90 percent, Tutsi 10 to 14 percent and Twa 1 percent. Moreover, the population density is the highest and the second highest in Africa respectively. Lastly the countries' economies are predominantly agrarian.⁹²

Mozambique is one of the exceptional cases where Tanzania's role in the resolution of conflicts extended beyond the liberation struggles to the post-independence period. Mozambique is the country which was supported by Tanzania in its conflict resolution by sending troops until the late 1980's when

⁹⁰ In the DRC Tanzania participated in election observer mission through the SADC and the UN. The UN monitors the implementation of Lusaka Peace Accord, as well as offering a military training team between 1998 and 2003. In 2013 Tanzania was again involved in DRC's conflict resolution through the deployment of peace enforcement mission. This will be discussed later. In Kenya, Tanzania played a key role in the negotiations that culminated to an agreement that ended the post-election stalemate between the government and the opposition in 2008. In the case of Uganda, firstly, Tanzania opted for non-recognition of the Idi Amin's regime, which overthrew Milton Obote's government in 1971. Secondly, the country went to war with Uganda in 1978/79 following Amin's invasion of the Kagera salient. Afterwards, Tanzania facilitated the re-installation of the new government.

⁹¹ Due to its geographical location, Tanzania forms part of both the Great Lakes and Southern African regions.

⁹² Peter Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence," *Comparative Politics* 31 (3) (April 1999): 253.

profound changes were taking place within Tanzania and at the international level.

The methodology used is qualitative, largely informed by documentary analysis. Data was collected from both primary and secondary sources. The data pertinent to Tanzania, Mozambique, Rwanda and Burundi was collected from the libraries of the following institutions: the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation (MNF), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), University of Dar es Salaam, Centre for Foreign Relations, and University of Newcastle. Research reports and official documents were obtained from the East African Community Headquarters. Also official records from the following institutions were analysed: parliamentary Hansards from the Parliament of Tanzania, and official communications and documents from Tanzania's Department of National Archives and Records Management.

The data was analysed by establishing the correlation between the themes and patterns of the collected information. The collected data was afterwards interpreted and assessed in such a way that it responds to the study's research questions. Data collection and analysis was done simultaneously. It implies that the report writing was done concurrently when the collected data was being analysed.

Structure

This study is divided into two parts. Part one, which comprises chapters one and two, gives a historical overview of the first phase of Tanzania's foreign policy and the participation in conflict resolution from the early 1960's to the late 1980's. Part two, which consists of chapters three to five, largely cover the period between 1990 and the present wherein the case studies are discussed and research questions tested.

Chapter one revisits the nation's independence and the strategies employed to support other territories' liberation struggles. It locates the building of the country's foreign policy within the international system including the choice of the non-aligned position, Commonwealth membership and other

organisations. It further reviews the international organisation frameworks for conflict resolution such as the traditional UN monitoring, front line states alliance and the OAU mechanisms. Tanzania's approaches and strategies to conflict resolution are also covered in this chapter. Each strategy is reviewed in the countries and territories where it was applied and the outcomes are evaluated. Likewise, the analysis of the existing domestic, regional and international environments that informed Tanzania's choice of a particular approach is done.

Chapter two investigates the gradual shift in conflict resolution agenda particularly the end of both the Cold War and the liberation struggles. Issues such as the changing nature of conflicts in the region, the international community's focus on conflict resolution are explored. They include perception on human security, adoption of peacekeeping and peace enforcement mechanisms. At the same time the role and the philosophy underlying Tanzania's participation on conflict resolution during this time are studied in order to determine the direction of such changes.

Part two of the thesis which comprises of chapters three to five, cover the case studies of Mozambique, Rwanda and Burundi. The countries have been selected mainly to facilitate the tracking of the changes as have been taking place in order to reach a conclusion as to whether there have been continuities or shifts in terms of the Tanzania's involvement in conflict resolution. Chapter three, which is on Mozambique, reviews the nature of the problems and issues in both the pre- and post-independence conflicts. It then analyses conflict resolution strategies that Tanzania has adopted and then measures the degree of their success. It further explores opportunities and challenges that the country was facing and the role that diplomacy plays.

The Rwandan conflict is discussed in chapter four. The nature of the conflict and the role of the UN, SADC and OAU in its resolution are considered in detail. The response and experiences of the international community in conflict resolution from other countries is further linked in the discussion. The

chapter discusses also the challenges and opportunities that Tanzania was facing in terms of the regional diplomacy, economic capability and whether or not she could capitalise on the opportunities.

Chapter five analyses the nature of the crisis in Burundi, and attempts to differentiate Tanzania's role in conflict resolution from that of Rwanda. The country's location, the capacity for humanitarian intervention and the ability to influence conflict resolution process are also investigated. In the same way, it examines the extent of success on the part of Tanzania.

Post-Cold War debates, including the West's view of Africa, as well as the challenges and opportunities brought about by globalisation are discussed in chapter six. Security threats such as terrorism, resource conflicts and the role of the West in sub-Saharan Africa are considered in detail along with the role of China, U.S and other actors in sub-Saharan Africa. The focus is also on the relationship and complementarity between the global, regional and sub-regional players. These will be evaluated in terms of the foreign policy, diplomacy, security and response to the emerging issues. Lastly, we will assess Tanzania's role within these contexts.

The concluding chapter provides both the study's findings and the theoretical significance of the work. It further discusses the application of the RSCT in each of the case studies and to Tanzania's participation to conflict resolution in general. The chapter identifies aspects that spoke a different dimension of the RSCT and lastly, highlights trends that will dominate and/or change in Tanzanian foreign policy.

Chapter 1

The building of Tanzania and conflict resolution strategies

Introduction

This chapter reviews Tanzania's nation building processes and the participation in conflict resolution both internally and externally. The main point is that most of the post-independence nation building strategies largely focused on the prevention of intra-state conflict. Domestic initiatives further shaped Tanzania's conflict resolution initiatives. The promotion of national unity, for example, influenced Tanzania's support for liberation struggles in the Southern African region and other parts of the world.

The chapter is divided into two major parts. Part one discusses Tanzania's independence and its experience with nation-building project. This discussion focuses on particular approaches adopted by Dar es Salaam to promote development and hence prevent domestic conflict. The second part analyses Tanzania's strategies to resolve conflicts in other territories and the influence of the external environment on the country's initiatives. The background to independence and post-independence support for conflict resolution is examined, along with Tanzania's relations with other actors. The challenges faced by the government are also highlighted, including the decision to form the Union with Zanzibar as well as the diplomatic crisis that it faced following its stand on various international issues. These are discussed against the background of the Cold War, which inevitably influenced Tanzania's actions and reactions.

One cannot discuss Tanzania's participation in conflict resolution without referring to Julius Nyerere.¹ He masterminded and influenced the nation's

¹ Nyerere was born in Butiama-Mara region in 1922 and passed away in 1999. He attended primary education in Musoma and joined a mission secondary school-Tabora in 1937. Educated at Makerere College-Uganda (1943 to 1945) and was awarded diploma in education. After graduation, he went to teach in St. Mary's Secondary School (Tabora). He received a Master's degree in History and Economics in 1952 from Edinburgh University (Scotland). Nyerere was

credibility and legitimacy in conflict resolution from the liberation struggles to the mediation of the post-Cold War intra-state conflicts. Nyerere's philosophy and "charisma,"² influenced Tanzania's foreign policy decisions and the approach to conflict resolution. During independence struggles, he devised his country's and later the Southern African regional strategies to end colonialism. Even after resignation from presidency, Nyerere carried out the promotion of global economic order – particularly for the countries of the South. Moreover, during the 1990's civil wars in the GLR, he facilitated the Burundi peace talks until his death in 1999.³

Nyerere was personally influential in shaping the country's conflict resolution strategies and foreign policy decisions. Given that he was influential in articulating Tanzania's position in most of the foreign affairs issues Tanzania became an influential actor in African diplomacy. As Salim observes, most world leaders⁴ could not consult Africa's independence movements and development, especially in Southern Africa, without seeking advice from Nyerere. In the April 1976 meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State – Henry Kissinger – in Dar es Salaam, Nyerere requested U.S.'s support in the struggle against colonialism

elected the president of TAA in 1954 and initiated the Organisation's transformation to TANU to be in the same year. The Governor to Tanganyika Legislative Council immediately appointed him. He was still teaching at St. Francis College-Pugu Secondary School (near Dar es Salaam), a profession which he obtained the name *Mwalimu*-meaning teacher. He resigned in 1955 in order to concentrate in politics. He was the country's first President between 1962 and 1985 afterwards, returned to Butiama where he was engaged in farming and conflict resolution. See <http://bongocelebrity.com/2007/10/14/tunapomkumbuka-mwalimu-nyerere> [Accessed on 01 February 2010]. See also Yeager, *Tanzania: An African Experiment* 19, 93; Madaraka Nyerere, "A short biography of Julius Nyerere" in *Africa's Liberation: The Legacy of Nyerere*, ed. Chambi Chachage & Annar Kassam eds. (Kampala: Pambazuka Press, 2010), xvi-xvii.

² Charisma is considered to be an important element for most of the African anti-colonial struggles and the subsequent post-independence nation building. For a discussion on this see Thomas E. Dow, Jr., "The Role of Charisma in Modern African Development," *Social Forces* 46 (3) (1968): 328.

³ See www.nathanielturner.com/Julius Kambarage Nyerere.mht [Accessed on 04 February 2010].

⁴ The world leaders included among others, Henry Kissinger, David Owen and Andrew Young. See Salim, "Remembering Mwalimu" 27-28.

and racism. Kissinger responded, "We believe that without majority rule there can't be peace and independent African development."⁵ It should be noted, however, that different strategies had been employed even before the attainment of Tanganyika's independence. The choice of their use was limited by the fact that the territory was still a British protectorate.

Several factors seemed to have influenced Nyerere's philosophy on conflict resolution. At his early age, being a son of a Zanaki chief, he was brought up in a large family and with a high level of interaction with other members of the community. In the process, he learned the values of living in peace, working together in the daily activities particularly in cultivating and harvesting. Furthermore, it could also be said that, he developed – from his father – leadership skills and the responsibility of resolving conflicts.⁶ This was later demonstrated when he joined St. Mary's Secondary School – Tabora where he mobilised his fellow students to protest against unfairness and inequalities by the school management.

Nyerere's religious values further influenced his strong stance against discrimination which, if not properly handled can cause conflict. Dowden argues that Christian socialist missionaries influenced Nyerere's philosophy. He argues that this is evident in Nyerere's ideas on the sharing of resources as demonstrated by his leadership in Tanzania's adoption of *Ujamaa* policies. Maoulidi too argues that Nyerere's faith further moulded him and his political behaviour. His perception of discrimination – in terms of gender, race or ethnic – resembles to "eating the flesh of another human being."⁷

⁵ *The East African*, "Kissinger, Nyerere held private meeting on US policy on South Africa." 8-14 August 2011, 2.

⁶ In African communities respected people such as chiefs were entrusted with the responsibility of resolving conflicts among the members of the community. For a discussion on Nyerere's family background see <http://www.jamiiforums.com/jukwaa-la-siasa/who-influenced-nyerere-his-ujamaa-philosophy-and-azimio-principles-6.html> [Accessed on 21 March 2010].

⁷ Salma Maoulidi, "Racial and religious tolerance in Nyerere's political thought and practice" in *Africa's Liberation: The Legacy of Nyerere*, ed. Chambi Chachage & Annar Cassam eds.,

Another influence on Nyerere's thinking and the early experiences in conflict resolution came from formal education. The writings of the enlightenment scholars – Jean Jacques Rousseau, John Locke and Shakespeare enriched Nyerere's thoughts. The works influenced Nyerere's perceptions on imperialism [and capitalism] and how their manifestations can cause conflict in African societies.⁸ In one of his interviews Nyerere pointed to John Stuart Mill's influence on him to the extent of writing an essay on freedom of women – while at Makerere University in 1944. Although Nyerere's ideas were leaning towards freedom and equality at the family and national levels, they were also focusing on conflict prevention and resolution in a larger society through the improvement of the lives and welfare of the Africans.⁹ This was demonstrated when he initiated the formation of the Tanganyika Welfare Association while in Makerere (1943) with the aim of improving the lives of Africans in terms of promoting equality and fairness.

The practices and customs of traditional Africa largely influenced Nyerere's philosophy. He believed in and promoted the African versions of equality, democracy and particularly – admitting to being "an African first then a socialist." The latter, especially the Fabian socialism version, was developed according to Bunting while studying at the University of Edinburgh.¹⁰ Nyerere himself argued that his ideas on liberation struggles were initially his own but were later influenced by his formal education. He studied the early anti-colonial movements against the Germans and British, which were largely unsuccessful,

(Kampala: Pambazuka Press, 2010): 140-141. See also Richard Dowden, *Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles* (London: Portobello Books Ltd., 2008), 270.

⁸ This was later justified between 1968 and 1969 when Nyerere translated Shakespeare's works *Julius Caesar*, *Macbeth* and *Merchant of Venice* in Kiswahili. For a discussion on this see Vicensia Shule, "Mwalimu Nyerere: the Artist" in Chachage and Cassam, *Africa's Liberation*, 165-166.

⁹ Bunting, "The Heart of Africa: Interview with Julius Nyerere" 66.

¹⁰ Bunting, "The Heart of Africa: Interview with Julius Nyerere" 67. See also Hakim Adi and Marika Sherwood, "Julius Kambarage Nyerere" in *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora Since 1787* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 147.

along with those successful strategies to independence. None was more inspiring than a neighbour in the Indian Ocean Rim. Nyerere acknowledged herein that during India's liberation struggles, Gandhi advocated a moral approach, "so did I."¹¹ While Gandhi's success in attaining India's independence in 1947 was an important factor in his understanding of decolonisation, Nyerere's attitude was influenced by a movement much closer to home. His commitments were reinforced by Nkrumah's release from prison in 1949 followed by Ghana's independence in 1957.

Promotion of equality went hand in hand with the belief that the attainment of independence would be a means to achieve development. Nationalist struggles were waged due to the reason that colonialism, racism and ethnicity favoured the minority. In this context, development was associated with the promotion of human equality.¹² In order to attain development it was necessary for the African countries to remove all forms of domination between and among different groups. For this reason the post-independence Tanganyikan government introduced policies such as the national service and the quota system in education, the abolition of chieftainship (1963), Africanisation of the public service (1962) and nationalisation of the major means of production (1967).

The experience of the nationalist struggles and the nation building at the domestic level informed Tanganyika's support for conflict resolution and the promotion of pan-African unity. The latter was identified with the task of building pan-African nation through the removal of the boundaries. This was built on the fact that African colonial territories were created by the artificial boundaries that rarely coincided with the traditional settings. As Tordoff argues, for instance, the Bakongo were divided into French Congo, Belgian Congo and

¹¹ Bunting, "The Heart of Africa: Interview with Julius Nyerere" 66.

¹² Julius K. Nyerere, Independence Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, 14 December 1961. Also found in *Freedom and Unity* 147-155.

Angola.¹³ Here the problem was that most of the independent African states went into conflict with their neighbours re-claiming part of the territory which they believed was re-drawn by the colonialists to suit their own interests.

Independence and nation-building

Neither the nationalist struggles of the early Twentieth Century nor the attainment of political independence in the early 1960's were a foundation of the Tanzanian nation. Tanzanian nationhood can be traced to a combination of the cultural, economic, social and political interactions and settlement of diverse groups that took place thousands of years.¹⁴ Before the Nineteenth Century, the area was more influenced by the Arabs and the slave trade. Afterwards, when European interests in Africa overtook the Arabs, the territory served as an entry into East, and sometimes, West Africa. Nevertheless, during the colonial period and early years of independence, Tanzania was not of strategic importance to the outside powers.¹⁵ As Hoskyns argues, it was Kenya that dominated the East Africa's coast, as it had done in colonial times, when it developed as a hub with the region's most developed communications, infrastructure, military bases and other facilities.¹⁶

Nation-building efforts focused on the promotion of national unity forged during the liberation struggles and overcome ethnic or racial divisions set by colonialism. In so doing, the ruling party, TANU, declared the intention of building a socialist nation. The initiatives were taken to be part of the government's responsibility of providing security to every individual, given that

¹³ William Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 31, 50.

¹⁴ The groups include the Cushites, Bantu-speakers, Ngoni and the Nilotes. See J.E.G Sutton "The Peopling of Tanzania" in *A History of Tanzania* ed. Isaria N. Kimambo and Arnold J. Temu (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), 1. See also R.W. Johnson, "Nyerere: A Flawed Hero," *The National Interest*, 69.

¹⁵ Catherine Hoskyns, "Africa's Foreign Relations: The Case of Tanzania," *International Affairs*, 44 (3) (July 1968): 450.

¹⁶ Hoskyns, "Africa's Foreign Relations," 454. See also Ian C. Parker, "Ideological and Economic Development in Tanzania," *African Studies Review* 15 (1) (April 1972): 56.

concerted efforts were made to increase literacy rates and improve health services provision. For instance, by 1984 the literacy rate was 91 percent and almost all children were in school. At the same time there were thousands of engineers, doctors and teachers. This situation is contrary to 1961 when 85 percent of the adult population was illiterate, and there were two trained engineers and 12 doctors.¹⁷

Tanzania was more important in resolving liberation conflicts in Southern Africa and Dar es Salaam itself served as an outlet for the hinterland. Tanganyika's nationalist struggles and subsequent nation building were different from its immediate neighbours. According to Mazrui and Mboya the presence of white-settlement triggered conflicts. For instance, the 120,000 Tanganyikans who gave up their lives during the *Maji Maji* conflict against the Germans from (1905-1907) contributed to planned future nationalist struggles.¹⁸ Furthermore, the absence of white-settlers differentiated Tanganyika from Kenya and other countries in the region. According Mboya, "in any colony where there has been considerable white settlement, violence has become inevitable."¹⁹ Tanganyika's independence and post-independence conflict was prevented by the elimination of racial and ethnic divisions²⁰ between different groups. This was evident throughout the nationalist struggles and even during the promotion of self-government on majority rule.

¹⁷ Bunting, "The Heart of Africa: Interview with Julius Nyerere," 68.

¹⁸ Ali A. Mazrui, "Anti-Militarism and Political Militancy in Tanzania," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 12 (3) (1968): 270. See also Mboya, *Freedom and After* (New York: Little Brown, 1963).

¹⁹ G. C. K. Gwassa, "The German Intervention and African Resistance in Tanzania," in *A History of Tanzania*, 86. Tom Mboya, *Freedom and After* 84-85. See also Hoskyns, "Africa's Foreign Relations" 450.

²⁰ At independence there were more than 120 ethnic groups, and the population was approximately 10,000,000 people. On the Mainland, more than 99 percent were Africans; 100,000 Asians; 25,000 Arabs and 15,000 Europeans. In Zanzibar there were 300,000 Africans; 50,000 Arabs and 20,000 Asians. See Leon E. Clark, ed., introduction to *Nation-Building: Tanzania and the World* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 13-14.

Tanganyika's independence struggles were through peaceful means. This could partly be explained by the fact that the country was a UN Trust Territory under British administration. At this juncture restrictions were placed on British policy in relation to the territory, which simplified the operations of the liberation movements. The national liberation leaders of a trust territory had the right to table the petition to the UN's Trusteeship Council, and to appeal to the General Assembly – the opportunity which Nyerere and Chief Marelle II maximised.²¹ In the end, the petitions brought independence to Tanganyika. Given this context, Nyerere was confident in the effectiveness of the negotiations and advocated the use of peaceful methods.

Tanganyika attained independence on 9 December 1961 and Nyerere became the first Prime Minister.²² He soon resigned from his position so that he could concentrate on re-organising the party – TANU and strengthen domestic development programmes. Consequently he had to hand over power to Rashidi Kawawa.²³ When the country became a Republic on 9 December 1962, Nyerere

²¹ Unlike Tanganyika, Zanzibar was a British protectorate. See Yeager, introduction to *Tanzania: An African Experiment* 2; Nyerere's Speech to the United Nations General Assembly of 14 December 1961 in *Freedom and Unity* 144; Johnson, "Nyerere: A Flawed Hero," 67; William H. Friedland, "The Story of Bwana UNO," Review of *Tanganyika and International Trusteeship*, by B.T.G. Chidzero. *Indiana Press Journals*, December 1961. See also T.L.M Marealle II OBE *The Petitions which Brought Uhuru to Tanganyika, Delivered Before the Trusteeship Council of the UN*, New York, USA (Moshi: Printing Services (T) Ltd., 2003).

²² TANU won majority seats in the 1960 elections that were carried under British supervision to establish self-government. Nyerere became the Chief Minister and thereafter the Prime Minister.

²³ Kawawa was Nyerere's closest associate. He was born in 1926 in Songea - southern Tanzania and passed away in 2009. He attended primary school in Tunduru, Lumesule, Kilwa Kivinje-Liwale, and then Dar es Salaam. After passing standard ten exams in 1947 he joined Tabora Upper Secondary School. He worked as an Accounts Clerk in the Public Works Department and afterwards as a social worker in the early 1950's, coordinating adult literacy campaigns. He was sent to Urambo-Tabora in 1953 to work among the Kikuyu detainees in Miyombo camp who were held because of the Kenyan *Mau Mau* movement. He served as assistant general secretary of Tanganyika African Government Services Association in 1951 and in 1955 was elected its President. He pioneered the establishment of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour and served as the first general secretary in 1955. Kawawa resigned from government employment in 1956 and became TANU's Central Committee member in 1957 and later the Vice President in 1960-when first appointed to Cabinet. He retired from the government service in 1985 and remained actively involved in politics until his demise. See <http://www.dailynews.co.tz/feature> [Accessed

was elected President and Kawawa remained the Prime Minister until 1964 when the latter became the Second Vice-President.²⁴

The first year of independence was devoted to domestic affairs and nation building plans. Emphasis in the second year and afterwards was on both domestic and external relations, particularly African affairs. The main task after independence, among others, was to eliminate racial discrimination and affirm dignity of all Tanganyika citizens. Racial discrimination was removed in education and health sectors: by the end of 1962 there was a single educational system and the citizens were treated in hospitals according to medical problems, and not race. As Nyerere argues, the obligation after independence was to "build the nation" and "to establish the dignity for all."²⁵

Self-help²⁶ was designed and promoted by the government of Tanganyika as a socio-economic policy. The purpose was to foster economic and people-centred development especially in the rural areas. Some of the reasons for the government's adoption of self-help in the early 1960's were to improve the day-to-day lives of the people and overcome the economic challenge the country was facing from drought, floods and the declining terms of trade of the 1960's. It should be noted, however, that self-help was both a political and economic nation-building strategy since it was created out of the three-year development plan and that people were to participate in voluntary labour projects without government's finance. Regional commissioners were

on 01 February 2010]; see also <http://www.bookrags.com/rashidi-mfaume-kawawa> [Accessed on 01 February 2010]; Also translated from John M. J. Magotti, *Simba wa Vita Katika Historia ya Tanzania, Rashidi Mfaume Kawawa* (Dar es Salaam: Matai and Company Limited, 2007), 4-7, 14-15.

²⁴ Al Noor Kassum, *Africa's Winds of Change: Memoirs of an International Tanzanian* (New York: I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd, 2007), 40.

²⁵ Julius K. Nyerere, "TANU Ten Years After Independence" *Tanzania Notes and Records, a decade of progress 1961-1971* Number 76 (1975): 4-5.

²⁶ People participated in voluntary labour projects to build roads, schools, hospitals, public halls, communal farms and dams. See Joseph Nye, Jr., 'Tanganyika's Self-Help,' *Transition*, 11 (November 1963): 35; Mazrui, "Anti-Militarism and Political Militancy," 282.

charged with the responsibility of interpreting and implementing the development plan down to the village level.

The success of self-help could be measured in terms of projects that were completed and the degree of national cohesion. Nye argues that to a large extent the programme solved the rural services problem and more people were involved in the political process.²⁷ He adds that the initiative could be interpreted as the people's first contact with the government since it was a nation-building attempt by deriving a development strategy that would trickle down to the rural areas. As a result, a significant number of people in the villages were involved in the implementation.²⁸

Despite the success, self-help as a platform faced challenges. More than 95 percent of the population lived in villages and depended largely on agriculture. Despite the fact that more schools were constructed and that there was more investment in educating people, the education did not provide the required skills to improve farming. Most of the people could not attain the expected competence, as the then Minister of Education later elaborated, "...students were unable to turn a trained mind to the solution of our problems..."²⁹ Although the strategy aimed at improving the lives of the people at the village level, positive results could have been seen if efforts targeted in balancing between voluntary labour projects and provision of the adequate farming skills.

²⁷ By mid 1963 Tanganyika had built 9,725 miles of new road, repaired 4,397 miles of old roads, constructed 166 clinics, 368 schools and undertaken many other projects. See Nye, Jr., "Tanganyika's Self-Help," 37; *Tanganyika News Review*, January 1963, 8. See also http://www.jamiiforums.com/celebrities-forum/7662-kambona-je-historia-itampa_16 [Accessed on 20 April 2010].

²⁸ Nye. "Tanganyika's Self-Help," 36; Mazrui, "Anti-Militarism and Political Militancy in Tanzania," 282.

²⁹ Speech delivered by the then Minister of Education – Solomon Eliufoo – to all students, 1 July 1964. The speech can also be found in Leon E. Clark, "Message to all Students on the eve of the New National Endeavour" in *Nation Building: Tanzania and the World* 102-105.

The abolition of multiparty and the subsequent adoption of a one-party democracy were espoused as nation-building strategies. As a measure to prevent internal conflict and promote national unity, the TANU's National Executive Committee passed a resolution making Tanzania a one-party state in 1963. Following a recommendation by a presidential commission on the establishment of a one-party state, it was later incorporated in the 1965 State Constitution. One of the major reasons for the establishment of one-party system was to get rid of ethnic, racial, religious and regional divisions that would cause conflicts.³⁰

The introduction of national service in October 1966³¹ was the other nation-building approach aimed at imparting upon the youth bravery, courage, obedience and perseverance more than the classroom training.³² The programme was instrumental in providing technical and craft skills that were insufficient. These include recruiting workers for the construction of Tanzania-Zambia railway line. As a conflict prevention and national integration measure, the programme was introduced to unite all Tanzanian youth irrespective of race, ethnic group, religion or level of education as well as impart patriotism. It was developed out of the idea that Tanganyika was at war with poverty as manifested in the economic development programmes. Through participation in the national service therefore, the youth could use the skills to initiate projects

³⁰ Max Mmuya and Amon Chaligha, *Towards Multiparty Politics in Tanzania: A Spectrum of the Current Opposition and the CCM Response* (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 1994), 4. See also Julius K. Nyerere, "TANU Ten Years After Independence" 9.

³¹ A compulsory ideological and military training programme launched by the government to impart discipline and mobilise people. All form six leavers, university and vocational training graduates and professionals who had not attended the programme, were required to undergo the two-year training. The duration was later reduced to one year, then six months and remained no longer compulsory. The programme was revived in 2011 and made compulsory again from 2013. The duration of the programme is three months.

³² The White paper on the National Service Scheme presented to the Parliament on 3 October 1966 by Rashidi Kawawa, the then Second Vice-President. See also Progress Report by *Reporter Magazine*, Nairobi-Kenya 8 August 1969. The report can also be found in Clark, *Nation Building: Tanzania and the World*, 110-114.

that would enable them build the nation, and at the same time contribute to the country's development.

Since more nation-building attention was paid to the development of all people, the 1967 Arusha Declaration articulated Tanzania's intention to build a socialist and self-reliant nation.³³ According to the Declaration, development programmes were to be drawn on egalitarian and co-operative basis, and the development was to be achieved through the effective use of resources.

The leaders' code of conduct was issued specifying the leaders' ethics and responsibilities. The aim was to dismantle the growing small group of bureaucrats and political leaders some of whom endeavoured to accumulate wealth for themselves. Such leaders capitalised on their positions which in the long run would alienate them from the majority and hence, cause conflict. The aim was to ensure that no leader abused office by exploiting others. It should be noted, however, that the leadership code was largely influenced by Nyerere's philosophy on the need to work hard within familyhood, as was the case in pre-colonial African societies.³⁴ Part of the reason was that the little wealth was to be shared by all. Since the majority of the Tanzanians were poor, leaders had to set examples by being responsible to the people and not accumulating wealth.

The philosophy behind *Ujamaa* – the Tanzanian version of socialism – was that it was possible for Africans, regardless of their social backgrounds, to come together in national movements and retain the unity forged during liberation struggles. *Ujamaa's* core belief could be traced back to communal and social orientations that evolved even before the development of an alternative

³³ See Cliffe, "From Independence to Self-Reliance," 256. See also Bunting, "The Heart of Africa" 67.

³⁴ Cliffe, "From Independence to Self-Reliance," 256. See also Julius K. Nyerere "After the Arusha Declaration" *Freedom and Socialism: A Selection From Writings and Speeches 1965-1967* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968), 395, 398.

ideology or the possibility of ideological confrontation.³⁵ The building of *Ujamaa* was based on the communalist African past, and was to be implemented according to Africa's blueprint. Nyerere argued that pre-colonial African societies were classless; people lived in tranquillity and peace and had experienced no antagonistic contradictions.³⁶ Instead of seeing socialism being born out of class conflict, as was the case in Europe, African states considered that their predecessors practiced socialism prior to the onset of colonial rule. African socialism was built on the notion of extended family and cooperation in the village communities.³⁷

Self-reliance that could trace its origin from self-help aimed at protecting the nation's independence, including upholding sovereignty and reduction of dependence on foreign aid and loans.³⁸ The Declaration outlined Tanzania's development goal of exploiting domestic resources more than depending on the developed world. Recognising the importance of foreign aid, and cautious of maintaining independence in decision making, Nyerere stated that, "We shall not depend upon overseas aid to the extent of bending our political, economic and social policies."³⁹ It should be observed that despite initiatives to reduce external dependence, Tanzania saw an increase in overseas aid for the period between 1967 and the late 1970's. Mushi and Mathews hold that dependence on foreign aid increased from 24 percent in 1967/68 to 68 percent in 1978/79.⁴⁰

³⁵ Ehud Spinzak, "African Traditional Socialism- A Semantic Analysis of Political Ideology," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (11) 4 (December 1973): 633, 642-45.

³⁶ See <http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/59515> [Accessed on 02 December 2009]. See also Haroub Othman, "Mwalimu Julius Nyerere; An Intellectual in Power," *Sites of Memory*, 76; Johnson, "Nyerere: A Flawed Hero," 70.

³⁷ Alex Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics* (2nd edition) (London: Routledge, 2004), 51.

³⁸ Press Statement of 12 February 1967; Kassum, *Africa's Winds of Change*, 53-54. See also Cliffe, "From Independence to Self-Reliance," 256.

³⁹ Press Statement, 12 February 1967. See also Kassum, *Africa's Winds of Change*, 53-54.

⁴⁰ Katherine Mathews and Samwel Mushi, *Foreign Policy of Tanzania 1961-1981: A Reader* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1982), 56. See also Shule, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy during the Third Phase Government," 23.

In implementing the Arusha Declaration the government nationalised banks, the National Insurance Corporation [which the government possessed majority share] and other firms. The government further acquired majority shares in industries such as that of tobacco, breweries and cement. In others, it paid full and fair compensation for the assets. As a strategy to prevent conflict caused by exploitation, nationalisation was sought to ensure majority control and benefit from the major means of the economy.⁴¹

The adoption of the Arusha Declaration could be seen as a continuation of Tanzania's effort to seek appropriate nation-building and development strategy, particularly the promotion of an egalitarian society. Furthermore, the Declaration was adopted as an immediate solution to the outcome of Tanzania's diplomatic crises of the years between 1963 and 1965. Tanzania's stress on the principle of independence in decision-making led some of the principal donors, such as the U.S, U.K and Germany, to either withdraw or reduce the amount of aid. Consequently, Tanzania resorted to the aid diversification strategy and explored the possibility of exploiting its domestic resources.

Most of the nation-building strategies focused mainly on the prevention of domestic conflict. Tanzanian leaders perceived a lack of access for the majority of the population to the social services and the basic needs as a source of quarrels among people.⁴² Nyerere equated this internal situation to the image of being in conflict; he once said that, although there had been *Maji Maji* conflict and the slave wars "one would find no parallel to the slaughter of our people which has stemmed from [the three enemies] poverty, ignorance and disease."⁴³ In this case, the perception of war against the three enemies was intended to prevent intra-group conflicts. In addition, the impact of the

⁴¹ Julius K. Nyerere "Public Ownership in Tanzania." and "Socialism is not Racialism." *Freedom and Socialism: A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1965-1967* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press 1968) 252-253, 257.

⁴² Mazrui, "Anti-Militarism and Political Militancy in Tanzania," 282.

⁴³ See Julius K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), 177.

challenges could be more severe in the sense that without deliberate efforts most people would have endlessly been affected by the troubles.

Nation-building strategies to a certain extent faced setbacks, particularly in the education sector.⁴⁴ There seemed to be a gap between what was learned at school and the reality of Tanzanian life. The education system, resembling that of the British, was designed to train students to serve in the offices than to impart the skills that would help in improving their ordinary lives. Although agriculture was introduced in the primary school syllabus by the colonial government since 1955, the curricula largely prepared students to join secondary school, instead of providing them with the skills for self-employment or for work in the agriculture sector. It is important to note, however, that Education for Self-Reliance (ESR) was placed at the core of nation building to further resolve the conflict caused by the colonial education system. Some of the measures included elimination of racial segregation, and schools were to address the local community's needs and in the end those of the nation.⁴⁵

Other leaders worked with Nyerere in achieving nation building. Rashid Kawawa had a similar vision on nation-building and conflict resolution. He was born during the period when his father was a member of the Tanganyika African Government Servants. In turn, he had learned the strength of resolving conflicts through workers' associations. During independence struggles Kawawa was against oppressive employers and the colonial masters, and saw racism as the main factor causing conflict in South Africa.

⁴⁴ Despite the government's effort to allocate more than 20 percent of the budget, by 1967 there were primary schools to cater for the 50 percent of the school-going children, and out of them only 10 percent could join secondary schools and 1 percent to the college. See Jos Elstgeest, "Primary Education: Revolution for Self-Reliance," in *Tanzania: Revolution by Education*, ed. Idrian N. Resnick, (Arusha: Longman of Tanzania Ltd., 1968), 229-233. See also Leon E. Clark, ed., "The Schools: Preparation for What?" in *Nation-Building: Tanzania and the World VI*, 88-96.

⁴⁵ Education for Self Reliance was introduced on 9 March 1967. See Ned Bertz, "Educating the Nation: Race and Nationalism in Tanzanian Schools," in *Making Nations Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa*, ed. Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett and Paul Nugent (Leiden: BRILL, 2007), 169.

As Prime Minister and later Vice-President, Kawawa led Tanzanians in the campaign to restore human dignity and in the formulation of policies that would improve people's standards of life.⁴⁶ He further introduced the Africanisation of the civil service in 1962 as part of conflict resolution strategy, when Africans replaced non-Africans in the government's departments. In essence, the policy aimed at correcting the composition of the civil service, which was by then dominated by non-Africans to the extent that it reflects the reality.⁴⁷

TANU Secretary Oscar Kambona⁴⁸ proposed an alternative nation-building approach and conflict prevention. His view was that before the implementation of the Arusha Declaration, it was necessary that the citizens be made aware of the importance of living in *Ujamaa* villages. His point was that pilot villages that would facilitate people's understanding of living in collective communities be established. Besides Kambona's argument, it was more important for the people to identify their own development needs rather than the central government to identify them and allocate resources to the people. Due to differences in the level of development across the country, it could have been useful for the people at the local level to be empowered to identify their development needs and then the central government allocate resources.

⁴⁶ It is from this background which Kawawa acquired the famous name *Simba wa Vita*, literally meaning "The Lion of War" due to his determination to lead people in the war against the development challenges facing the country. Translated from Magotti, *Simba wa Vita* 4-6.

⁴⁷ Nyerere, "TANU Ten Years After Independence" 5-6.

⁴⁸ Kambona was born in 1928 in Kwambe village – Mbamba Bay and passed away in 1997. He attended primary school education under a mango tree – at his home. He was educated at St. Barnabas Middle School in Liuli – Southern Tanzania and thereafter Alliance Secondary School in Dodoma – central Tanzania. Was later selected to Tabora Boys' Government School, where he first met Nyerere (who by that time was teaching at St. Mary's Secondary School). Kambona became TANU Secretary General during independence struggles while Nyerere was the President. In August 1967 Kambona resigned from the Cabinet and as TANU Secretary General and subsequently fled to exile in London. He returned in 1992, during the re-introduction of the multiparty democracy. <http://www.jamiiforums.com/jukwaa-la-siasa/> 58481-historia-ya-oscar-kambona-iko-wapi [Accessed on 01 February 2010]; See also T.M. Shaw, "The Foreign Policy of Tanzania 1961-1968" (M.A. dissertation, the University of East Africa, 1969), 41.

As a response to the challenges encountered during the implementation of the Arusha Declaration, the villagisation programme was subsequently adopted and implemented between 1972 and 1974. By 1972 the government had realised the slow pace in both the establishment of *Ujamaa* villages and communal production. Part of the reason was that the strategies outlined in the Declaration largely depended on persuasion, and the citizens had to volunteer. The government and TANU, therefore, specified that it was an obligation for all people to live in the villages, and that was to be achieved by 1976. Consequently, people in the rural areas were forced to move to selected villages where they could collectively work for their development and access social services such as education and health.⁴⁹

In 1977, TANU and the ASP merged to form *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM).⁵⁰ The latter was taken as the only party responsible for political and policy issues in Tanzania. The decision was based on ideological reasons that one party was ideal for achieving *Ujamaa* through the revolutionary party. The creation of CCM could be seen from the experience from other countries and movements; many parties were a cause of divisions along ethnic or ideological lines. Some of the examples include Frelimo of Mozambique.⁵¹

Nyerere's critics including some of African scholars, Western economists, governments and development agencies have questioned his policy initiatives. Nyerere has been criticised for failing to increase agricultural production during socialism and self-reliance era. By the end of 1976, for example, Tanzania had shifted from being Africa's largest exporter to the largest importer of

⁴⁹ For a discussion on this see Julius K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism: A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1965-1967*, (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968), 337-366. See also Issa G. Shivji, *Where is Uhuru? Reflections on the Struggle for Democracy in Africa*, ed. Godwin R. Murunga (Nairobi: Fahamu Books, 2009), 110-111.

⁵⁰ Meaning the Revolutionary Party

⁵¹ Mmuya and Chaligha, *Towards Multiparty Politics in Tanzania* 4.

agricultural products.⁵² Villagisation too has been criticised. Shivji notes the shortcomings in the programme's planning and implementation. He argues that villagers were not involved in the planning phase, where they could determine areas for villages, farming and residence. As a result, majority were forced to leave their areas whereby, some could not collectively access the social services as expected.⁵³

Post-independence issues: Relations with the major powers and international institutions

China was important to Africa's liberation struggles and served as the post-independence development model for a number of African countries, including Tanzania. The development of China's relations with African countries coincided with not only the Cold War rivalry but also with the post-independence nation-building project. Chinese interaction with Africa was formalised in 1956 when Egypt, one of the six countries present in the Bandung conference, formally recognised the government in Beijing. Beijing's presence in Africa can be traced to the struggle against the super-powers. Accordingly, it developed both bilateral and multilateral relations. While the 1950's alliance with the Soviet Union placed China in the Communist Bloc, the Korean War put China in direct conflict with the U.S.⁵⁴ Sino-African relations were strengthened between 1960 and 1965 during the liberation struggles and the subsequent attainment of political independence; as well as during the Sino-Soviet conflict.

China supported the nationalist struggles through the "people's war"⁵⁵ and nation-building through direct development assistance. The outcome of the

⁵² See www.juliusnyerere.info/index.php/nyerere/about/category/biography/ [Accessed on 10 April 2014]. See also Cranford Pratt, "Julius Nyerere: The Ethical Foundation of His Legacy" at www.queensu.ca/snid/pratt.htm#_ftnl [Accessed on 10 April 2014].

⁵³ Shivji, *Where is Uhuru?* 110-111.

⁵⁴ George T. Yu, "China's Role in Africa," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Volume 432, Africa in Transition (July 1977): 96-109.

⁵⁵ Armed struggle adopted and advocated by China to liberate people from exploitation and oppression. For the struggle to succeed, it should be self-reliant headed by an indigenous

struggle and the advocacy of people's war influenced African countries to turn to China for material and moral support in conflict resolution. A combination of factors seemed to have compelled Tanzania to support armed liberation struggle. On the one hand, the colonialists were taking longer to grant independence to their territories. On the other hand, the Chinese provided material support. For instance, although Peking's decision to construct Tanzania-Zambia railway was considered to be part of the development aid, the main goal was to liberate Zambia from economic dependence on South Africa.

China-Tanzania relations⁵⁶ were also fostered by Peking's support of Tanzania's diplomacy. This included conflict management in Africa, advocacy for the restructuring of the global economic order, and the emphasis on nation building.⁵⁷ Although China had initially been focusing on the provision of medical teams, medicines and equipment,⁵⁸ after independence Tanzania attempted to create an alternative social system that would further address domestic needs. Dar es Salaam was attracted by China's success in nation building and transformation of the important sectors within a short time. Like other developing countries, China was oppressed and exploited and afterwards emerged as a significant power.⁵⁹ Due to similar environmental conditions Tanzania was convinced that the nation-building goal could be attained as in

leader, guided by a comprehensive ideology and led by a Communist party-which must control the masses.

⁵⁶ China developed relations separately with both Tanganyika and Zanzibar before independence. After the union, there was an increased interaction with the government of the United Republic of Tanzania. The country has throughout been a major recipient of Chinese aid. The relations were formalised by signing of a treaty in 1965 during President Nyerere's visit to China.

⁵⁷ See Yu, *China's Role in Africa*, 106. For an additional discussion about Chinese-Tanzania relations see also George T. Yu, *China's African Policy: A Study of Tanzania* (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1975).

⁵⁸ See Yanzhoung Huang, "Pursuing Health as Foreign Policy: The Case of China," *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 17 (1) (Winter 2010): 109.

⁵⁹ China attained political independence in 1949 and by early 1960s the Chinese living conditions had been transformed. Education and health sectors had already registered success.

China. Nyerere emphasised that both countries had much to learn from each other due to the reason that majority of the population "earn their living from the land or in the rural areas."⁶⁰

Post-independence support for conflict resolution shaped Tanzania's relations with the U.S. While Washington publicly declared support for liberation struggles behind the scene it was opposing the Soviet and Communist Chinese hegemony. Responding to Nyerere's urge for the U.S's support for the Southern African liberation, President Jimmy Carter acknowledged the need for getting rid of colonialism through armed struggle.⁶¹ According to Mpangala, even though Carter was concerned, he did not specify the type of assistance that the U.S. would provide. Herein, when Tanzania requested support from the U.S. Washington's policies focused on promoting the domination of Western European nations in Africa. Therefore, while the U.S. officials publicly backed decolonisation, they privately advocated the maintenance of Western European influence in strategic African states. In other words, when the U.S. policy was seen to be conducive to decolonisation, it was facilitating an informal transformation of the American corporations control from the European colonial masters.⁶²

American-Tanzanian relations evolved in two stages. In the Nineteenth Century trade relations were formalised by the signing of the treaty between

⁶⁰ Press release-Information Service Division-Ministry of Information and Tourism (The United Republic of Tanzania) 18 February 1965.

⁶¹ In their speeches, Presidents John F. Kennedy and Jimmy Carter articulated the intention of supporting the struggles against colonialism and racism. See Julius K. Nyerere, *Crusade for Liberation*, (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1978), 8-12. See also Mpangala, "Tanzania's Support to the Liberation Struggle" 19.

⁶² For more discussion see David A. Dickson, "U.S. Foreign Policy toward Southern and Central Africa: The Kennedy and Johnson Years," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 23 (2) (Spring 1993): 305; Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Origins and Contemporary Forms," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 10 (1972): 503-524. See also I. William Zartman, "Europe and Africa: Decolonisation or Dependency?" *Foreign Affairs* 54 (1976): 325-343.

the Sultan of Zanzibar and the U.S. in 1833.⁶³ Among other issues, the treaty provided for American consuls to reside in Zanzibar ports and resolve conflicts that involved U.S. citizens. The subsequent stage entailed the establishment of a consul-general in Dar es Salaam in 1958, during the period of transition to independence. The development of both stages was influenced by the events in the international system. The establishment of trade and consular relations was in part due to the reason that the U.S. had a number of military facilities and more operations were conducted in Africa. Moreover, during World War II, the U.S.'s interests shifted to political and economic issues. Africa had natural resources that could be used during the war, and for recovering the war costs in its aftermath.

Washington's foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa had been that of detachment, given that European powers were the ones responsible for administering the territories. There could be two possible explanations for this situation. First, between 1952 and 1956 the U.S. policy focussed on the Korean War, to the extent of overlooking other parts of the world such as Africa. Second, colonialism was identified with economic development. Washington perceived it to be progressive and contributing to Africa's development.⁶⁴ The perception was complemented with the assumption that premature decolonisation movements could result in conflict hence, pave way for communist expansion.

Dar es Salaam sometimes had to cease diplomatic relations with the Western powers to prove its commitment to anti-colonial conflicts. At the Prime Ministers' Commonwealth conference held in London in June 1965, Tanzania did

⁶³ U.S.-Zanzibar relations are considered to be one of the earliest trade-consular relations between the U.S. and Africa. See George Shepperson, "African and America," *British Association for American Studies*, New Series, 3 (December 1961): 25. For a more discussion on Tanzania-United States relations see also Mennen Williams, "Diplomatic Rapport between Africa and the United States," *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*, Africa in Motion (354) (July 1964): 59.

⁶⁴ For a discussion on this see Steven Metz, "American Attitudes Toward Decolonisation in Africa," *Political Science Quarterly*, 99 (3) (Autumn 1984): 516.

not accept some sections of the *communiqué* on Rhodesia and Vietnam. Nyerere argued that Tanzania and the other developing countries had tried for quite some time to get an affirmation from the British government that the negotiations with the Smith regime aimed at granting independence to the majority. According to Nyerere, "We were unable to receive this assurance."⁶⁵ Since the British refused to put any serious pressure on the Smith regime, Tanzania and Ghana were the only states that terminated diplomatic relations by December 1965. This was an implementation of the collective decision of the OAU Council of Ministers over Rhodesia; it was also an expression of Tanzania's strategy that was employing all possible measures to resolve colonial conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.

Besides bilateral relations, Tanzania joined multilateral organisations. The country's recognition of and support for international institutions⁶⁶ was for one major reason: to play an activist role in advocating for reforms of the world's economic structures; as well as resolve conflicts in the colonised territories.⁶⁷ Tanzanian leaders perceived that unequal relations between the developed North and the developing South caused conflict. This would mean that the North, being the beneficiary of the existing economic structure would strive to maintain its position, while the South being the disadvantaged is struggling to correct the situation. It was to this end that Tanzania opted to support anti-colonialism in Africa and other Third World countries as well as

⁶⁵ Smith, *Nyerere of Tanzania*, 147; Anyaoku with Cassam, "Nyerere and the Commonwealth." See also Salim, "Remembering Mwalimu" 27.

⁶⁶ For more discussion on this see Julius K. Nyerere, "Policy on Foreign Affairs," Nyerere's Speech to the TANU bi-annual National Conference in Mwanza, 16 October 1967. The speech was also published in Julius K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism: A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1965-1967* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968) 372-373, 377-381. See also Nyerere's Independence Address to the United Nations published in *Freedom and Unity* 145, 148.

⁶⁷ Parliamentary Hansards, "Membership of the Commonwealth," government motion on independence and membership of the Commonwealth, 5 June 1961 Hansard 36th Session (4th meeting). See also Julius Nyerere, "Tanganyika and the Commonwealth," *The Royal Commonwealth Society Journal*, December 1961.

work towards strengthening international organisations. This intention resulted in the decision to join the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Commonwealth of Nations and the UN.

The 1955 Bandung Non-Alignment Conference challenged the U.S's attitude and interest towards Africa. When communism was gaining dominance in most of the newly independent states, the non-aligned countries were seen to be leaning towards communism. Conversely, Washington shifted the emphasis and sought to cooperate with the nationalist movements in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.⁶⁸ This scenario partly offers an explanation for this apparent support for liberation struggles by Presidents Kennedy and Carter. The ambiguous U.S. strategy was largely determined by the nature of the bi-lateral relations with the Western European countries. For instance, there were differences between U.S's treatment of Angola and Mozambique on the one hand and that of Southern Rhodesia on the other. Washington adopted a less confrontational policy towards Lisbon due to the U.S. access to the Portugal-controlled Azore Islands, which it used for transit of forces to Europe, Africa and the Middle East.⁶⁹

Anti-colonialism and conflict resolution also featured in multilateral relations. Tanzania joined the NAM⁷⁰ in order to have independent decision

⁶⁸ See Metz, "American Attitudes Towards Decolonisation" 522-523.

⁶⁹ For further discussion on this see Dickson, "U.S. Policy toward Southern and Central Africa" 305.

⁷⁰ The term "non-alignment" was coined by the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954 in his speech in Colombo Sri-Lanka. NAM simply means not aligned with the East or West [military camps]. Formed in 1955 during the Asian-African Bandung conference when 29 Asian and African heads of state and governments met (except Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, North and South Korea) to discuss shared concerns – colonialism and the influence of the West. The founders include Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Ahmed Sukarno of Indonesia and Josif Broz Tito of Yugoslavia. Currently, the movement comprises of 118 member states and other 15 observers waiting for admission; it represents almost 55 percent of the world's population and 20 percent of the global economy. See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country-profiles/2798187stm> [Accessed on 02 December 2009]. See also <http://www.sis.gov.eg/VR/NAM/english/backgrounds.html> [Accessed on 02 December 2009].

making in international affairs, secure friendship with other nations regardless of their ideological position, and forge a common stand with other developing countries in economic matters. Being a NAM member, Dar es Salaam would play an activist role than just maintain neutrality in championing fairness and respect for equality among countries in the international system. The dominance of the two power blocs complicated Tanzania's effort to mobilise international support for conflict resolution. It therefore sought to join the movement so as to obtain support from either bloc.⁷¹ As a result, the country became a leading member advocating Africa's independence at the NAM and succeeding in pressing for the adoption of more radical stand on liberation struggles.

At the international level, Tanzania faced a challenge in promoting equality in economic affairs. As an alternative, Dar es Salaam used the NAM as a forum to mobilise cooperation among poor countries to overcome the world's inequality. Addressing the NAM meeting in 1970, Nyerere emphasised the need to "act together" to maintain dignity and independence.⁷² Advocating the cooperation for mutual benefit, the emphasis was on the less poor to contribute to the development of the poorer. This, however, could not immediately be realised due to the reason that the final *communiqué* of the Bandung conference that formed the NAM offered several recommendations without specifying the implementation strategies. Notwithstanding the NAM and the subsequent founding of the G77,⁷³ the main goal has been the mobilisation of

⁷¹ For a discussion on Tanzania's perception on NAM see T. Niblock, "Aid and Foreign Policy in Tanzania, 1961-1968" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sussex, 1971), 147. See also Johnson, "Nyerere: A Flawed Hero," 68.

⁷² Julius K. Nyerere, "Developing tasks of Non-Alignment" in Nyerere, *Man and Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 67-68.

⁷³ G77 was established on 15 June 1964 by developing countries with common problems that needed joint action in the U.N. system. Created at the conclusion of the first U.N. conference on Trade and Development and consisted of Afro-Asian, Latin American and Caribbean countries. The main objectives were to promote trade, development and peace. See <http://www.uon.org/g77/establish.html> [Accessed on 21 January 2010].

collective action in the negotiations. As Akindele argues, most of the resolutions emphasised the strengthening solidarity of an African bloc to promote African interests in various international organisations.⁷⁴

Tanganyika and Zanzibar became members of the Commonwealth of Nations⁷⁵ on 9 December 1961 and 10 December 1963 respectively. After the Union in 1964, Tanzania became a single member. Being a British territory, Tanganyika joined the organisation a few months before independence through a unanimous consent of the members followed by attendance to the meetings. This has been a commonly used approach, given that the Commonwealth has no charter or any other instrument that provides for the admission of the new members.⁷⁶

Tanzania attached a specific importance to the Commonwealth. As Nyerere emphasised, "We are anxious to join the associations which do not involve us in the present Cold War."⁷⁷ It was evident that, being a Commonwealth member, Tanzania could be able to independently carry forward conflict resolution agenda. Nyerere added that the other conflict that

⁷⁴ R.A. Akindele, "Reflections on the Preoccupation and Conduct of African Diplomacy," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 14 (4) (December 1976): 573.

⁷⁵ The Commonwealth was a voluntary association of 54 independent sovereign states, majority are former British colonies. Commonwealth's origin dates back to 1867 when Canada was granted self-government. The British parliament passed the British North American Act creating the self-governing Dominion of Canada. Other territories that afterwards became dominion include Australia (1900), New Zealand (1907), the Union of South Africa (1910). The Commonwealth was formally formed in 1931, with the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the Irish Free State and Dominion of Newfoundland as founders. Mozambique and Rwanda are the only two countries admitted to the association without any former relations with the United Kingdom. For a discussion on Commonwealth background and membership see http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/belize/bz_appnb.html [Accessed on 22 February 2010]; see also http://www.thecommonwealth.org/internal/191086/191247/the_commonwealth [Accessed on 02 December 2009].

⁷⁶ On Commonwealth see http://www.dfat.gov.au/intorgs/commonwealth/aus_comm_1.html and http://www.commonwealth-of-nations.org/United_Republic_of_Tanzania [Accessed on 22 February 2010].

⁷⁷ Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity* 135. See also Nyerere, "Tanganyika and the Commonwealth" *The Royal Commonwealth Society Journal*, December 1961.

would follow after the liberation struggles was “between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ of the world.”⁷⁸ He believed that by virtue of being a Commonwealth member Tanzania could participate in and suggest ways of rectifying the relations between the rich and poor nations. Subsequently, Nyerere’s activism made him one of the South Commission’s⁷⁹ founders in 1987.

Tanzania used the Commonwealth as a platform for mobilising international opinion on the necessity to resolve liberation and anti-racism conflicts. Tanzania influenced the opinion of Commonwealth Prime Ministers⁸⁰ to the extent that South Africa had to withdraw its membership despite being the oldest member. John Diefenbaker – Canada’s Prime Minister, seconded Tanzania’s position and consequently persuaded South Africa to leave the organisation. In December 1961, Tanganyika became a full member. The country’s decision to adopt this strategy could partly be explained by the reason that apart from the National Congress of British West Africa,⁸¹ PAFMECA and All African Peoples Conference,⁸² there was hardly an established international

⁷⁸ Nyerere, “Tanganyika and the Commonwealth” 135.

⁷⁹ The Institution aims at bridging the gap between the rich and poor nations through working closely with the G77. See Adi and Sherwood, *Pan-African History* 151.

⁸⁰ On the eve of the annual Commonwealth Heads of State and Government meeting in London-July 1961 Nyerere wrote a letter to the *Observer* and the *Manchester Guardian* newspapers, which questioned South Africa’s membership to an institution guided by mutual respect and equality among nations. The letter further explained that Tanganyika would withhold its Commonwealth membership in such a situation and that decision would set a precedence to the other African, Asian and Caribbean countries soon to attain independence from the British. See <http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/59508> [Accessed on 04 February 2010].

⁸¹ J.E. Casley Hayford influenced the organisation’s creation in 1920 as an attempt to federate West African territories. For a more discussion on this see Hollis R. Lynch, “Edward W. Blyden: Pioneer West African Nationalist,” *Journal of African History* VI (3) (1965): 373.

⁸² The first pan-African organisation to discuss issues related to colonialism and imperialism. The first conference of African Liberation movements from across the continent was held in Accra-Ghana, December 1958. The second and third conferences took place in Tunis (1960) and Cairo (1961) respectively. See Houser, “Meeting Africa’s Challenge,” 18.

organisation such as the Commonwealth to promote Africa's conflict resolution. By that time Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone were the only Commonwealth members. Since most of the decisions were through consensus building, using the media could be seen as a viable strategy to capture the majority.

On 14 December 1961 Tanganyika became the 104th member of the United Nations.⁸³ Zanzibar joined the organisation on 16 December 1963. After the ratification of the Articles of Union on 26 April 1964, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar became a single member, changing the name to the United Republic of Tanzania on 1 November 1964. The country has served in the UN Security Council non-permanent position for two terms, between 1975 and 1976 and from 2005 to 2006.⁸⁴ During the first term presidency, Tanzania's main agenda was liberating the colonised territories. During the second term the concern was the resolution of the GLR conflicts. Both terms will later be discussed.

Before independence Tanganyikans considered retaining military trusteeship⁸⁵ in the UN. Joseph Nyerere – Nyerere's brother – who was the then Secretary General of TANU Youth League tabled the proposal to the parliament.⁸⁶ The main reason was based on the UN's overall objective of promoting international peace and security as well as Chapter VII of the UN Charter that prohibits the use of force without the authorisation of the Security

⁸³ Nyerere delivered independence address to the UN General Assembly and articulated the principles that would guide Tanganyika's domestic and external relations.

⁸⁴ See <http://tanzania-un.org/index.asp> [Accessed on 02 December 2009]. See also Jacqueline A. Kalley, Elna Schoeman, and L.E. Andor, *Southern African Political History. A Chronology of Key Political Events from Independence to mid 1997* (London: Greenwood Press, 1999), 573-638.

⁸⁵ This was on 15 May 1961 when internal self-government was granted. While Nyerere was appointed the Prime Minister responsible for domestic affairs, the British government retained control over foreign relations and the military until 9 December 1961 when the country became fully independent.

⁸⁶ Joseph Nyerere quoted by Ali A. Mazrui, "Anti-Militarism and Political Militancy in Tanzania," 270. See also Tanganyika Assembly Debates, 36th Session (Sixth Meeting), November 30, 1961. Cols 18, 20.

Council. The other was that, Tanganyika did not have the military capability to defend itself against major powers' intervention. With this consideration, according to Mazrui, the country could have been the only nationalist regime to consider retaining the army under the UN control. On the one hand, as Mazrui argues, Tanganyika could set "a precedence" that would empower the UN to maintain international peace and security. On the other hand, the decision could have influenced Tanzania's views on conflict resolution, particularly with respect to the shift from negotiations to the armed struggle whereby the military had been a key player.

Capitalising on the UN, as the organisation that passes legitimacy in authorising international action, Dar es Salaam urged the removal of foreign occupation in Vietnam and Korea.⁸⁷ Calling for the resolution of Vietnam and Korea war, Tanzania was of the view that international behaviour of the powerful nations caused conflicts, resulting in crime against innocent civilians and violation of fundamental human rights. The argument put by the Tanzanian leadership was that the occupation and aggressive acts by the U.S. against the People's Republic of Korea makes it difficult for the Korean people to independently decide their future. They therefore called for the U.S. and its allies to withdraw their troops from Vietnam and the occupying forces from Korea.⁸⁸ In the General Assembly, Tanzania consistently backed eastern-sponsored resolutions on the Korean and Chinese questions.

Furthermore, even though the UN was an important organisation in conflict resolution, Tanzania advocated reform of the organisation to improve its effectiveness. During a state visit to China Nyerere emphasised that "Tanzania recognises that it [the UN] must be reformed" to include the People's Republic

⁸⁷ Tanzania established diplomatic relations with North Korea on 14 January 1965. In trade relations however, Tanzania was a partner to both North and South Korea. See Sang-Seek Park, "Africa and Two Koreas" 75, 83, 86.

⁸⁸ Speech delivered by S. Mhando – Tanzanian Minister of Foreign Affairs – at the United Nations General Assembly, 24 September 1969. Also can be found in Clark, *Nation-Building: Tanzania and the World* 150-151; Niblock, "Aid and Foreign Policy in Tanzania" 342-343.

of China.⁸⁹ Tanzania's view on the exclusion of China from the UN was that, it was limiting the Third World countries' participation in the important decision making institution. This view was, however, motivated by historical ties with Peking, which were strengthened in 1965 in the aftermath of Tanzania's crisis with the West. In the end, the Communist China replaced Nationalist China in the UN in 1971.

Conflict resolution strategies: Support for liberation struggles

Tanzania could not stand alone in most of the decisions that seemed to hold back conflict resolution efforts; it sought support from other actors. During the 1971 Singapore Commonwealth summit, Tanzania protested against London's proposal to renew the Simonstown Agreement with South Africa on arms sales. Again, the position was based on the fact that the weapons would be used against the black South Africans. In addition to the moral conviction, the impact of the arms could also be seen in South Africa's destabilisation strategy⁹⁰ in the region and the support for the rival groups within the territories. Besides the protest, the Agreement was renewed, and London further refused to impose economic sanctions on Pretoria resulting in being criticised later in the 1985, 1987 and 1989 Commonwealth meetings. The rejection influenced other African countries and the Commonwealth as a result, to pressurise the British, despite the latter's claim on state's obligations.⁹¹

Tanzania, supported by Zambia, rejected the decision of the 1985 Bahamas Commonwealth meeting, to send an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to South Africa. The team, led by Sir Geoffrey Howe, Britain's former Foreign

⁸⁹ President Nyerere's Address to a rally in Peking Square, 26 February 1965. See also "State Visit to the People's Republic of China," in *Freedom and Unity*, 323-325.

⁹⁰ A policy designed by South African government as a reaction to economic sanctions. The strategy was based on some form of intervention to maintain hegemony and undermine the struggles against Apartheid.

⁹¹ See <http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/59508> [Accessed on 04 February 2010].

Secretary, went to evaluate the progress towards majority rule. The refusal was based on the perception that British interests would possibly weaken African countries' efforts on South Africa. The position was perhaps inspired by the 1965 African countries' experience with the British over Smith's regime over the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Tanzania's stance resulted in the appointing of General Olusegun Obasanjo – Nigeria's President and Malcom Fraser – Australia's Prime Minister to co-chair the group.⁹²

Another aspect, hosting refugees, proved to be important in understanding conflicts in post-colonial Africa. Tanzania had been receiving refugees from 1959, giving it the most refugees in sub-Saharan Africa. Even before 1965, the largest number came from Mozambique.⁹³ It also hosted political refugees from Angola, South Africa, South West Africa (Namibia), Rhodesia and even a group from Comoro Islands. Although most of the early 1960's refugees resulted from the liberation struggles, those of the 1970's escaped their governments' mistreatment on ethnic or racial bases.⁹⁴

To a certain extent, Tanzania and the local communities benefited from the refugees' presence despite the widely accepted argument that they pose security and economic threats. Since they have remained in Tanzania for many years, those refugees who settled outside the camps have been providing labour and skills for an extended period of time. In addition, the communities in areas closer to the refugee camps benefited from improved infrastructure, health and education services.⁹⁵

⁹² <http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/59508> [Accessed on 04 February 2010].

⁹³ After the outbreak of the civil war between Frelimo and Renamo about 300,000 refugees fled to Tanzania. See Smith, *Nyerere of Tanzania*, 155; Mpangala, "Tanzania's Support to Liberation Struggle" 20.

⁹⁴ By late 1970s Tanzania had about 60,000 Burundians and more than 100,000 from Uganda, Rwanda and southern Africa. Rodger Yeager, *Tanzania: An African Experiment*, 102.

⁹⁵ Recently, the government has granted citizenship to 162,000 Burundian refugees who had been in the country for more than 38 years. See <http://bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8625429.stm> [Accessed on 17 April 2010]. For a more discussion refugees' benefit see Karen Jacobsen, "Can

Tanzania hosted the African Liberation Committee (ALC)⁹⁶ headquarters in Dar es Salaam. For several years the government had been providing moral and material support to the liberation leaders and their movements.⁹⁷ Nearly all liberation movements in Southern Africa had training camps and offices in Tanzania⁹⁸ for the planning and coordination of their activities. Consequently, Dar es Salaam became a safe haven and a launching station for most of the liberation movements. In the end, the majority of the Heads of State and Government from the 1960's through the 1980's seemed to have lived more in Tanzania than in any other country.⁹⁹ The ALC concluded its activities during the 1990's after the end of apartheid.¹⁰⁰

Refugees Benefit the State? Refugee Resources and African State-building," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 40 (4) (December 2002): 578, 581, 585.

⁹⁶ The ALC was established in 1963 and was headed by the Tanzanians; Ambassador Sebastian Chale, followed by Ambassador George Magombe and later, Ambassador Brigadier General Hashim Mbita. The Committee was mandated to coordinate and facilitate the support from the other African states in terms of training and provision of materials to the liberation movements.

⁹⁷ Geir Lundestad, *East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics 1945-1996*, Translated from the Norwegian by Gail Adams Kvam (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), 278. See also Kambona, "Colonialism and the African Liberation Committee," 2.

⁹⁸ The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) was founded in Tanzania; the African National Congress (ANC) and PAC of South Africa; Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Organisation (ZAPU) of Zimbabwe, the MPLA of Angola and South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia.

⁹⁹ Mpangala, "Tanzania's Support to the Liberation Struggle" 20; Bunting, "The Heart of Africa: Interview with Julius Nyerere" 65. Reprinted from *New Internationalist Magazine*, Issue 309, January-February 1999. See also Khadiagala, *Allies in Adversity* 53.

¹⁰⁰ The organisations included the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the African National Congress (ANC), the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO), the Zimbabwe African People's Organisation (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). With the exception of GRAE which established offices in Kinshasa and the MPLA's main office was in Brazaville and also had offices in both Dar es Salaam and Lusaka. The latter was the other centre of liberation movements. See Akpan "African Goals and Strategies toward Southern Africa" 251; George M. Houser, "African Liberation Movements: Report on a Trip to Africa" Spring 1967 *Africa Today* 14(4) Trends in African Liberation Movements (August 1967): 11. See also Jamhuri ya Muungano Tanzania, *Taarifa ya Miaka Hamsini ya Uhuru wa Tanzania Bara*, 45.

Providing logistical support and hosting liberation movements enhanced Tanzania's role in conflict resolution. The country also provided a transit route for the logistical, military and humanitarian support to the liberation movements. Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF) established a Special Duty Unit to facilitate training, receiving arms and ammunition from Algeria, the Soviet Union and China and handed them over to the liberation movements.¹⁰¹ The Soviet Union, China and Cuba also provided education facilities to members of the liberation movements in exile. It should be noted that most of the liberation support came from the eastern bloc, which did not prevent Tanzania from automatically being drawn into the Cold War confrontation.

The Tanzanian army also provided military training facilities to the guerrilla fighters before being dispatched to their respective countries. Military training centres were established in Farm 17 – Nachingwea, Chunya – Mbeya, Kongwa – Dodoma and Mgagao – Iringa. Tanzanian soldiers and others from the front line states went to fight in South African territories along with the guerrilla fighters.¹⁰² The fact that some of the Tanzanian soldiers lost their lives participation in the armed struggle demonstrated the country's commitment to conflict resolution in the region.

Besides supporting the anti-colonial struggles politically and diplomatically, Tanzania served as a forum for academic debates. In addition to being involved in struggles in their respective countries, the guerrilla-intellectuals and African liberation movement activists refined their theories at

¹⁰¹ Scandinavian countries provided humanitarian and diplomatic support to the movements. The Soviet Union and China's interest was to see the liberation movements using revolutionary approach to resolve the conflict. The ammunition was shipped through Tanzania with tax exemption. See Mpangala, "Tanzania's Support to Liberation Struggle" 20.

¹⁰² Nathan Shamuyarira, "Tanzania" in *Conflict and Change* ed. Douglas G. Anglin et al., (1978), Tanzania's Position Paper on African Strategy in Southern Africa, circulated at the Nineth Extraordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers in Dar es Salaam, April 7-9, 1975. See also Mpangala, "Tanzania's Support to the Liberation Struggle" 20.

the University of Dar es Salaam.¹⁰³ This process in turn, contributed to the country's intellectual development. Furthermore, Tanzania provided the freedom fighters with the necessary skills that could be used once the conflict was over. The government provided land for building schools and some of the freedom fighters were given priority in higher learning institutions. Government scholarships were offered to South Africans and Mozambicans to study in Tanzanian universities. At some points half of the student intakes of Sokoine University of Agriculture were South Africans.¹⁰⁴

Coercive diplomacy and military strategies

When the termination of diplomatic relations with the British over the UDI issue was not successful, Tanzania adopted coercive diplomacy.¹⁰⁵ During the September 1966 London conference of the Commonwealth Ministers, Nyerere, leading the African group, pressed the British to remove the Smith regime. Tanzania called for sanctions against both South Africa and Rhodesia.¹⁰⁶ In response, however, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson proposed negotiations. As a result, a resolution: "No Independence Before Majority African Rule" (NIBMAR), was adopted.¹⁰⁷ Although the resolution did not adequately respond to Tanzania and Africa's position, to a certain extent it paved way for the adoption of more radical strategies.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³ The liberation movement activists included the U.S. civil-rights activists such as Black Panther movement members and the Vietnam War resisters. Others were from Mozambique, South Africa, Angola and South Africa. See Othman, "Mwalimu Julius Nyerere; An Intellectual in Power," 70; Bunting, "The Heart of Africa. Interview with Julius Nyerere" 65.

¹⁰⁴ Kassam, *Africa's Winds of Change*, 46-47.

¹⁰⁵ Coercive diplomacy can be in the form of the use of threats or limited force to either compel or deter the parties. See Jönsson and Aggestam, "Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution" 35.

¹⁰⁶ Kalley, Schoeman and Andor, *Southern Africa Political Events* 573-630.

¹⁰⁷ Anyaoku with Cassam, "Nyerere and the Commonwealth" [Accessed 04 February 2010].

¹⁰⁸ Diplomatic relations with Britain resumed on 4 July 1968. See Kalley, Schoeman and Andor *Southern Africa Political Events*, 573-630.

Coercive diplomacy was used against South African racial regime and against its occupation over Namibia and in Zimbabwe. Proponents of the strategy pressed for sanctions, thereby banning commodities and isolating the offenders from the international community.¹⁰⁹ In other circumstances, however, the approach did not result in the intended outcomes. As Gordon argues, in 1963 the British vetoed the African states' proposal to the Security Council on the adoption of resolution on Rhodesia. This was done despite being supported by most members of the UN General Assembly.

Tanzania's advocacy of economic sanctions against South African regime was to compel the government to change its racial segregation policy. Undeniably, the impact of economic boycott was limited by the fact that, the apartheid regime adopted stern measures against the non-white population, some of which caused fatalities. After the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 the government moved to ban the ANC and PAC, and introduce legislation in 1967 against terrorism.¹¹⁰

Besides support for national liberation, Tanzania was also concerned about how African independent governments conducted their affairs. Yeager argues here that the country not only acted against colonial and racist regimes, but also "African fascists."¹¹¹ For example, when Idi Amin overthrew Milton Obote in 1971¹¹² the same year, Tanzanian Government issued a statement withholding the recognition of Amin's regime. At the same time Tanzania denied the accusation that it was training the guerrillas fighting in Uganda.¹¹³ Tanzania

¹⁰⁹ Mpangala, "Tanzania's Support to the Liberation Struggle" 9. See also Dar es Salaam Declaration From the Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Dar es Salaam 7-9 April 1975, 103-111.

¹¹⁰ <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/aam/aamhist.html> [Accessed on 10 June 2010].

¹¹¹ Yeager, *Tanzania: An African Experiment* 99.

¹¹² Uganda attained independence from the British in 1963. Idi Amin overthrew Obote's government while attending the Commonwealth meeting in Singapore. For more discussion see <http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/59508> [Accessed on 04 February 2010].

¹¹³ Kalley, Schoeman and Andor, *Southern Africa Political Events*, 573-630.

seemed to have adopted this strategy to prevent conflicts resulting from military coups and unconstitutional changes of governments. Even though coups featured in sub-Saharan Africa at this particular time, most of the African governments, including the OAU perceived them as internal matters, not deserving external interference.

In East Africa, Tanzania employed the military strategy in the Uganda conflict. The Tanzania-Uganda conflict was preceded by border clashes of July-August 1971. Mediation, organised initially by Jomo Kenyatta and later Haile Selassie of Ethiopia¹¹⁴ resulted in Nyerere and Amin signing an accord on 28 May 1973. The agreement worked for a while but broke out on 28 October 1978 when Amin invaded Tanzania through the Kagera salient.¹¹⁵ In reaction, Tanzania People's Defence Forces (TPDF) joined by anti-Amin forces in exile [which later formed the Uganda National Liberation Front] marched into Uganda in April 1979. Amin fled and his regime collapsed.¹¹⁶

As part of post-conflict reconstruction the Tanzanian forces remained in Uganda at the request of the first post-Amin government. The troops mainly maintained security and trained Uganda's new army. Tanzania had to accept Uganda's request in part due to insecurity caused by the conflict. As a result, more resources were incurred in the operation. Nyerere admitted that "...the cost of helping our Ugandan brothers is very high-both in money and abuse..."¹¹⁷ From Nyerere's statement, it seems likely that Tanzania was militarily and economically overstretched but had to continue maintaining its forces in Uganda given the determination to support conflict resolution. It also

¹¹⁴ Kalley, Schoeman and Andor, *Southern Africa Political Events*, 573-630.

¹¹⁵ Kawawa was a Defence Minister during this time (1977-1980). See Akiki Bomera Mujaju, "Internal Conflict and its International Context" in *Conflict Resolution in Uganda*, ed. K. Rupesinghe (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989), 268. See also Magotti, *Simba wa Vita katika Historia ya Tanzania*, 66.

¹¹⁶ Gordon, "Anglophonic Variants: Kenya versus Tanzania," 98.

¹¹⁷ Nyerere, *A Time of Struggle* Presidential Address to the National Assembly 10.

seems likely that Tanzania's intervention in Uganda was followed by limited military engagements in regional conflicts due to that cost.

During the same conflict, the Mozambican President Samora Machel supported Tanzania by sending a battalion of soldiers. Besides the fact that Machel was facing intra-state conflict Mozambican soldiers joined the Tanzanians to demonstrate solidarity. Beyond that, there was little regional support. The OAU was hesitant in seeking to resolve the conflict through a series of mediation meetings between Nyerere and some of the African leaders. It was only the FLS members and Ethiopia that were willing to vote for condemnation of Amin's invasion of Tanzania.¹¹⁸ The OAU's approach against Amin's actions since 1971 provided Tanzania with the justification of using military strategy.¹¹⁹ Arguably, OAU's role in the Uganda conflict was limited by the "non-intervention in the internal affairs" principle, which could trace its origin back to when Amin overthrew Obote. Tanzania condemned the act although the OAU members perceived it to be a domestic affair.

Tanzania was also involved in conflict resolution in the Seychelles¹²⁰ where it supported Prime Minister – France Albert René in the 1977-armed coup. About 400 Tanzanian troops were sent to the Seychelles to protect the government that had been targeted for overthrow by South African mercenaries.¹²¹ Given that the Seychelles did not have an army, the core was made up of 60 Tanzanian-trained guerrillas fighting against President

¹¹⁸ See Oliver Furley and Roy May, "Tanzania's Military Intervention in Uganda" *African Interventionist States*, ed. Oliver Furley and Roy May, (Aldershot-England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2001), 76.

¹¹⁹ Gordon, "Anglophonic Variants: Kenya versus Tanzania," 93-94.

¹²⁰ Tanzania participated in conflict resolution in Comoro, Sao-Tome and Principe, Guinea Bissau and Western Sahara. In Comoro the armed forces went to support Ali Soilih's regime as well as train the army. For a discussion of this see Jamhuri ya Muungano Tanzania, *Taarifa ya Miaka Hamsini ya Uhuru*, 44-45. See also Furley and May "Tanzania's Military Intervention in Uganda" 70.

¹²¹ Gordon, "Anglophonic Variants: Kenya versus Tanzania," 98. See also *The East African*, "The 2011 Africa Leadership Scorecard" 6-12 February 2012, xv.

Mancham's government. After the coup, Tanzanian and Indian officers trained the Seychelles' army. Furthermore, Tanzanian forces helped to resolve the 1982 mutiny. One factor that explains Tanzania's support for René was his decision to stay in Tanzania during liberation struggles as a leader of the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP) – whose headquarters were in Dar es Salaam. Here he was influenced by the *Ujamaa* policy, which could be reflected in his subsequent introduction of a one-party state and socialist programmes back in Seychelles.¹²²

A blend of diplomatic, material support and the armed struggle strategies

In the case of South Africa¹²³ and Zimbabwe, a number of strategies were employed. This could partly be explained by the reason that Zimbabwe was taking longer to attain majority rule and South Africa had the persistent problem of apartheid.¹²⁴ Omari argues that the conflicts in South Africa had two dimensions. The first was related to the domestic environment that emanated from apartheid and the subsequent outlaw of the anti-apartheid movements. The second dimension was South Africa's relation with the neighbours in the region, which was influenced by destabilisation.¹²⁵

After being banned in South Africa in 1961, the PAC and ANC opened offices in exile. The ANC's branch in Dar es Salaam became operational in 1962 and later moved to Morogoro (Tanzania) until 1995. Tanzania was one of the

¹²² For a discussion on this see Karrim Essack, *The Armed Struggle* (Dar es Salaam: Printpak Tanzania Ltd., 1979), 197; M. Franda, *The Seychelles: Unquiet Islands* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 69-72; Anthoni van Nieuwkerk and William M. Bell, "Seychelles" *Security and Democracy in Southern Africa* Gavin Cawthra, Andre du Pisani and Abillah Omari (eds.) (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2007) 149. See also Furley and May, "Tanzania's Military Intervention in Uganda", 70.

¹²³ South Africa was the first country in the Southern African region to acquire a dominion status in early 1909, and subsequently attain independence in 1911.

¹²⁴ Institutionalised racism developed after 1948 whereby individuals were classified according to skin colour – whites, blacks or coloureds. Lundestad, *East, West, North, South* 278.

¹²⁵ Omari, "The Rise and Decline of the Front Line States" 51-58.

first countries where the ANC launched its regional operations after Accra 1960/61; and Algiers and Rabat in 1962. Pfister notes that, Tanzania was chosen by the ANC leaders probably due to its reputation for work in conflict resolution. The movements' decision to stage armed struggle while in exile was an outcome of the failure of the 50 year-old peaceful strategies.¹²⁶

Between 1964 and 1967 the ANC was allowed by the Tanzanian government to establish four *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK)¹²⁷ military bases. In support, the Soviet Union provided arms to ANC military training camps in Tanzania from 1964 to the 1980's. Moreover, from 25 April to 1 May 1969, the ANC held its first consultative meeting, the Morogoro Conference, which was important for two major reasons. It was in Morogoro where the ANC's major political strategy was devised and the Department of International Affairs (DIA) established to mobilise and strengthen the international struggle against apartheid. The other reason was that the conference paved way for the amendments in the ANC's structures. The National Executive Committee was elected and the Revolutionary Council created to mobilise the people and wage the armed struggle. Indeed, in addition to becoming a non-racial organisation the ANC formally recognised the important role of the working class.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Shepherd, "Africa Today in the Early Years" 17. See also Houser, "Meeting Africa's Challenge" 22.

¹²⁷ Literarily means the spear of the nation. It was the military wing of the ANC during the liberation struggles. Moreover, due to its relations with Frelimo and the MPLA, the ANC managed to establish MK training camps in both Mozambique and Angola.

¹²⁸ Roger Pfister, "Gateway to International Victory: The Diplomacy of the African National Congress in Africa, 1960-1994," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Volume 41 (1) (March 2003): 56. See also <http://countrystudies.us/south-africa/85.htm> [Accessed on 02 August 2010]. See also William Pomeroy, *Apartheid, Imperialism and African Freedom* (New York: International Publishers Co. Inc., 1986), 175-176. See also Devan Pillay, "The Tripartite Alliance and its discontents: Contesting the 'National Democratic Revolution' in the Zuma era" *New South African Review 2: New Paths, Old Compromises?* John Daniel, Prishani Naidoo, Devan Pillay and Roger Southall eds., (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2011), 34.

In Zimbabwe's liberation, Tanzania through the FLS largely participated in devising the material, diplomatic and the use of force strategies.¹²⁹ The use of arms followed the Zimbabwean movements' decision from 1965.¹³⁰ In April 1964 ZANU stated that, it would "wage the struggle for liberation...by any means."¹³¹ Again, Tanzania supported confrontation when diplomacy seemed to have failed. Nyerere expressed this in a speech delivered in London in 1975: "We are forced back to the alternative strategy outlined in the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969." He added, "The armed struggle in Rhodesia will have to be resumed and intensified until the conditions are ripe for realistic negotiations."¹³² Nyerere's speech indicated that African states were determined to pursue armed liberation until the Smith regime accepted the need to negotiate with the nationalist movements. The struggle continued until 1980, when Zimbabwe became independent.

Tanzania's support for ZANU could further be explained in terms of personal relations between Nyerere and the movement's senior leaders, Herbert Chitepo¹³³ and later, Robert Mugabe. While working as Tanzania's Director of Public Prosecution, Chitepo developed rapport with Nyerere. Indeed, it had been argued that the overriding factor behind Tanzania's support to ZANU was

¹²⁹ One of the major reasons for the formation of the FLS was Zimbabwe's liberation. For a discussion on this see A. Seidman, *The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa* (New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1985), 82. See also Omari, "The Rise and Decline of the Front Line States" 118.

¹³⁰ Houser, "Meeting Africa's Challenge," 22.

¹³¹ Reed, "International Politics and National Liberation," 38.

¹³² Khadiagala, *Allies in Adversity* 52.

¹³³ ZANU's Central Committee member and the subsequent Chairperson of ZANU's *Dare re Chimurenga* – Shona term for the Council of the revolution responsible for providing political leadership for ZANU's military when ZANU's Central Committee was detained in Rhodesia. Chitepo was appointed the Chairperson of the Joint Military Command for Zimbabwe's Liberation established in 1972 between ZANU and ZAPU. The negotiations that resulted to the signing of the Joint Protocol took place in Mbeya – Tanzania. See Press Release, Information Services Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting "ZANU and ZAPU form a United Front" C/727/72 IS/I. 327, 23 March 1972.

Nyerere's personal confidence in its leader.¹³⁴ Reeds adds that Tanzania (and Mozambique) influenced ZANU's conflict resolution strategies in two ways. First, the country sought to encourage ZAPU and ZANU to join efforts by establishing a Joint Military Command responsible for planning and carrying forward a revolutionary conflict.¹³⁵ Second, in the events that resulted in the 1979 Lancaster conference, Nyerere was able to convince ZANU leaders led by Mugabe into negotiations, which they persistently opposed.

Other conflict resolution strategies

Peaceful and forcible strategies were not the only ones employed, Tanzania used the media too. In addition to raising awareness, Tanzanian media provided a platform for conflict resolution discussion. The *Nationalist* and the *Standard* newspapers published articles on domestic and conflict resolution affairs.¹³⁶ Some of the articles were debates on regional and international progress made on liberation struggles. Some debates, for example, discussed how Angolan guerrillas succeeded in applying Mao tactics in the struggle against Portuguese rule.¹³⁷

Other published articles were about Africa's revolution. *Cheche* and later *Maji Maji* published articles by University of Dar es Salaam staff and students.¹³⁸ The discussions were largely on the role of youth in the struggle "to rid Africa of exploitation." In one of the articles, Museveni explained how they formed university students' organisation in 1967 to encourage revolutionary activities at

¹³⁴ At this time ZAPU was still employing the peaceful strategy in the struggles. See Reeds, "International Politics and National Liberation" 38.

¹³⁵ The Joint Protocol signed in Mbeya – Tanzania was part of the implementation of the ALC meeting decisions held in Benghazi – Libya 12-19 January 1972. See Press Release, Information Services Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, C/727/72 IS/I. 327, 23 March 1972.

¹³⁶ The former was the ruling party's newspaper and the latter, government's paper. See Othman, "Mwalimu Julius Nyerere" 73-74.

¹³⁷ See "Mao's Tactics", *The Nationalist* 6 February 1970, 2. See also "Decolonisation" *The Nationalist* 27 May 1965, 4.

¹³⁸ Othman, "Mwalimu Julius Nyerere," 77.

the University.¹³⁹ In 1960 Nyerere published a pamphlet, *Barriers to Democracy* in which he criticised the white minorities in Kenya, Rhodesia and South Africa for rejecting the concept of a multiracial society based on African majority rule.¹⁴⁰ Tanzanian government radio station established an independent channel to air liberation activities. Later in this work we will discuss the inauguration of Radio Tanzania's external service in 1968 to propagate the liberation movements' ideological principles.¹⁴¹

On other occasions, the Tanzanian government hosted exiled writers such as South African poet – Keorapetse Kgotsile whose works focused on the resolution of conflict between the apartheid regime and the black population, and on the role of exile politics in liberation struggles.¹⁴² Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this strategy was limited. In 1966 the South African government banned the circulation of black writings in the territory. The ban was later incorporated in the Internal Security Act.

While in Tanzania, the government facilitated members of the liberation movements to attain education. The government provided land to the ANC freedom fighters for settlement and to build the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College (SOMAFCO) at Mazimbu – near Morogoro, in 1979.¹⁴³ It seems likely that the government sought to educate the freedom fighters so that they could improve the struggle against apartheid. The other reason was for the exiled

¹³⁹ D.W. Nabudere, "The Role of Youth in the African Revolution" *Cheche* Issue Number 2, (July 1970): 11. See also Y. Museveni, "My Three Years in Tanzania" *Cheche* Issue Number 2, July (1970): 13.

¹⁴⁰ Pfister, "Gateway to International Victory," 56.

¹⁴¹ Colin Legum and John Drysdale ed., *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1968-1969* (London: Africa Research Limited, 1969), 220.

¹⁴² Es'kia Mphahlele, "Africa in Exile," *Daedalus* 111 (2) Black Africa: A Generation after independence (Spring, 1982): 45.

¹⁴³ The college was initially a secondary school that was later expanded to day care centre, nursery and primary school as well as a library. The centre also provided adult education. Students were mainly from South Africa and few born in exile. See *The Daily News* "SOMAFCO: 10th Anniversary" 23 August 1989, 7.

fighters to serve their government once they resolve the conflict with the apartheid regime.¹⁴⁴ In other instances, university and college scholarships were provided to the movements by the government to study in the Tanzanian higher learning institutions.

The liberation movements' leaders hosted in Tanzania and the strategies adopted by the Tanzanian government needed some form of protection. The government in turn adopted the National Security Act in 1970.¹⁴⁵ Given that the West was uncomfortable with Tanzania's actions, the Nyerere government took steps to protect members of the various movements. Section 9 of the Act empowers the President to declare any liberation movement based in Tanzania a "special party" whereby the party and its leaders were given some protection. Furthermore, section 3 makes spying illegal, which was not an offence before. It should be noted, however, that the practice of the President to declare a special party existed since 1963, although not incorporated in law.¹⁴⁶

Diplomatic ambiguities: Union with Zanzibar and the recognition of Biafra

Racialised politics and elements of the Cold War influence featured in Zanzibar's post-independence politics. To prevent the conflict that would arise out of identity or leadership Tanganyika sought to unite with Zanzibar. The union between the Republics of Tanganyika and Zanzibar¹⁴⁷ was effected on 26 April 1964. Nearly a month after Zanzibar's independence, Sheikh Abeid Karume, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) leader and John Okello – a Ugandan

¹⁴⁴ "Pressure on apartheid must continue" Address by J.K. Nyerere, CCM Chairperson at Mazimbu-Morogoro on the 10th Anniversary of Solomon Mahlangu College, 23 August 1989. *Sunday News* 27 August 1989, 3.

¹⁴⁵ Prior to this legislation, there was only one colonial Official Secrets Ordinance whereby the law did not provide for issues related to spying and colonial puppets.

¹⁴⁶ Translated from Press Release, Information Services Division, Ministry of Information and Tourism, "Hotuba ya Makamu wa Pili wa Rais akifikisha mbele ya Bunge Muswada unaohusu usalama wa nchi" 37/70, 19 Machi 1970.

¹⁴⁷ Zanzibar comprises of Pemba and Unguja as the main and a number of other small islands which attained independence on 10 December 1963.

soldier led a revolution and consequently, the Zanzibar government was overthrown on 12 January 1964. Afterwards, Oscar Kambona, the then Minister of External Affairs outlined Tanzania's diplomatic relations policy on 27 May 1964. Among other things, the policy specified that consulates would be established in Zanzibar.¹⁴⁸

Historical ties between Tanganyika and Zanzibar set the ground for the Union.¹⁴⁹ Relations between the Mainlanders and the African majority on the islands were developed in various ways dating back to the period of trade interactions with the rest of the world. The islands [and to some extent the coast] had established trading relations with Arabia, India, Egypt, Persia, Greece and other countries. Arabs and Shirazi settled and intermingled with the Bantu-speaking mainland groups, which culminated in the emergence of Swahili culture.¹⁵⁰ Later on, the nationalist struggles particularly close association between TANU on the mainland and the island-based ASP reinforced the relations.

The Union was to some extent used by Tanganyika to set an example of promoting Africa's political federation following pre-independence setbacks of achieving that of the East African region.¹⁵¹ Unification at the sub-regional level was perceived to be a stepping-stone towards a wider African integration and was achieved when regional cooperation in Africa and Europe was being strengthened. It could have been seen that Tanganyika wanted to prove that the initiatives were homegrown rather than being influenced by international events. While addressing the national assembly and maintaining that the Union

¹⁴⁸ Kalley, Schoeman and Andor, *Southern African Political History* 573-638.

¹⁴⁹ Cliffe, "From Independence to Self-Reliance," 248-249.

¹⁵⁰ See Ian C. Parker, "Ideological and Economic Development in Tanzania," *African Studies Review* 15 (1) (April 1972): 45.

¹⁵¹ Pratt, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania* 139.

was inspired by the desire for African countries, Nyerere said that unity in the African continent does not have to come via Moscow or Washington.”¹⁵²

The decision to form the union could be considered as an effort to counteract the Cold War. The Mainland government feared that the islands could be turned into a centre of Communist subversion. Kambona described to an American journalist that the concern was on the growing Communist presence in Zanzibar and the related danger of Cold War in the Congo spreading. The challenge was how to detach Zanzibar from the East and at the same time prevent it from being used by the West for its own interests.¹⁵³ To resolve this conflict, the Mainland had to immediately adopt the initiatives, which to a certain extent were a reaction to the events at the regional and international levels.

Evidently a key motive towards the creation of the Union could be seen in terms of overcoming the Cold War security challenges.¹⁵⁴ Given that the impact of the Cold War had already been experienced in other parts of Africa and Asia, the primary goal was to prevent Zanzibar and the Mainland from being drawn into the confrontation. Describing the international politics of the time and Zanzibar’s domestic situation Nyerere said, “China on the island... on the mainland the Americans saying I am fighting Communism, and it’s Vietnam in Africa.”¹⁵⁵ The Union could, therefore, be seen as both a stabiliser to the Cold War and a model towards pan-African unity.

¹⁵² Smith, *Nyerere of Tanzania* 126-127. See also Julius K. Nyerere, “The Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar” *Freedom and Unity* 291-294.

¹⁵³ See Pratt, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania* 139. See also Kassum, *Africa’s Winds of Change* 44-45.

¹⁵⁴ Tanzania was becoming a platform for the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet dispute. The immediate recognition of the Zanzibar revolution, mostly by the Communist countries strengthened the ties between them. Furthermore, the Soviet Union feared the direct U.S. or U.S. sponsored intervention in Zanzibar. Through integration and upholding the non-aligned position and dignity of states Nyerere severed the challenge. See Pratt, *the Critical Phase in Tanzania*, 134-139. See also Smith, *Nyerere of Tanzania*, 137-138.

¹⁵⁵ Smith, *Nyerere of Tanzania* 128.

The unification strengthened Tanzania's credibility in conflict resolution since racial and ideological divisions featured in Zanzibar's history and politics. On the one hand, the Arab-led Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) developed relations with Egypt and the Sudan with the hope that politicised Islam would resolve the conflict over unity. The radical wing of the communist ideology on the other hand, led by Abdularhman Mohammed Babu, invited the People's Republic of China to open an embassy in Zanzibar. The British negotiated independence with the ZNP leaders and formed the majority in the government, which further aggravated the divisions. The 1964 revolution drew international community's attention and received mixed reactions.¹⁵⁶ To regulate Zanzibar's growing political conflict, the revolutionary government was integrated to the Mainland.

The Union posed Tanzanian foreign policy dilemma with German Democratic Republic (DDR).¹⁵⁷ In the aftermath, the DDR put pressure on Tanzania to offer the same level of diplomatic status as that accorded by the People's Republic of Zanzibar. This was followed by the country's compromise solution to allow the DDR to open a Consulate-General in Dar es Salaam, which

¹⁵⁶ Within ten days of the Revolution East Germany, China, the Soviet Union, then Czechoslovakia, Cuba, North Korea, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania recognised the new government. China became a trade partner in cloves, and provided loans, the Soviet Union trained the new army; the East Germans provided doctors for the Zanzibar hospitals. The West sought to withhold recognition until late February and decided not to intervene although at first moved forces closer to Zanzibar. For a discussion on Zanzibar Revolution see Robert D. Kaplan, *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power* (New York: Random House, 2010), 313-314.

¹⁵⁷ Tanganyika formed a larger part of the German East Africa and after independence the country had established relations with West Germany. Following the Zanzibar revolution, East Germany established an embassy in Zanzibar, being its first in Africa. Smith, *Nyerere of Tanzania*, 137-138.

would not possess official recognition.¹⁵⁸ Dissatisfied with the decision, West Germany rejected and retaliated by recalling the naval and air training personnel and withdrawing aid. In turn, Tanzania ordered the removal of all German technical assistance personnel. Evidently, if the Union government would comply with the West Germany's demands, it would create a negative impact. As Cliffe argues, the retaliation was a lesson to Tanzania; she had learnt about the pressures that could be employed by the developed nations to protect their interests.¹⁵⁹

Unlike Zanzibar, the state of Biafra in Nigeria¹⁶⁰ sought to secede following economic and social exclusion. After the military takeover of Nigeria, ethnic tensions intensified and others did not accept people from the Eastern region as Nigerian citizens. As a result of exclusion from power and inter-ethnic killings, on 30 May 1967 Colonel Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu unilaterally declared independence for the Republic of Biafra. Tanzania sought to recognise and support Biafra. It was indeed a form of diplomatic embarrassment that would compel the Federal Government to initiate peace negotiations. The decision was inspired by Tanzania's belief that it is the responsibility of the African governments to provide security to its citizens. Nyerere emphasised that

¹⁵⁸ The decision was guided by the policy that embassies would be established with the United Republic of Tanzania government, while consulates with the revolutionary government of Zanzibar. See Pratt, *the Critical Phase in Tanzania*, 141. See also Official Gazette, 19 February 1965. The other post-Union foreign policy crisis was that of January 1965 when Tanzanian government announced its decision to expel two U.S. embassy officials over subversive activities in Zanzibar.

¹⁵⁹ Cliffe, "From Independence to Self-Reliance," 249.

¹⁶⁰ At independence Nigeria adopted a federal government structure set by the colonialists comprising three regions defined in terms of the country's major ethnic and religious groups – the Muslim Hausa-Fulani in the North; religiously heterogenous Yoruba in the South-West; and the Christians Igbo in the South-East. The Southern states of the federation, including Biafra, decided to delay their demand for independence until the North was ready to join them. The Igbo staged the secession due to economic, ethnic, cultural and religious tensions in Nigeria. Tanzania was the first country to officially recognise Biafra on 13 April 1968, followed by Gabon, Ivory Coast, Zambia and Haiti. The Secessionist state collapsed on 15 January 1970. See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/596712.stm>; and <http://www.usafricaonline.com/nyererebiafra.html> [Both accessed on 02 December 2009].

Biafrans experienced "rejection within their state."¹⁶¹ Since the Igbo were being exterminated within their own country; they therefore had the right to self-determination so as to guarantee their own security.

Criticising oppressive leaders and regimes strengthened Tanzania's credibility in conflict resolution.¹⁶² Tanzania supported Biafra because it was concerned with the mobilisation and maintenance of international support for the struggle against colonialism and exclusion. This stand was contrary to most African Heads of Government who were concerned about maintaining power in the wake of secession, coups and fragmentation within their states. As Daddieh and Shaw argue, if African incumbent leaders supported Biafra, it could have sent wrong indications to their political opponents.¹⁶³

Diplomatic relations between Tanzania and Nigeria were suspended and the negotiations continued until 16 January 1969 when Nyerere discussed the Biafran issue with the then France President, Charles de Gaulle.¹⁶⁴ Biafra collapsed after the defeat by the Federal troops largely led by British officers coupled with hunger, lack of medicine and equipment. On 7 June 1971 Nigeria and Tanzania agreed to exchange diplomatic envoys, and later on 1 September the same year, Tanzania re-opened its diplomatic Mission in Lagos. Tanzania, however, resolved the conflict with the Nigerian government during the 1970 OAU summit after Biafra's defeat.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶¹ Government Printer, Dar es Salaam 13 April 1968. See also T.M. Shaw, "The Foreign Policy of Tanzania 1961-1968," (M.A. dissertation, the University of East Africa, 1969), 178-179.

¹⁶² Gordon, "Anglophonic Variants," 95.

¹⁶³ Cyril Kofie Daddieh and Timothy M. Shaw, "The Political Economy of Decision-Making in African Foreign Policy: Recognition of Biafra and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)," *International Political Science Review* 5 (1) Foreign Policy Decisions in the Third World (1984): 21, 31.

¹⁶⁴ Kalley, Schoeman and Andor, *Southern African Political History*, 573-638.

¹⁶⁵ Mushi and Mathews ed., *Foreign Policy of Tanzania* 103. See also N.U. Akpan, *The Struggle for Secession 1966-1970: A Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War*, 2nd edition (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1976), 165, 192.

Beyond the State: Support for regionalism

The support for liberation struggles intensified from the late 1950's when Mwalimu Nyerere, then TANU President, stated that during Tanganyika's independence the freedom torch would be lit on top of Mount Kilimanjaro to throw light of freedom all over Africa.¹⁶⁶ This assertion symbolised Dar es Salaam's post-independence support for anti-colonialism and conflict resolution and consequently, pan-African nation-building process. The reason was that the country did not consider itself to be liberated while other African countries were still in conflict.¹⁶⁷ At this time, it was possible for Tanzania to identify its independence with that of the other nations because all of them had one goal – anti colonial struggles. Afterwards, pan-African nation building was to a certain extent neutralised by the fact that post-colonial states had different goals to attain in both domestic and external environments.

Nyerere invited to Mwanza fellow nationalist movements' leaders from Uganda, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Zanzibar and Zimbabwe and formed PAFMECA on 17 September 1958. The proposal was tabled in March 1958 – during Ghana's first anniversary, when Nyerere discussed with Nkrumah and George Padmore about the All African Peoples Conference (AAPC) that was to convene in the same year. Tom Mboya and Joseph Murumbi discussed with Nyerere the possibility of establishing a sub-regional grouping as a precursor to African unity. PAFMECA was later endorsed by AAPC in its Accra meeting.¹⁶⁸ Tanzania was the movement's first leader and a permanent secretariat was established in Dar es Salaam. This was supported by the country's geographical proximity to

¹⁶⁶ Mpangala, "Tanzania's Support to Liberation Struggle" 15.

¹⁶⁷ National liberation implied the liberation of all African countries. The idea was for the first time articulated by Kwame Nkrumah – Ghana's first president in 1957 when he emphasised that his country's independence would be meaningful if linked to Africa's liberation. He reiterated during the 29 July 1958 address to the United States, organised by the American Committee on Africa. See George M. Houser, "Meeting Africa's Challenge: The Story of the American Committee on Africa," *A Quarterly Journal of African Opinion*, VI (2/3) Summer/Fall 1976, 19. See also P. Olisanwuche Esedebe, *Pan-Africanism: The Idea and the Movement, 1776-1991*, 2nd ed., Washington D.C., (Howard University Press, 1994), 165.

¹⁶⁸ Adi and Sherwood, *Pan-African History* 148-49.

the colonised territories. The other reason was that there was a possibility that Tanzania was to become the first British East and Central African territory to attain independence.¹⁶⁹

The PAFMECA played a specific role in preventing and resolving racial conflicts. The organisation's main objective was to promote solidarity and cooperation among both the nationalist movements and independent states. It aimed at unifying Eastern and Central African movements and at facilitating discussions on strategies to attain self-government. All the objectives were implemented with the determination to use non-violent approach. During the April 1959 conference, as Maoulidi argues, Nyerere too resolved the conflict between Arab and African movements as they were divided along racial lines in the liberation struggles. In September the same year, Nyerere confirmed that Europeans and Africans would be treated as African citizens after independence.¹⁷⁰

In 1962, the movement expanded to include Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Somalia, South Africa and Swaziland and was re-named Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA). PAFMECSA's intention of using peaceful approach to conflict resolution was not always successful. Most of the territories attained independence between 1961 and 1963. Other countries such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique seemed to have been taking longer. Two conditions could be identified here for Tanzania. In the first place, it was imperative to shift the strategy; to become more aggressive. In the second place, support for the creation of a larger regional organisation was necessary in order to join efforts for conflict resolution. TANU largely provided financial support to PAFMECSA,¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁹ Salim, "Remembering Mwalimu," 26.

¹⁷⁰ Maoulidi, "Racial and religious tolerance" 136-137.

¹⁷¹ Adi and Sherwood, *Pan-African History*, 149.

which implied that in the long run, Tanzania could not fully support the enlarged organisation.

Nyerere's speech to the Heads of State and Government Conference in Addis Ababa in 1963 articulated Tanzania's determination to support the armed struggle in conflict resolution. He emphasised that the country had already begun to participate in the resolution of colonial and racial conflicts and was ready to sacrifice more including "to die" for final removal of the humiliation of colonialism in Africa. He further highlighted that it was Africa, which had to take the necessary collective measures to liberate the colonised territories.¹⁷² PAFMECSA was dissolved after the creation of OAU and was replaced by 1977. The African Women Conference of 1962 held in Dar es Salaam attended by women from all over Africa influenced the formation of the OAU. The conference to some extent served as a precursor of the subsequent conference that launched the OAU in the following year.¹⁷³

Tanzania's demonstrated commitment to the participation in Africa's conflict resolution resulted in the adoption of Resolution 11 of the OAU establishing a liberation coordination committee. It was later named the African Liberation Committee (ALC) or the Committee of Nine.¹⁷⁴ Since Tanzania was to provide the chairperson¹⁷⁵ and the headquarters were in Dar es Salaam, most

¹⁷² Tanganyika's commitment to support armed liberation struggle in southern Africa surprised many since Nyerere's approach to Tanganyika's nationalist struggles were peaceful. See Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity* 215-216; Mpangala, "Tanzania's Support to the Liberation Struggle" 16. See also Abillah H. Omari and Paulino Macaringue "Southern African Security in Historical Perspective" in *Security and Democracy in Southern Africa*, ed. Gavin Cawthra, Andre du Pisani and Abillah Omari (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2007), 50.

¹⁷³ Translated from Hotuba ya Waziri Mkuu, Bwana Rashidi Kawawa kupokea maandamano baada ya mkutano wa wanawake wa Bara la Afrika, Dar es Salaam 31 Julai, 1972, Information Services Department, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Press Release 76/72 IS/I.302, 31 July 1972.

¹⁷⁴ The nine appointed Committee members were Algeria, Congo (Brazaville), Ethiopia, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanganyika, Uganda and the United Arab Republic.

¹⁷⁵ Oscar Kambona – the then Minister of External Affairs was the Chairperson of both committees – for drafting the OAU Charter and the ALC. His involvement and prominence in Tanzania's independence struggles resulted to the Ministerial appointment, which was also

of the meetings were held in Tanzania.¹⁷⁶ The committee was responsible for harmonising assistance from the African states and managing a special budget for the struggle for freedom. It collaborated with the OAU governing board and the Tanzanian government in providing funding, logistical support and facilitation of training and publicity to the officially recognised movements. One of the Committee's last responsibilities was to end apartheid in South Africa.¹⁷⁷

The creation of the OAU was largely backed by Tanzania because it faced two major challenges: the liberation of the Southern African region and the problem of handling refugees. Support for the formation of the OAU as a pan-African body would allow its members to speak with one voice on issues affecting African countries, particularly in the multilateral organisations negotiations. Furthermore, it involved a number of states in sharing the burden of work on conflict resolution. As Hoskyns argues, the creation of the OAU also helped Tanzania in overcoming the challenges associated with activities to deal with conflicts in the region.¹⁷⁸

To prevent inter-state conflicts and from the traditional territorial state perspective, Tanzania called for the respect of the borders at independence. The 1960's border conflicts between Niger and Benin (formerly Dahomey), and between Ghana and Ivory Coast indicated that peace and stability were more

contributed by his influence among the liberation movements' leaders based in Dar es Salaam. For a detailed discussion on this see <http://www.jamiiforums.com/jukwaa-la-siasa/> 58481-historia-ya-oscar-kambona-iko-wapi [Accessed on 15 April 2010].

¹⁷⁶ See Mohamed Sahnoun, "Nyerere, the Organisation of African Unity and Liberation," <http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features> [Accessed on 02 December 2009]; Nnoli, *Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania*, 6. See also Omari, "The Rise and Decline of Front Line States" 47.

¹⁷⁷ The Dar es Salaam ALC meeting of 8 to 12 January 1975 discussed the new strategy in supporting struggles against Apartheid. Between 1992 and 1993 other meetings were held in Dar es Salaam and Arusha to review the management of the transitional process. Mpangala, "Tanzania's Support to the Liberation Struggle" 17. See also Dinah Richard Mmbaga, *Historical Description of the African Liberation Committee: Reconstructing the Process*: (Dar es Salaam: Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, 2006), 3, 10 and 120.

¹⁷⁸ Hoskyns, "Africa's Foreign Relations: The Case of Tanzania," 456.

important than re-drawing borders. During the OAU 1964 Cairo Summit, Nyerere, supported by the majority of delegates, stressed the inviolability and permanence of borders. This view prevailed in Resolution 104 of the OAU Assembly.¹⁷⁹ The resolution, however, provided room for neighbouring states to adjust the borders by an agreement. This OAU resolution notwithstanding, border conflict, however, featured in African international relations well beyond that point. Indeed, between 1971 and 1978, Tanzania found itself in conflict with Uganda and Burundi respectively. In 1978/79 it also clashed with Uganda over the border – despite prior mediation by Presidents of Kenya and Somalia – which resulted in the signing of the five-point peace agreement in Mogadishu.¹⁸⁰

Although critics were of the view that the OAU has been ineffective in resolving intra-state conflicts due to the non-interference principle, it was successful in regulating Tanganyika's army mutiny. The mutiny took place on 20 January 1964 in Dar es Salaam when sections of the army demanded higher salaries and the total Africanisation of the corps. Nyerere in response requested the British troops to maintain order, including disarming the soldiers. The OAU later authorised the bilateral loan of troops to replace the British in the mutiny's aftermath. Tanganyika signed an agreement with Nigeria and Ethiopia¹⁸¹ for the provision of peacekeeping troops from Nigeria that served as the local police reserve, and the air force training contingent from Ethiopia. Nevertheless, concern triggered among African countries about the possibility of compromising between the OAU Liberation Committee and the liberation

¹⁷⁹ Morocco and Somalia expressed reservations. The former was laying claims on Mauritania while the later was claiming the Ogaden (part of Ethiopia) and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya. See Salim Ahmed Salim, "Remembering Mwalimu," in *Sites of Memory*, 26. See also <http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features> [Accessed on 02 December 2009].

¹⁸⁰ Kalley, Schoeman and Andor, *Southern African Political History*, 573-630.

¹⁸¹ B. David Meyers, "Intraregional Conflict Management by the Organisation of African Unity," *International Organisation* 28 (3) (Summer 1974): 363, 367-368.

movements based in Dar es Salaam by the British troops, which did not happen.

Tanganyika's move towards regionalism could also be interpreted as a lesson from the European countries, which are economically powerful yet taking initiatives towards cooperation. At the sub-regional level, East African unity¹⁸² was considered important for conflict prevention and economic development. In 1961 Tanzania was ready to postpone its independence so that it could attain federation with Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar. Since there was no positive response from Kenya, Tanzania became independent ahead of the other two.¹⁸³ The proposal for immediate creation of the East African federation was largely driven by the question of timing. In other words, the motive was grounded in the belief that immediate unification of the newly independent states would empower them to speak as one bloc, especially on economic issues. More than 30 years later Nyerere conceded, "I felt we should become one country." According to him, the question was "how and when;" he was convinced that at the "time of independence."¹⁸⁴

After the experience of the first federation attempt, Tanzania was still confident in regional cooperation to the extent of being ready to have a Federal President from Kenya. In an interview Nyerere explained that he and Milton Obote [Uganda's leader] went to Jomo and said: "let us unite our countries and you be our head of state. He said no."¹⁸⁵ Kenya's refusal could be explained by a number of factors. As Makinda argues, economic interests prevailed over

¹⁸² Dates back to the 1920's when the British government initiated move to integrate the economies of Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda. By 1927, there was common tariff, duty-free transfer of imported goods, single currency and integrated railways, customs, posts and defence. Yeager, *Tanzania: An African Experiment* 97.

¹⁸³ Uganda gained independence in 1962, followed by Kenya in 1963. Kassum, *Africa's Winds of Change* 39. Also translated from *Mwananchi*, "Shirikisho la Afrika Mashariki au Umoja wa Afrika?" 31 Januari 2007, 15.

¹⁸⁴ Smith, *Nyerere of Tanzania* 72.

¹⁸⁵ Bunting, "The Heart of Africa." 68.

Kenya's relations with the neighbouring countries as demonstrated by the fact that it was a more industrialised and an economically powerful nation.¹⁸⁶ The other reason is that from the liberation struggles, Kenyatta received a regional reputation of being a strong supporter of pan-Africanism even though in reality, after independence, he was leaning towards neutrality.

Tanzania seemed to have overlooked the fact that independence would complicate regional cooperation given that each country would separately define its national interests and development strategies.¹⁸⁷ While Kenya and Tanzania were close political allies in the liberation struggle, they later evolved different ideological and economic development patterns. Tanzania moved towards an egalitarian and self-reliant agrarian socialism while Kenya took a capitalist path, with emphasis on foreign investment and industrial development. Uganda's option for Tanzania's course was reflected in the adoption of the Common Man's Charter.¹⁸⁸ Influenced by the liberation struggles experience, Tanzania seemed to have disregarded the fact that each country had different development needs.

Cooperation in the East African region was sought between independent states while that of Southern Africa was mainly among the liberation movements. The informal Front Line States (FLS) alliance established in 1975 constituted Zambia, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique and Botswana.¹⁸⁹ The OAU entrusted the alliance with provision of greater support to the liberation efforts

¹⁸⁶ From the colonial period, Kenya's economic performance outstripped that of Uganda and Tanzania, and the distribution of revenues and trade profits under the East African High Commission and the East African Common Services Organisation reinforced the trend.

¹⁸⁷ David F. Gordon, "Anglophonic Variants: Kenya versus Tanzania," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 489, International Affairs in Africa (January 1987): 92.

¹⁸⁸ Uganda's blue print of African Socialism. Yeager, *Tanzania: An African Experiment* 97-99.

¹⁸⁹ The FLS traces its origin in the Mulungushi Club formed in 1970. Key players were Nyerere and Kaunda. Other founders were Sir Seretse Khama (Botswana), Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria), Samora Machel (Mozambique's transitional government) and Agostinho Neto (Angola). The Mulungushi Club was for the Heads of State than interstate relations and focused on the resolution of liberation conflicts. Omari and Macaringue "Southern African Security" 50-51.

and pressurise on the white minority regimes of South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe.¹⁹⁰ Zambia and Zaire (the current DRC) also participated in resolving the ern African conflicts even before the creation of the FLS.¹⁹¹ Both were largely the primary actors due to the direct role played in the struggle against colonialism and racism.

Following the alliance's responsibility of coordinating liberation activities, Mozambique and other members experienced reprisals from the South Africa and Rhodesia. In response Tanzania initiated the adoption of a defence pact in 1977 where an attack to any one of the members was considered to be on all of them. Unlike the other frontline states, Tanzania did not experience major attack from the South Africans or Rhodesians, except in the Southern regions bordering Mozambique where the Portuguese military action occurred. The government initiated the policy of arming the villagers who were trained in self-defence in 1967.¹⁹²

The coordination of diplomatic and political activities of the FLS resulted in the establishment of the SADCC in 1980.¹⁹³ Whereas SADCC was established to promote and support economic liberation of the Southern African region after the independence, it could also be seen as a reaction against South Africa's proposal of forming the Constellation of Southern African States.¹⁹⁴ The reason

¹⁹⁰ Mpangala, "Tanzania's Support to the Liberation Struggle" 10.

¹⁹¹ Omari, "The Rise and Decline of the Front Line States," 109, 112-113.

¹⁹² Rashidi Kawawa – then Second Vice-President announced that all physically fit Tanzanians in the villages bordering Mozambique were being trained in self-defence. This was described as the extended measures of the Standing Committee on Defence of the OAU African Liberation Committee. See "Tanzania Villagers Armed," *East African Standard*, April 19, 1967. See also Johnson, "Nyerere: A Flawed Hero," 68.

¹⁹³ SADCC was founded few months before Zimbabwe's independence. The initial meeting was held in Gaborone – Botswana 1979; followed by the first conference in Arusha – Tanzania (the same year). The draft resolution was adopted in Lusaka – Zambia 1980. See J. Barron Boyd, Jr., "A Subsystemic Analysis of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference," *African Studies Review*, 28 (4) (December 1985): 46-47.

¹⁹⁴ For more discussion see Ahmed, "A Regional Framework for Promoting Security" 9-10.

was that Southern African countries were striving to disassociate with the apartheid regime. Nevertheless, most of the SADCC's projects were aid-dependent, which exposed them to the influence of donors. Moreover, ideological confrontation impacted some of the organisation's members, given that the West did not consider providing development assistance to the governments that adopted socialist policies.

Other players involved in conflict resolution

Tanzania was not without assistance. Kenneth Kaunda, the then Zambia's President worked with Nyerere to resolve colonial and racial conflicts. Zambia provided a rear-base to the ANC, MPLA and SWAPO. Furthermore, guided by moral stand the two leaders were able to influence the OAU and Commonwealth summits over the years.¹⁹⁵ Zambia, however, unlike Tanzania, officially denied any connection with establishing or hosting guerrilla-training camps. The liberation movements were instead permitted to open offices in Lusaka.¹⁹⁶ The government facilitated the construction of the African Liberation Centre in 1965, where all the nationalist movements were accommodated.¹⁹⁷ The centre was established to allow the government exercise some form of supervision over the exile groups and minimise domestic security threats.¹⁹⁸ Zambia appeared to be more restrictive than Tanzania, perhaps due to its geographical location, being bordered by Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories – Angola and Mozambique.

Scandinavian countries provided both diplomatic and humanitarian support for the nationalist movements.¹⁹⁹ From the early 1960's, Norwegian

¹⁹⁵ www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/59501 [Accessed on 02 December 2009].

¹⁹⁶ See Essack, "Armed Struggle in Southern Africa" 1432.

¹⁹⁷ Houser, "African Liberation Movements," 11.

¹⁹⁸ Douglas G. Anglin, "Confrontation in Southern Africa: Zambia and Portugal," *International Journal* 25 (3) (Summer 1970): 504.

¹⁹⁹ The assistance was in the form of health services and medicine, training including scholarship programmes, food and clothing.

support, for example, came initially from civil society organisations, particularly churches.²⁰⁰ Scandinavian countries also provided training and scholarship programmes. The International University Exchange Fund (IUEF) was established in early 1960's financed by Scandinavian countries to help the liberation movements obtain scholarships and training.²⁰¹ The ground for Sweden's support was laid by its then Prime Minister – Olof Palme. His 1965 address to the Congress was a breakthrough to Swedish support for the liberation movements. He articulated a policy for supporting conflict resolution especially for the people of Vietnam and Southern Africa.²⁰² Consequently, humanitarian support from the Scandinavian countries was shipped through Tanzania.

International non-governmental organisations, such as the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF), were established to assist apartheid victims and their dependants. The organisation dates back to 1953 when the NGO Christian Aid was formed in England. The movement later spread to Europe and in 1972 was transformed to International Defence and Aid Fund with branches in Australia, the Netherlands and the U.S. At the same period, the American Committee on Africa (ACA) was formed and established its own fund affiliated to the IDAF, while maintaining its own activities.²⁰³

The ACA supported the freedom struggle in Southern Africa.²⁰⁴ The region turned to be the organisation's major area of concern when the colonies sought to use the armed struggle.²⁰⁵ The committee started to work in South Africa (1956), when 156 South Africans were charged with treason. The ACA

²⁰⁰ Mpangala, "Tanzania's Support to the Liberation Struggle" 14-15.

²⁰¹ Shepherd. Jr, "Humanitarian Assistance to Liberation Movements" 81.

²⁰² Mpangala, "Tanzania's Support to the Liberation Struggle" 14-15.

²⁰³ Shepherd Jr., "Humanitarian Assistance to Liberation Movements," 80.

²⁰⁴ They also include Guinea-Bissau in West Africa which was a Portuguese colony. Other countries include Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.

²⁰⁵ Houser, "Meeting Africa's Challenge," 22.

funded the education campaign, Declaration of Conscience against Apartheid, which later evolved to a celebration of Human Rights Day on 10 December 1957. One hundred and twenty-three leaders representing 28 nations signed the declaration.²⁰⁶ The statement emphasised that "Freedom and human dignity are in grave jeopardy in South Africa" and called on governments and organisations "to persuade the South African government, before it reaches a point of no return..."²⁰⁷

Challenges faced by Tanzania

Serving as the rear base turned Tanzania an enemy to the apartheid and Portuguese governments. In February 1968 S.A. Muller, then Deputy Minister of the South African police accused Tanzania of harbouring terrorist training camps.²⁰⁸ On its part, the Government of Tanzania openly admitted to host training camps for freedom fighters and called the oppressed people to regard it as a revolutionary base.²⁰⁹ The result of this act, however, was that Tanzania's Southern regions became a target of the Portuguese harassment and military attacks.²¹⁰ In reaction, the regions were declared restricted areas, this contributed to economic under-development.

Hosting the liberation movements sometimes posed a threat to the national security. In the early 1970's the ANC and PAC were implicated in the coup plans initiated by Kambona, Tanzania's former Minister of Foreign Affairs and the OAU Liberation Committee Chairperson, against Nyerere. During the court investigations of May 1970, Oliver Tambo, then ANC leader, refused to

²⁰⁶ Martin Luther King, Pablo Casals, Alan Paton, Bruno Walter John Gunther and Julius Nyerere were among the signatories.

²⁰⁷ Houser, "Meeting Africa's Challenge," 16-17.

²⁰⁸ Kalley, Schoeman and Andor, *Southern African Political History*, 573-630.

²⁰⁹ A.K. Essack, "Armed Struggle in Southern Africa," *Economic and Political Weekly* 5 (34) (22 August 1970): 1432.

²¹⁰ Mpangala, "Tanzania's support to the Liberation Struggle" 21.

testify against Kambona. It resulted in the organisations' activities being suspended for several years. Relations were later re-established after September 1978 when Nyerere received an ANC delegation headed by Tambo.²¹¹

Inter-liberation groups' misunderstandings caused by ideological orientation and/or competition for recognition by either the Tanzanian government or the ALC, somewhat posed a challenge. The ANC and PAC were guided by opposing policies. The PAC advocated a black exclusivity policy while the ANC supported the non-racial policy. As a result of the influence of the white people, the ANC was being described in terms of race and ethnicity. In 1962 the ANC established provisional headquarters in Dar es Salaam, presumably motivated by the plan of having access to Tanzanian government and subsequently the ALC's support. In 1964, however, the ANC moved its headquarters to Morogoro. As Pfister argues, while the reasons were unclear, it could partly be explained by the PAC's decision to shift its headquarters to Dar es Salaam in the same year.²¹² In the end, Tanzania sought to recognise the two organisations perhaps due to the reason that both had the same goal – resolving conflict with the apartheid regime.

Tanzania had to use the meagre resources available to support the Tanzanian-based liberation movements since African states lacked the material, economic and military power to assist them. The ALC's first report to the OAU Council of Ministers of August 1963 indicated that only five African states had contributed to the Liberation Fund, totalling £ 240,000.²¹³ Compared to their adversaries, the countries were militarily weak. The total sub-Saharan Africa armed forces were estimated at 150,000 while that of South Africa alone was

²¹¹ Pfister, "Gateway to International Victory," 56.

²¹² Pfister, "Gateway to International Victory," 55-56.

²¹³ Akpan, "African Goals and Strategies toward Southern Africa," 251. See also *Africa Report*, August 1963.

approximately 112,000 and Portugal's 148,000.²¹⁴ As Nyerere argued, African states are poor; some were focusing on the nation-building priorities while others were trying to make independence meaningful to the people. Nyerere is of the view that the nationalist movements needed more help than Africa alone could provide in terms of armaments and economic support. As a result, the nationalists could not have specific strategy for the struggles rather, had to accept help from wherever they could get it.²¹⁵

Conclusion

Tanzania's nation-building initiatives focused on the promotion of the unity forged during the liberation struggles. The aim was to overcome racial and ethnic divisions set by colonialism. It was for this reason that the then ruling party-TANU, declared the intention of building a socialist nation based on an egalitarian system. To achieve this, policy strategies adopted included the introduction of the national service, quota system in education, abolition of chieftainship and the Africanisation of the public service. Most of the policy initiatives reflected the broader framework of socialism and self-reliance.

Nyerere's influence in building Tanzania's legitimacy in conflict resolution was important. In addition to his family and educational background, Ghandi and Nkrumah further inspired Nyerere. He adopted strategies of the successful resistances in Ghana and India to the then Tanganyika's context. This influence of Nyerere eventually shaped the country's nationalist struggles and support to other territories. He also worked with his close allies such as Kambona and Kawawa. Despite Nyerere's personality, factors such as the Cold War and the nature of the international system influenced Tanzanian conflict resolution and foreign policy decisions.

²¹⁴ They include army, navy, air force and paramilitary. Akpan, "African Goals and Strategies toward Southern Africa" 250-251. See also Legum and Drysdale, "African Contemporary Record" 718.

²¹⁵ Nyerere, "America and Southern Africa," 675-76.

The nationalist struggles experience and nation-building informed Tanzania's diplomacy and the promotion of pan-African unity. At the regional level, the country's concern was to liberate the whole of Africa followed by the continental unification. It was to this end that Nyerere invited to Mwanza the other nationalist leaders from the neighbouring countries to form PAFMECA, which largely played the role of resolving colonial conflicts. The organisation was later expanded to include wider Southern African territories. The creation of the OAU in 1963 replaced PAFMECSA.

The government's decision to unite with Zanzibar and recognise Biafra posed a challenge to Tanzania's credibility in conflict resolution. Although both choices were largely justified by upholding dignity of the people and states, they resulted in breaking diplomatic relations with some countries of the West, some of whom were the principal donors. As a consequence of aid withdrawal, Tanzania's economy was negatively impacted on. Due to this Tanzania sought alternative internal and external means to implement development programmes.

Recognising the importance of working with the other actors Tanzania joined NAM, the Commonwealth, and backed the proposal to form the OAU. The major aim was to have an independent position in foreign affairs decisions. In addition to supporting nationalist struggles in these organisations Tanzania further advocated the recognition of the African countries. One of the strategies was to create the OAU so as to have a platform where African countries could speak with one voice on the international issues that affect their interests. The mobilisation of the various actors and the international institutions to support conflict resolution was also accompanied by the change of strategy, from peaceful to a more aggressive.

The success of any strategy was largely determined by other actors' support, negotiations power and the ability to convince others to take action. Tanzania's moral support and the mobilisation of the world opinion were important in laying the ground for the international community's acceptance of

the decolonisation movements. One of the notable strategies was advocacy for the colonised territories' interests in the international institutions. The liberation movements, for example, were given an opportunity to address the UN General Assembly.

Tanzania was against military coups and unconstitutional changes of government. The country's military intervention in Uganda could partly be explained in terms of this perspective. Moreover, Tanzania wanted to demonstrate that it was not only concerned about the colonial and racist regimes but also about post-independence dictators. Although perceived to be an intervention into a neighbouring country, Tanzania wanted to maintain its legitimacy in protecting and promoting respect for humanity in a situation that was considered by the region to be an internal affair.

Chapter 2

Towards the end of the Cold War: Tanzania's shifting agenda of conflict resolution

Introduction

From the mid-1970's Africa was gradually emerging in world politics in a number of ways. The superpowers were involved in the Horn and Angola's conflicts; negotiations were carried out with South Africa on granting independence to Namibia and ending apartheid. In East Africa unresolved misunderstanding between Nyerere and Idi Amin resulted in the 1978/79 Tanzania-Uganda armed confrontation. Furthermore, Tanzania's conflict with Kenya partly contributed to the collapse of the former East African Community (EAC).

Globally, capitalism challenged socialism, resulting in economic and subsequent political shifts. Socialist governments such as Tanzania could not independently cope and therefore, sought to implement structural adjustment programmes that entailed economic liberalisation and political pluralism.¹ At the regional level, the end of apartheid system and decolonisation conflicts took place at the same time. As will be demonstrated, both had implications on Tanzania's foreign relations and also on the involvement in conflict resolution in sub-Saharan Africa.

The focus of Tanzania's conflict resolution and foreign policy agenda was largely dominated by removal of colonial legacies and the debates about relations between rich and poor countries. As noted earlier, Nyerere had been an influential advocate in not only promoting majority rule in the region and leading the struggle against neo-colonialism, but also in defending developing

¹ M. Anne Pitcher and Kelly M. Askew, "African Socialisms and Post-socialisms," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 76 (1) (2006): 1.

countries' interests in the North-South relations. Consequently, Tanzania remained an influential actor in international politics. Nyerere mobilised foreign aid from eastern, western and even Scandinavian countries.² The international assistance was used for both financing domestic development programmes and supporting the remaining nationalist movements.

Internally, *Ujamaa* adopted as the Tanzanian nation-building strategy at independence was challenged by capitalism. Using economic indicators as the criterion, the neo-liberals argued that self-reliance was never attained. The ideology, however, had impact on people's lives. Pitcher and Askew argue that socialist values had tangible effects on the social aspects of Tanzanian villages.³ A high degree of success was registered in the creation of national consciousness and the promotion of a common language. More importantly, the majority could have an opportunity to participate in nation-building and development programmes. The government succeeded in reducing income disparities ratio from 27:1 in 1961 to 9:1 by 1987 and reducing adult literacy rate from 10 percent in 1960 to 72 percent in 1980.⁴

This chapter explores Tanzania's shifting agenda of conflict resolution from the late 1970's to the 1980's. The argument here is that the change of the presidency and the circumstances at the regional and international levels had implications on Tanzania's traditional approach to conflict resolution and shift of emphasis. The chapter further argues that even though the outlook remained the same, the changes marked a turning point in the country's foreign policy and the subsequent involvement in conflict resolution.

The chapter begins with a review of the debates about the end of the Cold War and the implications for Tanzania. International and regional politics

² Gordon, "Anglophonic variants: Kenya versus Tanzania," 101-102.

³ Pitcher and Askew, "African Socialisms and Post-socialisms," 2. See also Fantu Cheru, *The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development and Democracy* (London: Zed Books, 1989), 46.

⁴ Differently, for example, from Kenya that took a capitalist path whereby by 1987 the ratio was 49:1. See Cheru, *The Silent Revolution in Africa* 46.

in conflict resolution are analysed, followed by leadership and governance issues. Subsequently, the chapter highlights challenges to the international and regional conflict resolution approaches and revisits Tanzania's change of leadership and the subsequent adoption of economic liberalisation policies. Before the conclusion it examines the philosophy and the role of Tanzania within the evolved environment.

Debates on the causes and implications of the end of the Cold War

The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the emergence of the new norms with an impact on Africa. There were more multilateral interventions with peacekeeping turning out to be an important conflict management tool for the UN. Humanitarian intervention therefore became an influential aspect of conflict resolution. In the absence of the Soviet threat U.S. influence was also marginal. Consequently, the strategic importance of the major powers for African states declined.

The end of the Cold War had a specific outcome on Africa's conflict resolution. The collapse of the former USSR influenced the way Russia was involved in Africa's conflict resolution. Some debates about the end of the Cold War focus on Soviet Union's domestic factors while others on the external ones.⁵ Those debates that concentrate on internal factors identify factors such as leadership. Compared to the previous leaders, Gorbachev was much younger when he assumed power, and brought an alternative perception towards the world. Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev sought to cooperate with the West. After being elected to power in 1985, Gorbachev reformed the Soviet's political system to provide for a greater degree of openness. Gorbachev and Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, learned from the changes that had taken place in the Western Europe that stable, liberal and peaceful states were no longer a threat to Soviet.⁶ Gorbachev improved relations with the West partly in order to

⁵ Crockatt, "The end of the Cold War" 111. See also Lundestad, *East, West, North, South* 128.

⁶ Richard Saull, *The Cold War and After: Capitalism, Revolution and Superpower Politics*, (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 168.

reduce military spending and develop productive capacity and technological skills.⁷ In short, as Saull observed, political change and economic crisis contributed more to ending Soviet Communism than the military pressure from the West.⁸ Saull distinguishes between realism and ideational approaches as the dominant theories about the end of the Cold War.⁹

Realists and neo-realists focus on the structure of the international system and the balance of power. Their basic assumption is on the military dimension of the Cold War particularly the 1987 and 1991 arms reduction agreements. According to them, the economy and ideology are to be secondary factors in explaining the end of the Cold War. The USSR made strategic concessions – arms reduction, withdrawal from east-central Europe, and cutting down political and military involvement in the Third World. In the end, the USSR's decision contributed to the end of the Cold War.

Advocating the endogenous and non-material factors to the Soviet Union, ideational approaches provide an alternative view to realism. The basic assumption is that the Cold War ended because the ideas and norms that shaped the Soviet's policy-making during Gorbachev's regime were transformed and recognised by the West. The ideationalists add that the objective of Gorbachev's reforms until 1989 was to maintain some part of the Communist power within the USSR, without absolutely relying on military power. They stress ideas that informed Gorbachev's new thinking and how this was complemented by shifts in the ideological mindset, away from the Cold War.¹⁰

Declinism embedded in America's history, attempted to explain the end of the Cold War. The theory was developed in 1988 and advocated by Paul

⁷ On 25 December 1991 Gorbachev resigned from presidency of the collapsed USSR. See John T. Rourke and Mark A. Boyer, *World Politics: International Politics on the World Stage, Brief* (2nd edition) (New York: McGraw Hill, 1998), 35.

⁸ Saull, *The Cold War and After* 168.

⁹ Saull, *The Cold War and After* 166.

¹⁰ Saull, *The Cold War and After* 168.

Kennedy, among others. Focusing on the economy, the debate was whether or not the U.S. was declining as a super power, following the path of the Great Britain in the late Nineteenth Century. The main argument was based on the degree to which the U.S's economic base was destabilised by spending more on defence and/or on consumption. Here, historical data were used to measure economic growth, productivity, defence spending, savings and investment.¹¹

Related to declinism, Amin analysed the culmination of the Cold War in terms of the defeat of U.S's military hegemony and the emergence of a multi-polar world. For him, the U.S. military dominance keeps the world into unresolved conflicts and reduces the chances of social and democratic developments for the countries of both the South and of the North.¹² Amin proposes multi-polarity that addresses all dimensions of the North-South relations. He argues that during the 1970's the NAM gradually changed from the political objective of liberating the Third World to "trade union fighting for economic demands vis-à-vis the North."¹³ In the end, the NAM was more inclined to the Latin American countries – with the exception of Cuba. Indeed, after the Cold War, the NAM seems to be more important to the countries of the South than before, given the growing gap between the North and the South.

Endism replaced declinism in 1989. Concerned about the nature of conflicts, scholars such as Fukuyama argued that, conflicts among states were coming to the closing stages.¹⁴ He described endism in terms of "the end of

¹¹ See Samuel P. Huntington, "The Errors of Endism" in *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1994), 33-35.

¹² Samir Amin, *Beyond US Hegemony? Assessing the Prospects for a Multipolar World*, (London: Zed Books, 2007), 1-2.

¹³ Amin, *Beyond US Hegemony? Assessing the Prospects for a Multipolar World*, 86.

¹⁴ Huntington, "The Errors of Endism" 33.

history,” which did not mean the end of international conflict *per se*.¹⁵ For Fukuyama, conflict between states will remain but he predicted that terrorism, liberation conflicts and ethnic conflicts would increase. Like Mueller, Fukuyama admits that due to historical reasons, conflicts may occur among Third World states, and that there is a lesser possibility of conflict between countries such as China and the Soviet Union. Fukuyama concludes that economic and environmental issues will replace ideological conflict in most of the countries.¹⁶

Describing the post-Cold War, Doyle emphasised that conflicts between liberal states would be impossible but might occur within the Third World. Focusing on the post Cold War situation, Betts adds that most of the Third World would be areas of conflict for many years to come.¹⁷ Several implications could be identified. Cold War conflicts could have a spill over effect, especially in countries such as the DRC and Angola. During nationalist struggles the superpowers supported opposing groups, which left a greater chance of post-independence civil war. Moreover, the colonialists in Rwanda and Burundi left structures that could be manipulated to cause intra-state conflict after independence. Besides identity, the nature of conflicts could change into resources such as land and water, which are increasingly becoming scarce.

International politics and conflict resolution

The end of the Cold War resulted in multi-level responses to conflict. Following the proliferation of intra-state conflicts, several actors – governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental have been involved in conflict management. It was presumed that the first initiative would come

¹⁵ The “end of history” implied the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. See Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” in *Ideological Voices: An Anthropology in Modern Political Ideas* Paul Schumaker, Dwight C. Kiel, Thomas W. Heilke (New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1997), 409-410. See also Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *the National Interest* 16, Summer 1989.

¹⁶ Fukuyama, “The End of History?” 417.

¹⁷ Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War* 13.

primarily from within the country, followed by sub-regional and then regional organisations (OAU level) and finally the UN and the international community. In Africa, it has not always been the case for such levels of responses to conflict. The 1992 Arusha Conference on Rwanda, for example, was a result of African initiatives, whereby at the regional level the OAU in collaboration with the individual countries such as Tanzania played a key role. At the international level, it was the UN and the Western countries.¹⁸ This will be discussed in detail in the succeeding chapters.

The end of bipolar competition gave room to multilateral peacekeeping. There were fewer multilateral interventions before 1989.¹⁹ Previously, peacekeeping evolved as a tool in the peaceful transfer of power that enabled the Western powers to limit national liberation struggles.²⁰ Between 1989 and 1993, the UN assumed a leading role in conflict management.²¹ While 13 peacekeeping operations were established in the first 40 years, from 1988 thirty-six new operations were launched.²² During the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations²³ were largely military in character, and were

¹⁸ James Gillawa Bwana, "Rwanda, the Preventable Genocide: The United Nation's Failure Mission" (M.A. dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 2006), 65.

¹⁹ With the exception of the ONUC mission in Congo (1960-1964) and the OAU operation in Chad led by Nigeria in 1981.

²⁰ Indarjit Rikhye, "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking" in *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*, Henry Wiseman (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 15-16.

²¹ Stephen F. Burgess, "African Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Challenges of Indigenisation and Multilateralism," *African Studies Review* 41 (2) (September 1998): 47-48.

²² Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills, "From Peacekeeping to Managing Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa," in *From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa*, ed. Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (Johannesburg: SAIIA and ISS, 1999), 1.

²³ Peacekeeping operations were conceived in 1946 by the UN as a simple means of international observation of the manner with which parties in conflict complied with UN resolutions to stop hostilities. Since then, peacekeeping has evolved in size, complexity, legitimacy and effectiveness though in practice it has been facing challenges. See Henry Wiseman, editor "Introduction," in *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), xi.

deployed after a cease-fire but before a settlement of the conflict.²⁴ The purpose of the intervention was to set the ground for conflict resolution. Peacekeeping, however, evolved in response to the Security Council's failure to make effective use of conflict resolution strategies and the UN's failure to agree to the appropriate way to limit the arms race.²⁵

Increased concern for humanitarian interventions and the international community's role in rebuilding the failed states transformed peacekeeping operations.²⁶ From the early 1980's to the mid 1990's, humanitarian crises escalated from an average of 20-25 to about 65-70 per year. The increase implied a shifting emphasis from state to human security. Humanitarian assistance turned out one of the principal activities of the UN and was having a major impact on the organisation's priorities, budget, staffing and operations. As a result, the UN was confronted with two challenges. First, even though the organisation's humanitarian assistance expanded, the interests or public opinion of the major powers determined it.²⁷ Second, an established formula of financing the emergency operations was missing given that humanitarian crises were difficult to foresee.

The end of the Cold War to some extent resulted in the decline of African states' strategic importance to the major powers. The U.S.'s influence on the continent declined following the absence of the Soviet Union threat. In part this could be explained by the shift of U.S.'s interests from the war to the resolution of the Middle East conflict. Consequently, external powers became reluctant to provide African countries with the material, diplomatic or even military support. For instance, U.S. economic investment in Africa during the late years of 1980's

²⁴ Boutros Botros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace (2nd edition) With the new supplement and related UN documents*, (New York: United Nations, 1995), 10.

²⁵ Rikhye, "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking," 5.

²⁶ Cilliers and Mills, "From Peacekeeping to Managing Complex Emergencies" 1-2.

²⁷ South Centre, *South Centre for a Strong and Democratic United Nations: A South Perspective on UN Reform*, (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1997), 18.

declined to less than a third compared to Brazil. Consulates were eventually closed and the amount of aid reduced.²⁸

The U.S. developed an alternative approach to establishing bilateral relations with individual states. In 1979, for example, Kenya reached an agreement that granted the U.S. access to the country's military facilities. As a result, Kenya became a key actor in the Horn conflicts. Even before that, in the 1977-78 Ogaden War, Kenya actively supported Ethiopia against Somalia, despite the presence of Soviet advisers and Cuban troops on the Ethiopian side. Furthermore, in an effort to protect against Somali irredentism, Kenya strengthened ties with the U.S. and openly identified itself with the West. In the end, Kenya became a major recipient of U.S. military aid during the 1980's.²⁹

Relations between African countries and the West were shaped by the concern about internal governance and economic management. Africa's declining geo-strategic importance coincided with increased dependence on the West for economic support. While the West was experiencing economic crisis, financial support for African countries was attached to the implementation of sound economic management programmes. The taxpayers therefore, expressed reluctance in providing financial assistance to countries that did not initiate economic reforms and observe human rights.³⁰

²⁸ Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics* 160-161.

²⁹ David F. Gordon, "International Economic Relations, Regional Cooperation, and Foreign Policy" in *Beyond Capitalism vs. Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania* ed. Joel D. Barkan (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1994), 237.

³⁰ Ibrahim A. Gambari, "The Role of Regional and Global Organisations in Addressing Africa's Security Issues," in *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security* ed. Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1996) 31. See also Joel D. Barkan, "Divergence and Convergence in Kenya and Tanzania: Pressures for Reform" in *Beyond Capitalism vs. Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania* 3.

Throughout the 1980's the "security" concept faded from concentrating on the state to incorporate environmental factors and human rights.³¹ Ullman proposed a broader concept beyond country's "military threats" to include political, economic, societal, environmental dimensions – and from individual to state and systemic levels.³² Environmental and human security increasingly turned a trans-national concern. Human beings caused environmental depletion, which resulted in the insecurity of individuals, societies, states, the ecosystem and the international system.

Africa's development too was linked to international peace and security. As Obasanjo argues, international peace and security are essential for the attainment of Africa's development. To Obasanjo, the pillar on which international peace and security had been built, that is, disarmament and development, had been dismantled by America's policies of the late 1970's and the early 1980's.³³ Doornbos adds that the concern for Africa's development further shifted from questioning of "what went wrong".³⁴ Two decades after independence most of the African countries had been unable to develop as had hoped at the time of independence. The question presumed that the ground for Africa's development was properly set but unanticipated factors hampered the process.

The countries of the South pressed for the creation of the New International Economic Order (NIEO).³⁵ The demands of the group 77 – the group of developing countries with common problems – at the UN Conferences

³¹ This was categorised as the first generation of security of the 1980's. See Carsten F. Rønnefeldt, "Three Generations of Environment and Security Research," *Journal of Peace Research*, 34 (4) (November 1997): 473. See also Ullman, "Redefining Security," 129-153.

³² Rønnefeldt, "Three Generations of Environment and Security Research," 474.

³³ Obasanjo, "Africa's Needs" 80.

³⁴ Martin Doornbos, "The African State in Academic Debate: Retrospect and Prospect," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 28 (2) (June 1990): 185-186.

³⁵ NIEO was launched in 1975, after October 1973 war followed by the increase in oil price. See Amin, *Beyond U.S. Hegemony?* 86.

on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), were on the elimination of trade barriers, the promotion of fair commodity prices, the provision of multilateral aid and the expansion of exports for the manufactured and semi-manufactured goods from the developing countries. The developed countries, however, rejected the proposed changes.³⁶

Towards the end of the 1980's, the Soviet Union changed its posture on the UN and the resolution of regional conflicts. Russia embraced the UN as an institution entrusted with the mandate to manage regional conflicts. Russia's position was that it was necessary to resolve regional conflicts than striving to win them. In the mid 1980's, the Soviet Union abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine in foreign affairs and the communist economic development strategy. Moscow was further committed to reduce ideological competition and military confrontation particularly in the Third World and developed dialogue with the U.S. As Keller argues, cooperation between the Soviet Union and the U.S. resulted in ending conflicts in Namibia, Angola and Ethiopia.³⁷

After decades of indifference and conflicting attitudes towards UN peacekeeping, Moscow turned one of its outspoken supporters.³⁸ The country reduced its outstanding peacekeeping operations debts from U.S. \$200 to U.S. \$125 million and expressed the intention to clear the remaining. Russia's renewed attitude on Africa's conflict resolution and behind the scenes diplomacy played two critical roles. The first was an agreement reached in December 1988 that resulted in the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola by

³⁶ Akindele, "Reflections on the Pre-occupation and Conduct of African Diplomacy," 574.

³⁷ Edmond A. Keller, "Towards a New African Order? Presidential Address to the 1992 Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association," *African Studies Review*, 36 (2) (September 1993): 2.

³⁸ Lundestad, "East, West, North, South 130-131. See also Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, "Resurrecting Peacekeeping: The Superpowers and Conflict Management," *The Third World Quarterly*, 12 (3/4) 1990-1991, 124.

July 1991. The second contributed to the renewal of the Namibian independence process.³⁹

While Russia sought to support the UN, the U.S. largely abandoned the organisation. The latter's official support largely declined during Ronald Reagan's leadership. This was in part due to the American's belief that the organisation's goals by that time were not complementing those of the U.S. As a result, the Reagan administration withdrew or threatened to withdraw from some of the UN agencies. Moreover, the country refused to pay its dues and stepped up its veto in the Security Council. By 1987, the administration opted to cautiously contribute to UN multilateral peace efforts, but one where they advance Washington's interests. The U.S. still resisted UN involvement in the regions considered to be its "sphere of influence." Subsequently, the Reagan government accepted UN mediation in Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq conflict and Namibia's decolonisation.⁴⁰

In response to "An Agenda for Peace," the General Assembly adopted resolutions 47/120A and B on 18 December 1992 and 20 December 1993. In the first resolution, the Assembly mandated that the Secretary General pursue preventive diplomacy⁴¹ and strengthen Secretariat's capacity in early warning, especially collection and analysis of information, for situations likely to endanger international peace and security.⁴² The Secretary General was empowered to devise early international responses so as to easily prevent conflicts than the belated intervention.

³⁹ Weiss and Kessler, "Resurrecting Peacekeeping," 134.

⁴⁰ Weiss and Kessler, "Resurrecting Peacekeeping," 125.

⁴¹ To prevent a dispute so that it does not escalate into armed conflict.

⁴² Boutros Boutros-Ghali: Secretary General of the United Nations "Confronting New Challenges-Report on the Work of the Organisation from the 49th-50th Session of the General Assembly," (United Nations: New York, 1995), 215.

Leadership and governance issues

From the early 1980's some of the African countries were facing food shortages, rising commodity prices and declining foreign exchange. Others like Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Southern Africa were recovering from the effects of drought and famine. To resolve the problem, in 1986 the UN called a special session on Africa, and consequently the World Bank and IMF insisted that to qualify for development assistance, the countries should implement economic reform programmes. Poor governance was identified as the source of Africa's problems and aid was attached to the establishment of good governance,⁴³ which was seen as key to economic growth. Good governance is exercised when the leaders are accountable in managing and invest in public funds, transparent in awarding contracts.⁴⁴

During the Cold War, human rights and democracy were largely unimportant to the West. Whereas human rights were not a priority then, during the 1990's political stability was an important qualification for loans and grants to African governments.⁴⁵ Human rights were increasingly becoming the collective concern of the international community. Again, good governance formed a larger component of aid condition. The West did this because security was concerned with not only that of the state but also the treatment of the citizens. The elements of human rights and democracy were not entirely missing in countries such as Tanzania, except that the emphasis in the 1980's and 1990's had a liberal than a socialist outlook.

Towards the end of the Cold War, some of the African states' conflicts indeed resulted from poor governance. The disintegration of state institutions

⁴³ Good governance refers to efficient and effective government characterised by mutual relations between the leaders and the citizens. In addition to policy formulation, leaders were expected to be responsive in the sense that they work without oppressing the citizens.

⁴⁴ Keller, "Towards a New African Order?" 3.

⁴⁵ Goran Hyden, "Party, State and Civil Society: Control Versus Openness" in *Beyond Capitalism vs. Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania* 96.

especially the police and the judiciary resulted in a breakdown of law and order, leading to internal conflicts. Other conflicts, however, resulted from a spill over of the Cold War confrontation and nationalist struggles. The situation raised the need for multilateral military and humanitarian interventions. In the end, the international community's perception of foreign intervention and the rights of states was transformed.⁴⁶ Ghali suggested that international intervention was to be extended beyond military and humanitarian roles. They had to promote national reconciliation and re-establishment of effective governance structures.⁴⁷

There was a re-emergence of ethnic nationalism among groups incorporated into multi-ethnic states.⁴⁸ The colonial regimes left power vacuums exposing ethnic, geographical, ideological, historical and religious differences. Deep feelings of insecurity, severe economic hardship caused by discriminatory politics and exclusion in political participation caused conflicts. As a result, some of the ethnic groups sought to claim the right to self-determination, thus went into conflict with the regime in power. Ethiopia (Eritrea), Somalia (Somaliland Republic) and Rwanda are some of the cases.⁴⁹ Conflict was most likely to occur when elections were rigged; the minority controlled the larger part of the economy or when the political process was exclusive.

Conflicts that grew from such internal developments stood a greater chance to be internationalised. On the one hand, intra-state conflicts in Sudan, Somalia and Mozambique generated refugees and armed rebels across national

⁴⁶ Gambari, "The Role of Regional and Global Organisations" 31.

⁴⁷ Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (2nd edition) 9-10.

⁴⁸ Edmond J. Keller, "Introduction" in *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security*, ed. Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1996), 3.

⁴⁹ Herman J. Kohen, "Africa and the Superpower- An Agenda for Peace," in *Out of Conflict: From War to Peace in Africa*, ed. Gunnar M. Sørbø and Peter Vale (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1997), 164.

borders.⁵⁰ On the other hand, regional actors – particularly states, intervened in the intra-state conflicts such as in the DRC through the support of different rebel groups. In the end, there are greater chances of internal conflicts degenerating into regional conflicts. For example, the conflict between Rwanda and Uganda and the Banyamulenge against the allies from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia represented such a pattern.⁵¹

The end of the Cold War influenced states' sovereignty. Rules on when and how international and regional organisations intervene in domestic conflicts were to be re-defined. According to Keller, this was an important aspect of the New African Order. For example, when ethnic and other domestic conflicts break out or spill over borders, would Africa have the capacity, willingness and the mechanisms to resolve them?⁵² These issues will be discussed in detail from chapter three to five.

Regional politics and conflict resolution

Intra-state conflicts towards the end of the Cold War multiplied. By the 1980's, civil wars in Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia caused instability in the region resulting in violence and famine. In the early 1990's, Eastern Africa was yet fully structured for collective conflict prevention or management. Even though regional institutions were concerned with the inter-state conflict prevention, states were left to resolve their internal conflicts. In Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, revolutionary movements came to power and sought to resolve the conflict through the creation of "governments of national unity" by accommodating ethnic and religious groups.⁵³

⁵⁰ Keller, "Towards A New African Order?" 1.

⁵¹ Burgess, "African Security in the Twenty First Century" 59.

⁵² Keller, "Towards A New African Order?" 1.

⁵³ Burgess, "African Security in the Twenty First Century" 46.

The changes in the international system influenced regional politics. When the USSR was disintegrating in 1990 Russia ceased to supply weapons to Ethiopia. The decision impacted on the Ethiopian conflict, as external interests and resources were removed. Consequently, in 1991 Mengistu's regime fell to an alliance of rebel forces in 1991. If the Soviet backing was still available, the regime fall would have never happened or would have taken longer to take place.⁵⁴

Regional organisations progressively acquired a new importance in conflict resolution. The SADCC, the ECOWAS and the OAU were called upon to manage both economic development strategies and increased security concerns. The move towards a new form of regionalism was complemented with the idea that regional organisations possessed a better position to provide the necessary focus on security threats in their respective areas.⁵⁵ Eventually the organisations succeeded in solving some of the conflicts while others escalated.

In response, the OAU led by Nigeria, attempted to resolve the Chad conflict through the introduction of African peacekeeping force in 1981.⁵⁶ Facing financial constraints, however, the force failed to secure a stable ceasefire, and was undermined by states that continued to separately support the warring factions. There was also an unsuccessful call for assistance from the UN in the form of joint peacekeeping.⁵⁷ The UN's seemingly reluctant position was perhaps caused by the fact that the West was uninterested in this form of conflict resolution. As will later be examined in Rwanda's and Burundi's cases,

⁵⁴ Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics* 159.

⁵⁵ Theo Neethling, "Towards Joint Ventures: Use of UN Observer Missions in Africa" in *From peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa*, ed. Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (Johannesburg: SAIIA and ISS, 1999), 38.

⁵⁶ Other troops were from Senegal and the former Zaire (current DRC). Libya intervened, through diplomacy and the creation of another unsuccessful peacekeeping operation. See Rikhye, "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking," 15-16.

⁵⁷ Rikhye, "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking," 15-16.

the OAU was transformed in 1992 and some of the established components were the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution and a “peace fund” to deal with the proliferating intra-state conflicts.⁵⁸

Towards the end of 1980's, a new form of peacekeeping operation was established. The operation intervened after the completion of negotiations and was mandated to help the parties implement the agreement they had negotiated. Such operations were successfully deployed in Namibia, Angola, El Salvador and Mozambique.⁵⁹ While the UN was successful in peacekeeping and peace building in Namibia through the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) and Mozambique (ONUMOZ). The organisation largely failed to resolve Somalia's and Rwanda's conflicts.⁶⁰

The first multipurpose UN peacekeeping force was employed in Namibia. The operation demobilised the fighting forces, repatriated the refugees, administered elections and supervised the transfer of power to a new government. Namibia's success was followed by a large operation in Mozambique (1993-94). In Angola, the 1992 United Nations Verification Mission in Angola II (UNAVEM II) was unsuccessful partly because the UN was not granted absolute authority to monitor elections and demobilise the military forces. UNAVEM III, from 1995-1997, was given greater mandate and as a result, achieved greater success.⁶¹

At the 1992 OAU Summit in Dakar – Senegal, Salim Ahmed Salim proposed the creation of a regional mechanism for conflict prevention and resolution. The framework traces its origin to the 1991 Kampala Conference

⁵⁸ OAU's authority and leadership were strengthened by the 1989 election of Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania – a candidate for the United Nations Secretary General in 1981 and 1986, and one of Africa's most respected statespersons. See Burgess, “African Security in the Twenty-First Century” 40.

⁵⁹ Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* 10.

⁶⁰ Burgess, “African Security in the Twenty-First Century” 39.

⁶¹ Burgess, “African Security in the Twenty-First Century” 40.

recommendation on the establishment of a permanent conference on security, stability, development and cooperation along with the need to establish a continental peacekeeping mechanism. The adoption of such an approach was expected to significantly re-define the OAU's role in conflict resolution by committing the organisation to conflict prevention, management and resolution. African states were required to surrender some of their sovereignty in the interest of regional and continental security.⁶² To a certain extent, the mechanism managed to regulate the conflicts. As will be discussed in Chapter four, the OAU intervened in some of the conflicts such as in Rwanda where the UN and the international community took long to respond.

One nation's peacekeeping activities, however, turned out to be the deployment of an intervention force for another.⁶³ In situations such as in the DRC, the neighbouring states of Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe intervened in the name of "conflict resolution." The situation deteriorated despite the presence of SADC, AU forces and the international community. This raised a question on the legitimacy of external intervention. Nyerere highlighted a challenge to the post-Cold War intervention strategies. He said, "under what circumstances" and "who makes a judgement" remain an indisputable and a complex problem for both African countries and the international community.⁶⁴

Challenges to international and regional conflict resolution

Increased peacekeeping costs impacted negatively on the UN's capability and timely financing of conflict resolution. Prior assessments such as capacity of the peacekeeping force and resources mobilisation have sometimes delayed the

⁶² Keller, "Towards a New African Order?" 8.

⁶³ John Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israel Interface* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989) 9. See also South Centre, *South Centre for a Strong and Democratic United Nations: A South Perspective on UN Reform* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1997) 18.

⁶⁴ Mwalimu Nyerere, "Foreword" in *What is Africa's Problem? Speeches and Writings on Africa*, ed. Yoweri K. Museveni (Kampala: NRM Publications, 1992), 7.

peacekeeping deployment. A budget presentation by the Secretary General is necessary and precedes any peacekeeping operation. The Security Council has to agree on the necessity of such a UN operation. By the time all the procedures are fulfilled then the conflict would have escalated, which implies that more costs would be required for the UN force.⁶⁵ Moreover, it is likely that the situation on the ground that called for a different structure and mandate of the peacekeeping force could have changed.

Even though the UN's financial capacity primarily improved from 1985, the organisation still faced some constraints. A few member states delay payments or are unwilling to contribute to the regular budget and peacekeeping force. For instance, from peacekeeping contributions, the U.S. and the USSR were responsible for over 40 percent of the budget and eight countries for almost 85 percent.⁶⁶ The U.S. worsened the situation, as we have seen, by neglecting to pay the regular contributions during the Reagan's administration. Consequently, the total volume of UN's assistance to developing countries declined.⁶⁷ Furthermore, the UN's ability to resolve regional conflicts was largely determined by the consensus between the superpowers. While it was true that the UN could not work effectively if supported solely by friendly relationship between the U.S. and the USSR, it was equally true that the organisation could not work effectively without their political and economic support.⁶⁸

Within the region, the OAU largely lacked the political and financial capacities to conduct major peacekeeping operations. That said, the organisation managed to resolve many conflicts that did not need multilateral interventions. The OAU had been successful in conducting limited military operations and using diplomacy especially in mediation, conciliation and

⁶⁵ South Centre, *South Centre for a Strong and Democratic United Nations* 76.

⁶⁶ Weiss and Kessler, "Resurrecting Peacekeeping," 140.

⁶⁷ Ghali, "Confronting New Challenges" 1.

⁶⁸ Weiss and Kessler, "Resurrecting Peacekeeping" 125.

arbitration. As a result, the organisation tended to focus on mediation, good offices and conflict prevention.⁶⁹ The OAU's role is analysed in detail in the case studies in this thesis.

Leadership change and the adoption of economic liberalisation policies

Nyerere retired from the presidency in November 1985 and later as chairperson of the ruling party – CCM in 1990, making him the third out of approximately 170 African leaders who had since independence voluntarily relinquished power.⁷⁰ The manner in which leadership was transferred to Ali Hassan Mwinyi⁷¹ as both Head of State and Chairperson of the Party was a credit to the foundation laid by Nyerere.⁷² Tanzania's leadership change coincided with an economic crisis and ongoing negotiations with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) on the adoption of economic recovery programmes. Due to the fact that shifting to neo-liberal policies was contrary to Nyerere and Tanzania's socialist ideology, stepping down was the immediate option than re-orienting his political belief.

⁶⁹ Neethling, "Towards Joint Ventures" 38. See also Keller, "Introduction" 12.

⁷⁰ Ali A. Mazrui, "Conflict in Africa: An Overview" in *Armed Conflict in Africa*, ed. Carolyn Pumphrey, Rye Schwartz- Barcott Triangle Institute for Security Studies (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press Inc., 2003), 28.

⁷¹ Mwinyi was Tanzania's second President from 1985 to 1995 born in 1925 in Coast region. Between 1933 and 1942 he attended primary education at Mangapwani and Dole – Zanzibar. Among others, he studied Diploma in Education from 1954 to 1956 at the University of Education – Durban, United Kingdom. He also specialised in English and Arabic languages. He taught at Mangapwani and Bumbwini schools in Zanzibar. Before becoming president, he served as an ambassador, and minister in various Union Government ministries. He was elected the President and the Chairperson of the Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar. He is known as a moderate who introduced economic liberalisation in Zanzibar and later in Tanzania Mainland (1986). See Werner Biermann and Jumanne Wagao, "The Quest for Adjustment: Tanzania and the IMF, 1980-1986," *African Studies Review*, 29 (4) (December 1986), 90; Julius E. Nyang'oro, *A Political Biography of Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, President of the United Republic of Tanzania*, (Trenton: Africa World Press Inc., 2011), XV, Xvii, XXV. Also translated from Jamhuri ya Muungano Tanzania, *Taarifa ya Miaka Hamsini ya Uhuru wa Tanzania Bara* 69.

⁷² Hyden, "Party, State and Civil Society" 83-84.

Tanzania was among the first African countries to implement IFIs and donors' prescriptions for economic reforms as a pre-condition for assistance. From early 1979 to 1985, Tanzania engaged in negotiations with the IFIs and bilateral donors on how and under what circumstances the country would embark on economic stabilisation. Initially, the focus was on macro-economic policy reforms and later with the IFIs. Political reforms followed in late 1980's.⁷³ As a result, major changes took place with a neo-liberal outlook in the country's socialist formation. Tanzania started negotiations with the IMF in 1979 but refused to sign a structural adjustment programme until 1986. Instead, the state responded to the crisis with a series of its own policy initiatives and structural adjustment programmes. For instance, cooperative societies were reintroduced in 1983 to replace State Crop Authorities. Furthermore, the local government was reinstated in the villages.⁷⁴ All the measures were largely unsuccessfully pursued.

The transition from Nyerere to Mwinyi resulted in a lower priority to international affairs. One of the reasons for this could be that, with the exception of Mozambique and Namibia, other territories had already attained independence. Post-independence civil wars in Mozambique, Namibia's independence in 1990 and the termination of the apartheid regime in South Africa were some of the factors that marked the transitions of Tanzania's involvement in conflict resolution. In 1992 the ANC's training camps in Southern Tanzania were handed over to the government. Subsequently, in 1993 Tanzania pushed the PAC into the South African elections after the closure of the PAC's military base.⁷⁵ The end of the liberation struggles implied that

⁷³ Barkan, "Divergence and Convergence in Kenya and Tanzania," 28. See also Biermann and Wagao, "The Quest for Adjustment" 90.

⁷⁴ Matthew J. Costello, "Administration Triumphs over Politics: The Transformation of the Tanzanian State," *African Studies Review* 39 (1) (April 1996): 139.

⁷⁵ This followed the removal of ban on the ANC, the PAC and the SACP in October 1989. Afterwards, the first group of Roben Island prisoners including Walter Sisulu and Ahmad Kathranda was released. Nelson Mandela's release from prison on February 1990 stimulated the peaceful negotiations and the subsequent resolution of conflict with the apartheid regime. For a

Tanzania's "traditional" role began to gradually shift from Southern Africa to the resolution of intra-state conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi and other African countries.

Tanzania's domestic reforms to some extent interrupted the state-society relations built on socialism and self-reliance.⁷⁶ While Tanzania was a model of a progressive society, IMF policies posed a problem. Trade liberalisation was adopted as part of economic restructuring. On the one hand, the government saw the economy as improved due to free availability of goods. On the other hand the ruling party was concerned about the cost of many imported goods, which could not be afforded by workers and peasants. Whereas the local manufacturers faced competition from imported goods, the same was felt in the provision of social services due to cost sharing. As Nyerere argued, the IMF's prescriptions were "an infringement on Tanzania's sovereignty" given that their implementation resulted in profound changes on the country's domestic policies.⁷⁷ Nyerere further admitted the challenge faced by the African countries after the end of Communism in 1989. His decision to encourage multiparty debate in 1990 was partly a response to those evolutions. Consequently, a combination of external and domestic factors informed Tanzania's politics and policies.

Internally, as Barkan argued, declining living standards in other African countries coincided with the end of apartheid, decolonisation movements and the Cold War. Barkan argues that demands for democratic governance and liberalisation emerged from within, backed by the international community, which subsequently ignited change in the existing domestic order.⁷⁸ Although

discussion on this see T.G. Murithi, "Editor's Note" *Africa Quarterly*, Special Issue: Post-Apartheid South Africa, Volume 32 (Numbers 1-4). See also David F. Gordon, "International Economic Relations" 252.

⁷⁶ Komba, "The Role of the Party (CCM) in Foreign Policy Making" 101. See also Biermann and Wagao, "The Quest for Adjustment" 90.

⁷⁷ Barkan, "Divergence and Convergence in Kenya and Tanzania" 28.

⁷⁸ Barkan, "Divergence and Convergence in Kenya and Tanzania" 1.

this trend was evident in Kenya and the former Zaire, it was not the case for Tanzania. Despite the economic crisis, the domestic environment was less influential in promoting political change. To a larger extent, the international environment influenced the adoption of the neo-liberal policies. The Nyalali Commission's Report (1991) indicated that the majority of the Tanzanians favoured a single party system.⁷⁹ While one could question the methodology employed to collect the views, the political and economic changes in the regional and international levels largely informed the decision to multiparty democracy.

From the Arusha Declaration in 1967 to the 1980's when the IMF imposed conditions, Tanzania pursued aid and trade diversification policies.⁸⁰ Afterwards, the country's principal bilateral donors particularly the European Economic Community (EEC) backed the IMF's prescriptions. The Community decided to link aid to acceptance of the IMF's recommendations.⁸¹ The EEC backed the Fund's position as the only solution to Tanzania's crisis and did not consider the country's proposals. Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands lessened the problems by providing finance and import support programmes. As a result, the most needed commodities could be imported. Despite the economic crisis, the Tanzanian population still supported their leaders, unlike many other African countries where economic difficulties resulted to social and political unrest.⁸² It should be noted, however, besides trade diversification,

⁷⁹ Nyang'oro, *A Political Biography of Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete*, 69-70.

⁸⁰ Attempts were made to open other aid and trade avenues apart from the traditional ones such as UK, U.S, Germany and other countries of the West.

⁸¹ Julius K. Nyerere, "Is Africa Responsible?" Presidential Address at the Institute of Social Studies, the Hague – Netherlands 13 March 1985, 9. See also Komba, "The Role of the Party (CCM) in Foreign Policy Making in Tanzania," 120.

⁸² Biermann and Wagao, "The Quest for Adjustment" 95.

Tanzania was still economically tied to the West. Britain and the EEC remained the main trading partners.⁸³

Trade and aid relations were guided by the non-alignment principle, which was largely influenced by socialism and self-reliance. This implied that Tanzania was to receive aid and to trade with different sources regardless of their ideological orientation. As Komba argues, Tanzania welcomed the Chinese proposal to build the TAZARA railway as it invited the Americans to build the Dar es Salaam-Tunduma road.⁸⁴ The NAM, as we have seen, remained Tanzania's foreign policy principle even after the Cold War. It is important to highlight here that Tanzania's resistance to reforms began to weaken in early 1980s, even before the end of the Cold War. Initially, a successful resistance could be mounted through the NAM, where one superpower could be played off against the other. There was also the option to become a client of one superpower.⁸⁵

During the reforms Tanzania seemed to have entered into an ideological conflict between socialism and the neo-liberal policies. According to Komba, the 1984 budget abolished food subsidies and introduced the liberalisation of the social services and external trade.⁸⁶ As opposed to what happened in most of the Eastern European countries, Tanzania's ruling party – CCM did not collapse. The Party managed to transform the socialist policy to neo-liberalism.⁸⁷ Nyerere justified the change arguing that "the socialist vision can be retained and our past socialist advances defended" in the country's economic transition. He emphasised, for example, that the private sector could be allowed to contribute

⁸³ Komba, "The Role of the Party (CCM) in Foreign Policy Making in Tanzania," 127.

⁸⁴ Komba, "The Role of the Party (CCM) in Foreign Policy Making in Tanzania," 130.

⁸⁵ Barkan, "Divergence and Convergence in Kenya and Tanzania" 3.

⁸⁶ Komba, "The Role of the Party (CCM) in Foreign Policy Making in Tanzania," 121.

⁸⁷ Pitcher and Askew, "African Socialisms and Post-socialisms," 6.

to the national economy until full socialism is attained.⁸⁸ The challenge remained how to cope with the neo-liberal policies in a socialist context. As the government seemed to be overwhelmed with economic management and policy reforms, it overlooked the question of strategising the attainment of socialism through the liberal transformations. Nyerere further noted the necessity of having “flexibility in the implementation of socialist policies” which was crucial in preserving socialism and self-reliance. The issue here was that international economic structures operating on capitalist principles dictated the direction of Tanzania’s economic and political development.

The philosophy and the role of Tanzania in conflict resolution

While Tanzania was actively engaged in conflict resolution issues during the 1970s and the early 1980s, the pace was reduced in the latter years of the 1980s.⁸⁹ Three factors could explain such changes. First, the end of decolonisation and the attainment of independence of the Southern African region countries implied that, to a large extent, Tanzania had attained its foreign policy objective. This assumption, however, ignored the fact that the nature of conflicts were transformed to identity and resource conflicts shaped by ethnic, governance or religious factors.

Second, as earlier noted, the U.S. could no longer tolerate Tanzania’s regional diplomacy, especially its posture against U.S’s “constructive engagement” with South Africa. In addition, by the latter years of 1980s, South Africa’s strategies to regional politics were transformed. Behind-the-scenes deals re-established a high-profile international diplomacy, which was Tanzania’s strong suit.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ J.K. Nyerere, Address at the opening of the CCM National Conference in Dodoma, 22 October 1987, 11. See also *Daily News*, “Private Sector won’t Swallow Socialism, says Nyerere” 7 August 1989.

⁸⁹ Gordon, “International Economic Relations,” 242.

⁹⁰ Gordon, “International Economic Relations,” 252.

Third, the growing economic crisis resulted in greater dependence on external assistance. Tanzania was compelled to comply with the IFIs conditions, which implied that the country had to shift the attention of its focus to the relations with the major aid and trade partners. Previously, independent decision-making could be employed to secure Western aid to support both socialist transformation and the liberation struggles.⁹¹ Tanzania's deteriorating economy was aggravated by the world economic crisis that begun in early 1980s. As a result, the country required additional foreign aid whose realisation was linked to domestic economic and political transformations. Caught in the middle of this situation Tanzania opted to advocate for a fair international economic order as well as promote regional economic cooperation.

Tanzania played a leading role in the NIEO, whose institutional manifestations were the Group of 77 within the UN, the NAM and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). During the call for the creation of a NIEO, developing countries began to draw attention from the leading industrial countries, including the U.S. According to Gordon, Tanzania, as one of the sub-Saharan African countries, played a greater role in the NIEO and Nyerere was one of the international spokesperson for the movement. The government has been at the forefront of demanding for an alternative international economic order because the old one had demonstrated to be ineffective and inequitable. The demand was to have an order that provided an opportunity for equitable distribution of resources, power and an equal sovereignty.⁹²

Tanzania challenged the West's perception on the nations of the Third World with respect to their internal problems such as malnutrition, diseases,

⁹¹ Biermann and Wagao. "The Quest for Adjustment" 98.

⁹² Gordon, "International Economic Relations," 238. See also Justinian F. Rweyemamu, *Third World Options: Power, Security and the Hope for Another Development* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1992), 117, 135.

hunger and natural calamities. In a 1985 speech⁹³ Nyerere declared that "African starvation is topical" while the relations between rich and poor countries "have been relegated to the sidelines of world discussion."⁹⁴ The issue here was that poverty, whose causes could be identified in terms of the way the international system is structured, is based on factors within the state. In this case, poverty causes insecurity whose effects spill over across the region. As Nyerere argued, the problems in themselves do not cause conflict until when the victims react to the situation resulting to the breakdown of law and order.⁹⁵

Even though poverty has been identified as an intra-state factor, it is to some extent reinforced by the distribution of wealth in the international system. Tanzania's concern was that although the South covers the larger part of world and comprises the majority of the world's population, they have a smaller share in the world's wealth. Consequently, most of the people suffer from hunger, malnutrition and preventable disease; and lack formal education and skills.⁹⁶ The presence of these conditions provides the ground for conflict.

In the Eastern and Southern Africa, Tanzanian diplomacy and the role in conflict resolution took a different direction. Two imperatives emerged. First, the country sought to strengthen regional economic cooperation, particularly the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). Following the collapse of the former EAC in 1977 strategies were sought to strengthen regional cooperation in Southern Africa. Secondly, initiatives were taken to resolve the conflict with Kenya that resulted in the closing of the border. In mid-1983 then Tanzania's Prime Minister Edward Sokoine expressed the need

⁹³ The address was given to a combined meeting of the Royal African Society with a number of other British voluntary bodies at the Royal Commonwealth Society in London on 21 March 1985. The earlier speech was delivered on 21 November 1975.

⁹⁴ Julius K. Nyerere, "Africa and the Debt Crisis," *African Affairs*, 84 (337) (October 1985): 489.

⁹⁵ Nyerere, "Africa and the Debt Crisis," 490.

⁹⁶ Chairman's Preface, *The Challenge to the South: Report of the South Commission* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

to resolve the dispute when he emphasised on the re-opening of the border and the normalisation of Kenyan-Tanzanian relations. In November 1983 the Presidents of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda met in Arusha where they announced agreement on the major issues in dispute between them. The border was re-opened seven years later.⁹⁷

At the international level throughout the 1980s, the USSR expanded ties with Tanzania. The Soviet Union decided to use Dar es Salaam as one of its Africa's regional centres. According to Gordon, two factors explain such a decision: the international reputation of the then President – Nyerere and the presence of representatives of the liberation movements that made Dar es Salaam "Africa's diplomatic capital." Tanzania turned into one of the largest recipients of Soviet military assistance in Africa, after Angola and Ethiopia. By the late 1980s economic aid from the USSR and the other Eastern bloc countries increased.⁹⁸

After the 1978/79 Tanzania-Uganda conflict, both countries faced complex security situations. Instead of installing an unstable government in Uganda, the Tanzanian army had to temporarily establish authority while training the armed forces. Close connections to Milton Obote existed, with whom Nyerere shared a socialist development vision. Unfortunately, for Tanzania, Obote's second phase government (1981-1984) was not much different from that of Amin's.⁹⁹ While Kenya feared that Tanzania was attempting to establish a socialist government in Uganda, Dar es Salaam was

⁹⁷ Gordon, "Anglophonic Variants" 94.

⁹⁸ Gordon, "International Economic Relations" 235-262.

⁹⁹ This was the second time when Tanzania temporarily established authority in Uganda. The first time was after the collapse of Amin's regime when a government led by Yusuph Lule – then Chairperson of the UNLF Executive Committee – was formed and immediately recognised by Tanzania. Lule's government requested the Tanzanian government to stabilise the situation especially when the armed forces and the police were being established. See The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, "Tanzania and the War Against Amin's Uganda, July 1979, Dar es Salaam, 15-16. See also Gordon, "International Economic Relations" 246.

heavily spending resources in an effort to stabilise the situation. According to Gordon, estimates of the cost ranged at least from U.S\$ 500 million. Perhaps this could be one of the contributing factors to Tanzania's economic crisis.

Internally, Tanzania faced the challenge of economic liberation. Nyerere argued that during Africa's independence struggles there was a conviction that "political liberation would take care of economic independence,"¹⁰⁰ which was not the case. He added that it was easy to mobilise African countries for political liberation but there remained difficulties for economic liberation since "they [African countries] do not perceive the problem in the same way."¹⁰¹ This could have been due to the fact that after the attainment of political independence, most of the African countries remained economically tied to their former colonial masters, which turned difficult to de-link. Furthermore, although African countries shared similar colonial backgrounds, after independence they individually defined national economic development priorities. As the countries defined the goals according to their needs to a certain extent contributed to the variations of the African political economies.

Tanzania's economic performance compelled Mwinyi's government to concentrate on domestic than external issues. Moreover, Dar es Salaam still participated in regional affairs, regardless of the economic crisis the country was facing.¹⁰² The next chapter revisits the government's decision to send and maintain its forces in Mozambique while it was experiencing an economic crisis. It should be noted, however, that there has been an impact on the Tanzania's foreign policy and the participation in conflict resolution following the withdrawal from the international affairs between 1985 and 1995.¹⁰³ Whereas

¹⁰⁰ Julius K. Nyerere, "Third World Negotiating Strategy," *Third World Quarterly*, 1 (2) (April 1979):20.

¹⁰¹ Nyerere, "Third World Negotiating Strategy," 21.

¹⁰² Gordon, "Anglophonic Variants: Kenya versus Tanzania," 98.

¹⁰³ Translated from T. L. Maliyamkono, *Changamoto Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: Tema Publishers Ltd., 2003), 161. See also Killian, "Factors Informing Changes in Tanzania's Foreign Policy"

Nyerere focused on both internal and external issues, Mwinyi was more concerned about economic management programmes. Again, the breakout of the civil conflicts in the GLR necessitated the government to shift the attention and strategies given the security threat they posed.

Conclusion

Tanzania's domestic, regional and international settings influenced its foreign policy and the subsequent involvement in conflict resolution. In reviewing debates on the causes and implications of the culmination of the Cold War, two issues could be identified. First, besides the fact that the theories explain the internal and external factors for the collapse of the Soviet Union, the implications of the disintegration were on Tanzania and other African countries. The analysis focuses on Russia's involvement in Africa's conflict resolution after the disintegration of the former USSR. Second, although some debates such as declinism concentrate on analysing the U.S. hegemony, the impact was again on African countries. The main concern was on the destabilisation of U.S's economic base.

Tanzania's focus on conflict resolution began to shift from the late 1970's as a response to the regional and international changes. The shifts coincided with developments in the domestic environment, which had implications on the country's foreign policy and diplomacy. Following the economic crisis of the 1980's, IFIs intervened in Tanzania's policies through economic restructuring programmes. Concentrating on domestic economic management programmes the government placed lower emphasis on international and regional issues.

The change of presidency mostly influenced Tanzania's traditional approach to conflict resolution. While Nyerere tended to balance between internal and external issues – although more weight seemed to be placed to the regional and international affairs – Mwinyi was principally concerned with domestic economic management. Tanzania's leadership shift also took place at the same time when the decolonisation conflicts and the Cold War were

approaching the end. The end of the Cold War turned the international community's concern about human rights and democracy.

Furthermore, given the multi-level responses to conflict, the UN became more important to the resolution of African conflicts. On the one hand, the U.S. selectively supported peacekeeping interventions that complemented its interests. Russia on the other hand, backed the world body and the regional initiatives for conflict management. Within Africa, regional and sub-regional organisations were transformed so as to better handle the expanded security concerns. The OAU, for example, established the mechanism for conflict prevention and resolution. Besides the challenges faced, the organisation succeeded in resolving the conflict through mediation, diplomacy and the use of good offices.

Chapter 3

The role of Tanzania in Mozambique's conflict resolution

Introduction

Mozambique experienced two forms of conflict; the liberation struggles from the 1950's to 1975 and the post-independence civil war lasting between 1975 and 1992. The major parties to independence conflicts were the liberation movements, which later joined together to form *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) and the Portuguese colonialists. The main external actors were Tanzania and Zambia, regional organisations and the international community including the UN, the U.S. and the former USSR.

The nature of the conflict and the actors changed in Mozambique's post-independence conflict. Rhodesia's Smith regime devised a destabilisation strategy to demoralise Frelimo's decision to support Zimbabwe's liberation and anti-apartheid movements. *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) – also known as Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) – was created to destabilise the Frelimo government. Regional actors such as the FLS, independent states and other regional organisations influenced Mozambique's conflict resolution. At the international level, non-governmental organisations including Saint'Egidio participated in the Mozambique's conflict resolution. The changed nature of the conflict, the increased number of actors and the evolution of the international system to a certain extent influenced the outcome of post-independence conflict.

This chapter analyses the role played by Tanzania in resolving Mozambique's conflicts. The main argument is that the level of the country's involvement in the post-independence conflict resolution is less compared to the period of liberation struggles. The conditions within both countries, the factors at the regional level and at the international system shaped Tanzania's role in Mozambique. During the late 1950's Tanganyika hosted the first group of refugees from Mozambique escaping drought and the Portuguese repressive

acts. After Tanganyika's independence and the formation of Frelimo the role expanded to include provision of education and military training facilities; and land for settlement. The support continued to the late 1980's when Tanzanian troops were withdrawn from Mozambique. The Peace Accord was signed in 1990 and elections were subsequently held in 1992.

Mozambique is a peculiar case in Tanzania's record of conflict resolution because it was involved from the late 1950's to early 1990's, in different magnitudes. Mozambique's civil wars were an example of those at the end of the Cold War with some conflict resolution scholars considering its management as the first "non-traditional" post-1989 conflict.¹ Utilising the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), the chapter addresses the following questions for analysis. What were the drivers for Tanzanian foreign policy and the involvement in Mozambique's conflict resolution? What were the roles of the regional and sub-regional organisations in resolving the conflict, and how Tanzania worked with such institutions? What have been the successes and/or losses of Tanzanian foreign policy? And, were there any opportunities and/or challenges that Dar es Salaam was facing?

The RSCT will focus first on the relations between the international community and Tanzania on the one hand, and the regional structures on the other. Second, the focus will be on the region's interactions with the neighbouring regions including East Africa, the Horn, and the Indian Ocean. Finally, Tanzania's domestic situation and the country's relations with the neighbours in southern Africa will be analysed.² Security concerns at different levels are inter-linked to such an extent that they cannot be separately analysed. As Brown argues, the major security perceptions and concerns are inter-linked to an extent that the countries' national security cannot be considered in isolation from each other.

¹ Communita di Saint'Egidio, USA (International) <http://www.iisd.org> [Accessed on 05 September 2007].

² Southern Africa has been identified as a security region in relation to other sub-regions.

The chapter is divided into four major parts. The first part provides a background to the Mozambique's conflict and how it was resolved in both pre- and post-independence periods. The second part discusses the role of international, regional and other actors in the resolution of Mozambique's conflict, focusing on how these actors influenced the Tanzanian foreign policy and its participation in Mozambique. The third part is about the strategies adopted by Tanzania, and how has the domestic environment informed the Tanzanian foreign policy and the approach to Mozambique. It will discuss the opportunities and challenges faced and whether or not Tanzanian diplomacy succeeded in the Mozambique's case. The conclusion forms the last part that draws out the specific theoretical and practical lessons from conflict resolution.

Liberation struggles (1950s-1975)

Mozambique was Portugal's colony.³ The Portuguese were the first Europeans to colonise Africa, and almost the last to grant political independence. When the British and French African colonies were attaining independence in the 1960's, Portugal attempted to isolate its territories from this trend.⁴ Portugal's lack of development and its colonies' underdevelopment provide part of the reasons. According to Hanlon, by the early 1980's, the World Bank categorised Portugal itself as a developing country. Consequently, after independence Portugal's colonies remained among the poorest sub-Sahara African countries.⁵

³ Others were Angola and Guinea Bissau.

⁴ Omari and Macaringue, "Southern African Security in Historical Perspective" 46.

⁵ Joseph Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire* (London: Zed Books Limited, 1984), 15. See also Charles O. Chikeka, *European Hegemony and African Resistance, 1880-1990*, Studies in African Economic and Social Development, Volume 23. (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2004), 167; MPLA, "A Parasite Country Par Excellence" Aquino de Bargaça and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.), *The Liberation Reader: Documents of the African Liberation Movements*, Volume 1, the anatomy of colonialism, (London: Zed Press Ltd., 1982), 20.

During the 1950's Mozambicans travelled across the Southern and East African regions seeking work in South African mines⁶ or in Tanganyika to work in sisal and cotton plantations. At first, small groups of refugees arrived in Tanzania escaping drought and Portuguese brutality. Soon there were about 60,000 refugees in Tanganyika.⁷ Those who worked in plantations preferred to work in Tanganyikan sisal plantations instead of Mozambican because they earned much more money. While staying in Tanganyika the sisal cutters supported and participated in TANU meetings whose main agenda was to conscientise people on the importance of liberation struggles. As a means to mobilise the masses, TANU used the cooperatives of coffee and cotton producers.⁸

Consequently, those who went back to Mozambique introduced the ideas of TANU and the cooperative societies. For instance, in 1956 João Namimba – a Mozambican local teacher was in Tanganyika and met Nyerere – then TANU's leader, the latter stressed the necessity of Mozambicans to form their own movement. As a result, the African Voluntary Cotton Society of Mozambique was formed in 1957.⁹ The creation of a cotton society somewhat paved way for more nationalist organisations in the early 1960's.

Across the region, the majority of Mozambique's neighbours attained independence during the early 1960's. Mozambicans were inspired by the success of the nationalist struggles and developed the idea of forming liberation movements. At the same time Portugal intensified violence and harassment

⁶ Mozambique's economy was integrated into that of South Africa through the provision of cheap labour to the mines. In turn, Portugal was compensated by South Africa in the form of gold at a fixed price – which contributed to foreign exchange earning. See Nguyuru H. I. Lipumba, "The State of the Economies of Front Line States and the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa," in *Confrontation and Liberation in Southern Africa: Regional Directions After the Nkomati Accord* ed. Ibrahim S. R. Msabaha and Timothy M. Shaw (Gower: Westview Press Inc., 1987), 77.

⁷ For a desicussion on this see Miller, "The Politics of `Decolonisation in Portuguese Africa" 146.

⁸ Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire* 23.

⁹ Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire* 23.

against Mozambican nationalists. This forced more to migrate into neighbouring countries,¹⁰ from which in 1960 they formed UDENAMO (National Democratic Union of Mozambique),¹¹ and in 1961 MANU (Mozambique National Union)¹² and UNAMI (National African Union of Independent Mozambique).¹³ The MANU was named and structured on the TANU model.

The formation of the three organisations did not pose a potential threat to the Portuguese regime. This could in part be due to the fact that the headquarters were in neighbouring countries and the movements comprised few exiled members hence, experienced inadequate mass support from the nationalists inside Mozambique. In Mozambique itself, however, the Portuguese secret police (PIDE) increased oppression and banned political activities, which added to outflux of many who joined Frelimo in Tanganyika.¹⁴

To overcome the factors that divided them, Nyerere invited the three organisations in 1962 to establish their headquarters in Dar es Salaam.¹⁵ Encouraged by Nyerere, Nkrumah and the Conference of Nationalist

¹⁰ Amour Zacarias Kupela, "The Effects of the War of Destabilisation in Mozambique" (Post Graduate Diploma dissertation, Centre for Foreign Relations, 1990), 15.

¹¹ UDENAMO was formed in Salisbury/Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia on the model of Joshua Nkomo's National Democratic Party.

¹² MANU was formed in Tanganyika and comprised people who had been active in TANU. Initial support came from Makonde dock and plantation workers in Kenya and Tanzania, many of whom had lived abroad for more than a decade.

¹³ UNAMI established an office in Blantyre – Malawi. See Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982* (Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1983), 79-80.

¹⁴ Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire* 24.

¹⁵ Ronald H. Chilcote and Eduardo Mondlane, "Eduardo Mondlane and the Mozambique Struggle," *Africa Today* 12 (9) (November 1965): 5. See also Kupela, "The Effects of the War of Destabilisation in Mozambique," 15.

Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP), the movements merged to form Frelimo on 25 June 1962.¹⁶

Eduardo Mondlane,¹⁷ Frelimo's first leader, managed to unite different organisations into a national movement. His revolutionary ideas had developed since his childhood. His mother was a traditional woman who encouraged him to go to school. The motive here seems to have been to equip him to confront the Portuguese. He followed his father's footsteps, who died in the struggle to recover the power of traditional people in Mozambique. Moreover, his uncle who had died after being imprisoned for 25 years as he opposed the Portuguese system, was the paramount chief in the South. Mondlane's ideas were nurtured in 1947 when he was a social sciences student at the University of Witwatersrand. He collaborated with students who were against racial segregation. This resulted in his deportation to Mozambique two years later.¹⁸

While in Mozambique, Mondlane organised the Mozambican students' movement, *Nucleo dos Estudantes Africanos Secundarios de Moçambique* (NESAM) that comprised secondary school students and was led by some who were in South Africa. Functioning under the cover of social and cultural activities, the organisation spread the spirit of nationalism among the youth and

¹⁶ Isaacman and Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution* 81. See also Kupela, "The Effects of the War of Destabilisation in Mozambique," 15.

¹⁷ Mondlane was born in 1920, Gaza District – Southern Mozambique. He was the first in his family to acquire formal education, studying at a mission primary school. He was, however, barred from secondary education due to the racial segregation policy. Subsequently he taught himself English and consequently won a scholarship for a high school in South Africa. He pursued M.A and Ph.D degrees in Sociology at Northwestern University – Illinois. He received his Ph.D in 1960, making him Mozambique's first Ph.D holder. He was killed on 3 February 1969 in Dar es Salaam, by a bomb concealed in a book. It is suspected that he was assassinated by PIDE, probably with help from dissidents within Frelimo. See Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, Ronald Segal (ed.), (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1970). See also Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire* 25; Isaacman and Isaacman *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution* 81-82.

¹⁸ Chilcote and Mondlane, "Eduardo Mondlane and the Mozambique Struggle," 4. See also Edward A. Hawley "Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane (1920-1969): A Personal Memoir," *Africa Today* 26 (1) (First Quarter 1979): 20.

mobilised resistance against cultural subjugation by the Portuguese. As a result, the organisation set the ground for the formation of Frelimo with leaders such as Eduardo Mondlane, Joaquim Chissano¹⁹ and Josina Machel.²⁰

Mondlane's writings to a certain extent shaped Frelimo's ideology. In addition to being influenced by Marxist scholars such as Mao Zedong, Mondlane met other radical African students trying to build a sound anti-colonial ideology out of Pan-African, pan-Negro and Marxist philosophies. His revolutionary thinking was strengthened in 1950 when he – as the first African Mozambican – was sent to Lisbon University by the colonial regime for further studies. Among his colleagues, Amílcar Cabral and Agostinho Neto subsequently led liberation struggles in Guinea Bissau and Angola respectively. Mondlane received a bachelor degree from Oberlin College in the U.S. in 1953.²¹

Mondlane joined the UN Department of Trusteeship in 1957 as a research officer. It was here that he made further contacts. Most prominent was Nyerere and several Mozambican nationalists. Nyerere in turn promised Mondlane Tanganyika's full support in case a guerrilla struggle becomes necessary.²² In 1961, with the protection of a UN passport, Mondlane spent three months in Mozambique talking to groups operating clandestinely inside the territory. He resigned in late 1961 so that he could fully participate in liberation activities. Between 1961 and 1963 Mondlane was a lecturer at Syracuse University. He reflected that it was a "waiting period until Tanganyika

¹⁹ Chissano served as Mozambique's second President after Samora Machel. Chissano negotiated the peace agreement between Frelimo and Renamo after 16 years civil war. He relinquished power to Armando Emilio Guebuza, although the constitution permitted Chissano to contest for another presidential term. Magotti, *Simba wa Vita katika Hostoria ya Tanzania* 75-76.

²⁰ Kupela, "The Effects of the War of Destabilisation in Mozambique," 13.

²¹ Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire* 25. See also Steven F. Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961-93," *The China Quarterly* No. 142 (June 1995): 392.

²² Witney J. Schneidman, "Frelimo's Foreign Policy and the Process of Liberation," *Africa Today* 25 (1), Southern Africa: Confrontation and Conflict (January-March 1978): 58.

was completely independent.” At the same time he maintained contacts with exiled political movements. In 1962 Mondlane was among those who brought together in Tanganyika the various parties for a joint congress. He later commented “in June 1962 I came to Dar es Salaam with the sole purpose of convincing those who were still doubtful about unity.”²³

Subsequent to the formation of Frelimo, the Portuguese colonial authorities banned all nationalist activities. Even though Frelimo leaders still believed in peaceful struggles, repression, imprisonment and killings proved that negotiations with the colonial regime would not result in the desired outcome.²⁴ The perception on using peaceful approach was to some extent influenced by the fact that most of the founders of Frelimo lived in the British colonies. As a result, Mozambican nationalists gradually began to develop confidence in the effectiveness of the armed struggle.

Samora Moïses Machel²⁵ was among those who fled to join Frelimo in Tanganyika. The first Congress of September 1962 decided to use military action. Consequently, in January 1963 Machel and a group of other militants were among the earliest to be sent to Algeria for military training.²⁶ After returning to Tanganyika, he headed the first military training camp and was

²³ Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, 3. See also Chilcote and Mondlane, “Eduardo Mondlane and the Mozambique Struggle.” 4.

²⁴ FRELIMO, *Message from Comrade Samora Moises Machel, President of FRELIMO to the 24th Session of the Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity*, Dar es Salaam, 8 January 1975, 8.

²⁵ Machel was born on 29 September 1933. He was the first President of Mozambique after independence. He succeeded Frelimo’s leadership from Eduardo Mondlane from 1969. Together with others, he influenced Mugabe not to leave the conference table during the Lancaster House negotiations in 1979. Machel was later killed in an aircraft crash inside South African territory on 20 October 1986 on the way back to Mozambique from a meeting in Zambia. See Jacqueline Kalley, Schoeman and Andor *Southern African Political History* 215-312. See also Steven F. Jackson “China’s Third World Foreign Policy” 392. *Daily News* “Maputo rejects crash findings.” 13 May 1987.

²⁶ Hanlon, *Mozambique: Revolution Under Fire*, 27. See also Barry Munslow ed., *Samora Machel, An African Revolutionary: Selected Speeches and Writings*, Translated by Michel Wolfers (London: Zed Books, 1985), xiii.

instrumental in planning and coordinating the first phase of the armed struggle.²⁷ The conflict began in 1964, and developed later into full-scale war.

Frelimo's responsibility was to launch the struggle in Mozambique and to liberate the country's Southern regions. Contrary to the Portuguese expectations that Frelimo forces could invade Mozambique from outside they were in fact already inside. The Portuguese could not locate Frelimo freedom fighters operating in the territory.²⁸ Furthermore, the struggle was simplified by the fact that the movement maintained contacts with the other groups inside Mozambique. Mbita explained that Frelimo enjoyed total support of the larger Mozambican population and the political awareness was similar to that of the liberation struggle.²⁹

The success of Frelimo's first operation resulted in increased recruitment. On 25 September 1964 Frelimo had 250 trained and had equipped officers, operating in small units of ten to fifteen each. In mid 1965, the forces were operating in company strength and by 1966 the companies were organised into battalions. In 1967 Frelimo had 8,000 trained and equipped army personnel, excluding recruits. Over three years Frelimo increased the fighting strength thirty-two times. This growth meant that Lisbon had no other option than increase defence expenditure. An indication of this growth was that, in 1964 there were about 35,000 Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique and by the end of 1967 they had to increase the commitment from 65,000 to 70,000.³⁰

²⁷ Isaacman and Isaacman *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution* 99.

²⁸ Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, 138. See also Chikeka, *European Hegemony and African Resistance* 169.

²⁹ Hashim I. Mbita, "Activities of Liberation Movements," A Memorandum of the Executive Secretary of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, in *Southern Africa, Papers and Documents of the UN-OAU Conference*, Oslo, 9-14 April 1973, Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand (eds.), (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1973), 70.

³⁰ Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, 139-140.

Two factors largely contributed to Mozambique's independence in 1975. One was the armed struggle supplemented by negotiations between Frelimo and the Portuguese regime. The other factor was the April 1974 *coup d'état* in Portugal which took place against the background of deteriorating strategic and economic situation. The new regime was compelled to promise constructive changes in Angola and Mozambique, including reduction in military spending. A ceasefire was signed in 1974 followed by independence in 1975.³¹

Despite its ultimate success during the liberation conflicts, Frelimo faced challenges. During the launch of the armed struggles, misunderstandings prevailed over the appropriate military tactics and administration of the liberated zones. Machel confirmed that between 1967 and 1969 Frelimo was "paralysed" by disputes.³² In his last visit to Kongwa before Mozambique's independence, Machel conceded that when Frelimo's members arrived in Kongwa in 1964 they were divided and "... it was the unity which we [Frelimo] managed to obtain here [in Tanzania] that permitted us to win..."³³ As Minter has argued, Tanzania's full support during Frelimo's internal crisis was essential in preventing the movement's disintegration or a victory of the faction associated with PIDE.³⁴ Leaders were influenced by individualism, ethnicity, regionalism and racism. As a result, there was a high level of distrust and to some extent PIDE had penetrated the movement. To resolve the problem Frelimo sent strong messages that promoted nationalism.³⁵

³¹ D. Birmingham, *Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique*, (London: James Currey Publishers Ltd., 1992), 52. See also Omari and Macaringue, "Southern African Security in Historical Perspective" 51.

³² Hanlon, *Mozambique: Revolution Under Fire* 25, 27.

³³ Munslow, *Samora Machel* xiv.

³⁴ William Minter, "Major Themes in Mozambican Foreign Relations 1975-1977," *A Journal of Opinion* 8 (1) (Spring 1978): 43.

³⁵ Witney J. Schneidman, "Frelimo's Foreign Policy and the Process of Liberation" 58. See also Kupela, "The Effects of the War of Destabilisation in Mozambique," 18-19; Hanlon, *Mozambique: Revolution Under Fire* 25, 27.

Post-independence conflict resolution (1975-1990s)

Immediately after independence, Mozambique was involved in a conflict on its Western border with Rhodesia. The conflict was due to Mozambique's support for ZANLA – the military wing of ZANU. The Smith regime in Rhodesia recruited former PIDE, Portuguese soldiers and ousted Frelimo members in the early 1970's to form Renamo.³⁶ From Rhodesia, Renamo began attacks into Mozambique in June 1976.³⁷ Smith's regime used Renamo to terrorise people in rural Mozambique so as to limit the country's ability and willingness to support Rhodesia's nationalist struggles.³⁸ Renamo had bases in Malawi and at Gorongosa – Mozambique. After Rhodesia's independence in 1980 Renamo remnants along with Smith's troops fled to South Africa. Both were coordinated and integrated to South Africa's intelligence and military apparatuses.³⁹

To reduce dependence on South Africa, which was set to destabilise post-independence Mozambique, as a so-called front-line state, was integrated into the economies of the FLS and SADCC. The intention was to stabilise the state politically and economically so that the region becomes powerful and deterrent to South Africa.⁴⁰ In turn, the South African government could not

³⁶ The organisation later received support from the right-wing private U.S. foundations that opposed Frelimo government's Marxist policies.

³⁷ *New Times* (SU), No. 2, 1983. See also William J. Pomeroy, *Apartheid, Imperialism and African Freedom* 49. See also Frank James Tester, "Art and disarmament: turning arms into ploughshares in Mozambique" *Development in Practice* 16 (2) (April 2006): 169-170.

³⁸ Lipumba, "The State of the Economies of Front Line States" 77. See also Horace Campbell, "War Reconstruction and Dependence in Mozambique," *Third World Quarterly* 6(4), October 1984; James D. Sidaway and David Simon, "Geopolitical Transition and State Formation: The Changing Political Geographies of Angola, Mozambique and Namibia," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 19 (1) Special Issue: Namibia: Africa's Youngest Nation (March 1993): 15.

³⁹ For a discussion on Renamo as Africa's first terrorist organisation see Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Roots of Terror* (Dar es Salaam: E&D Limited, 2004), 89-95; Pomeroy, *Apartheid, Imperialism and African Freedom*, 49. See also Tester, "Art and disarmament: turning arms into ploughshares in Mozambique" 169-170.

⁴⁰ Altaf Gauhar and Julius K. Nyerere, "Julius Kambarage Nyerere," *Third World Quarterly* 6 (4) (October 1984): 836.

accommodate this regional strategy which isolated Mozambique from South Africa.

The apartheid regime adopted three measures in response to this regional approach on Mozambique. The first was to adopt some form of economic sanctions against Mozambique by withdrawing the support that ensured financial stability to the territory. South Africa reduced the amount of goods passing through Mozambique. For example in 1973, Maputo was handling 6.8 million tons of South African imports and exports; by 1979 the figure dropped to 4.3 million tons and down to 1.1 million tons in 1983.

The second measure was to control Mozambican labourers and migrants. There was a 60 percent reduction in the recruitment of Mozambican labour for the South African mines. During the pre-independence period there was an average of 120,000 Mozambican miners in South Africa whereby, by 1977 the number dropped to approximately 41,000. It implies that more than 70,000 Mozambicans were retrenched.⁴¹ In addition, before independence there were 115,000 Mozambican migrant workers in South Africa and by 1985 the number had dropped to 40,000. Such a decline was an outcome of South Africa's decision to regulate the influx of Mozambican workers. This had impact on Maputo's economy; as noted earlier that Mozambique was depending on migrant workers' revenues.⁴²

The third measure was to destabilise Mozambique and the region. South Africa financed, trained and armed Renamo. Renamo troops killed people, destroyed industries, plantations as well as transport and communication systems. By 1982 Renamo members had destroyed 140 villages leaving 110,000 displaced and forced the closure of 489 primary schools with approximate 90,000 students. Between 1982 and 1983 Renamo destroyed 900

⁴¹ Msabaha and Hartman, "Tanzania after the Nkomati Accord" 122.

⁴² Lipumba, "The State of the Economies of Front Line States" 78.

shops in rural areas and demolished more than 100 health centres.⁴³ It is estimated that from 1976 at least 100,000 Mozambicans were killed in the armed struggle and 600,000 died from diseases and starvation. Moreover, nearly 1.7 million people were internally displaced and almost 200,000 children lost their parents or suffered from trauma.⁴⁴

Mozambique's deteriorating economy and security left its leaders with two options. One was to uphold the decision of isolating South Africa – a joint decision with other countries in the region. This choice would risk complete destruction by South Africa and Renamo. The other alternative was to negotiate with South Africa and come up with a strategy for good neighbourliness.⁴⁵ It was this path that Maputo followed, against the wishes of the regional leaders and opted to negotiate with South Africa. The Frelimo government signed the non-aggression pact – the Nkomati Accord on 16 March 1984 with South Africa, which bound both parties to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs.⁴⁶ The parties also agreed not to use their territories for bases, transit or accommodation for guerrillas. This applied to both the ANC and Renamo. South Africa, however, breached the Accord since just before the agreement Pretoria provided military equipment to Renamo.⁴⁷

Mozambique seemed to be compelled to negotiate with South Africa because the regional decision to isolate the latter worsened the former's economy. At the international level, the Mozambican regime realised that the

⁴³ Msabaha and Hartman, "Tanzania After the Nkomati Accord" 123.

⁴⁴ Kupela, "The Effects of the War of Destabilisation in Mozambique" 59-60.

⁴⁵ Colin Legum, "The Nkomati Accord and Its Implications for the Front Line States and South Africa" in *Confrontation and Liberation in Southern Africa: Regional Directions After the Nkomati Accord* ed. Ibrahim S. R. Msabaha and Timothy M. Shaw (Gower, Westview Press Inc., 1987), 92.

⁴⁶ Samora Machel and P.W. Botha – then South African Prime Minister signed the agreement at the border between the two countries.

⁴⁷ Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire* 257. See also Pomeroy, *Apartheid, Imperialism and African Freedom*, 84-85.

Soviet Union was unwilling to make similar commitment as it did for Hanoi during the unification of its own country. In short, Frelimo could no longer count on economic and military backing from the Soviet bloc and China. The USSR was unable to provide military assistance to prevent destabilisation and somewhat lacked interest in providing economic assistance. This was justified by the 1980's growing misunderstandings between the Soviet Union and Frelimo. The only viable option was either to accept "dictation" by Pretoria, or negotiate an agreement that would enable Mozambique rebuild economic and political bases.⁴⁸

On the Tanzanian side there were implications for Mozambique's decision to reach an agreement with South Africa. Initially Dar es Salaam criticised Mozambique for signing the Accord but later realised Frelimo's limited options as discussed above. Therefore, between 1986 and 1988 the Tanzanian government provided Mozambique with 3,000 troops. The deployment somehow drained Tanzanian treasury given that there was no other country willing to provide support. A bilateral defence agreement between Tanzania and Mozambique was signed to facilitate the despatch of armed forces. Dar es Salaam's experience of the military engagement in Mozambique was one of the initial signs of the foreign affairs changes that were to take place in the late 1980's.⁴⁹

South Africa succeeded in isolating Mozambique from the FLS, which was led by Tanzania. Although Mozambique was Tanzania's ally and closest friend, South Africa managed to create contradicting goals between Mozambique's nation-building ideals and economic survival. The country was compelled to see that the key to economic stability was in Pretoria, not in Dar es Salaam.

⁴⁸ Mark Webber, "Soviet Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Final Phase" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 30 (1) (March 1992): 12. Legum, "The Nkomati Accord and Its Implications for the Front Line States" 92-93; Obasanjo, "Africa's Needs" 88.

⁴⁹ Omari, "The Rise and Decline of the Front Line States" 70-71. Also quoted from Africa Report 32 (1) (January-February 1987) 67. See also David F. Gordon, "International Economic Relations" 252.

Furthermore, the Accord provided for financial assistance implying that Mozambique was to be integrated into the South African economy in terms of finance, markets, labour, technology, transport and communication networks.⁵⁰

The other implication was that South Africa's presence and security threat were brought closer to Tanzania. The Nkomati Agreement further provided for defence and security cooperation. Areas such as the Cabora Bassa dam were to be jointly guarded by South African and Mozambican troops. At the beginning when Tanzania allowed the ANC to operate on its territory Mozambique served as a security insulator state. With the signing of the Nkomati Accord this buffer turned a reverse "corridor" which South African agents could easily traverse to collect intelligence and security pertaining to the ANC bases in Tanzania, and on Tanzania.⁵¹ Consequently, Tanzania found itself bordered by a neighbour that would pose a security threat.

The peace talks

From 1984 there had been a series of official and unofficial negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo. The latter demanded integration in the government, a step resisted by Frelimo. Initial negotiations took place in the Frankfurt Hotel on 29 May 1984 and later in Pretoria from 1 to 3 October 1984. In early 1989, the Mozambican Catholic Church with the permission of Frelimo government met Renamo leaders in Nairobi to get their perceptions on Mozambique's situation. There was no positive outcome.⁵² Part of the reason was that by that time Renamo was not ready for negotiations as was assured of South Africa's continued military and political support.

The disintegration of the former USSR and the end of apartheid in the region compelled the Frelimo government to resume contacts with Renamo. The government, therefore, officially requested the Zimbabwean President

⁵⁰ Msabaha and Hartman, "Tanzania after the Nkomati Accord" 125.

⁵¹ Msabaha and Hartman, "Tanzania after the Nkomati Accord" 125-126.

⁵² Kupela, "The Effects of the War of Destabilisation in Mozambique," 73, 75.

Robert Mugabe and the Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi to mediate the conflict and were approved by both parties. On 7 August 1989 the two Presidents endorsed the oral guidelines and called on the parties to support peace initiatives. Two rounds of Nairobi talks followed,⁵³ resulting in the two sides acknowledging that violence was not a solution to their conflict. On its part, Frelimo held that it was undemocratic to use violence in undertaking constitutional reforms. Renamo, on the other hand, opposed the imposition of leaders to the Mozambicans using military force. Renamo perceived itself as Mozambique's active political force that denounced violence as a means to change the existing order.

Declining state legitimacy and internal public pressure to resolve the conflict were factors that compelled the parties to reach the Rome Peace Agreement. The first direct meeting mediated by Saint'Egidio was held in Rome from 8 to 10 July 1990.⁵⁴ The organisation was involved partly because it found it difficult to assist the people affected by drought if the conflict was not first resolved. Armando Emilio Guebuza, the incumbent President and the then Minister for Transport and Communications, led the Frelimo delegation. Raul Manuel Domingos, the Head of the Department of External Relations, led the Renamo delegation. The meeting resulted in a *communiqué* that stressed issues that unite both sides. The Agreement further provided for the transformation

⁵³ Mary H. Moran and M. Anne Pitcher, "The 'Basket Case' and the 'Poster Child': Explaining the End of Civil Conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique," *Third World Quarterly* 25 (3) (2004): 511. See also Kupela, "The Effects of the War of Destabilisation in Mozambique," 75.

⁵⁴ A Rome-based international Non-governmental Organisation recognised by the Holy See as a lay public association. A high school student founded Saint'Egidio in Rome 1968. Although the majority of the members are from Italian cities others are found in more than 40 countries and are approximately 30,000. The organisation is spread in Europe, Central and Latin America and Africa. Some of the activities include the provision of humanitarian assistance, creating solidarity between the church and people of different beliefs. The Community has participated in conflict resolution in Albania, Algeria, Burundi, DRC, Guatemala and Kosovo. See *Comunità di Saint'Egidio*, USA (International), <http://www.iisd.org> [Accessed on 05 September 2007]. See also United States Institute of Peace, "Catholic Contributions to International Peace" Special Report 09 April 2001, 1-12.

from a one-party to multi-party system.⁵⁵ The two delegations with the same composition met again in Rome from 11 to 14 August 1990.⁵⁶

Renamo seemed to be forced to negotiate with Frelimo because it was weakening militarily. This could be explained by the fact that apartheid was ending. Internally, South Africa concentrated on political reforms with the release of Nelson Mandela from prison in February 1990. The changes were accompanied by the removal of the ban on the ANC, PAC and SACP.⁵⁷ At the international level, Pretoria was concerned with breaking through economic sanctions and political isolation imposed by the international community. In turn, Renamo's military operations were constrained by a lesser attention and military support from the Botha government. Realising the uncertainty to receiving South Africa's support Renamo strengthened contacts with Portugal and West Germany and in Africa with Kenya and Malawi for political and military assistance.⁵⁸

The UN was involved in the Mozambican peace process through peacekeeping troops (ONUMOZ), contribution and financing of the 1994 multiparty elections. The force was assembled after the success of the Renamo-Frelimo negotiations and was mandated to help the parties implement the agreement. The UN troops assisted in demobilisation, disarmament, clearing landmines, supporting the refugees and internally displaced persons. The UN was involved because of two reasons: commitment demonstrated by parties to resolve the conflict by signing the general peace agreement, and the realism that seemed likely that the conflict had all the elements of a civil war. Mozambique's operation was one of the few post-Cold War UN peace

⁵⁵ Anicia Lalá, "Mozambique" in *Security and Democracy in Southern Africa* ed. Gavin Cawthra, Andre du Pisani and Abillah Omari (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2007), 108.

⁵⁶ Kupela, "The Effects of the War of Destabilisation in Mozambique," 76-77.

⁵⁷ T.G. Ramamurthi, "Editor's Note" 1.

⁵⁸ Kupela, "The Effects of the War of Destabilisation in Mozambique" 77-78.

missions.⁵⁹ Although the signing of an agreement was considered by the international community to be an indicator of the commitment to peace, it has not always been the case elsewhere. As will be shown later, Burundi has been falling back to conflict despite the signing of a series of agreements by the parties.

Due to the successful conflict resolution and adherence to the Peace Agreement, the international community perceived Mozambique as a credible mediator. Among others, the country participated in the AU mission in Burundi – with support from the UK, resolved the Comoros conflict and in the easing of tensions in Madagascar and Zimbabwe. When serving as a facilitator for Burundi conflict resolution Nyerere invited the Mozambican government to contribute to the promotion of peace and reconciliation. Earlier, Mozambique sent observers to the DRC and had a small military police unit in East Timor. Portugal provided the logistical support for Mozambique's force in Timor.⁶⁰

Renamo has recently returned to arms in demand for a share in the energy resources discovered in the country. Two reasons largely explain Renamo's move. First, SAPs implementation like in most other African countries has compelled the government to further withdraw from the sectors that it has been controlling. The situation has caused conflict as the majority of the Mozambicans including former Renamo rebels could not access food, shelter and social services.⁶¹ The second-related factor is Renamo's demand for changes in the electoral law and their inclusion into the government forces. Hanlon argues herein that the pace for the gap between the rich and the poor has tremendously increased whereby Renamo's leaders want also to equally

⁵⁹ For a discussion on this see Moran and Pitcher, "The 'Basket Case' and the 'Poster Child': Explaining the End of Civil Conflicts" 511. See also Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (second edition)

⁶⁰ Lalá, "Mozambique" 120-121. For more discussion on contribution to conflict resolution see www.juliusnyerere.info/images/uploads/nyerere_lifetime_legacy_joaquim_chissano.pdf [Accessed on 10 April 2014].

⁶¹ Joao Bernardo Honwana, "Civil-Military Relations in the Transition to Democracy: The Case of Mozambique," *Africa Development*, Volume XXIV, Numbers 3&4, 1999, 139.

benefit from the country's natural resources. Given that Frelimo appears to be unwilling to share, the most Renamo would do is destroy the railway line as a strategy to compel the government to address the issues.⁶²

Global players, Tanzanian foreign policy and the involvement in Mozambique

Tanzania facilitated the establishment of the first contacts between Scandinavian countries and Frelimo representatives. Sweden for example, began to provide humanitarian aid and educational support to the Southern African liberation movements from 1964.⁶³ A significant component of Sweden's aid was an Education Fund to support the Dar es Salaam-based Mozambique Institute. The Institute was formed in 1963 by the Tanzanian government to train Mozambican refugees. Although the nature and the scope of the institute changed over time,⁶⁴ the purpose remained to train Mozambican freedom fighters so that they serve in different government departments after independence.⁶⁵ Significantly Scandinavian support for Tanzania and Mozambique was not driven by the prevailing Cold War paradigm rather, an interest in Tanzania's promotion of socialism and self-reliance.

The collapse of the Salazar regime in 1975, however, resulted in the U.S. and the USSR playing more active role in the region. To Washington, southern Africa was seen through the prism of the Cold War ground and Mozambique

⁶² For a discussion on this see *The Citizen*, "What Mozambique's Renamo ex-rebel leaders and militias really want" 25 October 2013, 9.

⁶³ This was preceded by parliamentary approval of the government's proposal for special education fund in Southern Africa. See Tor Sellström, "Some Factors behind Nordic Relations with Southern Africa," in *Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa; A Post-Apartheid Perspective* ed. Berti Odén and Haroub Othman Seminar Proceedings No.22, (The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1989), 29-30.

⁶⁴ Originally the institute was designed to serve as a tutorial centre and later developed to a secondary school.

⁶⁵ At the beginning the Ford Foundation financed the institute but was later withdrawn in 1964. See Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, 178-179.

was regarded as the Soviet's ally.⁶⁶ Chester Crocker, U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, visited Mozambique and asked Machel not to "internationalise the war" between Frelimo and Renamo. In other words he did not want to see Cuba's assistance and its allies.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, Maputo-Washington relations improved during the Carter Administration. Carter was more concerned with human rights especially with the South Africa's apartheid record. Thus, by 1978 Maputo developed an interest in improving relations with the U.S. Frelimo had this to say, "We are ready to develop friendly and cooperative relations with all states, irrespective of their social systems."⁶⁸ In an interview, Machel confirmed that President Carter had reviewed American policy towards Africa. According to the policy, the U.S. would disassociate with the countries that support colonialism and apartheid.⁶⁹

Ronald Reagan's election to presidency in 1980 worsened Mozambique-U.S. relations. Washington developed tough, anti-Communist, pro-South Africa posture. Reagan's constructive engagement policy⁷⁰ with South Africa provided ground for Pretoria's attack on its neighbours. The policy facilitated the expansion of the U.S's political, military and diplomatic exchanges with Pretoria. Frelimo seemed to have been shocked by the January 1981 investigations conducted after a South African raid. It was realised that the CIA had penetrated even the Central Committee. The information was passed on to South African security services – which facilitated South Africa's attack on

⁶⁶ Hanlon *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire* 234.

⁶⁷ *Guardian* (UK), 13 January 1983; Pomeroy, *Apartheid, Imperialism and African Freedom*, 108.

⁶⁸ Isaacman and Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution*, 185.

⁶⁹ Isaacman and Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution*, 185.

⁷⁰ The logic behind is that one can bring changes in Namibia and to the apartheid system by moving closer and by becoming friendlier to South Africa.

Maputo suburbs.⁷¹ For instance, in 1981 José Massinga, who was appointed one of the directors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, admitted being a CIA agent.⁷²

The reason for U.S. involvement in Southern Africa despite the fact that it had no formal colonial links was partly to contain communism. Washington rejected aid to Mozambique due to its Marxist leadership and ideology. Furthermore, from 1981 the U.S. linked the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola with the progress towards Namibian independence.⁷³ Indeed, the Americans were largely concerned with maintaining Southern Africa within the Western sphere of influence militarily, economically and politically. Tanzania's role in the region was further challenged. Given the country's opposition to constructive engagement, the Reagan's administration was less willing than its predecessors to accept Tanzania's leadership in African diplomacy.⁷⁴ Accordingly, Tanzania's ability to continue playing a major diplomatic role in sub-Saharan Africa decreased.

The role of the U.S. could further be seen in post-Nkomati Mozambique. Washington pressed for the recognition of Renamo through the creation of a coalition government. Furthermore, Mozambique was required to integrate exiled Renamo members into the army and the civil service. The U.S. offered to provide financial assistance to the "resettlement centres." Another condition was that aid was to be withheld from the state farms, cooperatives and small peasant farmers. The U.S. was ready to provide agricultural assistance to Mozambique with the condition that it should go to private farmers including

⁷¹ Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution under Fire*, 234. See also Isaacman and Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution*, 187.

⁷² Massinga was a leader of Mozambican U.S. student organisation who instead of joining the struggle in Mozambique decided to go for a Ph.D in Geneva. He returned in 1973 following Frelimo's reconciliation policy. See Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire*, 31.

⁷³ See Obasanjo, "Africa Needs" 88. Msabaha and Hartmann, "Tanzania After the Nkomati Accord," 120. See also the American National Security Memorandum on Southern Africa prepared by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa, under the direction of Dr Henry Kissinger, 1969.

⁷⁴ Gordon, "International Economic Relations," 250, 252.

the Portuguese who either remained after independence or were to return with Renamo. Both measures were not intended to rescue Mozambique's worsening economy rather, forced the country to comply with U.S. pressures.⁷⁵

Moscow was not the only problem for the Americans. Close relations with Tanzania facilitated China's admission into the Mozambican revolution. Most Chinese aid to Frelimo was delivered through the ALC. The assistance consisted of small arms and instructors to the Frelimo camps in Tanzania. As early as 1965, Tanzania permitted Chinese personnel to train and equip Mozambican guerrillas.⁷⁶ At a congress in Mozambique Frelimo's leader – Mondlane thanked China for the contribution to the armed struggle. He said, "I would like to express gratitude... to the Government of the People's Republic of China... who have trained and continue to train many of our military cadres..."⁷⁷ China's significance to Mozambique's conflict resolution was to some extent the experience of the people's war.

At the beginning, Frelimo simultaneously pursued aid from Moscow and Beijing. The guerrillas were trained in both Russia and China. As the conflict intensified, China and the Soviet Union became the major sources of financial aid, weapons and diplomatic support. Nevertheless, Frelimo's ideological orientation placed it closer to the USSR and Eastern European countries. Unlike other liberation movements, Frelimo managed to neutralise the conflict between the two.⁷⁸

Moscow, however, later replaced Beijing as Mozambique's main arms supplier. The Soviet Union provided political and diplomatic support to Frelimo. Moscow provided doctors, teachers and geologists, although at a lower level as

⁷⁵ Pomeroy, *Apartheid, Imperialism and African Freedom*, 85.

⁷⁶ Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy," 398-399.

⁷⁷ Sidaway and Simon, "Geopolitical Transition and State Formation" 15.

⁷⁸ Isaacman and Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution* 171-172. See also Scheidman, "Frelimo's Foreign Policy and the Process of Liberation," 59.

compared to arms.⁷⁹ Contrary to what one would have expected in the Zimbabwean struggle, Mozambique supported ZANU rather than ZAPU – Moscow’s ally. In an attempt to overcome dependency, Frelimo concluded major agreements with Britain, France and Italy and subsequently began to receive military assistance from Portugal. Since China was not a UN member until 1971, Russia was the only Security Council permanent member to consistently vote with the Afro-Russian bloc in condemning Portugal.⁸⁰

The UN was the ideal forum that Frelimo could use to condemn Portugal. The General Assembly adopted several resolutions related to Mozambique’s struggle, including the Resolution 2787 (XXVI) of 1971 that legalised the use of armed struggle against colonialism. Although the West did not back this stand, the resolution drew the world’s attention to Southern Africa and served as a justification for providing aid to the liberation movements.⁸¹ A subsequent declaration was adopted on granting independence, which called for immediate rather than gradual steps. Although a committee was set up in 1972 to recommend implementation procedures, the Portuguese government refused to recognise UN’s mandate and declined to submit annual reports.⁸²

The Commonwealth, then increasingly dominated by the new members from the Afro-Asian bloc, provided technical assistance to Mozambique from the 1980’s. Between 1988 and 1993 Maputo received a high priority in the Commonwealth through “Special Fund for Mozambique.” Relations between Mozambique and the organisation could be traced back to 1975 with the visit of Michael Manley – Jamaica’s socialist Prime Minister.⁸³ The UK backed the

⁷⁹ Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire*, 234.

⁸⁰ Scheidman, “Frelimo’s Foreign Policy” 59.

⁸¹ Scheidman, “Frelimo’s Foreign Policy” 61.

⁸² Mohammed El-Khawas, “Mozambique and the UN,” *A Journal of Opinion* 2 (4) (Winter 1972): 30.

⁸³ In the same year, Mozambique initiated negotiations to join the Commonwealth. The organisation was interested in Mozambique’s independence following the dispute in Rhodesia.

Special Fund initiative since it was developing ties with Maputo due to proximity to Rhodesia. Mozambique was admitted to the Commonwealth in early 1996 as the first country that was not a former British colony to join the organisation. Mozambique's admission to the Commonwealth can be argued, was some form of a reward to Samora Machel in his contribution to Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. Maputo, for example, supported sanctions against Rhodesia, which had a serious impact on Mozambique's economy. Robert Mugabe and Margaret Thatcher backed Mozambique's membership.⁸⁴

The changed setting at the international system and the subsequent signing of an agreement between Tanzania and the IMF in 1986 influenced Tanzania's policies. The country's commitment to the remaining liberation movements was neutralised by deteriorating economy and the IFIs' prescriptions to reduce costs on unproductive activities. This contributed to Tanzanian government's decision to withdraw forces from Mozambique in 1988.⁸⁵ In addition, developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had a profound impact on Tanzanian foreign policy and socialism. It implies that the "bourgeois principles" of human rights and equality were championed from a liberal democracy perspective. The policies were to be adopted as conditions for financial assistance.⁸⁶

The Cold War inevitably weakened Tanzania's role in conflict resolution as a NAM leader. The NAM was the country's important forum where small and weak countries could be mobilised to build and maintain political and economic

For a discussion on this see Victoria Te Velde, *The Commonwealth Brand: Global Voice, Local Action*, (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011), 85, 90.

⁸⁴ See Margaret Thatcher, Press Conference at Vancouver Commonwealth Summit, 17 October 1987; Margaret Thatcher, Press Conference in Malawi, 31 March 1989. See also history.stackexchange.com; africanhistory.about.com/od/eraindependence [Both accessed on 02 April 2014].

⁸⁵ Andrew S. Kiondo, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy: The Socio-Economic Context" in *Politics and Administration in East Africa* 351.

⁸⁶ Kiondo, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy: The Socio-Economic Context" 351.

independence. Tanzania's foreign policy posture was reinforced by its position as a NAM leader.⁸⁷ As Nyerere argued, "...the strength of a small country like ours lies in being part of... small countries."⁸⁸ Therefore one of the issues that the nation sought to consistently emphasise was "the maintenance of the unity of the NAM."⁸⁹ The Cold War, therefore, threatened the unity of the NAM because the big powers were involved in conflict in/or among NAM members.

It has been argued that the NAM seemed to lose its appeal during the 1990's after the disintegration of the USSR. Tanzania's achievements were at risk because it was left without an international conflict to be non-aligned. Two related situations emerged. First, the eastern bloc countries reduced interest in Dar es Salaam resulting in the ineffectiveness in manipulating the Cold War politics.⁹⁰ Second, as argued by Kiondo, Tanzania's right to independent decision-making was challenged. Indeed, the issue was how the country could maintain independent foreign policy decisions⁹¹ while at the same time protect itself from the donors' influence. Goshal et al maintain that NAM was not related to a bi-polar world only. It reflects weak states' struggle against great powers' hegemony. The struggle started since the formation of sovereign nations' system in the mid Seventeenth Century. Indeed, NAM has remained foreign policy option of the weak states regardless of whether the world is bi-polar, uni-polar or multi-polar.⁹²

⁸⁷ Gordon, "International Economic Relations," 240-241.

⁸⁸ Julius K. Nyerere, *A Time of Struggle* Presidential Address to the National Assembly (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 22 July 1980), 3.

⁸⁹ Sellström, "Some Factors behind Nordic Relations with Southern Africa" 29-30.

⁹⁰ Gordon, "International Economic Relations," 240-241.

⁹¹ Kiondo, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy: The Socio-Economic Context" 352.

⁹² See Goshal, D., S. Sen et al., ed. *Unique Quintessence of International Relations*, (New Delhi: Unique Publishers, 1993), 202-205; for more discussion on NAM and NIEO see John B. Nipwapwacha, "Non-Alignment and the Foreign Policy of Tanzania 1970-1980" (Advanced Diploma dissertation, Centre for Foreign Relations, 1981), 9-14.

After the collapse of Eastern European states, Tanzania's diplomatic reputation was challenged. The new regimes in East Europe could no longer afford to maintain an international presence; their interests in Tanzania declined too. At the same time within the region, the ANC was legalised in South Africa and was no longer a liberation movement. The West minimised interest in maintaining a large presence and sought to either close down or reduce the size of their embassies. Likewise, former East bloc nationals began to migrate from Tanzania. Dar es Salaam's capacity to manoeuvre among different sets of international actors somewhat diminished.⁹³

Tanzania's concern further shifted to the struggle for the new international economic system and changes in trade and aid conditions. Tanzania largely believed that economic sustainability would be attained when the current rules of the game were rectified. During the 1979, UNCTAD V Conference in Manila, Amir Jamal – Tanzania's then Minister of Finance played a key role in the negotiations. In the end two levels for negotiating for the NIEO were identified. These were the South-South cooperation and the global round of negotiations, later to be known as the North-South dialogue.⁹⁴ Tanzania's campaign had been concentrating on reforming the world economic order. Urging for a dialogue between the developed and the developing countries, Tanzania's approach to the economic problems seems to have been reformist. According to Kiondo, the country's strategies in international economic system will essentially remain reformist if they will not transcend the nationalist and petty bourgeois conceptualisations of foreign policy principles.⁹⁵

Regional actors in Mozambique's conflict resolution

In resolving Mozambique's conflict, several actors in the region played a role. South Africa could be identified among the influential actors through the

⁹³ Gordon, "International Economic Relations," 261.

⁹⁴ Kibacha, "Tanzania's Diplomacy in the UN: 1970-1980," 185.

⁹⁵ Kiondo, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy" 342.

destabilisation strategy. The strategy affected most of the independent states, which were at the same time experiencing declining economy in the sub-region. Although the FLS members reacted individually, they were nonetheless forced to change tactics. Instead of upholding confrontation the countries endorsed Mozambique's decision to sign the non-aggression pact with South Africa.⁹⁶ Omari and Macaringue add that similar non-aggression accords between South Africa and other majority-ruled states were signed but kept secret. This trend reflected a shift from confrontation politics to co-operation and accommodation.⁹⁷

Geography and history link Tanzania with its neighbours. Kenya and Uganda played a great role. As it was the case for the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Tanzania could not talk about pan-Africanism without setting an example in the East African region. Tanzania's desire to cooperate in East Africa continued even after the break-up of the former community in 1977. As Nyerere argued, the way that the EAC collapsed "had very serious consequences for Tanzania...." He added further that, the break up of the community should not be taken as an excuse for abandoning efforts to develop future economic co-operation in the region.⁹⁸ While his concern was on economic cooperation, he was aware that Tanzania has historically been promoting pan-Africanism.

Security concerns in Eastern and Southern Africa were interconnected. Tanzania's engagement in Mozambique and South Africa influenced its behaviour in East Africa, especially the conflict with Uganda. Nyerere argued that African states' reluctance to criticise oppressive regimes such as that of Idi Amin weakened their capacity to mobilise the international community on

⁹⁶ Mohammed Omar Maundi, "Tanzania" in *Security and Democracy in Southern Africa*, ed. Gavin Cawthra, Andre du Pisani and Abillah Omari (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2007), 201. See also Omari and Macaringue, "Southern African Security in Historical Perspective" 47.

⁹⁷ Omari and Macaringue, "Southern African Security in Historical Perspective" 49.

⁹⁸ Nyerere, *A Time of Struggle* 6-7.

Southern African affairs.⁹⁹ To a certain extent the conflicts between Tanzania and Uganda and between Tanzania and Kenya drew Tanzania's attention away from concentrating on the resolution of Mozambique's conflict. Machel characterised Uganda's invasion to Tanzania as an aggression where "Amin is being used to divert the attention of Tanzania from the struggle for African liberation... Uganda is simply an instrument to divert attention..."¹⁰⁰

During the 1980's, however, the East African states attempted to re-establish dialogue and cooperation so as to maintain regional stability.¹⁰¹ From the mid-1980's Tanzania, and to a certain extent Kenya, took lower regional profiles. Relations between the two were largely normalised although not close as it had been during the early post-independence period. Tanzania's reduced regional activity was partly an outcome of changing regional circumstances, costs and limitations of regional activism, economic crisis and growing dependence on external resources. The country's attention, therefore, gradually shifted to relations with the donors.¹⁰²

Mozambique's conflict resolution was to some extent influenced by the conditions in the Indian Ocean Region. Trade and migration linked the East Africa with the Indian Ocean.¹⁰³ The militarisation of the Indian Ocean by foreign powers introduced new security threats in both regions.¹⁰⁴ The Middle East conflict and the West's interests posed more threats in the world

⁹⁹ Gordon, "International Economic Relations," 242.

¹⁰⁰ Karrim Essack, *The Armed Struggle*, Volume II 296.

¹⁰¹ Msabaha and Hartman, "Tanzania After the Nkomati Accord" 130.

¹⁰² Gordon, "International Economic Relations," 250, 242.

¹⁰³ The Western Indian Ocean includes the islands of Seychelles, Comoros, Mauritius and Madagascar, stretches from the Horn to Southern Africa, and The Eastern Indian Ocean comprises of India, Sri Lanka and Western Australia.

¹⁰⁴ For more discussion on the militarisation of the Indian Ocean see Imran Hussein Kombe, "The Politics of Negotiating the Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean" (M.A. Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 1986) 1-31. See also Msabaha and Hartman, "Tanzania After the Nkomati Accord" 133.

particularly in East Africa and the Indian Ocean. Nyerere maintained that when the Russian Forces invaded Afghanistan, the Americans reacted by strengthening the military in the Indian Ocean and establishing a naval base at Diego Garcia and in the other countries on the East African coast. It was to this end that the Tanzanian government and Sri-Lanka introduced the first resolution in the UN General Assembly on the Indian Ocean. The Tanzanian government re-stated its determination to promote peace and security in the region while at the same time opposing the installation of foreign military bases. This stand was a setback for the East African countries given that the struggle against oppression was interpreted by the super powers in terms of East – West confrontation.¹⁰⁵

Due to its closeness, the Horn of Africa's security is linked to that of East Africa. Foreign involvement destabilises the Horn as the region occupies a strategic position in the air space. Moreover, the impact of drought, terrorism or conflict affects the neighbouring regions. Kenya, for example, borders Somalia with which it has been involved in a conflict of attrition over the North Eastern province. Kenya further entered into a military agreement with Ethiopia in 1964 that aimed primarily at Somalia. Due to border conflicts with Somalia and potential border disagreement with Ethiopia in the mid 1970's, Kenya perceived itself to be surrounded by pro-Russian socialist regimes. Eventually, Moscow sought to enter into technical and economic cooperation agreement with the countries that adopted the socialist ideology. In response, Kenya invited the U.S. to establish a military base in Mombasa. Kenya's behaviour and the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict destabilised the region to the extent that Tanzania and

¹⁰⁵ A Letter from Ambassador Salim A. Salim – Tanzania's Permanent Representative to the UN to the UN Secretary General, reference number TZNY/D.100/2, of 15 May 1974. See also Nyerere, *A Time of Struggle* 2-3; Fannuel Ismael Kuzilwa, "The Role of Ideology in Tanzanian Foreign Policy" (M.A. Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 1975) 74.

Africa's bargaining position were affected,¹⁰⁶ especially on Mozambique's conflict resolution.

The Kagera River Basin Organisation (KBO) was formally established in 1977 to foster economic cooperation. The institution's members include Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The goal was to generate power, provide irrigation and improve communications and economic infrastructure for large areas of Burundi, Rwanda, as well as economically underdeveloped parts of Tanzania and Uganda.¹⁰⁷ Two issues can be highlighted here. Judging from the time when the organisation was established and the fact that Kenya was not a member, one could conclude that the KBO was in part created as a response to the setbacks of the collapsed EAC. Moreover, the organisation's objectives have not been realised following the outbreak of the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi from early 1990's.¹⁰⁸ Perhaps concern about conflict resolution in the GLR as fully discussed in the next two chapters, has drawn the members' attention away from cooperation in economic issues.

Evidently the role of regional and sub-regional organisations in resolving intra-state conflicts was yet to be fully developed. The OAU, for example, was not largely involved in resolving Mozambique's 16-year civil war, in part because of the non-interference in the internal affairs principle. At the sub-regional level there existed SADC, EAC, and IOR with some overlapping responsibilities and memberships as well as with varying structures, capacities and purposes.¹⁰⁹ While some of the institutions such as SADC shifted their focus to economic cooperation, most of the regional organisations were not in a

¹⁰⁶ Webber, "Soviet Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Final Phase" 1. Msabaha and Hartman, "Tanzania After the Nkomati Accord" 131.

¹⁰⁷ Nyerere, *A Time of Struggle* 9.

¹⁰⁸ See Shule, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy During the Third Phase Government" 76-77.

¹⁰⁹ For a discussion on this see Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional Institutions, the UN and International Security: A Framework for Analysis," *Third World Quarterly* 18 (3) Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task-Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs (1997): 422.

position to formally intervene in resolving the Mozambique's civil war. Due to seeming absence of an appropriate regional organisation to resolve Frelimo-Renamo conflict, other actors and the international community assumed the role.

Other actors in resolving Mozambique's conflict

Religious institutions played different roles in both conflicts. On 8 July 1965, the Tanganyikan Christian Refugee Services signed a tripartite agreement with the Tanzanian government and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The Agreement facilitated for the settlement of 10,000 Mozambican refugees in Southern Tanzania.¹¹⁰ As we have seen, the refugees were escaping famine and Portuguese oppressive acts. It should be noted that before the use of the armed struggle, the activities of the church and the colonial state were intertwined. Missionaries owned large areas of land and collected tax and some before being abolished – were even involved in slave trade.¹¹¹

During the armed struggle, the church still supported the state and condemned violence. The oppressed fought against Christianity due to its political position by siding with the Portuguese. Realising that the colonialists were being defeated, some parts of the church joined the masses through the provision of humanitarian aid.¹¹² After Mozambique's independence the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service cooperated with the Tanzanian government and the UNHCR to repatriate over 10,000 refugees. This was done during the second round of repatriation beginning from 16 August 1976.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Kalley, Schoeman and Andor *Southern African Political History* 573-638.

¹¹¹ Essack, *The Armed Struggle* 232-233. See also Eduardo Mondlane, *Development and Nationalism and Mozambique* (London: PANAF, 1972), 142.

¹¹² Essack, *The Armed Struggle*, 233.

¹¹³ Kalley, Schoeman and Andor *Southern African Political History* 215-312.

Religious institutions were also involved in post-conflict reconstruction. For example, the Christian Council of Mozambique participated in disarmament through “tools for arms” project. The artists collected the weapons, cut them into pieces and later converted them into sculptures, instead of destroying them completely. The aim was to manufacture other useful tools such as chairs, benches while at the same time preserving the environment. As a result, the programme drew the attention of the international community, particularly on the effects of the conflict.¹¹⁴

Women were instrumental in Mozambique’s conflict resolution. Although they formed half of the work force, they were discriminated against by the Portuguese regime, and in the liberation movements. Realising their potential later, Frelimo decided to integrate women in the struggles initially as porters¹¹⁵ and later as guerrillas.¹¹⁶ As the first step the Women’s League (Lifemo) was formed in Mbeya, Tanzania (1966). The organisation could not perform as expected in part because women were not involved in the armed struggles and were not attending meetings. The organisation, nevertheless, succeeded to lay the ground for women’s role in the anti-colonial struggle.¹¹⁷ In 1967, Frelimo created a women’s detachment and the first group was sent for military training in Nachingwea – Tanzania. Female militants were instrumental in mobilising support in the areas that were still controlled by the Portuguese and in convincing the youth to join the struggle.¹¹⁸ However, there is no evidence on

¹¹⁴ Tester, “Art and disarmament,” 169.

¹¹⁵ Women’s role was limited to transporting materials, cultivating food for the combatants, working in health and education centres established by Frelimo; and spying on Portuguese troops. See Isaacman and Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution*, 91.

¹¹⁶ Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire* 28-29.

¹¹⁷ Laurinda Uele, “Underdevelopment and Liberation: Women Liberation as an Aspect of Social Emancipation” (Postgraduate diploma Dissertation, Centre for Foreign Relations, 1982), 16-17.

¹¹⁸ Michael G. Mgonzo, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in Tanzania” Postgraduate Diploma Programme Dissertation, Centre for Foreign Relations 1982), 17-20; Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire* 31. See also Isaacman and Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution*, 91.

the relations between Frelimo and Tanzanian women's organisations during the liberation conflict.

After independence, the Frelimo government established the Organisation of Mozambican Women (OMM). The organisation's objective was to transmit Frelimo's political agenda across Mozambique and raise awareness about women empowerment. In addition, the organisation had to mobilise women in the revolution while at the same time overcome discrimination in terms of gender and ethnicity. During the conflict the OMM trained 10,000 women to work as local militias to support the displaced and the victims. By 1980 the OMM membership had reached 300,000 women.¹¹⁹

Other actors to some extent undermined the credibility of the liberation movements, especially in the UN. While Frelimo had resorted to the armed struggle, Canada advocated the need for developing "peaceful" and "non-violent" solutions to the conflicts in Southern Africa.¹²⁰ In August 1973, Canadian groups organised a counter-conference in Ottawa at the same time when the Commonwealth meeting was taking place. The aim was to focus the international community's attention on the neglected issues of Southern Africa. Among others, John Malecela, the then Tanzania's Minister for Foreign Affairs, was a featured speaker and spoke specifically about the role of outside countries in Mozambique's conflict resolution. He explained, "...even if you [some of the Western countries] cannot aid our [Tanzania's and the liberation movements] cause of liberation, at least do not help our enemies." As Saul argues, Canada could not avoid supporting Portugal due to the good relations that existed between the two countries.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Moran and Pitcher, "The 'Basket Case' and the 'Poster Child'" 511. See also Munslow, *Samora Machel* 169, 170, 175.

¹²⁰ John S. Saul, *Canada and Mozambique*, (Toronto: The Development Education Centre and The Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies, 1974), 72.

¹²¹ Saul, *Canada and Mozambique*, 78.

Tanzania's support in resolving Mozambique's internal conflict

Tanzania was not only involved in resolving the conflict between Frelimo and the other actors but also in intra-movement conflicts. Frelimo experienced misunderstandings either from among the leaders or between the leaders and the members. As we have seen, the conflicts escalated after the decision to wage the armed struggle. One of the initiatives that Tanzania took was to encourage and persuade the leaders to settle their differences. When persuasion failed, Dar es Salaam decided to recognise one leader and remove the other. The judgement criterion was the support from the people.¹²² Essack questioned the efficacy of "gauging support" while the people were in a liberation struggle. Essack concluded that Tanzania succeeded in using its good offices especially with Nyerere's leadership and the ALC to help Frelimo remain focused and in the forefront of the struggle. In the same way, the recognised leader or movement gained respect from the international community.

From the early days of independence Tanzania provided bases for Frelimo. When the armed struggle was launched, Tanzania was the first country¹²³ to give Frelimo guerrillas' arms and training facilities. Dar es Salaam and Mtwara served as the entry ports for Frelimo's military equipment. Likewise, the government allowed military training camps to be established in the Southern border.¹²⁴ From the mid 1970's Tanzanian troops trained part of Frelimo's 2,500 troops. On 22 May 1976 about 1,500 Tanzanian troops helped President Machel defeat Renamo and were guarding the Cabora Bassa dam. After appeals from Machel, a joint military agreement between Tanzania and

¹²² Essack, *The Armed Struggle*, 289-290.

¹²³ Other countries were Egypt, Algeria and Zambia. See Isaacman and Isaacman *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution*, 171-172.

¹²⁴ Kenneth Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence*, (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1973), 178. See also Khadiagala, *Allies in Adversity* 179; William Minter, "Major Themes in Mozambican Foreign Relations, 1975-1977" *A Journal of Opinion* 8 (1) (Spring 1978):43.

Mozambique was signed in May 1981.¹²⁵ The support to Mozambique could be explained as part of good neighbourliness, that is, if instability exists in the neighbouring country, the same implies for Tanzania. As Nyerere argued, attacks on Mozambique posed a threat to the whole of Africa, and more so to neighbouring states.

Frelimo was provided with land and assistance by Tanzania to build training centres in Kongwa and later in Nachingwea. Kongwa was identified and allocated to Frelimo by Nyerere in 1964. It was Frelimo's first military training base and later for the other movements such as ZANU-PF, ANC, PAC, MPLA and SWAPO.¹²⁶ Afterwards, Kawawa – Tanzania's then Minister of Defence identified and made a point that Frelimo freedom fighters move to Nachingwea closer to Mozambique where the struggles were being waged.¹²⁷

The liberation movements' centres were also used for the provision of political, health and education services. A hospital was built in Mtwara and schools were constructed in Tunduru and Bagamoyo. The Tanzanian government helped Mozambicans attain free education from primary to university level. The first secondary school – the Mozambique Institute was established in Dar es Salaam. It served as a channel for Mozambique's development funds. The government further facilitated scholarships to foreign institutions for medium and higher-level studies. The facilities were later used to train Mozambican and Tanzanian diplomats.¹²⁸

Food was produced in Tanzanian training camps. Due to conflict and drought, food became a problem in Mozambique. Some of the peasants who

¹²⁵ Khadiagala, *Allies in Adversity* 179. See also Kalley, Schoeman and Andor, *Southern African Political History*. 215-312.

¹²⁶ Documentary aired by Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation (TBC), "Fifty years of the Mainland Tanzania Independence," 7 and 8 December 2011, 10-11 a.m.

¹²⁷ Magotti, *Simba wa Vita Katika Historia ya Tanzania* 74.

¹²⁸ Minter, "Major Themes in Mozambican Foreign Relations," 43-44. See also Kupela, "The Effects of the War of Destabilisation in Mozambique," 17.

went into the bush were mobilised by the guerrillas to produce food. Collective plots were set up to assist in feeding the fighters. As discussed above, women produced food for the guerrilla fighters. Mozambicans – especially women and Tanzanians carried food and ammunitions over long distances from Tanzania.¹²⁹

The Tanzanian government called upon the citizens to support Mozambique's struggle. TANU declared 1974 to be the "Year of Liberation." Many Tanzanians from the national to the village levels provided voluntary contributions to the liberation struggles. The donations included blood to the guerrilla fighters in hospitals, clothes and money. A 4 million TShs cheque and other contributions were handed over to Machel on behalf of the Mozambicans. He later acknowledged that Tanzanians offered "any sacrifice" to make Frelimo's victory possible.¹³⁰ One of the reasons for mobilising the Tanzanians was to promote prestige and capability of Frelimo, internally and externally in political, military and diplomatic spheres.

On the diplomatic front, Tanzania mobilised the world opinion in order to gain material, political and moral support. From Dar es Salaam, Frelimo opened more representative offices in Algiers, Cairo and Lusaka. Furthermore, to disseminate information on Mozambique's struggle, Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam (RTD) broadcast liberation programmes.¹³¹ The RTD external service was established in 1965 to broadcast liberation programmes to other African countries. The airtime allocated according to the intensity of the programme provided room for Frelimo to be given more airtime. Mondlane and later Machel participated in preparing the programmes.¹³² This strategy was successful in

¹²⁹ Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire* 28-29.

¹³⁰ Mgonzo, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in Tanzania" 52, 54. See also FRELIMO, *Message from Comrade Samora Moises Machel, President of FRELIMO to the 24th Session of the Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity*, Dar es Salaam, 8 January 1975, 25-26.

¹³¹ Kupela, "The Effects of the War of Destabilisation in Mozambique," 17.

¹³² Interview by Suleiman Hegga, TBC Programme on Tanzania's fifty years of Independence, 08 December 2011, 10pm-12 am.

that, majority of the Tanzanians were mobilised and informed of the progress of the liberation as they provided contributions to Mozambicans.

Although Tanzania preferred negotiations to armed conflict, it strongly supported the Mozambican guerrilla war. In 1976, Tanzanian troops were sent to help protect the newly independent country from Rhodesia's military interventions. Immediately after the troops' arrival, Nyerere warned Rhodesia: "Tanzanian troops will be used if the independence of Mozambique, Zambia and other FLS is threatened."¹³³ Consequently, during the FLS meeting of January 1977 a mutual defense agreement was signed. The pact provided that an attack on any one of the member countries would be regarded as an attack on them all.¹³⁴ Tanzania continued to contribute troops to Mozambique, as we have seen, until the late 1980's when economic recovery programmes were already implemented.¹³⁵

Domestic environment, Tanzanian foreign policy and the Mozambique's conflicts

The newly independent Mozambican government emulated aspects of Tanzania's policies. Influenced by *Ujamaa* ideology, the Mozambican government established communal villages and collective state farms. Production councils were formed to run the nationalised factories. Frelimo, however, did not accept Tanzania's ideas of African socialism based on communal traditions. The leaders rejected the argument that there was a distinctive "African Socialism" or "Mozambican Socialism."¹³⁶ On 3 February 1977 the Third Frelimo Congress adopted Marxism-Leninism as the official ideology. Thereafter, the 1978 Frelimo's Central Committee stressed that, while

¹³³ *Daily News* (Tanzania) 12 November 1976.

¹³⁴ Yeager, *Tanzania: An African Experiment* 1982, 96.

¹³⁵ Khadiagala, *Allies in Adversity* 199.

¹³⁶ Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire*, 34. See also Moran and Pitcher, "The 'Basket Case' and the 'Poster Child' 513.

Marxism-Leninism was a model, it was “necessary... to be on guard against the variations of socialism”. Marxism-Leninism was, nevertheless, not different from Tanzania’s *Ujamaa*. According to Thomson, it was difficult to distinguish between Marxist-Leninist regimes and their African socialist neighbours. He adds that the Africa’s Marxist-Leninist regimes traded more with the West than with the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe.¹³⁷

Later Mozambique abandoned its official socialist position. From 1983 the Frelimo government emphasised decentralised, capitalist-oriented, small-scale projects and import-dependent development projects in industry and agriculture. State-owned farms were re-distributed to private and small-holder farmers.¹³⁸ Frelimo, however, formally denounced the Marxism-Leninism and was transformed to a democratic socialist organisation. A multiparty constitution was later adopted in 1990.¹³⁹ The changes that took place implied that Tanzania was to some extent able to influence Mozambique’s policies. But domestic conditions and relations with the West compelled Mozambique to abandon the socialist policies even earlier than Tanzania.

The involvement in Mozambique’s affairs jeopardised Tanzania’s security. Portuguese and Renamo’s terrorist activities threatened Tanzania’s national security. Tanzania in turn, concentrated on eliminating physical threats across the borders to the extent of overlooking other development issues. According to Msabaha, economic growth and development are important components of national security but in practice they received lesser attention.¹⁴⁰ On the one hand, Nyerere acknowledged the influence of the regional security on domestic environment. He said: “We cannot ignore what happens outside our borders,

¹³⁷ Alex Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics*, 41.

¹³⁸ Merle L. Bowen, “Beyond Reform: Adjustment and Political Power in Contemporary Mozambique,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 30 (2) (June 1992): 256.

¹³⁹ Mark Simpson, “Foreign and Domestic Factors in the Transformation of Frelimo,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31 (2) (June 1993): 310.

¹⁴⁰ Msabaha and Hartman, “Tanzania After the Nkomati Accord” 127-128.

because very often our economy and our security depend on it." On the other hand, he seemed to place more weight on the domestic environment, "...but in the final analysis it is our own actions inside Tanzania which are more important..."¹⁴¹ Inevitably the primary objective turned to protecting the country's borders. Perhaps one of the reasons could be, apart from economic performance and development issues, Tanzania's domestic environment was more stable as compared to that of Mozambique.

The building of socialism reinforced Tanzania's importance at the regional and international levels. Although Yeager and others see the country to be internally less sufficient and economically dependent, the outside perspective had a different vision.¹⁴² Tanzania was recognised by the international community as Africa's leading proponent of national self-reliance and promoter of the creation of an equitable international economic order.

Two issues could be identified here. One, as Campbell demonstrates, Tanzania remained diplomatically influential in international affairs despite being one of the least developed in Africa. The nation commanded respect within the NAM and in the social democratic states of the Western Europe. Regionally, Tanzanian leaders opposed openly and condemned external domination and Africa's exploitation.¹⁴³ Two, even if socialism is judged by some to have failed, the ideology largely facilitated the Tanzanian government to administer a remarkably stable and equitable society. It is one of the states whose levels of education and health improved in the post-independence period. With the influence of the liberal economy, however, in the provision of social services some of the achievements have been "undone."¹⁴⁴ This background shaped

¹⁴¹ Nyerere, *A Time of Struggle* 11.

¹⁴² Yeager, *Tanzania*, 93.

¹⁴³ Horace Campbell, "External Factors on Domestic Policies in Tanzania," in *Politics and Administration in East Africa*, ed. Walter O. Oyugi (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers Ltd., 1994), 470.

¹⁴⁴ Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics*, 55.

Tanzania's path to multi-party democracy. Unlike some African countries where the adoption of multi-party democracy resulted in chaos and political mismanagement, the country largely managed to peacefully carry out political reforms.

Tanzania's commitment to Mozambique's conflict resolution could in part be seen within the context of the strong belief in national unity. Ethnicity is largely perceived differently in Tanzania as compared to other African countries where mass mobilisation resulted in politically destabilising situations. In Tanzania, there are more than 150 cultural and linguistic groups – 99 percent of all Tanzanians are African, and 95 percent among them are Bantu-speakers. The remaining 4 percent speak Nilotic, Paraniotic, Cushitic and Khoisan languages. The fifteen largest ethnic groups account for only a half of the total population¹⁴⁵ and all the groups are united through one language – Kiswahili. This domestic experience influenced Tanzania's approach in promoting a sense of unity and subsequently resolving Mozambique's conflict.

The ruling party – CCM was a dominant actor in Tanzanian foreign policy formulation and in major foreign decisions. Supported by the government top executives and bureaucrats, the party was involved in two major foreign policy areas: the formulation of principles and guidelines, and decision making on specific issues. In the former, Nyerere was influential and was acting through the party decision-making procedures. The government's top executive and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation made decisions on specific foreign policy issues.¹⁴⁶ One of the incidents was the 1978 decision to go to war with Idi Amin. Nyerere called a party meeting to brief the members; the discussion was not about "whether Tanzania should go to war with Amin"

¹⁴⁵ Yeager, *Tanzania: An African Experiment* 35.

¹⁴⁶ Kiondo, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy" 334. See also S.S. Mushi, "The Making of Foreign Policy in Tanzania," in *Foreign Policy of Tanzania*, ed. S.S. Mushi and K.M. Mathews 5.

rather a briefing by Nyerere on the government's steps to engage to the fight.¹⁴⁷

During Mwinyi's presidency, the cabinet and the private sector assumed a more influential role in foreign policy matters than CCM. The Tanzania Chamber of Commerce Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA), for example, was formed in 1988 to safeguard the interests of businesspersons in major policy decisions. As Kiondo argues, the emergence of the private sector would have an impact on the country's foreign policy as the group has extended influence to Tanzania's trade and investment, sectors that were not traditionally part of Tanzania's foreign affairs.¹⁴⁸

Although personalities and leadership styles changed, Tanzania's foreign policy principles and determinants remained largely the same. Whereas Nyerere was more concerned with external affairs, Mwinyi seemed to be inclined to domestic issues. When explaining that the country had accomplished most of its international commitments, Mwinyi emphasised that national resources would be "directed toward solving internal problems."¹⁴⁹ Judging from the economic condition, Mwinyi was ready to put on hold Tanzania's diplomatic achievements for economic benefits. As Killian argues, Tanzania's high profile in international affairs was reduced to participation in regional economic cooperation.¹⁵⁰ In practice, it was evident that the focus of the Tanzania's foreign policy was no longer based on the posture of Nyerere's era.

Tanzania's foreign policy began to focus on economic cooperation at the regional and global levels. The re-opening of the Tanzania/Kenya border in 1985 and joining the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) in the same year

¹⁴⁷ Jakaya Kikwete attended the meeting as a representative of the party's Zanzibar branch and was taking notes. See Nyang'oro, *A Political Biography of Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete* 65.

¹⁴⁸ For a discussion on this see Kiondo, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy," 349. See also Killian, "Factors Informing Changes," 28.

¹⁴⁹ Kiondo, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy," 1.

¹⁵⁰ Killian, "Factors Informing Changes" 94-95.

accompanied economic liberalisation measures.¹⁵¹ The PTA later evolved to Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). As will be discussed in the next chapters, this strategy worked for a short period as conflicts erupted in the neighbouring GLR countries.

Following economic liberalisation, a vigorous civil society emerged pressing for political reforms. On the one hand, it was an outcome of the lessons from the region, whereby Zambia and Burundi were moving towards multiparty democracy.¹⁵² On the other hand, in the region, a number of regimes were losing credibility as a result of political and economic mismanagement. In some of the countries the masses pushed for political reforms hoping that it would be a solution to the economic woes they were facing. In other countries the military overthrew the governments in power following dissatisfaction with the latter's performance. Tanzania's democratic transition therefore began in 1992 with the adoption of legislation for a multi-party system.

Post-Cold War Tanzania-Mozambique relations have taken a different direction. There has been a shift toward other forms of cooperation such as maritime security, promotion of joint border business, and investment in energy resources and offshore gas development. For example in February 2012 Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa signed a maritime security pact to promote collective efforts in combating criminal activities in the Indian Ocean such as piracy and drug trafficking. As Macaringue argues, there seems to be a paradigm shift in the period after the Cold War and apartheid.¹⁵³ Mozambique's security is currently largely built in relation to all other countries in the region unlike before when, the country's external threats were defined in relation to the apartheid South Africa.

¹⁵¹ Kiondo, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy," 348.

¹⁵² Maundi, "Tanzania" 193.

¹⁵³ See Paulino Macaringue, "Civil-military relations in post-cold war Mozambique," in www.issafrica.org/pubs/Books/OurselfesToKnow/Macaringue.pdf [Accessed on 1 April 2014]. See also István Tarrósy, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy Considerations Across Mozambique and East Africa," Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS) Viewpoints 2012, 2

Infrastructure improvement has also become an important factor in the current Tanzania-Mozambique relations. The opening of the Unity Bridge in October 2005 has not only facilitated transportation but also improved cross-border trade relations between the two countries. According to Tarrósy, poor infrastructure hindered cross-border trade and raised transportation costs. It should be noted, however, that from mid 1970's Nyerere and Machel developed the idea of connecting the two countries with appropriate roads and a bridge across Ruvuma River.¹⁵⁴

Opportunities and challenges faced by Tanzania's diplomatic role

In 1964 Portugal violated Tanzania's territorial integrity. Portuguese fighter planes intruded Tanzania's airspace into Mtwara and Ruvuma regions. While some of the planes were shot down, others bombed and killed a number of people. As a result, Tanzania's representative at the UN urged the Security Council to pronounce Portugal's behaviour in Africa a threat to international peace and security. Tanzania further mobilised other OAU members to intensify a campaign against Portugal. Members urged the UN organ to consider imposition of sanctions to compel Portugal to comply with the UN decisions.¹⁵⁵ Earlier, Tanzania in consultation with the OAU Committee of Four, called for a United Nations Security Council meeting. As an outcome resolution S/5380 of July 1963 was adopted calling for the Secretary General to effect negotiation between the Portuguese and the liberation movements. The attempt failed.¹⁵⁶

Tanzania further received frequent military intervention threats from Portugal. On 10 May 1965, then Portuguese Foreign Minister, Franco Nogueira,

¹⁵⁴ For a discussion on this see Tarrósy, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy Considerations" 1-2. See also www.africanhistory.about.com/od/mozambique/l/bl-Mozambique-Timeline-7.htm [Accessed on 2 April 2014].

¹⁵⁵ See Press Release, Information Services Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, C/907/72 IS/1.317, 16 April 1972; See also Mohamed El-Khawas, "Mozambique and United Nations" 32.

¹⁵⁶ Kibacha, "Tanzania's Diplomacy in the United Nations" 68.

declared Portugal's intention of waging legitimate retaliation against Tanzania.¹⁵⁷ Part of the reason was based on Tanzania's decision to host a "terrorist base" along Tanzania-Mozambique border. Tanzania was further described as a dangerous communist base in Eastern and Central African regions. With the "silent support" of its allies perhaps the Minister wanted to mobilise the international community and in the end receive NATO's support for its plans.¹⁵⁸ The other explanation could be that Portugal wanted to justify its 1964 actions in the Tanzanian territory.

Tanzania faced an internal dispute on the implementation of IFIs policies. While the party led by Nyerere opposed the adoption of SAPs, the government under Mwinyi implemented the IMF and the World Bank liberalisation packages.¹⁵⁹ In reality the agreement with the IMF reinforced the Washington Consensus that re-directed the path of the Tanzanian society in the wake of economic crisis that began from the late 1970's. Indeed, the goal of supporting the struggle against colonialism and apartheid were almost accomplished. The issue remained how to transform the ALC, which coordinated and facilitated nationalist struggles so as to lead African countries towards economic independence. As Nyerere emphasised, "... in our struggle for economic liberation, we still don't have the equivalent of the Liberation Committee..."¹⁶⁰

After the end of the nationalist struggles in Southern Africa, the remaining challenges were poverty alleviation, unemployment and post-conflict reconstruction. Being part of the region, Tanzania faced similar challenges. Strengthening regional cooperation was sought by the government to be an

¹⁵⁷ This took place when the Portuguese Foreign Affairs Minister held a press conference in London on the eve of the NATO Conference.

¹⁵⁸ *The Nationalist*, "Decolonisation" 31 May 1965, 4; See also *The Nationalist*, "Portugal Threatens Tanzania" 11 May 1965, 1, 3, 4.

¹⁵⁹ Campbell, "External Factors on Domestic Policies in Tanzania," 470-471.

¹⁶⁰ Gauhar and Nyerere, "Julius K. Nyerere" 822.

alternative path to development. But structural constraints were found to be a setback on such attempts.¹⁶¹ Tanzania, for example, perceives the current poverty to be caused by an unequal economic order. On this Nyerere had this to say, "... the existing pattern of wealth distribution in the world... [is] not the result of Africa's own actions..."¹⁶² He was of the view that economically independent Third World nations should act as liberated zones for the lesser developed countries, instead of seeking to join the developed world.¹⁶³

Internal security was determined by regional stability in East and South Africa. While Tanzania was concerned about the security of the Southern African region internal security threats existed in the East African countries. The 1 August 1982 attempted *coup d'état* in Kenya coincided with similar plans in Tanzania. Kenyan coup leaders escaped to Tanzania while the Tanzanian coup leaders sought refuge in Kenya. At the same time, Milton Obote who had returned to power in Kampala, feared Nairobi-based opposition groups. As a result two summits were held in Tanzania in 1983.¹⁶⁴ The October summit agreed on exchange of wanted political refugees and outlawed the use of each other's territory by opposition groups. The November summit officially dissolved the EAC and paved the way for normalisation of relations between Kenya and Tanzania. The East African leaders agreed to cooperate in new forms because peace and stability were more important in the region.¹⁶⁵

The effectiveness of Tanzanian foreign policy on the Southern Africa region was determined by cooperation with the like-minded states in the region.

¹⁶¹ Elling Njål Tjønneland, "South Africa's Regional Policies in the Late and Post-Apartheid Periods," in *Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: A Post-Apartheid Perspective*, ed. Bertil Odén and Haroub Othman, Seminar Proceedings No 22. (The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1989) 58.

¹⁶² Nyerere, "Is Africa Responsible?" 3.

¹⁶³ Gauhar and Nyerere, "Julius K. Nyerere" 822.

¹⁶⁴ D. Katete Orwa, "Continuity and Change: Kenya's Foreign Policy from Kenyatta to Moi" in *Politics and Administration in East Africa* 319-320.

¹⁶⁵ Orwa, "Continuity and Change" 330. See also *Weekly Review*, 12 December 1983, 7.

To some extent Tanzania's foreign policy posture was challenged. Mozambique and Zambia seemed to be economically inclined to South Africa and their geographical location exposed them more to invasion than Tanzania. If Mozambique and Zambia adopted a conciliatory approach because of economic dependence and geographical vulnerability, Tanzania found herself isolated from East and Central African affairs.¹⁶⁶

The strategy of decolonisation seemed to work well in Southern Africa but not in Tanzania's immediate neighbours. Due to the progressive nature of the foreign policy, the country found itself in trouble with the neighbours most of whom pursued conservative foreign policies. Malawi and Tanzania for example, were not in good terms as the former maintained diplomatic relations with apartheid South Africa. The country further accused Tanzania of harbouring Malawian dissidents. Throughout Nyerere's presidency, Tanzania-Malawi relations remained indifferent. Mwinyi's regime, however, normalised the relations as evidenced by Kamuzu Banda's state visit to Tanzania in early October 1992.¹⁶⁷

Compared to the nationalist struggles period, Tanzania's participation in the Mozambican peace negotiations somehow diminished. One Tanzanian diplomat observes that, "...with Mwalimu around, would the Mozambican peace negotiations go on without serious input from us [Tanzania]?... was anybody from the OAU seriously consulting us [Tanzanians] on these [Angolan and Mozambican] questions?"¹⁶⁸ This claim implied that Tanzania had no leverage in the negotiations as it was increasingly losing its traditional roles in influencing the course of the conflict. There seem to be other factors that explain Dar es Salaam's reduced involvement in Mozambique's peace talks.

¹⁶⁶ Msabaha and Hartmann, "Tanzania After the Nkomati Accord" 113.

¹⁶⁷ Kiondo, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy" 346-347, 351.

¹⁶⁸ Nyang'oro, *A Political Biography of Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete*, 114.

With the exception of Uganda, Mozambique's civil wars were one of the first experiences of Tanzania's involvement in post-independence conflict resolution. Tanzania's foreign policy was clear about the support for liberation struggles but not for resolving an intra-state conflict or a civil war. One of the reasons was the OAU's and Africa's perception on a country's "internal affairs." In addition to signing a bilateral agreement on the provision of troops, Tanzania's involvement was limited to condemning Renamo and the imperialists for supporting the movement. To this end, even if Tanzania volunteered to mediate, it could not have been possible to be accepted as a "neutral" mediator by Renamo.

Tanzania's involvement in Mozambique's civil war was also through hosting refugees. During the sixteen-year period, the country was refugees' recipient. This was facilitated by the "open-door" policy whereby Tanzania received, provided land and protected the Mozambican refugees. Moreover, the government of Tanzania was subsequently involved in the post-agreement through encouraging the trend towards national unity, greater understanding and reconciliation between the Frelimo government and Renamo.

Conclusion

Mozambique went through two forms of conflict. The liberation struggles from 1950's to 1975, followed by the post-independence civil war from 1975 to 1992. Being part of Southern Africa, Mozambique constitutes an influential security region with a high degree of security interdependence with the Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean regions. Southern Africa composes a separate regional structure in relation to the neighbouring sub-regions and the international system. Tanzania, as a member country in both eastern and Southern African regions has been involved in both forms of Mozambique's conflict.

Mozambique depicts a singular case in Tanzania's experience in conflict resolution as it bridges the gap between the support for liberation struggles period and the post-Cold War that concentrated on resolving the civil wars.

Compared to the liberation struggles period, the degree of Tanzania's participation in the resolution of Mozambique's civil war has been lesser. Conditions within Mozambique and in Tanzania, factors at the regional and international levels shaped Tanzania's role in Mozambique. This situation suggests a shift in trend towards a new form of involvement in conflict resolution. The following theoretical and practical conclusions can be drawn.

The Mozambican experience demonstrated the relationship between the international system, Tanzania's foreign policy and Mozambique's conflict resolution. On the one hand, the collapse of the Salazar regime in 1975 encouraged the U.S. and the USSR to increasingly play an active role in the Southern African region. To a certain extent the U.S. was attempting to contain communism. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War and the imposition of SAPs obliged Tanzania to withdraw from regional commitments and concentrate on domestic economic and political reforms. The return of Tanzanian troops from Mozambique in the late 1980's could be explained in terms of cost reduction on unproductive ventures. Moreover, the disintegration of the USSR implied decreased financial and military support from the Soviet Union.

The security interdependence is explained in terms of how the region and regional actors relate to the neighbouring regions. Geography and history link Tanzania with the other regions. While South Africa was identified as an influential regional actor in Mozambique's conflict resolution, security concerns in Southern Africa were linked to those of East Africa, the Horn and the Indian Ocean. Tanzania's concern was that, without criticising oppressive regimes in the Eastern African region, the ability to mobilise international support for Southern Africa liberation would diminish. Furthermore, foreign involvement in both the Indian Ocean and in the Horn introduced new security threats. The installation of military bases in the Indian Ocean for example, further influenced Mozambique's conflict resolution.

Mozambique's experience demonstrates the influence of Tanzania's domestic environment in conflict resolution. In addition to facilitating the

creation of Frelimo in Dar es Salaam, the country hosted refugees escaping drought, colonialism and later, the civil war. During the liberation struggles, the freedom fighters were provided with land, military equipment; training, education and health facilities by the Tanzanian government. They received assistance from China, the former USSR and the Scandinavian countries through the ALC. Nevertheless, apart from sending military troops to Mozambique, Tanzania had no leverage in the peace negotiations that ended the sixteen-year civil war.

Related to domestic environment is the promotion of national unity. To a large extent Tanzania's *Ujamaa* influenced Mozambique's post-independence nation-building ideology. After independence Frelimo adopted policies that would promote socialism. Although Frelimo chose Marxism-Leninism, it was not much different from the other socialist ideologies elsewhere. Tanzania's strong belief in national unity further strengthened its ability to resolve the conflict within Frelimo. Tanzania's strategy helped the movement to remain focused and united in the anti-colonial struggle.

The RSCT can be explained in terms of the involvement in conflict resolution, the influence of regional security on national security. Renamo's terrorist activities and the intrusion of the Portuguese fighter planes on Tanzania's airspace posed insecurity. Following Portugal's violation of Tanzania's territorial integrity, border security was in turn strengthened and the UN members were mobilised to support the campaign against Portugal's behaviour in Africa. Portugal reacted by sending military intervention threats and described Tanzania as a country that hosts a terrorists' base.

Besides the "conventional" military threat, Tanzania and Mozambique face other security threats. Poverty, unemployment and post-conflict reconstruction—for the case of Mozambique, are the threats that have been increasing during the post-Cold War period. Being part of the region that shares similar concerns, regional integration has been sought as an alternative and reliable path to overcoming the threats. Nonetheless, Tanzania still believes that

the current world's distribution of wealth largely contribute to the existing poverty.

Personality change from Nyerere to Mwinyi further influenced Tanzania's foreign policy posture from concentrating on international and regional affairs to domestic affairs. The ruling party – CCM gradually moved away from dominating foreign policy formulation and decisions. More actors including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the cabinet and the private sector assumed an influential role in foreign policy affairs. The creation of TCCIA in 1988 can be explained in terms of this background. It served as the beginning of the business community's involvement in Tanzanian foreign affairs. While the country's foreign policy was clear about the support for Africa's liberation, nevertheless, it did not provide for the resolution of post-independence conflicts or civil wars.

More important to Mozambique's conflict resolution was the role of non-state actors. Women were important as they participated in the struggle, cultivated food for the guerrillas, transported food and ammunition over long distances; and they mobilised the youth. In the absence of the regional and sub-regional mechanisms to take the lead in facilitating the negotiations, Saint'Egidio successfully assumed the role of resolving Mozambique's post-independence conflict. This could be explained by the fact that Tanzania was losing its influence over Mozambique's conflict.

Frelimo and Renamo had no other alternative than initiating the peace talks due to declining state legitimacy and internal public pressure. On the one hand, the public inside Mozambique was pressuring Frelimo government to talk with Renamo in order to find out the solution to the conflict. Renamo on the other hand, was increasingly becoming militarily weak as apartheid was ending in South Africa hence, members were uncertain about future support. Significantly, the parties realised that violence was not a solution to the conflict, which paved the way for the negotiations to take place.

Chapter 4

Tanzania's Involvement in Rwanda's conflict resolution

Introduction

Rwanda reflects the changing nature of the post-Cold War conflict resolution. While the international community considered Mozambique a success, Rwanda largely demonstrates the community's failure to prevent and resolve conflicts.¹ The nature of the conflicts, the type and number of actors involved in it, the resolution process and the politics at the international and regional levels largely influenced the outcome of Rwanda's conflict resolution processes. Besides ethnic relations and regional divisions within the country, political and socio-economic factors largely caused Rwanda's conflicts.²

Unlike the Mozambican conflict, which involved the people and the government, Rwanda's conflicts were between one group of people and another. Whereas Frelimo, originally a Tanzanian-based liberation movement, was later involved in a civil war with Renamo, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) did not fight for Rwanda's independence. Instead, it was formed to advocate the exiles' right to return to Rwanda. Moreover, the parties to Mozambique's post-independence conflict concluded it by signing a peace agreement, as we saw earlier. Rwanda's conflicts were resolved through military means.³ It is

¹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, "Africa on the Move: Revitalising Swedish Policy towards Africa for the 21st Century" Government Communication SKR 1997/98:122, 28. See also Adekeye Adebajo and Chandra Lekha Sriram (eds.), *Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2001), 161-162, 170, 172.

² Maundi, "Initiating Entry into the Mediation of Internal Conflict" 45.

³ Strategies to resolve South African, Zimbabwean and Mozambican conflicts were more or less the same while Ugandan, Ethiopian and Rwandan conflicts share similar experiences. Timothy Longman, "Obstacles to Peacebuilding in Rwanda" in *Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa*, ed. Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Mathews (Toronto: University of Toronto Press Inc., 2004), 64.

important to note here that Rwanda had a number of conflicts between the late 1950s and 1994.

This chapter examines Tanzania's involvement in Rwanda's conflict resolution. The main argument is that sub-regional dimensions of the conflict largely informed the country's response to Rwanda's conflict. The chapter further argues that the provisions of the 1993 Arusha Accord laid the ground for the workings of the post-genocide RPF government. Conditions within both countries, factors at the regional level and the international system shaped Tanzania's role in the conflict.

Using the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), the chapter addresses the following questions for analysis. What were the drivers for the Tanzanian foreign policy and its involvement in Rwanda? What have been the roles of the international and regional organisations, and how has Tanzania worked with such institutions? Were there any successes and/or failures of the country's foreign policy and its involvement in conflict resolution in Rwanda? Were there any opportunities and challenges the country faced?

The RSCT will be used to analyse four levels. The first level will be on the relations between the international community and the regional structures. In this chapter, the GLR has been identified as a security complex. Unlike other sub-regions where regional economic cooperation forms the basis for sub-regional security organisation, the GLR is not defined in terms of an economic integration arrangement.⁴ As will be explained, after the dissolution of the *Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs* (CEPGL), the countries joined other regional organisations. The second level will focus on the GLR's interactions with Eastern and Southern Africa, and the Horn of Africa. The last two levels will examine the influence of Tanzania's domestic environment on the country's relations with her neighbours. Part of the reason is that from the

⁴ Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "Building Security for Peoples, Societies and States" in *Security Dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes Region*, ed. Gilbert M. Khadiagala (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 189.

early 1990s onwards, Tanzania's security concerns shifted from Southern Africa to the GLR.⁵

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides background information about Rwanda's conflicts and the attempts to resolve them. Attention will be paid to the post-independence period, when Tanzania began to be more involved in the resolution of the conflicts. The second section discusses the role of the international, regional and other actors in Rwanda's conflict resolution, focusing specifically on how these actors influenced the Tanzanian foreign policy. The third section is about the strategies adopted, focusing on how the domestic environment informed the Tanzanian foreign policy and the country's approach used to resolve Rwanda's conflicts. In addition, we discuss opportunities and the challenges the country faced and whether or not Tanzanian diplomacy succeeded in resolving the conflicts in question. The last section provides some concluding remarks.

The causes and nature of Rwanda's conflicts

While conflicts have occurred in Rwanda since the 1930s, this discussion will focus on those that began in 1959. The 1959 conflict, "the social revolution," was intended to liberate the people and subsequently change the socio-political and socio-economic structures.⁶ The Catholic-educated Hutu succeeded in removing the King from power and conducted elections at all levels. The conflict, nevertheless, did not end the ethnic identities that existed. Instead, Hutu elites replaced Tutsi elites in leadership positions. The 1959

⁵ Maundi, "Tanzania" 201-202.

⁶ The Germans and later the Belgians created and shaped the country's ethnic divisions between the majority Hutu agriculturalists and the minority Tutsi cattle owners. For example, in 1935 the Belgians introduced the identity cards. For a discussion on this see Maundi, Zartman, Khadiagala and Nuamah, *Getting In* 31.

conflict caused about 10,000 deaths and approximately 130,000 Tutsis fled to Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi.⁷

While the Belgians supported the revolution, in 1961 they recognised the country as the Rwandan Republic. In 1962, Rwanda-Urundi was divided into Rwanda and Burundi and the two joined the UN as separate countries. A government was formed based on a power-sharing agreement between the *Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation des Bahutu* (PARMEHUTU) comprising of Hutu elites and the progressive Tutsis. The first period of independence (1963-1973) was marked by a series of massacres.⁸

The next phase of conflict was ushered in by the July 1973 bloodless coup, when Juvénal Habyarimana,⁹ then the Army Chief of Staff, overthrew Grégoire Kayibanda, the nationalist president.¹⁰ His leadership marked a power shift from Southern to Northern Hutu elites and from a civilian rule to a military

⁷ Maundi, "Initiating Entry into the Mediation of Internal Conflict" 45; Andy Koopmans, *Rwanda* (Philadelphia: Mason Crest Publishers, 2005), 24-26; Christopher Clapham, "Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking," *Journal of Peace Research* 35 (2) (March 1998): 197. See also Peter Uvin, "Reading the Rwandan Genocide," *International Studies Review* 3 (3) (Autumn 2001): 79.

⁸ Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda" in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens A Project of the International Peace Academy and the Center for International Security and Cooperation, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2002) 464; Koopmans, *Rwanda* 26. See also Christopher Clapham, "Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking," *Journal of Peace Research* 35 (2) (March 1998): 198; Alexander Johnston, "Ethnic Conflict in Post-Cold War Africa: Four Case Studies" in *Ethnic Conflict, Tribal Politics a Global Perspective*, ed. Kenneth Christie (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998) 135.

⁹ Habyarimana served as Rwanda's President (1973-1994). He was born on 8 March 1937 in Gisenyi – Rwanda. He studied at St. Paul College – Bukavu and Lovanium University – Kinshasa, both in Zaire. He acquired military training at the Officer's School in Kigali – Rwanda (1960-1961). Habyarimana was trained by the Belgian army to enforce Belgian colonialism. Afterwards throughout the Cold War he represented France's interests. Bill Berkeley, "Ethnic Conflict in Africa: A Journalist's View" Harry G. West (ed.), *Conflict and its Resolution in Contemporary Africa*, Series Editor (Kenneth W. Thompson) (Maryland: University Press of America, 1997) 5-6; Christopher Clapham *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 253; See also <http://www.answers.com/topic/juv-nal-habyarimana> and http://www.biographybase.com/biography/Habyarimana_Juvenal.html. [Both accessed on 04 August 2012].

¹⁰ Berkeley, "Ethnic Conflict in Africa: A Journalist's View" 5-6.

one.¹¹ Unlike the 1959 revolution, this was indeed an intra-Hutu regional conflict. Habyarimana led the Northern Hutus in a protest against the exclusionist tendencies of the Kayibanda regime that was mainly dominated by the Hutus of the South and central Rwanda.¹²

Although the urban population hailed Habyarimana's coup, he became a dictator. He killed the Tutsis and didn't treat the Hutus any better. The country's low international profile placed it in a difficult position both diplomatically and economically.¹³ To a certain extent this explains why Habyarimana's autocratic regime was not criticised by the international community. Also, in Africa, the governments in power at the time could do whatever they wanted to their people. The OAU's Charter only obliged governments not to interfere with other states' internal affairs.

After attaining power, the members of Habyarimana's regime dominated the Rwandan state. The *Mouvement Republicain National pour le Developpement* (MRND) was formed and was afterwards declared the only legal party by the President.¹⁴ The Party's supporters were given key administrative positions in the regions, the education sector, the army, state and the church. By 1980, 80 percent of command positions in the armed forces were held by members of the *akazu*, that is, a little house around Habyarimana, especially members of his clan. The *akazu* comprised of senior ministers in the MRND and senior army officers.¹⁵ Consequently, instead of reducing ethnic divisions, the government caused an "intra-ethnic group" conflict, in the sense

¹¹ Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda" 464-465.

¹² Maundi, "Initiating Entry into the Mediation of Internal Conflict." 46. See also Maundi, Zartman, Khadiagala and Nuamah, *Getting In* 32.

¹³ Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1999) 75. See also W.R. Smyser, *The Humanitarian Conscience: Caring for Others in the Age of Terror* (New York: Plgrave Macmillan, 2003), 187.

¹⁴ Its relationship with the state was similar to that of the old Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to the Soviet Government.

¹⁵ Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda" 464.

that the marginalised Southerners were dissatisfied with the Northern Hutu dominating Rwanda's economy. Jones argues that referring to Habyarimana's regime as "a Hutu" does not capture the pre-genocide Rwandan politics. The regime was clan-based; the Northern Hutu discriminated against both the Hutus from Southern Rwanda and the Tutsis.¹⁶

Rwanda experienced resource-based conflicts caused by increasing population and struggles over land.¹⁷ Between 1963 and 1993, the population rose from around 3 million to 7.5 million at an average growth rate of 3.7 percent per annum, making Rwanda one of the most densely populated sub-Saharan African countries. This population increase resulted in a decrease in the size of cultivated land. This means that the size of land that could be used for growing coffee, Rwanda's only cash crop, was reduced. Deforestation and soil erosion compounded the problem by further decreasing the available land for cultivation to 72 percent. The 1988/89 drought caused famine which killed about 300 people and led to others crossing the border into Tanzania in search of food.¹⁸

From 1989 onwards, internal and external factors caused conflicts in Rwanda. Internally famine resulted from an extended period of drought combined with the decline in coffee prices at the world market. Consequently,

¹⁶ Bruce D. Jones, "Military Intervention in Rwanda's Two Wars: Partisanship and Indifference" in *Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention*, ed. Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 121-123. See also Catherine Newbury, "Rwanda-Recent Debates Over Governance and Rural Development" in *Governance and Politics in Africa*, ed. Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton (Boulder: Rienner, 1992).

¹⁷ Peter Uvin, "Reading the Rwandan Genocide," 81-83; J. 'Bayo Adekenye, Bethuel Kiplagat and Nadir A. Mohammed, "Comparative Study of Existing sub-Regional Security Protocols in Africa" Research Report, (Ibadan: Africa Leadership Forum Publications, 1999), 3. See also Anver Versi, "Rwanda/Burundi: Anatomy of the Crisis." *New African* London, Number 320, 1994.

¹⁸ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* 87; Jamie Crook, "Promoting Peace and Economic Security in Rwanda through Fair and Equitable Land Rights," *California Law Review* 94 (5) (October 2006):1487. See also Thomas P. Sheehy, "Limitations to UN Peacemaking in Africa" in *Conflict and its Resolution in Contemporary Africa*, ed. Harry G. West Series Editor (Kenneth W. Thompson) (Maryland: University Press of America, 1997), 111.

coffee export dropped from U.S\$ 150 million in 1986 to U.S\$ 70 million in 1989. The situation caused economic difficulties to the Rwandan people, resulting in pressure for leadership change. Opposition groups, especially from Southern Hutu elites, arose and pressed for political reforms. Around the same time, the 1959 refugees in the neighbouring countries intensified struggles for their right to return to Rwanda.¹⁹ There was also an international pressure to democratise, led by the 1990 French threat to cut development assistance if Habyarimana's government did not open up for political liberalisation.²⁰ As a result, the multiparty system was adopted in 1993, followed by the formation of a multiparty government. There were, however, insignificant changes in the distribution of leadership positions.²¹

The October 1990 invasion by the RPF from Uganda justified the movement's strategy of pressuring the government to allow refugees to return to Rwanda. The RPF's objective attracted even some Hutu political exiles, including Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe and Pasteur Bizimungu, who later became top-ranking Hutu officers in the movement. Apart from the 1959 refugees, there were other Hutu fighters in the RPF who had migrated to Uganda in the 1920s and 1930s. These escaped Belgian colonialism and wanted to benefit from the economic privileges offered then in Uganda.²²

Paul Kagame was the RPF leader during the invasion. He was born in October 1957 in Gitarama, central Rwanda. Kagame fled with his parents to Uganda after the 1962 killings. In Uganda, he received education up to the secondary level. He later became one of the 27 activists who collaborated with Museveni in 1980 to form the National Resistance Movement (NRM), which later

¹⁹ Alison L. Des Forges, "Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response" in *Conflict and its Resolution in Contemporary Africa*, ed. Harry G. West Series Editor (Kenneth W. Thompson) (Maryland: University Press of America, 1997), 126.

²⁰ Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda" 465.

²¹ Timothy Longman, "State, Civil Society and Genocide in Rwanda" in *State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa*, ed. Richard Joseph (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 339.

²² Maundi, "Initiating Entry into the Mediation of Internal Conflict." 52-53.

launched a five-year Uganda's liberation war. Kagame served as a senior officer in Uganda's army from 1986 to 1990. After the completion of a staff and command course in Kansas – USA in 1990, Kagame started leading the Rwandan Patriotic Army – RPF's military wing. He served as the Vice-President and the Minister for Defence in the Government of National Unity that was formed on 19 July 1994. In 1998, he was elected RPF's Chairperson and on 17 April 2000 the Transitional National Assembly elected him Rwanda's first Tutsi President.²³

Earlier, the genocide that started on 6 April 1994, after the shooting down of Habyarimana's plane at Kigali airport, set the other phase of Rwanda's conflict. Planned by a group of extremists within Habyarimana's regime, the extremists fought against the Tutsi minority and the moderate Hutu. As will be discussed below, the groups perceived the power-sharing solution to the conflict between the government and the RPF as betrayal and a threat to their positions and privileges. Again, the extremists feared that the inclusion of the RPF in the new national army would facilitate the launching of a Tutsi military coup. The assumption was complicated by the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, Burundi's first Hutu President, by Tutsi military extremists in October 1993.²⁴

This account of a compressed timeline "has" its critics. Adelman notes that the Rwanda genocide neither started on 6 April 1994 nor did it end three months later. The genocide of the Tutsis started in 1959 and the "test runs" of the 1994 genocide began as early as 1991. The genocide introduced new

²³ Dan Smith, *The Atlas of War and Peace* with Ane Bræin (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2003), 92; Uma Shankar Jha and Surya Narayan Yadav, *Rwanda: Towards Reconciliation, Good Governance and Development* (New Delhi: Association of Indian Africanist, 2005), 11-15. See also Alan Rake, *African Leaders: Guiding the New Millennium* (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press Inc., 2001), 185-186.

²⁴ Adebayo, "The United Nations" 146.

conflicts in the GRL such as the DRC conflict of 1996.²⁵ Mackintosh, on the other hand, is of the view that “ethnic conflict” assertions inadequately explain Rwanda’s 1994 conflict. According to him, regional division, economy and party politics also caused the conflict. He goes on to argue that the Hutus and Tutsis cannot be considered as distinct groups since they speak a common language – Kinyarwanda, share similar traditions and have inter-married for centuries.²⁶ Du Pisani says that ethnicity is in itself not necessarily a negative factor but can be manipulated to cause conflicts. If manoeuvred in politics, ethnic identity can result in the dominant ethnic group effectively controlling the limited resources for its own interest. In the case of Rwanda, the favouring of one ethnic group over the other gave room for ethnic mobilisation that resulted in a terrible conflict.²⁷

Attempts to resolve the conflict

Since the 1970s, Rwandan exiles have been pressing for their right of return to their homeland. Instead of negotiating with them, however, Habyarimana emphasised that the country was already overcrowded. Rwanda had a population of 8 million in 64,000 square kilometres.²⁸ Consequently, after the 1990 RPF’s invasion, the President appealed to the international community for military assistance. Instead of encouraging him to use a diplomatic approach to resolve the conflict; South Africa, Egypt and France provided arms. Within six

²⁵ Howard Adelman, “The Rwanda Genocide” in *Genocide at the Millennium: A Critical Bibliographical Review* Volume 5 ed. Samuel Totten (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 31. See also Martin Shaw, *War and Genocide: Organised Killing in Modern Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 211.

²⁶ Anne Mackintosh, “Rwanda: Beyond ‘Ethnic Conflict,’” *Development in Practice* 7(4), Special Double Issue (November 1997): 470.

²⁷ Andre du Pisani, “Democratic Governance and Security: A Conceptual Exploration” in *Security and Development in Southern Africa*, ed. Gavin Cawthra, Andre du Pisani and Abillah Omari (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2007), 13. 1-22. See also Sheehy, “Limitations to UN Peacemaking in Africa” 111.

²⁸ Mel McNulty, “From Intervened to Intervenor: Rwanda and Military Intervention in Zaire/DRC” in *African Interventionist States*, ed. Oliver Furley and Roy May (England-Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2001), 176.

months, the number of soldiers in Rwanda's Armed Forces (FAR) grew from 6,000 soldiers to more than 30,000. Habyarimana increasingly used force to maintain his grip on power²⁹ as a response to the declining public support for his regime.

The RPF invasion, to some extent, contributed to the resolution of the conflict. It forced Habyarimana to speed up political reforms that had started in July 1990. Subsequently, in June 1991, the legislature approved the multiparty constitution, whereby the executive power was shared between the President and the Prime Minister. Later, five major political parties were formed, in addition to the ruling MRD. The Parties included *Mouvement Démocratique Républicain* (MDR), *Parti Social Démocrate* (PSD), *Parti Libéral* (PL), *Parti Démocrate Chrétien* (PDC) and *Coalition pour la Défense de la République* (CDR).³⁰

The 26 October 1990 Gbadolite regional summit that was held in Zaire set the formal beginning of the conflict resolution initiatives. A cease-fire agreement proposed by both Tanzania and the regional actors was to be supervised by a fifteen-member OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) from Zaire, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda. Given that the Gbadolite talks were unsuccessful, in the sense that the ceasefire agreement could not be signed, a subsequent meeting was held in Goma on 20 November 1990. The meeting largely re-stated the terms of the Gbadolite agreement. Apparently, during the talks, the Rwandan government either refused to participate or sent representatives without negotiating mandate. The government's stance was demonstrated by an emphasis on stationing the military force along the Rwanda-Uganda border to prevent further intrusion from the RPF.³¹

²⁹ Longman, "State, Civil Society and Genocide in Rwanda" 347.

³⁰ Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda" 469-470.

³¹ Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda" 468.

After the 1991 Dar es Salaam Conference, efforts were made to resolve the conflict. This culminated in the N'sele agreement of 29 March 1991. The Accord provided for the termination of the conflict as a step towards power-sharing negotiations. It was during this conference that for the first time Habyarimana's government accepted the need to negotiate with the RPF.³² A combination of internal and external factors seemed to have influenced the President's decision. One was Rwanda's deteriorating economy caused by unstable coffee prices in the world market. The situation was worsened by RPF's military attacks. Donors' pressure to institutionalise democratic reforms was the second factor.³³

The Arusha Peace Agreement was signed in 1993 and comprised six protocols negotiated and agreed upon by the parties for the period of one year. They included the N'sele cease-fire agreement, the rule of law, power sharing, repatriation of refugees, integration of armed forces and miscellaneous provisions. Basically the Arusha Agreement provided for the establishment of a multi-party Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG)³⁴ and the Transitional National Assembly (TNA), thirty-seven days later. Habyarimana's government was permitted to retain power on a condition that it would not take over BBTG's mandate or introduce new legislation.³⁵ The genocide, nevertheless, broke out before the Agreement was implemented.

³² Gerhardus Stephanus Swart, "The Role of Preventive Diplomacy in Africa Conflicts: A Case Study of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: 1998-2004" (Magister Artium Dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2008), 90. See also Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda" 469.

³³ Barbara F. Walter, *Committing Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 148.

³⁴ The goals of the Transitional Government were to promote democracy, strengthen national security and reconciliation, repatriate refugees, and establish the mechanisms for post-conflict reconstruction.

³⁵ Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda" 477.

International response, Tanzania's foreign policy and Rwanda's conflict

The international system was influential on Rwanda's conflict resolution and Tanzania's foreign policy. The international community, for example, perceived the post-Cold War intra-state conflicts as being within the "UN sphere of influence."³⁶ In response to "An Agenda for Peace," the UN's General Assembly adopted resolutions 47/120A and B of 18 December 1992 and 20 December 1993, respectively. In the first resolution, the Assembly mandated the Secretary General to pursue preventive diplomacy and strengthen the Secretariat's capacity. This entailed the collection and analysis of information on situations that are likely to endanger international peace and security. There was, nevertheless, sufficient early warning on the Rwandan genocide to the UN and the international community³⁷ but lesser initiatives to prevent it were made.

Rwanda is among the countries that received a substantial number of military interventions from 1990 onwards. During the four-year civil war and prior to the genocide, nine multilateral interventions sought to resolve the conflict. In addition, six separate military missions responded to the humanitarian emergency. None of the interventions, however, succeeded in preventing the massive escalation of violence in Rwanda.³⁸ The problem, as Jones sees it, was that the country demonstrated the international system's structural constraints in conflict management. The tools developed to promote peace and security such as the 1948 Genocide Convention, conflict resolution frameworks and the UN peacekeeping could not prevent the conflict.³⁹ Part of

³⁶ Sheehy, "Limitations to UN Peacemaking in Africa" 111.

³⁷ Ghali, *Confronting New Challenges*, 215. See also Paul Kagame, "Foreword" Alex de Waal *Who Fights Who Cares? War and Humanitarian Action in Africa* (Eritrea: Africa World Press, Inc., 2000), xiii.

³⁸ Jones, "Military Intervention in Rwanda's Two Wars" 124,128.

³⁹ Bruce D. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 6.

the reason was that from the late 1950s onwards, the UN concentrated on development, leaving issues such as conflict resolution to individual states.⁴⁰

The UN Security Council members were divided over the modalities to despatch a UN peacekeeping mission to Rwanda. France and Boutros Ghali, Egypt's Foreign Minister, who became UN Secretary General in January 1992, supported a Rwanda mission. Boutros-Ghali favoured a mission perhaps because his policy was dictated by "personal relationships."⁴¹ Nevertheless, on 5 October 1993, the Security Council decided to send the mission with inadequate resources and limited mandate. Only a few states volunteered a small number of forces.⁴² As a result, the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) laid a weak conflict resolution foundation. Contrary to the Arusha Agreement provisions, the UN Security Council mandated the force to provide security for Kigali only and the force was not authorised to seize weapons.⁴³

International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) were concerned about Rwanda's conflict earlier than the other actors. During the period of smaller massacres, they pleaded for the international community's intervention in Rwanda. In March 1993, the Human Rights Community report to the UN Human Rights Commission indicated the government's involvement in killing its own people. The response, however, was "not this year... we already have too many African countries on the docket."⁴⁴ Furthermore, when Boutros-Ghali was told that the genocide would take place, he said that neither Washington nor London wanted to change UNAMIR's mandate. He added that troop-

⁴⁰ Raymond F. Hopkins, "Anomie, System Reform and Challenges to the UN System" in *International Organisations and Ethnic Conflict* ed. Milton J. Esman and Shibley Telhami (London: Cornell University Press, 1995), 85.

⁴¹ Ghali was the architect of Egyptian foreign policy in Africa and the Middle East. See African Rights, *RWANDA* 1116.

⁴² The troops were 400 from Belgium, 940 from Bangladesh and 800 from Ghana.

⁴³ Smyser, *The Humanitarian Conscience* 189.

⁴⁴ Forges, "Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response" 127.

contributing states were threatening to terminate the operation if the situation worsened.⁴⁵ This reply expressed some form of African fatigue at the UN, which to a larger extent, resulted in the international community's failure to take preventive measures in Rwanda.

Two major reasons explain the international community's apparent reluctance to resolve Rwanda's conflict. The U.S. was just coming out of the Somalia tragedy. Eighteen U.S. rangers were killed on 3 October 1993, just two days before the UN Security Council discussed UNAMIR. Afterwards, the Clinton Administration issued a new peacekeeping policy embodied in the Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25). The policy restricted the approval of future UN missions and emphasised on minimising peacekeeping costs. Due to the fact that Somalia's operation had been expensive by UN standards, the operation delayed the approval of, the funding, the equipping and deploying of Rwanda's UN mission.⁴⁶ According to Cohen, the Clinton Administration's decision confirmed a policy that began in early 1992, during the Bush Administration.⁴⁷ As a result, the Security Council could not allocate the necessary resources required to implement the accords.

The other reason is the public's perception on conflict prevention in the U.S. The country responded late in Rwanda partly because the public could not support the government if it intended to spend money in preventive strategies. In other words, if the conflict was prevented the majority of people would not have appreciated the initiative taken. But, if the disaster was allowed to occur,

⁴⁵ Smyser, *The Humanitarian Conscience* 191.

⁴⁶ Adebajo and Sriram (eds.), *Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century* 170-173; Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003) 135, 137. See also Stephen John Stedman, "Conflict and Conciliation in sub-Saharan Africa" in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown Centre for Studies in International Security, (London: The MIT Press, 1996), 257.

⁴⁷ Herman J. Cohen, "African Capabilities for Managing Conflict: The Role of the U.S." in *African Conflict Resolution: The US Role in Peacemaking*, ed. David R. Smock and Chester A. Crocker (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 77.

then the government would have been commended for saving lives. Therefore, only U.S. \$10 million was needed at the beginning of June 1994 for the military equipment and the armoured personnel carriers to carry troops that would prevent the conflict. Instead, the U.S. government spent approximately 50 times the amount in humanitarian support.⁴⁸

In the absence of public pressure, the U.S. government did not feel obligated to act. Moreover, Rwanda's conflict was the first to be examined under the PDD 25. Again, guided by the policy, the U.S. initiated the move in the Security Council to withdraw the UN troops from Rwanda resulting in a reduction of the soldiers from 3,000 at the beginning of the genocide to 270 soldiers two weeks later.⁴⁹ After the genocide, however, the U.S. backed the French intervention before UNAMIR II was dispatched. The U.S. went on to close the embassy in Washington and froze Rwandan-held assets.⁵⁰

Part of the reason for the lack of the U.S.'s immediate response was that its interests in sub-Saharan Africa had declined after the Cold War. The delay in responding to Rwanda's conflict was partly guided by the policy of dealing with the conflicts that affected the country's national interests. Another reason is that the U.S. was the only superpower after the disintegration of the former USSR. As noted above, the USSR did not respond to Rwanda's conflict due to the internal reforms that the country was undergoing. Britain, Italy and Germany paid attention to only the conflicts in which the U.S. was involved. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, the U.S. intervened immediately on humanitarian grounds, but not in Rwanda. Indeed, the U.S.'s position with

⁴⁸ Forges, "Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response" 135.

⁴⁹ Forges, "Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response" 130-131.

⁵⁰ Donald Rothchild, "The US Role in Managing African Conflicts: Lessons from the Past" in *African Conflict Resolution: The U.S. Role in Peacemaking*, ed. David R. Smock and Chester A. Crocker (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 51.

regard to armed conflicts appears to be determined by the country's interests, not by the need to uphold the international law and human rights.⁵¹

France and Belgium responded immediately, possibly because of their historical role in Rwanda. The 1975 agreement on military cooperation and training provided the ground for French intervention in Rwanda. France provided arms and financial assistance to Rwanda and subsidised the purchase of weapons from Egypt and South Africa.⁵² The Rwanda government, in turn, mortgaged its tea plantations for the subsequent five years for the purchase of guns from Egypt. The deal was funded by Credit Lyonnais, a bank then partially state-owned.⁵³

France's role in Rwanda could be regarded as "hard-track" and "soft-track" diplomacy. The former comprised of military and financial assistance to Habyarimana's regime. Negotiations and mediation were prioritised in the soft-track diplomacy. The pursuit of the hard-diplomacy compromised the success of the soft-diplomacy. While advocating for harmony and reconciliation at Arusha, France was at the same time arming and training MNRD death squads. Evidently, the success of negotiations was constrained by the hard-track diplomacy. Remaining silent on massive human rights violations, France provided the incumbents some degree of legitimacy and credibility.⁵⁴ Indeed Melvern notes that without France Habyarimana's dictatorship would not have

⁵¹ Translated from Madjid Benchikh, "Rapport introductif: Problématique générale de l'intervention des organisations internationales dans les conflits armés" *Les Organisations Internationales et les conflits armés* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001), 19. See also Maundi, Zartman, Khadiagala and Nuamah *Getting In* 41-42.

⁵² Jones, "Military Intervention in Rwanda's Two Wars" 129. See also Linda Melvern *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (London: Zed Books, 2000), 24.

⁵³ Forges, "Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response" 136.

⁵⁴ Smyser, *The Humanitarian Conscience: Caring for Others in the Age of Terror* 188.

lasted longer. In fact, the failure of the May 1993 Accord was partly caused by France.⁵⁵

One major factor for France's involvement in Rwanda was that Paris interpreted the RPF's invasion from Uganda as a threat to Francophone Africa. Most of the RPF leaders were educated in Uganda and spoke English. François Mitterrand, the then French President, interpreted the invasion as a threat and sought to support Habyarimana. Egypt, under the authority of its then francophone foreign minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali, had similar perceptions. Habyarimana used French funds to expand Rwanda's army from 5,000 to 28,000 and to recruit the Presidential Guard-special militia force of 30,000. The Rwanda conflict therefore injected an Anglophone-Francophone "cold war" in the region.⁵⁶ If France could not act on Rwanda, it should have told other Francophone African leaders to seek alternative support elsewhere.⁵⁷ Following the dispute between the RPF government and France over its role in the genocide, Kigali decided later to join the Commonwealth. Rwanda was admitted to the organisation on 29 November 2009 as its 54th member, a second country that was a member of the organisation but not a former British colony.⁵⁸

Two months after Habyarimana's assassination, France volunteered to send troops to Rwanda to protect the citizens. It tabled the proposal following

⁵⁵ René Lemarchand, "Managing Transition Anarchies: Rwanda, Burundi and South Africa in Comparative Perspective," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 32 (4) (December 1994):602-603. See also Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* 24.

⁵⁶ Gilbert M. Khadiagala, ed., "Toward Peace, Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region" in *Security Dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes Region* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2006), 2. See also Smyser, *The Humanitarian Conscience*, 188.

⁵⁷ African Rights, *RWANDA* 1105, 1107.

⁵⁸ The application was supported by the UK, Australia, Canada and India. Others were Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, South Africa as well as Trinidad and Tobago. For a discussion see <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/Rwanda/6685316/Rwanda-joins-the-Commonwealth>; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/838493.stm> [Both accessed on 09 August 2012]; See also Yash Ghai and Lucy Mathieson, Rwanda's Application for Membership of the Commonwealth: Report and Recommendations of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, August 2009.

the delay in deploying UNAMIR II. The UN Security Council unwillingly endorsed the offer under Chapter VII of the Charter, with some members recommending French forces to join UNAMIR.⁵⁹ Mitterand, instead, kept the forces under the French command, implying that they would conduct a separate operation in the sense that they would protect the Hutu extremists running away from the RPF.⁶⁰ The French operation created a safe zone in South-Western Rwanda, where an estimated two million people were internally displaced. However, the force did not disarm the Hutu.⁶¹ Even though the French action saved many lives, it largely protected the Hutu perpetrators, not the Tutsi victims. Amidst these criticisms, French troops were withdrawn in August 1994.

Regional dynamics on Rwanda's conflict resolution

Rwanda's conflict caused insecurity across the region. The international community increasingly called upon regional institutions to resolve the conflict.⁶² Attempts were made by African leaders to institutionalise intra-state conflict resolution strategies. The 26th OAU summit held in Addis Ababa adopted in July 1990 a Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World. Subsequently the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government adopted the Cairo Declaration in June 1993 that established within the OAU a Mechanism for

⁵⁹ The operation was named "*Turquoise*."

⁶⁰ Smyser, *The Humanitarian Conscience* 196-197.

⁶¹ Dan Lindley, "Collective Security Organisations and Internal Conflict" Michael E. Brown (ed.) *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Centre for Studies in International Security, (London: The MIT Press, 1996), 547; Alain Destexhe, "The Third Genocide" *Foreign Policy* 97 (Winter 1994-1995) 11; Alan Rake, "France and Africa; A New Chapter" *New African* (November 1994) 13-14; *Economist* "Who Will Save Rwanda?" 25 June 1994, 13. See also Miall, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* 133, 135.

⁶² Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional Institutions, the UN and international security" 421.

Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.⁶³ To a large degree, this formed the basis for OAU's immediate response to Rwanda.

In 1991, the OAU was the first to assemble military observers for ceasefire monitoring.⁶⁴ Afterwards, the force successfully operated in Rwanda for fifteen months monitoring the implementation of the 1992 ceasefire agreement. Contrary to the general perception on the organisation, the OAU was ahead of the UN in analysing, issuing statements and taking action throughout the Rwanda conflict. The institution demonstrated its influence on negotiating agreements in N'sele in March 1991 and in Arusha in August 1993. Besides, that was the first time that the OAU performed a task of this nature; the initiatives were not publicly acknowledged.⁶⁵ Unlike the OAU force in Chad, the Rwanda peacekeeping force had a defined command, with the OAU Secretary General as the political commander. The force was expanded in February 1993 to monitor ceasefire and resettle the displaced persons.⁶⁶ Actually, Rwanda's conflict management was the first on-the-ground collaboration between the OAU and a UN peacekeeping operation. The Arusha Peace Agreement provided for a 2,500 person UN Assistance Mission to replace the OAU peacekeepers.

An observation should be made on the OAU's experience in Rwanda. The organisation throughout maintained a high profile, especially in the Arusha peace process. Perhaps this was in part due to Tanzania's Salim Ahmed Salim,

⁶³ Musifiky Mwanasali, "From the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union" in *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges, A Project of the International Peace Academy*, ed. Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 205.

⁶⁴ African Rights, *RWANDA* 1122.

⁶⁵ Forges, "Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response" 135.

⁶⁶ Ibrahim A. Gambari, "The Role of Foreign Intervention in African Reconstruction" in *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, ed. I. William Zartman (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1995), 230-231. Also translated from Assemblée Nationale, Enquête sur la tragédie rwandaise (1990-1994) Tome I, Rapport Numero 1271, le 15 décembre 1998, Les Documents d'information, 191.

the then Secretary General of the organisation, determination to achieve a peace agreement. One might regard the OAU's involvement in Rwanda as a justification for Africa's commitment to its own security through the establishment of conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms. In reality, the OAU wanted to demonstrate to the world that African countries understood Rwanda's problem and, therefore, were better placed to resolve it. Moreover, the OAU leadership did not perceive the RPF invasion as an aggression by Uganda; instead, it regarded it as an attempt by the exiles to return home.⁶⁷

The OAU's role in Rwanda faced a number of challenges. The major challenge was resources. According to Salim Ahmed Salim, Heads of State from Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mali and Tunisia were ready to provide intervention forces, but lacked logistical and financial support. Financial constraints further hindered the OAU from supporting the Arusha mediation efforts. For example, in 1993, the OAU was able to send only fifty field observers to Rwanda, instead of sending the required five hundred. Furthermore, it was difficult for the OAU to forge and uphold unity among the member states and at the same time maintain the neutrality of the intervention force.⁶⁸ Part of the reason was that some OAU members supported Habyarimana's government while others backed the RPF. Rwanda's conflict resolution highlights the challenge posed by sub-regional and regional actors' lack of neutrality. Tanzania was appointed to facilitate the peace talks because it was the only country in the region which many considered neutral with respect to the civil war.⁶⁹

While the OAU's experience demonstrated that regional organisations could play an effective role in conflict prevention and management, success is largely determined by the nature of a particular conflict. Although regional

⁶⁷ Melvern, *A People Betrayed* 52. See also Bwana, "Rwanda, the Preventable Genocide" 83-84.

⁶⁸ Bwana, "Rwanda, the Preventable Genocide" 83-84. See also Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional Institutions, the UN and international security: a framework for analysis," *Third World Quarterly* 18 (3) 1997: 432.

⁶⁹ Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda* 78. See also Jones, "Civil War, the Peace Process and Genocide in Rwanda" 63.

institutions had a limited role in domestic conflict resolution, the favouring of the incumbents influenced regional involvement. In most cases, African leaders supported and protected each other. As Nyerere said, "The OAU exists only for the protection of the African Heads of State." He also said that the "non-intervention" is likely to work in favour of the incumbent power holders. In the end, instead of resolving a domestic conflict, regionalism can sometimes intensify it.⁷⁰

Rwanda's conflict had a wider impact on the GLR. From 1990 onwards, Rwanda was the concern of the regional security bodies. After assuming power in July 1994, the RPF invaded the DRC in 1996 and 1998, respectively. Indeed, the conflict involved more than one country. The issue here is that Rwanda and Uganda invaded the DRC and by 1999 their armies were fighting in Kisangani – DRC, seeking to extract natural resources.⁷¹ Consequently, there were economic and security concerns in the GRL. Exploitation of the DRC became the main cause of the conflict. Rwanda officially withdrew its troops from the DRC in September 2002, although still maintained a clandestine military presence.⁷²

In an attempt to manage the Rwanda conflict, the region sought to resolve the refugee problem. Concentrating on the 1990's refugees, the region overlooked the earliest group and their descendants. Initiatives were not taken to re-integrate the 1959 Tutsi exiles into the Rwandan society. As Mamdani argues, to integrate them would require less coming to terms with a political opposition than with the claim that the Tutsis were as much a part of Rwandan

⁷⁰ Alagappa, "Regional Institutions, the UN and international security 432. Also quoted from Yassin El-Ayoutty, "An OAU for the future" in El-Ayoutty, *The Organisation of African Unity Thirty Years On*, 179.

⁷¹ After the RPF had captured government leadership, forces that were involved in the genocide escaped to eastern DRC. In the end, the presence of former Rwandan forces and *Interahamwe* imported the conflict to the DRC. See *The East African*, "Rwandan killers still terrorising eastern Congo," 16-22 June 2008, 9.

⁷² Filip Reyntjens, "Governance and Security in Rwanda" in *Security Dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes Region*, ed. Gilbert M. Khadiagala (London: Lynne Rienner Publisher Inc., 2006) 30, 31-32.

political community as were the Hutu.⁷³ Although the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs was established in 1991, it mainly focused on coordinating international relief supplies for the victims.⁷⁴ The Tanzanian government partly resolved the refugee problem through the UN Commission of Refugees established in the mid-1960s. The commission assisted the Government in settling the Rwandese refugees of the late 1950s, and later the Burundian and Zairian refugees.⁷⁵

The Rwandan problem touched the regional groupings of which Rwanda was a member. For example, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was established in 1983⁷⁶ to pursue economic development goals. The organisation focused on promoting regional cooperation and establishing the Central African Common Market. Indeed, conflict management and resolution were given a lower priority until after the Rwandan genocide. In 1996, the leaders shifted the focus from economic development to conflict prevention through the creation of an early warning mechanism. Political and security instability in Central Africa complicated the institutionalisation of the organisation. As a result, Rwanda joined COMESA⁷⁷ in 2004 and the EAC in 2007. Khadiagala says that in the absence of a common security framework,

⁷³ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers* 155.

⁷⁴ Hopkins, "Anomie, System Reform and Challenges to the UN System" 85.

⁷⁵ A letter from the UNHCR representative – Abdallah B.M. Saied to the Principal Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, United Nations High Commission for Refugees FA/R.30/2 from 18/07/1978 to 16/03/1982.

⁷⁶ ECCAS membership comprised of members of the Central African Customs and Economic Union (1981) and the defunct Economic Community of the Great Lakes States (1976). Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and São Tome and Principe are ECCAS members.

⁷⁷ International Peace Academy, "The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacity of African Institutions" a Report submitted by the Africa Programme of the International Peace Academy to the Ford Foundation, September 2002, 36.

the GLR will remain a “geographical expression” on the one hand, and a “paradigm of problems” on the other.⁷⁸

The conflicts in either Rwanda or Burundi had an impact on both countries. The Burundi military coup of 21 October 1993 destabilised the Rwandese peace process. The all-Tutsi army assassinated Burundi’s Melchior Ndadaye, the first elected Hutu President. Consequently, thousands of people lost lives and some Hutu fled to Rwanda and other neighbouring countries. The incident provided the opponents of the Arusha Agreement a justification for their position. As Linden notes, “The message... was that the Tutsis would never genuinely accept majority [Hutu] rule within the context of a government of national unity.”⁷⁹ On the Rwandan side, the leaders defended their discriminatory ideology by referring to the killings of the Hutu by the Tutsi-army in Burundi. Conversely, Burundian Tutsi leaders used Rwanda as an example to argue that the Hutu were “little more genocidal killers.”⁸⁰

The Horn of Africa forms an influential security region connected to the GLR. As we saw earlier, prior to the 1990s, states in the Greater Horn of Africa⁸¹ acted in isolation and sought security at each other’s expense. Since the member states could not agree on high politics, the concern shifted from hard to soft security, including agriculture, drought and disease control. To this end, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was

⁷⁸ Khadiagala ed., “Toward Peace, Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region” 7. See also Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis* 79.

⁷⁹ Khadiagala, “Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda” 485; Lemarchand, “Managing Transition Anarchies 585; Also quoted in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, with Bruce Jones, *International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Vol.2, Early Warning and Conflict Management*, (Copenhagen: DANIDA, 1996), 32.

⁸⁰ Killings were carried out in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1989 and 1993. See Peter Uvin, “Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence” *Comparative Politics* 31 (3) (April 1999): 266.

⁸¹ Greater Horn comprises of the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia), East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi) as well as the Eastern parts of the DRC. Among them IGAD members include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.

founded in 1986 with these purposes in mind. Beginning in the 1990s, states struggled to revive and strengthen common security arrangements, whereby the IGADD set initiatives to mediate the Sudan and Somalia conflicts. Even with the transition from the IGADD to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1996, the Sudan conflict remained unresolved. Part of the reason was the absence of a regional coordination mechanism and it was also difficult to identify and isolate mediators with opposing interests.⁸² Kenya and Uganda, for instance, are some of the members that have throughout been involved in Sudan's conflict resolution process.

Yoweri Kaguta Museveni,⁸³ Uganda's President, has to a certain extent been a key player in both IGAD and the GLR conflict resolution, with a lot of interest in Rwanda and the DRC. In Rwanda's conflict resolution, Museveni backed the RPF. Perhaps his experience in Tanzania and later Mozambique influenced his support of the movement. Museveni fought alongside Frelimo guerrillas in Mozambique and volunteered to help fight against American troops in Vietnam. He was educated in Tanzania where he acquired a socialist ideology; he later received military training in North Korea. Museveni's educational background influenced the National Resistance Army (NRA) that sought to implement socialist policies after attaining power in 1986. While studying political science at the University of Dar es Salaam, Museveni developed close ties with a number of African rebel leaders. They include Paul Kagame, Laurent Kabila (Maoist veteran of the then Zairean rebels) and John

⁸² Monica Kathina Juma, "The Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the East African Community" in *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges, A Project of the International Peace Academy* ed. Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 225. See also Gilbert M. Khadiagala, *Meddlers or Mediators? African Interveners in Civil Conflicts in Eastern Africa* Daniel Druckman and William Donohue (Series Editors) (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 188, 218.

⁸³ Museveni was born in 1944 as a member of the Ankoli ethnic group found in South Western Uganda that borders Rwanda. Museveni was named for the 7th battalion of the Kings African Rifles fought against the Italians and the Germans during the World War II. See Wayne Madsen, *Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993-1999*, African Studies Volume 50 (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1999), 39-40.

Garang (a Southern Sudanese Marxist). Museveni also met Jakaya Kikwete⁸⁴ in the 1970s when the former was associated with Tanzanian-based Ugandan groups that sought to overthrow Amin's regime.⁸⁵

The Rwandese exiles in Uganda were encouraged by Museveni to form the RPF.⁸⁶ The organisation dates back to June 1979 when the Rwandese Refugee Welfare Foundation (RRWF) was created to assist the oppressed. After Amin's fall in 1979, the Rwandese exiles were to some degree targeted for suppression. Consequently, in 1980, the RRWF changed its name to Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU) so as to openly discuss the question of the Rwandese exiles' right to return.⁸⁷ RANU was renamed RPF in 1987, with the aim of advocating for the Tutsi refugees' right to go back to Rwanda. Museveni encouraged and helped the exiles in their struggle to return to Rwanda.⁸⁸

Museveni further supported the exiles to intervene in Rwanda in 1994. The operation was successful in that it ended the genocide and paved the way for the return of Tutsi refugees.⁸⁹ While in Uganda, the exiles went through

⁸⁴ Kikwete is Tanzania's fourth President from 2005 to present. He was born in 1950 at Chalinze, Coast region. From 1958 to 1965 he attended primary and middle school at Msoga and St. John Bosco Schools (Lugoba). Kikwete studied at Kibaha Secondary School from 1966 to 1969. He earned a Bachelor's degree in Economics from the University of Dar es Salaam (1975) and joined Monduli Military Academy in 1976. Being in the position of the Lieutenant Colonel, Kikwete was employed in the same academy as Political Commissar. He has served as a Minister in different ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1995-2005), Kikwete was instrumental in resolving the Burundi conflict, the DRC conflict, the Madagascar conflict and Kenya's post-2007 election conflict. His Presidential term is expected to end in 2015. Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, *Taarifa ya Miaka Hamsini ya Uhuru wa Tanzania Bara* 70.

⁸⁵ Nyang'oro *The Political Biography of Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete* 119; Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 243. See also Madsen, *Genocide and Covert Operations* 39-40.

⁸⁶ Smyser, *The Humanitarian Conscience* 187-188.

⁸⁷ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis* 67.

⁸⁸ McNulty, "From Intervened to Intervenor 176-177. See also Prunier *The Rwanda Crisis* 67-68, 73.

⁸⁹ Ali A. Mazrui, "Conflict in Africa: An Overview" 34.

different experiences during, for instance, Amin's 1978-79 conflict with Tanzania. After the 1982 campaign against the Rwandese, the exiles sought to join Museveni's forces. As discussed earlier, a number of RPF members fought alongside Museveni in the NRA in the march to overthrow Obote's government in 1986.⁹⁰ Afterwards, the NRA launched a military attack to counter the insurgency in Eastern and Northern Uganda. This compelled Museveni to send abroad a large number of Rwandese exiles, including Kagame, for military training.⁹¹

Paul Kagame was one of Museveni's closest colleagues in the Ugandan armed forces.⁹² He joined the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), the guerrilla group created by Museveni in 1973 while in Tanzania. Kagame has been Museveni's friend since the latter's university days. He grew up in a refugee camp in Uganda. He received military training in Tanzania, which enabled him to join Uganda's National Liberation Army (UNLA) as an intelligence officer.⁹³ Museveni and Kagame shared similar left-leaning nationalist views, distrust of the West, a strong dislike of dictatorship and a belief in the strength of "popular welfare." Arguably, the Tanzania/Uganda conflict enabled Kagame to learn from the strategy used by Tanzania to defeat Idi Amin. The exiles realised that the experience they got from Uganda could be used to fight against Habyarimana's regime in Rwanda.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Nyang'oro, *A Political Biography of Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete* 120.

⁹¹ Ogenga Otunnu, "An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)" in *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, ed. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999) 33. See also Gérard Prunier, *From Genocide to Continental War: The 'Congolese' Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa* (London: Hurst Publishers, 2009), 13.

⁹² Smyser, *The Humanitarian Conscience* 187-188.

⁹³ Madsen, *Genocide and Covert Operations*; Rake, *African Leaders* 185-186; See also www.bbc.co.uk/news/10479882 and www.independent.co.uk/news/news-analysis/7364-the-forgotten-origins-of-the-rwanda-crisis-27 [Both accessed on 11 July 2013].

⁹⁴ McNulty, "From Intervened to Intervenor" 176. See also Prunier *The Rwanda Crisis* 68, 73.

Museveni supported the RPF in different ways. Throughout the conflict, Uganda supplied arms, food and petroleum. Furthermore, Ugandan military hospitals were made accessible to the RPF casualties and the country's Southern border was used as a place of refuge. Museveni diplomatically supported the RPF in regional and international forums. Despite Museveni's denial about his support for the RPF, CIA reports show that the Ugandan army transported arms from depots in Kigali to the border for use by the RPF.⁹⁵

Uganda supported the RPF in part as some form of compensation. The RPF played a significant role in the NRA. Most of the fighters in the Uganda guerrilla war were Banyarwanda refugees living in Uganda.⁹⁶ When Museveni went into Kampala, 3,000 of his 14,000 NRM troops were Rwandan Tutsis. Kagame was among the 26 Tutsis who joined Museveni on 6 February 1981 when he attacked Kabamba military school to acquire weapons.⁹⁷

The second reason for this support was that it was a way for Uganda to resolve its own domestic problems and to position itself in the region. Internally, the presence of Banyarwanda in the top political and military ranks as well as their role in Uganda threatened Museveni's regime. As anti-Rwandese sentiments were growing inside Uganda, a new Investment Policy was adopted, which did not allow aliens to own land. This resulted in a conflict against the Rwandan government. Inside Rwanda, Uganda wanted either to change its relations with the leadership so the exiles could be absorbed into Rwanda or to

⁹⁵ Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda" 467. See also Jones, "Military Intervention in Rwanda's Two Wars" 129.

⁹⁶ Aaron K. Kabweru Mukwaya, "The Uganda Movementocracy Foreign Policy and the GLR: An analytical overview" A paper presented at the Symposium on the Great Lakes Region Kampala – Uganda 8-10 April 2002, 29. See also Joan Kakwenzire and Kamukama Dixon, "The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda" in *The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, the Path to a Genocide* ed. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999), 65.

⁹⁷ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis* 68, 73. See also Madsen *Genocide and Covert Operations* 39-40.

change the regime. Regionally, Uganda seemed to be assuming the role of a regional hegemony.⁹⁸

Besides the fact that the UN Charter provides for the regional organisations and the UN to cooperate in conflict resolution, this cooperation has not always taken place. The hierarchy provided by Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter is not constantly observed. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union influenced regional alliances. Afterwards regional institutions used to undermine the UN's legitimacy. In most cases, the organisation can act in favour but not against the security interests of the major powers. In Rwanda's case, the UN was not considered the key player, although it has influence over regional institutions.⁹⁹

The region adopted the high-level summitry approach to resolve Rwanda's conflict. This strategy nevertheless faced a number of challenges. The regional early response was inspired by misinterpretations of the Rwandan conflict. The "inter-state conflict" and "government versus rebels" views influenced the regional summits that took place between 17 October 1990 and 7 September 1991. Rwandan and Ugandan Heads of State were fully involved while the RPF, despite being the main actor, was excluded from the negotiations.¹⁰⁰ Part of the reason was that regional governments perceived the RPF as "insurgents", hence illegitimate. Given Uganda's support for the RPF and the subsequent victory of the RPF, allegations and suspicions relating to

⁹⁸ Mukwaya, "The Uganda Movementocracy Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Region" 29-30. See also Ogenga Otunnu, "An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)" in *the Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire*, ed. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 34.

⁹⁹ Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional Institutions, the UN and international security: a framework for analysis" *Third World Quarterly* 18 (3) 1997: 436.

¹⁰⁰ Maundi, "Initiating Entry into the Resolution of Internal Conflict" 64. See also Maundi, Zartman, Khadiagala and Nuamah, *Getting In* 43.

Museveni's involvement in the Kenyan insurgent movements in Uganda increased.¹⁰¹

Paying a lot of attention to the refugee problem, the summits overlooked other contentious issues in the conflict. The assumption was that if the refugee status was what made the RPF seek to return to Rwanda, then its management would have resolved the conflict.¹⁰² This assumption, in turn, made it easy for Habyarimana to twist his diplomatic efforts of the early 1991 from the quest for a cease-fire to what he called the "regional crisis of Rwandese refugees."¹⁰³ Habyarimana sought to undermine the RPF's primary objectives of sending back the refugees to Rwanda and of sharing power.

The role of other actors in Rwanda's conflict resolution

Regional and global players were not the only ones involved in Rwanda's conflict resolution. The intervention of religious institutions changed over time. When an ethnic conflict broke out in the early 1990s, the churches largely remained passive. This was due in part to the fact that the church would lose if it criticised the ethnic structures that it participated in creating and reinforcing.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, during the 1994 genocide the churches mostly remained silent on the killings, partly due to the historical role of the missionaries and the cooperation that existed between church leaders and the state. The missionaries converted the Rwandese and developed a close alliance with the chiefs and the royal court. Consequently, being a Catholic was a basic

¹⁰¹ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 69. See also Clapham *Africa and the International System* 240.

¹⁰² Maundi, "Initiating Entry into the Resolution of Internal Conflict" 65.

¹⁰³ Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda" 468-469.

¹⁰⁴ Niels Kastfelt, ed., "Introduction: Religion and African Civil Wars; Themes and Interpretations" *Religion and African Civil Wars* (London: Hurst and Company Ltd., 2005), 17.

requirement for one's appointment to a political position.¹⁰⁵ A similar situation existed during the Belgian rule, that is, being a Christian was a pre-condition for becoming a member of the elite.

The role of the media in Rwanda's conflict resolution could be explained in different ways. Inside Rwanda, the opponents of the Arusha Agreement used the *Radio Télévision Libre de Mille Collines* (RTLNC) to strengthen strategies to hold back the implementation of the Agreement. For instance, in August 1993, the radio began to broadcast in the national language, openly mobilising the public to reject the Arusha Agreement and to prepare to fight against an RPF-dominated government. Again, at the outbreak of the 1994 genocide, the radio aired the names, addresses and number plates of the cars owned by the target Tutsi minority.¹⁰⁶

At the international level, the Anglophone press rarely covered the first three years of the conflict and the 1993 Arusha Accords. The BBC World Service radio and television were the only media that provided regular reports. Due to colonial and linguistic ties, the French and Belgian media provided more coverage. Again, when Habyarimana delayed implementing the Accords, little coverage was done in the Anglophone press; the Francophone press covered more than the Anglophone press.¹⁰⁷ The international community's attention during this time was paid to the first post-apartheid elections in South Africa.

Rwanda appeared for the first time in the international media in April 1994 when 250,000 refugees ran away from Rwanda in 24 hours – the world's

¹⁰⁵ Timothy Longman, "Churches and Social Upheaval in Rwanda and Burundi: Explaining Failures to Oppose Ethnic Violence" in *Religion and African Civil Wars* (London: Hurst and Company Ltd., 2005), 82. See also Kastfelt (ed.), "Introduction" 16-17.

¹⁰⁶ Bwana, "Rwanda, the Preventable Genocide" 3, 61, 62; Stephen R. Lewis Jr., ed. *Quett Ketumile Joni Masire: Very Brave or Very Foolish? Memoirs of an African Democrat* (Gaborone: MacMillan Botswana Publishing Co., 2006), 305. See also Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2000), 213.

¹⁰⁷ Allan Thompson, ed., *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide* London: Pluto Press, 2007. See also www.idrc.ca/openbooks/338-0/ [Accessed on 31 January 2007], 121-122.

largest exodus within a short period of time. Although the conflict was reported live, there was no immediate intervention by the international community, apart from the humanitarian assistance to the refugees. Perhaps this resulted from the fact that Western media erroneously classified the conflict “ethnic” or “tribal” even though its nature at the beginning was more political than ethnic or tribal.¹⁰⁸ The journalists described the genocide as a continuation of the decades-long ethnic dispute between the minority Tutsis and the majority Hutus. To a certain extent, this interpretation shaped the global community’s understanding of the nature of the conflict and the subsequent responses.

The UN, under Chapter VI of its Charter, established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to promote reconciliation. Resolution 977 of February 1995 stated that the Tribunal would be located in Arusha. The court’s objective was to punish those who perpetrated the genocide.¹⁰⁹ Although the RPF was the first to call on the UN to establish such a Tribunal and was extensively consulted during the drafting of the resolution, it voted against Resolution 955.¹¹⁰ Two observations could be made at this point. The Security Council established the tribunal as a way to rehabilitate the international community’s attitude towards the UN’s passivity in African affairs, particularly in preventing and resolving Rwanda’s conflict.

¹⁰⁸ Reyntjens, “Governance and Security in Rwanda” 14; Forges “Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response” 132; Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 145; Johan Pottier, *Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 54, 56.

¹⁰⁹ The Court formally began hearings in November 1995. See Jha and Yadav, *Rwanda: Towards Reconciliation* 59-60. See also Smyser, *The Humanitarian Conscience* 200.

¹¹⁰ Rwanda was the UN Security Council non-permanent member from January 1994. Again, on 18 October 2012 Rwanda was appointed again to serve in the non-permanent member position from January 2013 to December 2014. See Victor Peskin, *International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State Cooperation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 20-21; Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2002), 185. See also *The East African*, “Rwanda to use UN seat for DRC case” 20-26 October 2012, 10. Translated from Radio One News (Tanzania) 19 October 2012.

The second observation is that Rwanda voted against the tribunal due in part to the fact that the UN did not uphold the death sentence. The argument was that, in the final analysis, the tribunal would favour the Hutu who committed the crimes. While the Hutu suspects at the ICTR were given life sentences, as the harshest punishment, those in Rwandan courts got death penalties.¹¹¹ Nevertheless, neither the national courts nor the *gacaca* proceedings addressed the crimes committed by the RPF, especially after December 1994. Kagame's regime largely exerted pressure on the ICTR to evade prosecution.¹¹²

In addition to the ICTR, *gacaca* courts were re-established in 2001¹¹³ by the government of Rwanda to speed up the trial of genocide-related crimes. Grounded on a traditional form of conflict resolution, *gacaca* is a neo-traditional court that incorporates punitive and restorative justice.¹¹⁴ Despite criticisms, *gacaca* has tried more people and provided detailed information on how the genocide was carried out than the ICTR, the trial in Belgium and the Rwandan courts have done. *Gacaca* courts have handled about two million cases in eleven years, which could have taken more than two hundred years if filed in the national courts. More importantly, *gacaca* courts have largely promoted the

¹¹¹ See Peskin, *International Justice in Rwanda* 163; Jha and Yadav, *Rwanda* 67. See also Alexander Zahar and Susan Rohol, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda" in *Genocide at the Millennium: A Critical Bibliographical Review*, ed. Samuel Totten Volume 5 (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 216; *The East African*, "Suspects won't get fair trial in Rwanda-HRW" 28 January-3 February 2008, 16.

¹¹² Reyntjens, "Governance and Security in Rwanda" 18.

¹¹³ The courts began to work countrywide in 2005 and concluded trials in June 2012.

¹¹⁴ Koopmans, *Rwanda* 40. See also Max Retting, "Gacaca: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Postconflict Rwanda?" *African Studies Review* 51 (3) (December 2008) 26, 30, 35; Smith, *The Atlas of War and Peace* 92.

spirit of reconciliation and they give a good image of Rwanda's initiative to resolve internal conflicts.¹¹⁵

NGOs were influential in Rwanda's conflict resolution. There were over 100 NGOs in Kigali during the genocide; the number had grown to over 150 by February 1995. Moreover, INGOs and humanitarian agencies became important in Rwanda partly because the world's powerful governments were not interested in resolving Rwanda's conflict.¹¹⁶ In the absence of support from such governments, NGOs performed quasi-governmental functions and possessed more resources than those at the disposal of the RPF government. Wealthy governments seemed to be ready to provide emergency relief rather than promoting post-conflict reconstruction.¹¹⁷ There were nonetheless mixed feelings about the profile to be adopted and the degree of proximity to be maintained between the NGOs and the UN forces. For example, humanitarian organisations were not comfortable being placed under the forces, except when the security conditions dictated it.¹¹⁸

Strategies adopted by Tanzania to resolve Rwanda's conflict

During Rwanda's conflict, Tanzania still maintained that the problem was being shared among the neighbouring countries. Tanzania had been cooperating with Rwanda even before the escalation of the civil wars. The cooperation was motivated by the need to promote pan-African unity.¹¹⁹ To this end, from 1977 onwards, Tanzania and Rwanda harmonised trade, transport,

¹¹⁵ Translated from BBC Kiswahili Radio News (East Africa), 18 June 2012: [18.30-19.30 hours]. See also *The East African*, "Genocide tribunal to move from Arusha to Rwanda" 19-25 December 2005, 15.

¹¹⁶ Mackintosh, "Rwanda: Beyond 'Ethnic Conflict'" 472.

¹¹⁷ Mackintosh, "Rwanda: Beyond 'Ethnic Conflict'." 472. See also Clapham, "Rwanda" 207.

¹¹⁸ Antonio Donini, "The Bureaucracy and the Free Spirits: Stagnation and Innovation in the Relationship between the UN and NGOs" *Third World Quarterly* 16 (3), Nongovernmental Organisations, the United Nations and Global Governance (September 1995): 432, 434.

¹¹⁹ J.K. Nyerere, "Unity vital for economic recovery." An interview with Radio Rwanda journalist, *Daily News*, 27 April 1987, 1.

banking, immigration, cultural, industrial, educational and media affairs. This harmonisation was to be implemented by a Joint Commission of Cooperation. As a result, Habyarimana's visit to Dar es Salaam was followed by the admission of Rwandese students to hotel management and wildlife colleges in the country. Furthermore, some students were admitted to the University of Dar es Salaam and Sokoine University while others were trained at the Prisons College in Kiwira, Mbeya. Tanzania provided Rwanda with fifteen Kiswahili teachers for the university and secondary school levels.¹²⁰

To resolve the refugee crisis, Tanzania granted citizenship to some of the refugees from Rwanda. The decision was to some extent influenced by Tanzania's international commitments. The Arusha Pan-African Conference on refugees in May 1979 developed the "international solidarity" and "burden-sharing" principles to resolve the refugee problem. The outcome of the conference was that refugees were declared Africa's responsibility. The Arusha recommendation largely influenced the Tanzanian government's decision. In 1980, the government granted citizenship to approximately 36,000 Rwandese refugees and provided them with land for farming. It was the first occasion in Africa when such a large number of exiles ceased to be refugees. In the subsequent 1981 Geneva International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA), the international community commended African countries on their commitment to address their own problems.¹²¹

Tanzania's effort to resolve Rwanda's crisis was again demonstrated by organising a regional summit on refugees in February 1991. This initiative was partly justified by Mwinyi's¹²² commitment to uphold Tanzania's credibility in

¹²⁰ "Reinforcing fraternity" *The Daily News* 22 May 1987, 4.

¹²¹ A Letter from the Ambassador – signed by G.B. Liundi, Permanent Mission of the United Republic of Tanzania – Geneva to the Principal Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Reference Number TZG/U.10/19A of 4 May 1981. See also Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers* 164.

¹²² As Tanzania's second phase government President Mwinyi was involved in the resolution of Rwanda's conflict from the October 1990 invasion. He was the appointed facilitator to Arusha talks held under OAU authority. He then delegated the responsibility to Ami Mpungwe who was

conflict resolution. Mwinyi further persuaded Habyarimana to accept the return of the 1959 Tutsi refugees who had been living in Uganda and Tanzania to Rwanda.¹²³ The Dar es Salaam Refugee Conference of February 1991 set the ground for negotiations on refugee repatriation. The Dar es Salaam Declaration, however, partially resolved the conflict between the government of Rwanda and the refugees' right to return to their country.¹²⁴

Habyarimana attempted to take advantage of Tanzania's influence over Museveni so as to limit Uganda's military support for the RPF. At the 17 October 1990 Mwanza Summit, Habyarimana promised to resolve the conflict by meeting both internal and external demands. The negotiations, however, were determined by Tanzania and Uganda's ability to influence the RPF to observe a cease-fire. After a series of consultations, Habyarimana sought to negotiate with the internal opposition, leaving aside the RPF. The movement, nevertheless, continued the conflict: "We can't withdraw from our positions...it is totally unacceptable that we can leave our own country... and we can't go back to Uganda."¹²⁵

The Arusha process attempted to lay the ground for conflict resolution. The agreement "took" away power from the *akazu* and "divided" it between the regime and the opposition political parties. Two components of the agreement, however, produced strong reactions from certain factions in Rwanda. The ruling MRND and the CDR were allocated a minority position in both the transitional government and the national assembly. The RPF was given a powerful share in

then the Director of Africa and the Middle East in Tanzania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. For a discussion on this see Bruce D. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda* 78-79, 89, 91.

¹²³ Translated from Assemblée Nationale, *Enquête sur la tragédie rwandaise (1990-1994)* Tome III, Auditions Volume II 1998, 265; Assamblée Nationale, *Enquête sur la tragédie rwandaise (1990-1994)* Tome I, Rapport, Rapport Number 1271, le 15 décembre 1998, 182-183.

¹²⁴ Maundi, "Initiating Entry into the Resolution of Internal Conflict" 66. See also Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda* 54-55. Also translated from *Taasisi ya Mwalimu Nyerere, Kazi za Taasisi ya Mwalimu Nyerere* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers 2001): 6.

¹²⁵ Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda" 468.

the integrated national army which comprised RPF and FAR troops in a 40-60 ratio but commanded by a 50-50 split of RPF and FAR officers.¹²⁶

Furthermore, the Arusha Agreement gave the UN, the OAU and Tanzania the responsibility to implement it. The parties assumed that the UN would take charge of the implementation of the Agreement, for it had supported the talks until the agreement was reached.¹²⁷ This implied that Tanzania and the OAU would essentially play a secondary role to that of the UN. Yet the mediators and the parties had great expectations on the UN. In reality, the mediators overlooked the politics behind the Security Council's decision to establish a peacekeeping force, which would dictate other factors.

Tanzania was proposed by the UN Secretary General to host the ICTR. In February 1995, Boutros Ghali, the then Secretary General of the UN Security Council, recommended that the ICTR be located in Arusha. His report sought "impartiality and objectivity in the prosecution...[which] require that trial proceedings be held in a neutral territory."¹²⁸ As a result, Resolution 977 of February 1995 designated Arusha as the ICTR seat. Tanzania was chosen over Kenya largely because it had a symbolic significance. The 1993 Power-sharing Agreement was signed in Tanzania. In addition, locating the tribunal outside Rwanda meant that there would be little influence over the court from the country and the RPF. Although at the beginning Kigali protested against the court being located in Arusha, it later supported the decision so as to "foster the spirit of cooperation."¹²⁹

¹²⁶ See Walter, *Committing to Peace* 145; Jones, "Military Intervention in Rwanda's Two Wars" 124.

¹²⁷ Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda" 481.

¹²⁸ See Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of the Security Council Resolution 955, 13 February 1995; See also Peskin, *International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans* 166-167.

¹²⁹ Jha and Yadav, *Rwanda* 59-60.

Tanzania's efforts to resolve Rwanda's conflict faced a number of challenges. The failure to install the transitional government was a setback to the resolution of the conflict.¹³⁰ This was in part due to Habyarimana's reluctance to negotiate with the RPF whom he regarded as rebels. Moreover, even when Tanzania and the region succeeded in pressurising Habyarimana to observe and implement the Arusha Peace Accord, the shooting down of Habyarimana's plane changed the direction which the resolution of the conflict had taken.

The mediators and the parties to the Arusha Agreement could not provide the resources required for its implementation.¹³¹ Accordingly, UNAMIR was deployed late, due in part to the fact that it lacked the necessary equipment. After the Security Council's decision to extend UNAMIR's mandate for six more months from April to October 1994 the Presidential jet was shot down the next day.¹³² Tanzania constantly mobilised the international community, especially France, to participate in resolving the regional crisis. Part of the reason was that African countries did not have resources that could be used to resolve the conflict. Apart from all the efforts, none of the resources were received.¹³³

Tanzania's participation in Rwanda's conflict resolution was influenced by a combination of factors. The country thought that Rwanda's conflict could result in large numbers of refugees that the government could not manage. Dar es Salam was even more concerned that some refugees could use Tanzania as a ground for subversive activities against the Rwandan government.¹³⁴ Moreover, after the October 1990 invasion, the government seemed to be more

¹³⁰ Miall, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* 133, 134.

¹³¹ Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda" 463.

¹³² Miall, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* 133, 134.

¹³³ Translated from Assemblée Nationale, *Enquête sur la tragédie rwandaise (1990-1994)* Tome III, Auditions Volume II 1998, 265.

¹³⁴ Nyang'oro, *A Political Biography of Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete* 118-119.

concerned about Tanzanian-based Rwandese refugees than the refugees in other countries.¹³⁵ Perhaps this was due to the fear that the exiles might use a strategy similar to that of the RPF to secure their return to Rwanda.

The regional factors also influenced Tanzania's way of resolving the conflict. First, Tanzania was aware of competing interests between Zaire (the present-day DRC) and Uganda. While Zaire supported Habyarimana, Uganda backed the RPF.¹³⁶ Dar es Salaam sought to harmonise the interests by ensuring that the conflicting parties are facilitated to discuss the issues that are being contested. It was from this practice that the Tanzanian government commended political respect at the regional and international levels. The second is related to Tanzania's historical record of ensuring that stable and constitutionally elected governments lead in the neighbouring countries. Presidents Mkapa and Kikwete have at different times underscored the importance of resolving conflicts so as to promote [economic] cooperation and reconciliation with the neighbours.¹³⁷

Tanzania's domestic environment, foreign policy and its involvement in Rwanda's conflict resolution

To some extent, internal conditions within Tanzania influenced Tanzania's participation in Rwanda's conflict resolution. During the liberation struggles and the subsequent nation-building programmes, Tanzania and Rwanda chose different paths. Nyerere promoted strategies that would overcome racial and ethnic discrimination, and subsequently foster national

¹³⁵ Translated from Assemblée Nationale, *Enquête sur la tragédie rwandaise (1990-1994)* Tome III, Auditions Volume II 1998, 265-266.

¹³⁶ Bruce D. Jones, "Civil War, the Peace Process and Genocide in Rwanda" 62. See also Maundi, Zartman, Khadiagala and Nuamah, *Getting In* 42.

¹³⁷ Kikwete's Presidential Speech during the inauguration of the 9th Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania in Dodoma on 30 December 2005, 50. See also Benjamin William Mkapa's Presidential Speech at the opening of the 13th Conference on the State of Politics in Tanzania at Nkrumah Hall – University of Dar es Salaam 19 July 2005, 18. See also Jones, "Civil War, the Peace Process and Genocide in Rwanda" 67.

unity. Rwanda's nationalist President, Kayibanda, championed a nationalism based on [Hutu] identity. Unlike Tanzania, Rwanda's First Republic was a post-independence state with some elements of ethnic identities that were institutionalised by the colonial powers.¹³⁸

Rwanda's Second Republic under Habyarimana's leadership emulated some aspects of Tanzanian socialist development model. The people at the local level were organised in ten-cell administrative units headed by an elected leader.¹³⁹ Unlike in Tanzania, the powers of Rwandese local administrators were unlimited and were only accountable to their superiors. In 1991, however, Habyarimana institutionalised the local level security by creating "self-defence units." Under the ten-cell system, civilians were provided with arms.¹⁴⁰ The programme was initiated after the experience of RPF's October invasion and was extended to the other areas of Rwanda. Mamdani observes that in an attempt to prevent the RPF from capturing more territory the government expanded the army and trained more civilians using Tanzania's ten-cell model.¹⁴¹

Internally, more actors have increasingly been involved in the Tanzanian foreign policy affairs. Yet the role of the public opinion has not flourished. The expectation that Parliament would be independent and talk to the people about foreign affairs issues like conflict resolution had by the early 1990s not materialised.¹⁴² Even though the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs was established in 1972, it began to present its reports in 1992. For twenty years since its creation, the Committee had only been meeting during

¹³⁸ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers* 32-33.

¹³⁹ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 155.

¹⁴⁰ The programme was aimed at providing a gun for every ten households and training civilians to use the gun for self-defence.

¹⁴¹ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 205-206.

¹⁴² Mohabe Nyirabu, "Foreign Policy Under Multipartism in Tanzania" *Reflections on the Transition to Democracy in Tanzania* REDET Publications Number 1 1995, 72.

parliamentary sessions. Part of the reason was that the ruling party's National Executive Committee (NEC) made most of the foreign policy decisions. Moreover, during parliament sessions conflict resolution issues received one or two contributions.¹⁴³

At the domestic level, Benjamin Mkapa's¹⁴⁴ government concentrated on preventing potential conflicts. It was thought that the shift from socialist to liberal policies could result in conflicts. To prevent domestic conflicts, the government strengthened relations with donors, enhanced citizens' access to resources, fostered inclusive politics and promoted respect for human rights. By 1995 one could evaluate SAPs in terms of the extent to which the programmes for economic reforms had been implemented.¹⁴⁵ To create a conducive environment for investment and economic growth, Mkapa's government took measures to improve relations with donors and the neighbouring countries.¹⁴⁶

To reduce cost and regulate economic crises, the government limited foreign activities. Tanzania's embassies in Guinea, Burundi, Sudan and Angola had been closed down by 1994.¹⁴⁷ Domestic economic concerns compelled the

¹⁴³ Translated from *Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, Majadiliano ya Bunge: Taarifa Rasmi* (Hansard) 11-13 Mei 1992, Hoja za Kamati, Taarifa ya Kamati ya Mambo ya Nje ya Bunge 1985-1990, (Bunge Press na Mpigachapa wa Serikali: Dar es Salaam, 1992), 1171-72, 1178, 1216.

¹⁴⁴ Mkapa was Tanzania's third President (1995-2005). He was born in November 1938 in Masasi, Mtwara region. From 1945 to 1956 he attended Lupaso, Ndanda, Kigonsera and Pugu schools. He obtained his first degree in English from Makerere University in 1962 and a Postgraduate Diploma in International Relations from Columbia University (U.S) in 1963. Between 1966 and 1975 he worked in different government institutions and from 1976 to September 1995 different ministerial and ambassadorial levels of the United Republic of Tanzania government. *Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, Taarifa ya Miaka Hamsini ya Uhuru wa Tanzania Bara* 70.

¹⁴⁵ Nyang'oro, *A Political Biography of Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete*, 114.

¹⁴⁶ Benjamin William Mkapa, Presidential Speech at the opening of the 13th Conference on the State of Politics in Tanzania, Nkrumah Hall, University of Dar es Salaam, 19 July 2005, 7. See also Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, Presidential Speech during the inauguration of the Fourth Phase Parliament 30 December 2010, 29.

¹⁴⁷ Killian, "Factors Informing Changes in Tanzania's Foreign Policy" 42.

country to reduce its international engagements, which had some impact on major foreign policy decisions. As a result, the country's ability to uphold principled and independent foreign policy was reduced. Cheka notes that embassies were sometimes opened or closed in response to domestic and international conditions.¹⁴⁸

Opportunities and the challenges that faced Tanzania's diplomatic role

In resolving Rwanda's conflict, Tanzania encountered both opportunities and challenges. The major success was that the 1993 Arusha Accord became a blue print for the workings of the RPF government. After attaining power on 19 July 1994, the RPF expressed its commitment to implement the power-sharing provisions. With the exception of the MRND and the CDR, which were banned because of their role in the genocide, the other political parties were given positions in the government and seats in parliament as provided for by the accord. Faustin Twagiramungu, a Hutu, became a Prime Minister. According to the OAU Secretary General, the RPF attempted to form a government, which to a large extent, "took cognisance of the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement."¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless, to consolidate power, the RPF amended the basic law. This modified the political regime established in Arusha. Following the consolidation of the executive powers, the RPF was imposed on the government and the composition of parliament was restructured.¹⁵⁰

The Arusha peace process was an ideal example of "preventive diplomacy." Western negotiators and diplomats identified the Peace Agreement as the best in Africa since Lancaster House and was the best agreement that could have been reached. According to Jones, the negotiations involved a

¹⁴⁸ *The Daily News* (Tanzania), "Focus on economy, MPs advise foreign ministry" 1 August 1989, 1.

¹⁴⁹ Amare Tekle, "The OAU: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution" in *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, ed. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 126. See also OAU, CM/1861 (LXI) 1995, 2-3.

¹⁵⁰ Reyntjens, "Governance and Security in Rwanda" 17.

balanced composition of the regional actors, international players and the neutral parties. He adds that the fact that Hutu extremists who were not part of the Arusha negotiations manipulated the process, it resulted in the implementation breakdown.¹⁵¹

Tanzania's seemingly stable and multi-ethnic society could have played a considerable role in Rwanda's post-conflict reconstruction. Nyerere once said that Rwanda's and Burundi's conflicts would be resolved through a federation with Tanzania.¹⁵² This could have been facilitated by the fact that at some point, then Tanganyika and Rwanda-Urundi were Germany's colonies. Tanzania could have used its land and leadership to help the Rwandan people in the post-conflict reconstruction and during the implementation of the Arusha Agreement.¹⁵³ Alternatively, Tanzania could have trained Rwanda's armed forces as it did for Uganda. Hutu and Tutsi soldiers would be integrated and trained as part of the United Republic of Tanzania defence forces. According to Mazrui, the soldiers would then establish an army not based on ethnic divisions.¹⁵⁴ Perhaps this approach would result in a highly disciplined army and reduce attempts to overthrow the government.

Tanzanian facilitators succeeded in persuading Habyarimana to sign and consequently agree to implement the Arusha Accords. This achievement was more a result of the facilitated communication between the conflicting parties

¹⁵¹ Jones, "The Arusha Peace Process" 147-149.

¹⁵² Reyntjens, "The New Geostrategic Situation in Central Africa" *A Journal of Opinion* 26 (1), Central Africa in Crisis (1998): 12. See also Ali A. Mazrui "The African State as a Political Refugee" in *African Conflict Resolution: The US Role in Peacemaking*, ed. David R. Smock and Chester A. Crocker (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 22.

¹⁵³ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers* 133-134. Also translated from Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, Majadiliano ya Bunge, Taarifa Rasmi Mkutano wa 21 (Sehemu ya tano), 12-18 Julai 1995; Makadirio ya Matumizi ya Serikali 1995/96, Wizara ya Mambo ya Nje na Ushirikiano wa Kimataifa (Majadiliano yanaendelea), (Bunge Press na Mpigachapa wa Serikali, Dar es Salaam: 1996), 2747-2752.

¹⁵⁴ Mazrui, "Conflict in Africa: An Overview" 36. See also Warren Weinstein, "Burundi: Alternatives to Violence," *A Journal of Opinion* 5 (2) (Summer 1975): 19.

than imposing a solution on the problem. Indeed, the RPF and the government were provided with the ground to negotiate and change their perceptions. Tanzania, therefore, facilitated face-to-face talks between the conflicting parties and played an active role in the dialogue.¹⁵⁵ This success, however, posed insecurity to Rwanda's elite.¹⁵⁶ The signing of the agreement did not involve the extremists;¹⁵⁷ hence these lost the government "position" to the opposition and the army to the RPF.¹⁵⁸

Rwanda's conflict resolution analysts distinguish between the process and outcome of the peace negotiations. Jones argues that while the process was effective, the outcome was not. He maintains that by marginalising the CDR and the MRND from power, the Arusha Accords overlooked the basic principle which demands that parties to a conflict must participate in finding a solution. Khadiagala says that even though the Tanzanian mediators and Western observers wanted the CDR to be involved in the negotiations, the facilitators were unable to do so because they had to work within the framework of the motives of the principal parties. As a result, the mediators could not make the parties reach an inclusive settlement.¹⁵⁹

Related to the process-outcome distinction are conflict prevention initiatives. Jones notes that concrete measures were taken to prevent the escalation of the civil war, even before the genocide occurred. For him, Rwanda

¹⁵⁵ Walter, *Committing to Peace* 145. See also Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda* 69-71.

¹⁵⁶ Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda" 491. See also Allan J. Kuperman, "The Other Lesson of Rwanda: Mediators Sometimes Do More Harm Than Good," *SAIS Review* 16 (1) (1996): 228.

¹⁵⁷ The extremists included the ruling MNRD, the *Coalition pour la Defence de la République* (CDR), the *Interhamwe* militias and the presidential guard.

¹⁵⁸ The Arusha Accords provided for the restructuring of the 19,000 Rwandan army whereby 40 percent of the troops and 50 percent would consist of FPR.¹⁵⁸ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers* 155. See also Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis* 55.

¹⁵⁹ Jones, "The Arusha Peace Process." 150. See also Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda" 491.

is a case of the “failure of the actions taken” rather than “the failure to take action,”¹⁶⁰ as it has commonly been argued.

Compared to Rwanda’s other neighbours, Tanzania faced the challenge of impartiality. The government had to maintain its position as an interested party that was willing and prepared to resolve the crisis but remain neutral at the same time.¹⁶¹ The government could not act constructively by refraining from offending the interim government through stressing the need for a return to the Arusha process. As a mediator in the Rwandan conflict, “Tanzania has been very careful not to support or favour any side in the conflict....¹⁶²” This way, credibility could be maintained and negotiations remained on track.

Tanzanian refugee camps were sometimes turned into insurgent bases. Violence was extended to the Benaco Camp in Ngara, where about 250,000 refugees settled in a day. The Hutu refugee-militias – *Interahamwe* – carried out the violence organised by the leaders in camp administration.¹⁶³ These militias, largely responsible for the 1994 killings, were driven out of Rwanda by the RPF. The *Interahamwe* also used the camps as bases for organising their return.¹⁶⁴ Tanzanian authorities, in turn, detained and disarmed the militias. In late June 1994, when the government detained and expelled about 14 *Interahamwe* militias from the camp, riots erupted; about 5000-armed refugees demanded their release. Since there was no stable government in Rwanda to try them, Tanzanian authorities could not apprehend them.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁰ Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure* Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2001, 3.

¹⁶¹ Nyang’oro, *A Political Biography of Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete* 118.

¹⁶² African Rights *RWANDA: Death, Despair and Defiance* Revised 1995 Edition London: African Rights 1995, 1123.

¹⁶³ African Rights, *RWANDA* 1088-1089.

¹⁶⁴ Clapham, *Africa and the International System* 219.

¹⁶⁵ African Rights, *RWANDA* 1089-1090.

Conclusion

Rwanda has gone through several phases of conflicts. While the 1959 conflict was aimed at changing the social, political and economic structures created by colonialism, the 1973 coup was intended to overthrow the nationalist President. Population growth and the increasing resource scarcity caused the conflict of the 1980s. Declining coffee prices at the world market also compounded the problem. The 1990 RPF invasion from Uganda exerted pressure on Kigali to start negotiations and adopt a new constitution, which was adopted in 1993. The shooting down of the Presidential jet and the subsequent genocide stopped the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. Rwanda is a different case in Tanzania's experience of conflict resolution as it demonstrates a shift of conflict resolution strategies from Southern Africa to a new security region, that is, the GLR. The following theoretical and practical conclusions can be drawn.

Rwanda's experience demonstrates the influence of the international system on regional security. Besides, several multilateral and military forces intervened in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994 to manage the conflict and provide humanitarian support; none succeeded in preventing the genocide from occurring. Moreover, even though the UN Security Council members could not agree on the modalities of sending a peacekeeping mission to Rwanda, the October 1993 decision to dispatch a force with limited mandate laid a weak conflict resolution foundation. In this context, regional institutions largely assumed the responsibility to resolve the conflict.

The influence of the international system on regional security could further be demonstrated on the Tanzanian foreign policy. The international community's delayed response on Rwanda in the early 1990s compelled Tanzania to find ways to resolve the conflict. Among others, the major reason for the late response was the fact that influential actors such as the U.S. were no longer interested in African affairs. Rwanda's conflict broke out during the time when Washington was just coming out of the Somalia tragedy and its

interests had shifted from African countries to countries in Eastern Europe. Given that Rwanda's conflict posed a security threat to the neighbouring countries, Tanzania was compelled to mobilise regional actors to find a solution to the problem.

Being part of the GLR, Rwanda constitutes an influential security region. The GLR has a high degree of security interdependence between the neighbouring sub-regions and the international system. That is why the OAU assumed the responsibility of managing Rwanda's conflict. The OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution laid the ground for the organisation's immediate response to Rwanda's conflict. The OAU was ahead of the UN in analysing the conflict and issuing public statements. From 1991 to 1993, the organisation facilitated the negotiations between Habyarimana's government and the opponents that culminated in the signing of an agreement by the two groups.

The conflict in Rwanda had a broader impact on the GLR: from 1990s onwards, the country had been the region's security's concern. This can be seen in two ways. First, the 1990 exiles' invasion of Rwanda from Uganda implied that the other exiles scattered all over the region could use the same strategy to force their return to Rwanda. To prevent that from happening, the countries in the region, particularly Tanzania, compelled Habyarimana to resolve both the domestic conflict and to talk to the exiles in the region to restore peace to the country. Nevertheless, the regional actors had been playing a key role in resolving Rwanda's conflict even before the 1990s. Second, the RPF's invasion of the DRC in 1996 and 1998 changed the regional security dynamics. Ugandan and Rwandan armies went to fight inside the DRC so as to extract natural resources.

The RSCT can also be explained in terms of inter-state relations that produce a region and regional structures. Tanzania's facilitation of Rwanda's conflict resolution can be explained in terms of regional and humanitarian concerns and the fact that Rwanda's insecurity immediately impacts Tanzania's

domestic environment. This was demonstrated in 1994 when 250,000 refugees crossed the border into Tanzania within a day. Tanzania's influence on Rwanda goes back to the period before 1990. During the 1970s, Rwanda's Second Republic led by Habyarimana adopted some aspects of Tanzania's socialist model so as to promote development. The regime adopted the ten-cell local government structure led by an elected leader. In 1991, however, the units were trained in self-defence and were subsequently armed to counter RPF's attack.

Rwanda's conflict resolution demonstrates the relationship between the domestic environment and the other states in the region, as well as regional security structures and the international community. Within Tanzania, the opinion of the public was yet to influence the country's foreign policy decisions. Although the Parliament was expected to play a key role in the country's foreign policy formulation and decisions, it didn't effectively do so. This partly explains the reason for the absence of policy guidance on Tanzania's involvement in conflict resolution. Regional events also influenced Tanzania's internal decisions. For example, even though President Mwinyi and later President Mkapa concentrated on strengthening the economy, the urgent need to intervene in Rwanda's problems compelled them to resolve the conflict.

The RSCT can also be explained in terms of Rwanda's domestic conditions. The declining state legitimacy and internal public pressure to open up for multiparty democracy were the factors that pushed Habyarimana to accept negotiations. This was complemented by the fact that the country's economy was not performing well due to the decline in the export of coffee, and the RPF was becoming militarily stronger. More importantly, the conditions provided the ground for Tanzania to convince Habyarimana that violence could not solve the conflict.

Other actors such as the media were influential in Rwanda's conflict resolution. Both local and international media played conflicting roles. Within Rwanda, the Arusha Agreement antagonists used the RTLMC to mobilise people

to reject the agreement and to prepare to fight against the RPF-dominated government. With the exception of the BBC, international media did not adequately cover the series of negotiations that took place between 1991 and 1993. After the genocide had taken place, the international media mobilised the international community to deliver humanitarian assistance.

Chapter 5

The Role of Tanzania in Burundi's conflict resolution

Introduction

Burundi, like Rwanda, exhibits a conflict caused by economic and political factors. The elite manipulated ethnicity for political and economic gains, which largely contributed to institutional failure. Ndikumana notes that Burundi's conflict resulted from institutional failure rather than from cultural or historical hostility between the ethnic groups.¹ The malfunction further reinforced economic and political inequality among the ethnic groups and regions. Since discrimination was ethnic-based, violence and counter-violence turned ethnic as well.²

Burundi largely shares a historical background and ethnic composition with Rwanda. In both countries, the Hutu constitute approximately 85 percent of the population and the Tutsi 14 percent. The difference lies in the outcome of the distribution of power between the Tutsi and the Hutu. In Burundi, the Tutsi minority dominated and controlled important institutions such as the government and the army. In Rwanda the Hutu majority maintained power and systematically exploited and excluded the minority Tutsi from politics.³ It should be noted, however, that in both countries some sort of an intra-ethnic discrimination also caused conflicts.

Since the early 1960s, Burundi has gone through several phases of conflicts. At least six governments ruled Burundi between 1962 and 1965. In

¹ Maundi, Zartman, Khadiagala and Nuamah, *Getting In* 58; Stephen John Stedman, "Conflict and Conciliation in sub-Saharan Africa" 248.

² Léonce Ndikumana, "Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi: A Case for Political and Economic Liberalisation," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 38 (3) (September 2000):432. See also Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda," 253.

³ Clapham, *Africa and the International System* 51-52; Stedman, "Conflict and Conciliation in sub-Saharan Africa" 248. See also Ndikumana, "Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi" 433.

1966, the army took power through a coup that declared Burundi a Republic. Moreover, Burundi is among the African countries with the highest number of Heads of State (about six) who have been assassinated. Two of the first three Prime Ministers were assassinated. The first genocide in Central Africa and in the GLR took place in Burundi in 1972, following the mass killing of Hutu students and intellectuals.⁴

Tanzania has been involved in Burundi's conflict resolution in different ways, ranging from hosting the refugees, provision of good offices, mediation to facilitation of peace talks. As will be shown, the country's participation in Burundi started during the liberation struggles. In the 1990s, Nyerere, as an eminent statesperson, was appointed by the regional leaders and the international community to facilitate negotiations between the conflicting parties. The Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation (MNF), a Tanzania-based organisation, assisted him.⁵

This chapter is about Tanzania's role in Burundi's conflict resolution. The main argument is that Tanzania principally remained an influential actor despite the multiplicity of regional and international actors. The chapter further argues that even though the mediation role shifted from Tanzania to South Africa, the former largely set the ground for reaching the peace agreement and a fairly successful post-conflict reconstruction. As will be demonstrated, conditions within both countries, factors at the regional level and at the international system, shaped Tanzania's role in Burundi.

Participation in Burundi's conflict was the other case of Tanzania's involvement in conflict resolution in the GLR. While Rwanda's conflict had been resolved by the early 1995 [with the exception of post-conflict reconstruction]

⁴ Warren Weinstein, "Tensions in Burundi," *A Journal of Opinion* 2 (4) (Winter 1972): 27; René Lemarchand, "Burundi at a Crossroads" in *Security Dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes Region*, ed. Gilbert M. Khadiagala (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2006), 41; Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd., 2006), 488. See also Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers* 215.

⁵ Maundi, "Conceptualising conflict resolution" 2.

the conflict in Burundi continued until mid 2000s. The chapter seeks to address the following questions: What were the drivers for the Tanzanian foreign policy and its involvement in Burundi's conflict resolution? What have been the roles of the international and regional organisations in resolving the conflict and how has Tanzania worked with such institutions? Were there any successes and/or failures of the Tanzanian foreign policy? What opportunities and challenges did the country have? And how and to what extent could Tanzania afford to maximise the opportunities and overcome the challenges?

The analysis will be done using the RSCT and will be at four levels. The first level will concentrate on the relations between the international community and the structures and actors in the GLR. The second will focus on the GLR's interactions with Southern Africa. Again, the GLR has been identified as a security region which relates with South Africa. The main reason is that after 1994 South Africa was increasingly becoming an influential regional actor in both Southern Africa and in the GLR. The last two levels will concentrate on how Tanzania's domestic environment influenced the country's relations with its neighbours in the GLR and Southern Africa.

The chapter is divided into four major parts. The first provides a background to Burundi's conflict and the initiatives to resolve. The attention will be paid to Burundi's post-independence conflict because it is the time when Tanzania began to be largely involved. The second part discusses the role of the international, regional and other actors in Burundi's conflict resolution. Specifically, how have the actors influenced the Tanzanian foreign policy and its participation in the region? The third part is about the strategies adopted by Tanzania, the way the domestic environment informed Tanzania's foreign policy and its approach to Burundi's conflict. Before giving the conclusion, we discuss the opportunities and challenges the country had and examine whether or not the Tanzanian diplomacy succeeded in Burundi's situation.

Background and the nature of Burundi's conflict

Until the 1960s, elements of ethnic discrimination did not feature in Burundi although the potential had existed since the pre-colonial time.⁶ Ganwa Prince Louis Rwagasore formed the *Unité Pour le Progrès National* (Uprona), a nationalist party in 1958. Rwagasore was largely influenced to form Uprona by Nyerere and the 1955 Bandung Conference that called for immediate independence to the colonies.⁷ In the 18 September 1961 general elections held under UN supervision Uprona won 58 out of the 64 seats in the new National Assembly.⁸ To prevent (ethnic) conflict, Uprona retained the monarchy⁹ and the first post-independence governments were to be led alternately by the Tutsis and the Hutus. In reality, Uprona was a non-ethnic political party¹⁰ like parliament and the armed forces.

The first phase of conflict occurred in October 1965, following a coup attempt by Hutu army officers. The January 1965 killing of the Hutu Prime Minister, Pierre Ngendandumwe, preceded the incident. Afterwards, King Mwambutsa refused to appoint a Hutu Prime Minister despite that the Hutu had won 23 out of the 33 seats during the May 1965 legislative elections. In response, a group of Hutu in the armed forces staged a coup. The army succeeded in managing the conflict as by that time its composition included both Hutu and Tutsi. The failed coup was followed by the killings of the Hutu

⁶ Thomas Laely, "Peasants, Local Communities, and Central Power in Burundi," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 35 (4) (December 1997): 699.

⁷ Christian P. Scherrer, *Resolving the Crisis in Central Africa*, Policy Options, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), 6 May 1998, 11.

⁸ Burundi became a UN member on 26 July 1961 and subsequently attained independence on 1 July 1962.

⁹ In monarchy the King remained the *Mwami*/or ruler of the Kingdom of Burundi. This arrangement ended in 1966 whereby, Ntare V was the last King.

¹⁰ Europa Publications, *A Political Chronology of Africa (First edition)* ed. David Lea (London: Europa Publications Limited, 2001), 52-53. See also Mpangala, *Ethnic Conflicts in the Region of the Great Lakes*, 74-75.

officers in the army and in the political institutions. Increasingly the Tutsi gained control of the government and the military.¹¹

The 1966 coup installed Captain Michael Micombero,¹² a Tutsi officer. During the coup, prominent Hutu politicians and soldiers were killed,¹³ and afterwards, the Tutsis-Hima who were controlling most of the armed forces monopolised power. Subsequent Burundian governments from 1966 to 1993 were led by military regimes¹⁴ with the army mainly used as an instrument to maintain power. Again, all the Presidents were from the same village and Buyoya was Micombero's nephew. The Tutsi from the South dominated the key institutions, including Uprona's top positions, the army's command structure and the judiciary. For instance, by 1994, only 13 of the 241 magistrates were Hutu.¹⁵ Accordingly, other Tutsis and Hutus were excluded from leadership and politics.

Inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts as well as tensions within Micombero's regime largely caused the 1972 conflict. After the Hutu revolt in the Southern province, the Tutsi-controlled army was called in to intervene. The conflict

¹¹ Ndikumana, "Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi" 433-434. See also Rose M. Kadende-Kaiser and Paul J. Kaiser, "Modern Folklore, Identity and Political Change in Burundi" *African Studies Review* 40 (3) (December 1997): 34.

¹² Micombero was born in 1940 in Rutovu – Bururi Province and passed away in 1983 while in exile in Mogadishu – Somalia. As Burundi's first President he graduated from a military academy – Brussels in 1962. He served as the Secretary of State for National Defence from 1963 to 1966. Micombero was appointed the Prime Minister in 1966 and in the same year assumed Uprona's leadership. He promoted African Socialism and received support from China. Scherrer, *Resolving the Crisis*, 12; See <http://www.massviolence.org/Micombero-Michael>; See also <http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Michael+Micombero> [Both accessed on 10 January 2013].

¹³ Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* 488.

¹⁴ Captain Micombero (1966-1976), Colonel Bagaza (1976-1987) and Major Buyoya (1987-1993) and 1996-2003). All were Hima – Tutsi. Buyoya and Bagaza were trained together at *Ecole Royale Militaire de Bruxelles 1968-1973*. See Scherrer, *Resolving the Crisis in Central Africa*, 12.

¹⁵ Uprona led by Prince Louis Rwagasore, won both pre and post-independence elections. The opposition however, soon killed Rwagasore and his party was subsequently paralysed by an internal conflict. Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda" 256-257.

lasted for two months and several people lost lives as the army sought revenge against the Hutu. Between 100,000 and 200,000 Hutus lost their lives while approximately 150,000 fled into neighbouring countries, including Tanzania. Micombero's government retaliated by organising a "selective genocide" against educated Hutus, including teachers, church leaders, bank clerks, nurses, traders and civil servants. The army assembled and killed them.¹⁶

The 1972 conflict hardly attracted the attention of the international community. For its part, the U.S. did not intervene partly because its national interests were not threatened by the incident. The inaction could be confirmed by the characterisation of Burundi by the 1972 State Department policy paper as "an autistic and suspicious society."¹⁷ As the conflict displayed some elements of discrimination, the Hutu in leadership positions developed fear of and mistrust to the Tutsi-controlled government and the military. Several years afterwards Hutu parents could not send their children to school, fearing victimisation.¹⁸

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza¹⁹ was installed as President through the 1976 bloodless coup. Bagaza attempted to harmonise ethnic relations by preventing

¹⁶ Kadende-Kaiser and Kaiser, "Modern Folklore, Identity and Political Change in Burundi" 35; Ndikumana, "Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi" 433-434. See also Meredith, *The State of Africa* 488.

¹⁷ René Lemarchand, "U.S. Policy in the Great Lakes: A Critical Perspective" *A Journal of Opinion* 26 (1) Central Africa in Crisis (1998): 41.

¹⁸ Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda" 258; Ndikumana, "Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi" 433-434. Weinstein, "Tensions in Burundi" 27; Filip Reyntjens, "The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating: The June 1993 Elections in Burundi" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31 (4) (December 1993): 563.

¹⁹ Bagaza was born in 1946 – Rutovu. He served as Burundi's President between 1976 and 1987. Bagaza was the Chairperson of the Supreme Revolutionary Council in Burundi until 10 November 1976. He was a socialist with ties to Moscow. Ndadaye overthrew Bagaza in 1987 while attending a meeting in Canada. He went in exile in Libya for a short time then Uganda until 1993. In 1994 he formed le *Parti Pour le Redressement National* (PARENA) and remained its leader. Buyoya put Bagaza in house arrest in 1998 with the allegations of plotting another coup. Being the former Head of State he is currently Senator for life. See Scherrer, *Resolving the Crisis in Central Africa* 12; <http://www.gahuza.com/burundi-news/64-politique/392-larrivee->

the Hutus and the Tutsi from stressing ethnic differences. Apparently, the army and the government came to be under the control of Bagaza's political associates whose majority were again the Tutsi from the South.²⁰ He facilitated constitutional changes that made Burundi a one-party state under Uprona. During his leadership Catholic schools were nationalised and the government banned the radio station and the newspaper owned by the church. Part of the reason could be that Bagaza related the activities of the church with those of the colonialists. Furthermore, he perceived the church as a threat to his leadership as it was providing social services, hence becoming a powerful institution.

Pierre Buyoya,²¹ another Tutsi officer from the South, became President through the 3 September 1987 coup that proclaimed the Third Republic. Buyoya's coup had a limited impact since new violence erupted in August 1988, almost a year later. The military randomly killed thousands of unarmed Hutu civilians in some of the Northern provinces. Twenty thousand people are estimated to have lost their lives while 60,000 fled to Rwanda.²² The coup changed the direction of Burundi's ethnic relations and conflict resolution. To some degree, the citizens could freely identify themselves on an ethnic basis

[au-pouvoir](#); for more discussion see also <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/48741>; <http://articles.latimes.com/jean-baptiste-bagaza> [All accessed on 10 January 2013.]

²⁰ Kadende-Kaiser and Kaiser, "Modern Folklore, Identity and Political Change in Burundi" 35.

²¹ Buyoya was born in 1949 in Rutovu, Bururi province as a son of a farmer. He studied in France and West Germany and was also educated in Belgium. Buyoya served as Burundi's third President from (September 1987-July 1993) and the seventh President from July 1996 to April 2003. He is so far the country's longest serving Head of State. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma appointed Buyoya as the AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel on 26 October 2012 to coordinate the initiatives aiming at addressing the root causes of Mali conflicts. Buyoya is also currently Burundi's Senator for life. <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/24/world/burundi>; <http://nytimes.com/1996/07/30/world/new-leader> [Accessed on 29 December 2012]; See also <http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com> [Accessed on 10 January 2013]; Also discussed in <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/16/world/talks-on-burundi> [Accessed on 29 December 2012].

²² Reyntjens, "The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating" 563; Kadende-Kaiser and Kaiser, "Modern Folklore, Identity and Political Change in Burundi" 35. See also Ndikumana, "Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi" 449.

without fearing government punishment. Moreover, the President organised a national unity campaign to prevent another intra-state conflict.

Coups were not the only cause of Burundi's conflicts. High population rates coupled with the competition for limited resources also caused the conflicts. Moreover, the interaction of events between Burundi and the neighbouring Rwanda as well as the use of ethnicity for political mobilisation were a source of the conflicts.²³ Members of the elite manipulated ethnicity to maintain power. Weinstein notes that even among the Tutsis, regionalism and clan ties were used to exclude others.²⁴ Besides land scarcity and population growth, Burundi's economic performance was not good. Part of the reason was limited market opportunities caused by a low average per capita income, which was less than U.S. \$50 per annum.²⁵ As a result, the country highly depended on foreign aid to subsidise the scarcity of resources.

Melchior Ndadaye,²⁶ a Hutu and *Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi* (Frodebu) presidential candidate, was elected in 1993. Ndadaye was voted into power because it was the first time Burundi held multiparty elections and it seems that voting was done along ethnic lines. Ndadaye sought to regulate the

²³ Glynne Evans, "Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes" International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 311 New York: Oxford University Press 1997, 19.

²⁴ Weinstein, "Tensions in Burundi" 27-28.

²⁵ Weinstein, "Burundi: Alternatives to Violence" 19.

²⁶ Ndadaye was born in 1953, Murama – Muramvya Province. He grew up in Burundi and subsequently joined a teachers' training college. Following the 1972 killings of Hutus he flew to Rwanda where he graduated the first degree in education of the National University of Rwanda. He also studied at the teachers' training college in Butare. Afterwards, he worked as a teacher and part time lecturer at the university. Ndadaye further pursued the second degree in banking at the National Academy of Arts and Trade – France. In 1975 he founded Burundi's workers party while in Rwanda and served as its President. After 11 years in exile he went back to Burundi where he worked in credit department of the Meridien Biao Bank. In 1986 Ndadaye founded Frodebu, which operated as an underground political movement until 1991 during political liberalisation. In 1989 he was appointed to serve as an advisor to the rural development bank. Discussed in <http://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/melchior-ndadaye>; <http://www.s9.com/biography/Ndadaye-Melchior>; <http://www.afrcansuccess.org/visuFiche.php?Ndadaye>; See also <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/407322/Melchior> [All accessed on 10 October 2013].

dominance of the Tutsis in all sectors, to return the land taken by them to the Hutus and to open up for the return of the Hutu exiles. Eventually, a Hutu-dominated government was formed whereby, Sylvie Kinigi – a Tutsi woman was appointed the Prime Minister. Nevertheless, a significant percentage of the Tutsi remained in the armed forces²⁷ and Tutsi officers were not reconciled to the reforms. In the end, Ndadaye and other Hutu leaders were assassinated on 21 October 1993. The government was at the same time overthrown.²⁸ The conflict soon spread throughout the country. As the army attempted to manage the conflict, thousands of non-Southern Tutsis and Hutus were killed.²⁹

Burundi's conflict from 1993 was principally caused by unequal access to national resources. Economic opportunities for the Tutsi from the South were created by the military regime in the civil service, in education and in the armed forces. Moreover, corruption and patronage paved the way for the establishment of ethno-regional monopolies in the private sector.³⁰ After the assassination of the President and the Vice-President in the coup, power-sharing negotiations were conducted. Cyprien Ntaryamira, who was elected President by the parliament in January 1994, died on 6 April 1994 in the plane crash together with Rwanda's Habyarimana. President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya led the new government that was formed again in October 1994. The government could not rule as it was still affected by the conflict. Ntibantunganya's government was overthrown on 25 July 1996 in a coup

²⁷ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers* 2002: 215.

²⁸ It was approximately three months in the office and only two months after the signing of the Arusha Agreement. See Richard Dowden, *Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles* 224; Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers* 2002: 215.

²⁹ It is estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000 people lost lives in a three-month period after the coup; one million fled the Country and hundreds of thousands were internally displaced. See Stedman, "Conflict and Conciliation in sub-Saharan Africa" 235.

³⁰ Ndikumana, "Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi" 449.

staged again by Buyoya; an international embargo followed. Buyoya's second military coup took place when peace talks had already started in Tanzania.³¹

The major cause of the conflicts seemed to be the institutional failure, together with the government's loss of legitimacy and credibility. Institutions in Burundi could not perform the basic functions of protecting the citizens and equally distributing the resources to them. Ramadhani notes that the powers that imposed the rules of the game in Burundi heavily favoured both the military and the Tutsi elite from the South. As a result, the Burundian state relapsed into a private institution.³²

Initiatives to resolve Burundi's conflicts

Burundian Presidents made several attempts to resolve the conflicts with serious measures taken from 1988 onwards. The government of "ethnic parity" was formed with an equal number of Hutus and Tutsis in the Cabinet.³³ At the same time, the President immediately appointed Adrien Sibomana, the first Hutu Prime Minister. To resolve the problem of regional under-representation, the President ensured that the Hutus and Tutsis were equally represented. As a result, a large number of Hutus and non-Southern Tutsis were appointed ministers, managers and directors in departments previously held by the Tutsis from the South.³⁴

In October 1988, Buyoya established a commission comprising of 12 Hutus and 12 Tutsis to Study the Question of National Unity. The objective was

³¹ Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda" 262; See also Peter G. Forster, Michael Hitchcock and Francis Lyimo (ed.), "Postscript: Development in Rwanda and Burundi in the 1990s" in *Race and Ethnicity in East Africa* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 2000), 116-117. See also Lupa Ramadhani, "The Utility of Mediators in Conflict Resolution in Africa: A Case of Burundi Peace Talks" (M.A. Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam 2002), 37.

³² Ramadhani, "The Utility of Mediators" 34.

³³ Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda" 261-262. See also *Daily News*, "Burundi: On the precipice of pandemonium and peace" 16 July 2008, 9-10.

³⁴ Kadende-Kaiser and Kaiser, "Modern Folklore, Identity and Political Change in Burundi" 35-36.

to assess the possibilities of forging national unity. The commission submitted a report in April 1989 that paved the way for a national dialogue on the root causes of ethnic conflicts. The debate culminated in the drafting of a Charter of National Unity, which, among other recommendations, proposed solutions to Burundi's conflicts. The report for the first time acknowledged the existence of Hutu-Tutsi conflicts and suggested ways to resolve them.³⁵ The commission's report, nevertheless, did not recognise the post-independence regimes that manipulated the colonial structures to reinforce ethnic discrimination. Furthermore, the report did not specify measures to charge the people involved in the killings and the means to pay reparations to the victims.³⁶

Burundi sought to embark on a multiparty democracy, beginning with the adoption of a multiparty constitution in 1992. Ethnic-based political parties were outlawed and political parties were required to recruit members from across the country. In addition, they were to be approved by the Minister of Internal Affairs.³⁷ Two major issues could be observed here. Burundi's democratisation process caused conflicts instead of resolving them. One indication was that ethnic identities informed people's voting patterns. In turn, the Tutsis, who were the minority but who dominated state institutions, became unsure of their future. Second, until 1992, Burundi's government was still saying that a multiparty democracy would cause conflicts. A one-party political system was instead promoted as a conflict prevention measure. In reality, the ruling party became an instrument of ethnic exclusion.³⁸

³⁵ Reyntjens, "The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating" 564; Maundi, Zartman, Khadiagala and Nuamah, *Getting In* 60.

³⁶ To some extent the report mentioned the massacres of 1965, 1969, 1972 and 1988 as well as acknowledged human rights abuses. See Léonce Ndikumana, "Institutional Failure and Ethnic Conflicts in Burundi," *African Studies Review* 41 (1) (April 1998): 33.

³⁷ Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda" 261-262.

³⁸ Ramadhani, "The Utility of Mediators" 15; Ndikumana, "Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi" 437.

Another conflict resolution measure took place in education and the public service. From 1989 onwards, Hutu students were enrolled in secondary schools and higher education institutions and national examinations were fairly organised. The same was done in the civil service, where the Tutsis dominated most of the top positions. Employment procedures became more transparent and the government adopted affirmative measures in recruiting the Hutus into respective positions.³⁹ In the end, enrolment of Hutu students in schools and in government departments increased.

Beginning in 1990 Buyoya spearheaded the democratisation of Burundi. The West saw him as a moderate leader. To a certain degree, this attitude explains the West's support for Buyoya's 1996 coup. Others, however, compared Buyoya to his predecessors, that is, the supporter of the Tutsi domination. The difference was that Buyoya was compelled to initiate the multiparty democracy, which was somewhat a kind of response to the international community and the domestic demand for political reforms.⁴⁰ This is particularly evident after the 1988 and 1989 events. Buyoya realised that he could no longer lead through exclusion.

The initiatives to resolve Burundi's conflicts could be seen in the negotiations that resulted in the signing of the peace agreements. The first accord was signed in September 1994 and provided for power sharing between Uprona and Frodebu. Ould-Abdallah backed the efforts that resulted in the signing of an agreement. The condition was that if the President was a Hutu then the Prime Minister had to be a Tutsi.⁴¹ The contentious issue, however, remained the relation between the power of the President, which Buyoya strengthened, and that of the Prime Minister. The agreement was short-lived as the military overthrew the government again and re-imposed Major Buyoya in

³⁹ Reyntjens, "The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating" 564-565.

⁴⁰ Ndikumana, "Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi" 434.

⁴¹ Chris Landsberg, "South Africa" in *Security Dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes Region*, ed. Gilbert M. Khadiagala (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2006), 124.

1996. Neighbouring states led by Tanzania subsequently imposed sanctions on Burundi;⁴² a series of peace talks followed.

The Burundi peace talks formally started in 1996 by Mwanza I (April) followed by Mwanza II (June). Uprona and Frodebu were the main negotiating parties because they had representatives in parliament. Mistrust between the two persisted and resulted in an unsuccessful resolution of the conflict. While the Hutu emphasised that those responsible for killing Ndadaye should be charged, the Tutsi extremists rejected the power-sharing option.⁴³ Mwanza II talks were held in June 1996 at the time when the concerns of Mwanza I had not been resolved. Frodebu and Uprona were still blaming each other. To ensure that the negotiations remained on track, Nyerere held several follow-up meetings in Mwanza with the representatives of the two parties and behind the scenes with the extremist leaders. There were no other rounds of negotiations until 1998 when All-Parties Talks resumed in Arusha. Buyoya's coup and the regional reaction were part of the reason.⁴⁴

More actors were involved in the succeeding Arusha talks. The first session of the All-Party Talks took place on 21 June 1998 in Arusha. In addition to Uprona and Frodebu, seventeen political parties and civil society organisations' representatives participated in the talks, including women and youth associations. As a step towards conflict resolution, the parties signed a Declaration by the Participants in the Burundi Peace Negotiations Involving all

⁴² Forster, Hitchcock and Lyimo, eds., "Postscript: Development in Rwanda and Burundi in the 1990s" 117.

⁴³ Gérard Prunier, *From Genocide to Continental War* 64. For a discussion on Nyerere's mediation and the Mwanza process see Gilbert Khadiagala, *Meddlers or Mediators?* 117-122.

⁴⁴ It should be noted, however, that CNDD and the Burundian government signed the Rome Accords on 10 May 1997. Facilitated by *Comunita di Saint'Egidio* the agreement aimed at initiating the talks to resolve Burundi's conflict. Glynne Evans, "Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes" International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 311 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 35-36; Maundi, Zartman, Khadiagala and Nuamah, *Getting In* 74-75. See also <http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/cafrica/reports> [Accessed on 09 February 1999].

the Parties to the Burundi Conflict. The signatories committed themselves to engage in a conflict resolution through dialogue and to suspend the hostilities by 20th July 1998. After a series of negotiations, the parties signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement on 28 August 2000.⁴⁵ A few days later, however, a conflict between the Burundian army, *Forces Armées Burundaises* (FAB), and the CNDD-FDD and FNL guerrillas began.⁴⁶ The eruption of the conflict implied that the signing of the agreement only formed a part of but not a solution to the conflict.

Six months later, the agreement was largely unimplemented. In July 2001, it was further proposed that the transitional period should be divided into two halves headed by a Hutu and a Tutsi in turns.⁴⁷ The transitional government and the rebel group, the *Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (CNDD-FDD), signed the Peace Agreement in November 2003. According to the agreement, the former fighters were to be re-integrated into the civilian communities and elections were to be held on 31 October 2004.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, by 2008 some sections of

⁴⁵ According to the agreement Uprona under President Buyoya would form the government for 18-months. The same period was to be led by Frodebu's Vice-President – Domitien Ndayizeye. Furthermore, the government and the National Assembly was to be constituted by 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi. The senate and the army were to comprise of 50 percent Hutu and 50 percent Tutsi. See Ramadhani, "The Utility of Mediators" 53.

⁴⁶ Prunier, *From Genocide to Continental War* 288; Said J.K Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" (Masters Dissertation, University of Witwatersrand 2008), vi; Filip Reyntjens, "Again at the Crossroads-Rwanda and Burundi, 2000-2001," *Current African Issues* Number 24, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 2001, 18. See also *The East African*, "Civil society push for peace in Burundi" 28 July-3 August 2008, 6.

⁴⁷ The incumbent President – Buyoya was endorsed for the first 18 months and a Hutu – Domitien Ndayizeye the Vice President. The transitional government was subsequently installed on 1 November 2001. Ramadhani, "The Utility of Mediators" 70-71.

⁴⁸ The Accord provided for the CNDD-FDD to be incorporated in the government as political party and would obtain 4 cabinet posts, 15 members of parliament and 2 ambassadors. Also CNDD-FDD was allocated the post of the Vice-President of the National Assembly, 35 percent of the new police force and 35 percent of the vacant secret service. See Kidane Mengisteab, "Africa's Interstate Conflicts: Relevance and Limitations of Diplomacy," *African Issues*, 31/32, Vol 31 (1/2)- 32(1/2) (2003/2004): 36; Prunier, *From Genocide to Continental War* 288-289;

the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement on Burundi had not been fully implemented. FNL forces had not yet been demobilised and the disarmament and integration of ex-combatants into the national forces had not been completed.⁴⁹

The signing of the Cease Fire Accord (CFA) in Dar es Salaam on 7 September 2006 by the Burundian government and the last remaining movement, *Parti Pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu-Force Nationale de Libération* (Palipehutu-FNL), was expected to formally end the Burundian peace negotiations. For a period of ten years, the Burundian political parties signed more than five separate peace accords. The FNL signed the accord due to the “pressure to sign” and the threat of regional and international sanctions.⁵⁰ This was evidenced partly by FNL leader’s (Agathon Rwasa) comment during the signing ceremony. He said that they had signed the agreement but “...the time to lay down arms is not yet ... we will tell you when the time comes.”⁵¹

International response, Tanzania’s foreign policy and Burundi’s conflict resolution

The global community played different roles in Burundi’s conflict resolution. Donors largely sustained Burundi’s military regimes. The country continued to receive financial assistance even after having proved that the state machinery was used for discrimination. Burundi kept on receiving aid even when the military killed people in 1972, 1988 and 1991. Despite being known

Mikael Eriksson, Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, “Armed Conflict, 1989-2002,” *Journal of Peace Research* 40 (5) (September 2003): 596.

⁴⁹ Approximately over 100,000 guns were in private hands. *The East African*, “Burundi unsure which way to go in search of peace” 4-10 August 2003, II. See also Dowden, *Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles* 231-232.

⁵⁰ Jan van Eck, “Burundi: An ongoing search for durable peace,” *African Security Review* Institute for Security Studies Volume 16, (1) (2007): 114.

⁵¹ *The East African*, “Burundi’s last rebel groups signs peace deal but won’t disarm” 11-17 September 2006, 18. See also *The East African*, “New roadmap for Burundi peace process” 31 March 2008, 10.

for human rights violations, the Bagaza regime (1976-1987) continued to receive aid. Donors provided a total of U.S\$ 831 million, at an average of U.S\$ 75.6 million a year.⁵² From the 1970s onwards, Nyerere urged the OAU to monitor states' human rights conducts. The adoption of the Banjul Charter on Human and People's Rights in 1981 was the result of Nyerere's initiatives to promote and protect human rights.⁵³

Even though conflicts have continued in Burundi since independence, the international community became seriously involved in conflict resolution after the 1993 assassination of President Ndadaye. This does not mean that in the previous crises such as the 1972 conflict the global community did not intervene; rather, what it means that the level of intervention was lower compared to that of 1993.⁵⁴ Part of the reason was the growth, during the 1990s, of international protection of human rights. The international community perceived the assassination of Heads of State as a "thing of the past". Indeed, the failure to prevent Rwanda's conflict resulted in a number of mixed international initiatives for Burundi.⁵⁵

Individual countries such as China were involved in Burundi's conflict resolution. Through the protection of revolutionary strategies, Beijing targeted Burundi's Tutsi exiles and opposition factions in Kenya. It also sought to provide arms to the Hutu-led government and later to the Tutsis. After establishing an embassy in Bujumbura in 1964, the Chinese went into Congo, using their Burundian embassy to supply Lumumba with weapons. China-manufactured

⁵² Likewise, Micombero regime (1966-1976) received the sum of U.S\$ 21.2 million (an average of U.S\$ 2.1 million per year) and Buyoya's first regime (1987-1993) received U.S\$ 166 million (at an average of U.S\$ 27.7 million per year). For a discussion on this see Ndikumana, "Institutional Failure and Ethnic Conflicts in Burundi" 40. See also Weinstein, "Tensions in Burundi" 27.

⁵³ Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* 135.

⁵⁴ Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 49. See also Ndikumana, "Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi" 434.

⁵⁵ Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 95-96.

armaments were smuggled into Burundi through Uganda. Ugandan military officers working with Chinese representatives of the China North Industries Corporation transported the arms by air from Entebbe to Burundi's Tutsi government.⁵⁶ Beijing was also involved in Burundi's post-conflict reconstruction in two ways. First, the Chinese constructed hospitals and teacher training colleges in Bujumbura. Second, they also provided loans to Burundi. Nevertheless, guided by the "non-interference policy," China did not interfere with Burundi's internal affairs.⁵⁷

The former colonial ruler, Belgium, was also involved in Burundi. Belgium was concerned about both the size of the Chinese embassy in Bujumbura and Rwagasore's association with Lumumba and Nyerere. Belgium delayed Burundi's independence elections in 1961 so as to influence the election results. Rwagasore was Nyerere's close friend and Nyerere perceived Rwagasore as a second Lumumba. Belgium feared that after independence, Rwagasore could opt for Tanzania's *Ujamaa* ideology. As a result, the Belgians took measures to prevent Burundi from shifting to communism by sponsoring the creation of another political party. The Belgians further sought to transport military equipment to anti-Lumumba forces in Kivu through Bujumbura.⁵⁸

The UN's role in Burundi's conflict resolution changed over time. During the 1960s and 1970s, the UN members were not much interested in resolving Burundi's conflicts. For example, a case filed at the UN against human rights violations had been pending for so long and was dropped in 1975. In addition, during that time, the UN Commission on Human Rights did not criticise

⁵⁶ Madsen, *Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa* 228. See also Meredith, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* 148.

⁵⁷ *The East African*, "China in win-win relationship with Africa" 10-16 November 2012, 31.

⁵⁸ Patricia O. Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi: The Search for Spaces of Peace in the Great Lakes Region* (Indiana: Indiana University Press 2008), 62-63. Also translated from Taasisi ya Mwalimu Nyerere, *Kazi za Taasisi ya Mwalimu Nyerere*, 9.

violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, from the early 1990s onwards, the UN Secretary General worked with Nyerere and the OAU to resolve the Burundi conflict. The UN special representative sent periodic reports to the Secretary General on the security situation in Burundi. Even though the Security Council was informed of the deteriorating security, preventive measures were not taken.⁶⁰ Instead, Resolution 1040 of 29 January 1996 was adopted requesting the Secretary General to ask the OAU to propose appropriate conflict resolution strategies. The technical commission that was formed subsequently concluded that the existing conflict and the insecurity in the country did not allow for the UN security guards to be deployed.⁶¹

While humanitarian intervention was being discussed at the UN Security Council, the West was largely unwilling to commit troops.⁶² France and the U.S. were against such a move. Moreover, the West did not respond to Boutros-Ghali's request for the deployment of new UN peacekeeping missions. The UN forces were instead sent to areas that were strategic to the West such as Bosnia and Haiti. Again, part of the reason was the 1992 Somalia experience. Nonetheless, in response to domestic pressure and public opinion, the U.S. proposed the creation of a regional peacekeeping force. Interested in preventing state collapse, France capitalised on its Security Council's membership to persuade the others to deploy a peacekeeping force in Bujumbura.⁶³

⁵⁹ Weinstein, "Burundi: Alternatives to Violence" *A Journal of Opinion* 5 (2) (Summer 1975): 20.

⁶⁰ Ramadhani "The Utility of Mediators" 78.

⁶¹ Adebajo and Sriram, eds., *Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2001), 170, 173. See also Ramadhani, "The Utility of Mediators" 79.

⁶² See UN Security Council Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Burundi S/1996/116, 15 February 1996.

⁶³ Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 197; Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, *Burundi on the Brink 1993-95: UN Special Envoy Reflects on Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington: US Institute for Peace, 2000), 112-113.

The influence of international actors after 1990 could be analysed in terms of their numbers, agendas and perceptions of the Burundi conflict. By the end of 1997, there were about 23 different humanitarian NGOs and 13 different negotiators. Different interpretations on the nature of the crisis resulted in varied approaches used by the international and regional actors.⁶⁴ In the end, it was practically impossible to harmonise their activities,⁶⁵ which made Burundi's conflict resolution complex and interwoven. According to Sahnoun "the incoherence of effort of the international community allowed the parties to the conflict to do what they wished since they could always find someone to back them."⁶⁶

The international community, to some extent, could not fulfil its responsibility on the Burundian refugees. Compared to other continents, the support given to African refugees by 2001 was insignificant. Benjamin Mkapa, then President of Tanzania, referred to the "aid fatigue" of the international community towards the refugees. The concern was that Tanzania, a Third World country, was expected to fulfil international obligations by hosting large numbers of refugees while at the same time receiving insufficient support from the international community. The Tanzanian government was sometimes stretched to the extent that it was compelled to reduce the amount of food provided to the refugees. In turn, crimes increased. Mkapa said that in reality the West was not ready even to take at least 10 percent of nearly a million refugees hosted in Tanzania.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Lemarchand, "Burundi at a Crossroads" 51; Fabienne Hara, "Burundi: A Case of Parallel Diplomacy" in *Herding Costs: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*, ed. Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aal (Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace Press, 2003), 135.

⁶⁵ Ould-Abdallah, *Burundi on the Brink 1993-95*, 127. See also Evans, "Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes" 8.

⁶⁶ Evans, "Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes" 38, 41.

⁶⁷ Benjamin William Mkapa, *Presidential Address at a New Year Sherry Party for the Heads of Diplomatic Missions and International Organisations*, (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 10 January 2002), 6-7, 8-9. See also Hotuba ya Rais wa Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania,

There was an indication that African problems were not given the same priority as non-African ones. As the September 2001 UNHCR mid-year progress report indicated it was difficult to obtain U.S\$ 32.1 million for the refugees in Tanzania, but it was easy to secure billions of U.S. dollars to resolve conflicts outside Africa. In the end, about U.S\$ 20.2 million – which was equivalent to 63 percent of the initial budget – was disbursed. By way of contrast in 1999, former Yugoslavia refugees were provided with a subsistence allowance of roughly U.S\$ 120 to a refugee, which was four times as much as that given to refugees in Africa, that is, U.S\$ 35 to a refugee.⁶⁸

As an alternative to international community's delayed response to African conflicts the U.S. sought to empower African armies to intervene in conflict situations, instead of waiting for the P5 decisions. During the visit to Africa in October 1996, the then Secretary of State – Warren Christopher proposed the establishment of an African rapid response unit, initially through the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF).⁶⁹ The Force was structured in the form of collaboration framework, with the aim of strengthening the capacity of African armies to intervene in conflict and humanitarian crises. The initiative was partly informed by the setbacks encountered in the resolution of Somalia and Rwanda's conflicts. Given that Africa was still a strategic region to the U.S, it was expected that doing so would reduce dependence on the P5.⁷⁰ On the contrary, France and South Africa suspected U.S's proposal, as the former considered itself Africa's regional leader. South Africa interpreted the programme as Washington's attempt to dictate Africa.

Benjamin William Mkapa kwa Bunge la Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania – Dodoma (Dar es Salaam: Mpigachapa wa Serikali 30 Januari 2002), 69-70.

⁶⁸ Translated from Hotuba ya Rais wa Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, Benjamin William Mkapa kwa Bunge la Jamhuri ya Muungano 71. See also Mkapa, *Presidential Address at a New Year Sherry Party* 7-8.

⁶⁹ Joint military training exercises involving officers from France, UK, U.S, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal were conducted as the initial test of the programme.

⁷⁰ For a discussion on this see Adekeye Adebajo, "Africa, African Americans and the Avuncular Sam" *Africa Today* 50 (3) (Spring 2004): 102.

ACRF's objective paved the way for the creation of African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). There were mixed reactions from African countries on the initiative, as some of them saw it as a military-led conflict resolution programme. Tanzania, Egypt and Zimbabwe did not support the U.S's military plan for the region. After receiving U.S\$ 225,000 support from the U.S. in November 1997, the Tanzanian government offered an alternative. Instead of using the finances to send officers to the U.S. for military training, Dar es Salaam favoured a regional approach to resolve the conflict through SADC or the EAC. Subsequently, in 1999 ACRI led to the establishment of the African Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS).⁷¹

ACRI had a number of flaws. Instead of the support being channelled through the regional organisations such as the AU, the U.S. sought a bilateral support to its allies. This decision was to some extent guided by the U.S's national interests rather than the need to "collaborate" in resolving African conflicts. Moreover, Mandela and Nyerere disapproved of ACRI. The reason was that African governments were not consulted during its creation. It was an American-driven initiative. Furthermore, the programme was not established through the UN, a global institution entrusted with the responsibility of promoting international peace and security.⁷²

Regional dynamics

Even though the international community attempted to resolve Burundi's conflict with limited outcome, regional actors were largely involved. The November 1995 Cairo meeting convened by the UN Secretary-General⁷³ discussed a sub-regional framework for conflict resolution. Nyerere, as an eminent African statesperson, was recommended to mediate the conflict. He

⁷¹ See Ould-Abdallah, *Burundi on the Brink 1993-95*, 24-25. See also Madsen, *Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa* 252-253.

⁷² Adebajo, "Africa, African Americans and the Avuncular Sam" 102-103.

⁷³ The Rwandan, Burundian, Ugandan and Zairean Presidents as well as a Tanzanian Presidential representative also attended the meeting.

consulted different actors at the regional and international levels and visited Burundi.⁷⁴ After Nyerere had expressed his readiness, the UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, the OAU and the international community, appointed him the principal mediator. Regional leaders and the parties to the Burundi conflict welcomed Nyerere. The Burundian delegation and Buyoya's speech at the Great Lakes forum of the Centre for Preventive Action expressed their support to the mediator. Nyerere, therefore, received financial support from the international community.⁷⁵

Compared to Burundi's previous conflicts, regional leaders became more concerned about and involved in the 1996 conflict. The region adopted different strategies to manage the conflict. The regional initiatives influenced the West and consequently were more involved.⁷⁶ Besides that, the changing conflict patterns in the region resulted in the formation of "periodic security alliances" among regional members. Mobutu – then Zaire's President relations with Burundi is one such example. The CNDD-FDD had headquarters in Zaire. Even though this does not mean that Mobutu opposed Buyoya's regime, the coups in Burundi ended up in Banyamulenge and received support from Burundi's regime against Mobutu in 1996.⁷⁷

The other case involved Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. During the Rwandan genocide, Uganda and Burundi supported the RPF, which was fighting against Habyarimana's regime. Later, Uganda and Rwanda's PRF government invaded Zaire to oust the then President – Laurent Kabila – whom they had

⁷⁴ Bunting, "The Heart of Africa. Interview with Julius Nyerere on Anti-Colonialism" 64-65.

⁷⁵ See <http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/africa/reports/bu05e> [Accessed on 09 February 1999].

⁷⁶ Ndikumana, "Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi" 436.

⁷⁷ Claude Kabemba, "The Democratic Republic of Congo" in *Big African States*, ed. Christopher Clapham, Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2006), 111.

previously supported. The conflict intensified as it was extended and fought inside the DRC.⁷⁸

Uganda manufactured and supplied arms to Buyoya's government and provided a transit route. In Uganda there was an arms factory managed by the Chinese and the Northern Koreans and supervised by South Africans. Built with Libyan funds, the factory was handed over to South Africans. On their part, Americans established a unit in the military base to train the officers. In spite of the regional arms embargo imposed in 1999, Museveni released 28 containers of ammunition that were sent to Burundi for the Burundian army.⁷⁹

As we saw above, events in Burundi affected Rwanda and *vice versa*. The 1959 conflict in Rwanda contributed to ethnic tensions in Burundi and stirred resistance against power sharing. Rwanda's conflicts were referred to by the Burundian Tutsi regimes to induce a negative attitude of Hutu power in the Tutsi population. Again, the assassination of Burundi's Hutu President on 21 October 1993 by Tutsi hard-liners provided a justification for Habyarimana's regime to resist the power sharing solution.⁸⁰

Besides the fact that the rejection of the power sharing arrangement in Burundi was associated with the ethnic relations, there are also other reasons. Ndikumana notes that countries with new generation leaders border Burundi, namely Kagame and Museveni. Both have different backgrounds and do not prefer Western-supported power sharing solutions. Furthermore, both oppose liberal democracy, which they consider a threat. "...Deeply distrustful of

⁷⁸ Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 101.

⁷⁹ Madsen, *Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa* 228; Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 139.

⁸⁰ Ndikumana, "Institutional Failure and Ethnic Conflicts in Burundi" 34-35.

Western forms of democracy, and the tyranny of the majority... their first obligation is to ensure the survival of their respective communities."⁸¹

Regional intervention was crucial in Burundi. The African Union deployed its first peacekeeping mission, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB)⁸² between April 2003 and June 2004. The mission was mandated to oversee the implementation of three ceasefire accords, namely the 7 October agreement, the 2 November 2003 ceasefire agreement and the 16 November 2003 comprehensive ceasefire agreement. AMIB was to set the ground for UN intervention. Part of the reason was that the UN could not authorise a peacekeeping mission to an area where a comprehensive ceasefire agreement does not exist.⁸³ Even though protection of civilians was not AMIB's mandate, it succeeded in setting the ground by supervising elections that were held subsequently.⁸⁴ The mission, however, somewhat managed to reduce violence.

To ensure sustainability of Burundi's intervention force AMIB evolved into a UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) on 1 June 2004.⁸⁵ Initially AMIB took over the conflict management responsibility from the South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD). The Force was created under UN Security Council resolution 1375 and dispatched to Burundi in 2001 to protect some of

⁸¹ Ndikumana, "Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi" 445.

⁸² AMIB comprised of troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa, and military observers from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia totalling 3,128 troops. The force comprised of military forces, observers and civilians operating alongside some of the UN agencies, NGOs and donors.

⁸³ The Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement was mainly concerned with assisting in disarmament, mobilisation and reintegration of the former combatants and contributing to peace and stability in Burundi. See Kenneth C. Omeje, "Understanding Conflict Resolution in Africa" 85; Thomas Mandrup, "Peace Diplomacy: The South African National Defence Force in Burundi" in *African Security Governance: Emerging Issues*, ed. Gavin Cawthra (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2009), 121. See also Barbara Barungi and Karanja Mbugua "From Peacekeeping to Peace Building: Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa." *ACCORD, Conflict Trends*, Issue 4 (2005): 31.

⁸⁴ Meike Scholz, *Development and Cooperation* 35 (8) 2008, 214.

⁸⁵ See Mandrup, "Peace Diplomacy" 121, 129.

the Hutu parliamentarians. Later, South Africa incurred most of the costs to service AMIB and in the end found it difficult to be reimbursed. By covering most of the operational costs, the country wanted to demonstrate its regional power.⁸⁶ The annual cost of the operation was estimated at US\$ 185m, some of which was covered by the European Union (EU), North American and other donors. South Africa played a key role in the formation of AMIB possibly because Thabo Mbeki, the then President of South Africa, was the AU's chairperson.

Burundian leaders requested regional intervention to stabilise the situation. Then President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya (Frodebu) and Prime Minister Antoine Ndwayo (Uprona) jointly tabled the proposal to the regional leaders. On 25 June 1996 the leaders led by Tanzania examined the military option as requested by the Burundian government. Even though military intervention was identified as an immediate solution to the internal conflict, the armed forces and the Tutsi-dominated parties rejected. They perceived the regional military force as a way of neutralising the army's power. The refusal somewhat resolved the conflict in a different way given that regional leaders had different interests. Some supported the government, while others supported the army, or a particular ethnic group.⁸⁷

A number of states were concerned about the impact of Burundi's conflict on regional security, and accordingly followed Tanzania in seeking ways to coordinate their efforts to resolve the problem. As a precursor, the Tunis and

⁸⁶ Mandrup, "Peace Diplomacy" 131.

⁸⁷ Not all countries supported the proposal to send a military force to Burundi. While Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia were ready to send the forces, Rwanda and Kenya were not ready. See Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 197-198. See also Mohammed Omar Maundi, "The Internal Dynamics of the Burundi Peace Negotiations" in *Beyond Conflict in Burundi*, ed. Gaudens Mpangala and Bismarck U. Mwansasu (Dar es Salaam: The Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, 2004), 309, 311; Ibrahim A. Gambari, "The Role of Foreign Intervention in African Reconstruction" 231. Also translated from Taasisi ya Mwalimu Nyerere, *Kazi za Taasisi ya Mwalimu Nyerere*, 11. See also <http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/cafrica/reports/bu05e> [Accessed on 09 February 1999].

and Cairo summits discussed the impact of the Burundi situation within a regional perspective. The GLR Heads of State and Governments subsequently formalised the intervention in Burundi's conflict resolution through the Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi (RIB).⁸⁸ The RIB was instrumental, among others, in appointing Nyerere Burundi's mediator in 1996, devising the sanctions regime, finalising the ceasefire negotiations by handling the controversial issues that emerged during the negotiations and overseeing the implementation of the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement.

The RIB played a crucial role in Burundi's post-conflict reconstruction period (2000-2006) by resolving the pending issues in the Arusha Agreement. The regional Heads of State and Government persuaded the two remaining parties to the conflict, the CNDD-FDD led by Pierre Nkurunziza⁸⁹ and Agathon Rwasa's PALIPEHUTU-FNL,⁹⁰ to come to the negotiating table and use peaceful means to settle their differences. The two rebel groups declined to sign the Arusha Agreement due to their disagreement on the power sharing provisions in the transitional government as well as the the negotiations for a ceasefire with the transitional government. After a series of negotiations between 2001

⁸⁸ The Carter Centre initially financed the initiative. The RIB initially comprised of Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and the DRC and was later expanded to include Zambia and South Africa. The Initiative can be divided into three phases. The first phase (1993 to 1996) and the second phase that began from 31 July 1996 during the Arusha summit up to 28 August 2000 when the Agreement was signed. The third phase (from 2000-September 2006) was the implementation period and part of post-conflict reconstruction. See Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 195; Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 96, 100-101. See also Mark Bomani, "Foreword" *Beyond Conflict in Burundi* Gaudens P. Mpangala and Bismarck U. Mwansasu eds., (Dar es Salaam: The MNF, 2004), vi.

⁸⁹ Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD wanted the mediator to reject the other CNDD-FDD faction led by John Bosco Ndayikengurukiye; demanded to be given potential positions in the government such as the Vice-President, Commander in Chief of the armed forces and the Speaker of the National Assembly. At some point they denounced Zuma's mediation and called for returning the mediation back to Arusha.

⁹⁰ Rwasa's PALIPEHUTU-FNL refused to recognise the Arusha Accord and the transitional government President. The faction believed that the Agreement did not address ethnic issues that caused the conflict; as well as wanted Jean Baptiste Bagaza and Pierre Buyoya to be charged for discriminating the Hutu.

and 2002 and a threat of sanctions by the regional summit, the largest CNDD-FDD group signed a comprehensive ceasefire in December 2002. Subsequently PALIPEHUTU-FNL signed a ceasefire agreement in September 2006, after a huge international and regional pressure and threats from Tanzania.⁹¹

Even though regional leaders appeared to speak with one voice through the Regional Initiative on Burundi, in reality there were differences among them. They differed on the interpretation of a security threat and decision-making. On the one hand, Tanzania saw the conflict as threatening its economic interests, internal political stability and contributing to small arms proliferation. Uganda, on the other hand, defined the conflict in terms of the coup instituted by a soldier. Other countries such as Rwanda adopted an inward-looking approach to Burundi's problems. The similarities in ethnic composition in the two countries would mean that Rwanda was suspicious of the solution to the conflict that would disentangle its internal political ethnic setting.⁹²

The 1996 coup shifted the focus of regional efforts from negotiations to the adoption of forcible measures. Tanzania hosted a summit in Arusha on 31 July⁹³ to discuss and suggest measures to resolve the problem. The summit condemned the coup and Ndadaye's assassination and also ordered the return to constitutional order. Moreover, the meeting weighed measures to be taken, and in the end endorsed the proposal for multilateral military intervention as an alternative to economic sanctions. Sanctions were instead imposed.⁹⁴ It was

⁹¹ For a discussion on this see Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 54, Butiku, "Facilitation of the Burundi Peace Negotiations" 65; Adonia Ayebare "Peacemaking in Burundi" at responsibilitytoprotect.org/favoritadonia.pdf [Accessed on 15 April 2014]; See also Leonidas Nijimbere, www.berghof-peacesupport.org/publications/MED_insider_mediators_Br.pdf [Accessed on 15 April 2014].

⁹² For this discussion see Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 100-101.

⁹³ The Heads of State and Government of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, the then Zaire and Ethiopia – which was by then the OAU Chair – attended the summit.

⁹⁴ Sanctions were enforced by Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Eritrea and Rwanda. It included the closing of road, rail and air links to Burundi. Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 97, 101-102; Evans, "Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes" 60; See also Chris

indeed the first time that the OAU conflict resolution mechanism supported African countries to adopt a coercive strategy against their fellows on a conflict considered to be an "internal affair." The goal was two-fold: to compel the military regime to uphold democratic rules and to prevent potential unconstitutional changes of government in Burundi or any other country in the region,⁹⁵ as discussed below.

The economic embargo imposed from October 1996 to January 1999 was to some extent ineffective and faced the challenge of credibility. The effects were felt during the first six months. The key actors who imposed the sanctions, however, violated the terms of the blockade. Some of those who did so were military leaders. Capitalising on the porosity of the borders, France continued to supply goods and weapons, and coffee was exported via Lake Tanganyika and South Africa. The international community also violated the embargo. Daily flights to and from Belgium, France and other EU countries continued. Within the region, Kenya, which was highly influenced by economic interests, resumed flights to Bujumbura in August 1997.⁹⁶

The major problem was that the global community was against the blockade. Western countries led by the EU asked Nyerere to persuade other leaders to lift the sanctions. The claim was that it was the rural population that was mostly affected. The international community further asserted that besides the embargo, transactions continued with the neighbouring countries. There was proof of weapons and other goods entering Burundi in spite of the sanctions.⁹⁷

Landsberg, "South Africa" in *Security Dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes Region*, ed. Gilbert M. Khadiagala (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1995) 231.

⁹⁵ Evans, "Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes" 36.

⁹⁶ Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 198; See also *The East African* 18-24 August 1997; Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 101-102; Landsberg, "South Africa" 231.

⁹⁷ Lemarchand, "Burundi at a Crossroads" 52.

In the end, the Burundian government largely managed to mobilise the international attitude towards the embargo.⁹⁸ The Regional Sanctions Coordinating Committee met in mid-April 1997 and agreed to open up for the importation of most of the commodities. In reality, by that time the sanctions had already collapsed.⁹⁹

Nyerere's death in October 1999 opened a shift in the negotiations from Tanzania. Immediately Buyoya lobbied against the appointment of another Tanzanian to replace Nyerere and to move the peace negotiations from Tanzania to South Africa. Part of the reason was that the Tutsi extremists, including the President Buyoya, believed that Nyerere and Tanzania were favouring the Hutu. In the end, Mandela was nominated to succeed Nyerere at the Eighth GLR Summit on Burundi which was held on 1 December 1999. Mandela's nomination was perceived to be a relief by both Buyoya and some of the Western countries.¹⁰⁰ Mandela's appointment was largely influenced by his personal record as demonstrated by South Africa's success in resolving the conflict between the minority whites and the majority blacks.¹⁰¹

Mandela's entry in the Burundi negotiations to some extent paved the way for the expansion of South Africa's influence on the GLR. Even at the beginning, some sections in Burundi perceived South Africa's involvement in the mediation as an attempt to neutralise Tanzania's role.¹⁰² In turn, conscious of the historical relations with Tanzania, Mandela tried to maintain a situation that would not look like grabbing Tanzania's role in Burundi. In one of his speeches

⁹⁸ France, Italy and the Vatican were against the blockade as the sanctions regime acted against the neo-liberal and free market forces. See Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 198.

⁹⁹ Ramadhani, "The Utility of Mediators" 89.

¹⁰⁰ Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 83-84.

¹⁰¹ For a discussion on the transitions of the mediation from Nyerere to Mandela see Kristina A. Bentley and Roger Southall, *An African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi* (Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council, 2005), 63-68.

¹⁰² Landsberg, "South Africa" 123.

Mandela differed with those who recommended the shift of the peace talks from Arusha to South Africa. "...as a matter of respect to Mwalimu, let us continue the process in Arusha and... keep the entire facilitation team."¹⁰³ One of the greater achievements in this decision was that maintaining the Tanzanian facilitators guaranteed continuity of the conflict resolution process. Nevertheless, South Africa's presence challenged Tanzania's political and diplomatic influence in the region. The military strength and commitment were demonstrated when South Africa quickly volunteered to send troops to Burundi on behalf of the AU.¹⁰⁴

South Africa's Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, unsuccessfully attempted to convince the region to shift the negotiations from Arusha to Pretoria. The regional leaders interpreted the proposal as an attempt to grab the regional initiative. The rebels objected to the shifting of the venue, suspecting that South Africa was pro-the Tutsis.¹⁰⁵ Even though Zuma's proposal did not succeed, several subsequent meetings took place in South Africa. After a while, South Africa almost lost credibility as the parties sought to resolve the conflict either bilaterally or using alternative mediators. Mozambique's Joaquim Chissano and Omar Bongo of Gabon were among the substitutes for Mandela.¹⁰⁶

There were differences between Mandela's and Nyerere's conflict resolution styles. Ndikumana saw Mandela's approach as personalised and unprincipled. Mandela was criticised for being "inflexible" and "impatient" to the advice. During the Arusha Talks Mandela appeared to be hard on the Tutsis.

¹⁰³ Arusha thus remained the main venue for the negotiations until 28 August 2000 when an agreement was finally signed. Thereafter, Mandela passed on the mediation to Jacob Zuma. For a discussion on this see Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 83-84; See also Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 201-202.

¹⁰⁴ Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 83-84.

¹⁰⁵ Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 83-84.

¹⁰⁶ Landsberg, "South Africa" 123.

Furthermore, he condemned the conflicting parties for “failing their people and shaming all of Africa.” He blamed the leaders for behaving “without a vision”.¹⁰⁷ Perhaps the South African apartheid experience influenced Mandela to interpret the plight of the Hutus along the same line as that of the African majority and the Tutsis’ claims with those of the white minority.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, Mandela’s facilitation was considered a success since it culminated in the signing of a peace agreement in 2000.

Other players in Burundi’s conflict resolution

Besides the two divided major parties, smaller Hutu and Tutsi political parties formed part of the 17 groups in the Arusha Talks. Within the Hutu opposition, three guerrilla movements emerged. Frodebu was split into at least five parties which competed for recognition. Uprona appeared to be wracked by a continuing conflict between the extremists and the moderates. One temptation that seemed to attract even the extremists to struggle for the involvement in the negotiations was the *per diem* that was set on Western standards. A day’s payment was an equivalent of six month’s income of a Burundian. The other and less mercenary view was that participation in the conference provided broader chances for the inclusion in the (coalition) government.¹⁰⁹ In the end, the multiplication of the parties, movements and factions complicated the identification of credible participants in the peace talks.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Ndikumana, “Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi” 435.

¹⁰⁸ Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 201-202; See also Lemarchand, “Burundi at a Crossroads” 52.

¹⁰⁹ Lemarchand, “Burundi at a Crossroads” 50.

¹¹⁰ Robert Krueger and Kathleen Tobin Krueger, *From Bloodshed to Hope in Burundi: Our Embassy Years During Genocide* (Austin: University of Texas Press 2007, 278); Lemarchand, “U.S. Policy in the Great Lakes: A Critical Perspective” 43. See also Ramadhani, “The Utility of Mediators” 92.

The inclusion of all actors to some extent resulted in difficulties in reaching an agreement. Even if Mandela invited to Arusha talks the formerly excluded parties, the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, they could still not participate. The rules of procedure could not provide for military groups to join the talks.¹¹¹ The rebel groups and civil society organisations were granted an observer status. Moreover, the admission of the FNL and the FDD to the negotiations was vetoed by PALIPEHUTU and the CNDD, from which the two parties stemmed. Rejection of their representation resulted in violence. It turned out difficult to reconcile multiple actors' interests. In the end, Mandela could not amend the rules of procedure to accommodate factionalism of the negotiating parties.¹¹²

The military regimes were among the influential actors in Burundi's conflict resolution. They almost all maintained the strategy of excluding the Hutus. Inherited from the Belgian colonialists who introduced identification based on ethnicity, subsequent Burundi's governments (1966-1993) reinforced the practice. Unlike Rwanda, after independence, Burundi sought to remove ethnic identities from identity cards.¹¹³ Nevertheless, ethnicity was manipulated for political ambitions. The Ministry of Education worked with the national intelligence services to maintain secret lists showing ethnic identities of

¹¹¹ According to the Rules of Procedure for the Burundi Peace Negotiations involving all parties to the Burundi the negotiations were to be conducted at the plenary meetings, committees and informal consultations. Where possible, each negotiating party was to appoint a representative for the plenary and for the committees. It was further agreed that negotiators should be the seventeen political parties that signed the Declaration of 21 June 1998 whereby new parties were to be admitted with the consent of all parties. For a discussion on this see Ramadhani, "The Utility of Mediators" 58.

¹¹² Ramadhani, "The Utility of Mediators" 57, 60-62.

¹¹³ Kadende-Kaiser and Kaiser, "Modern Folklore, Identity and Political Change in Burundi" 30; OAU, International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events Report, 7 July 2000, chapter 7.

students. The registers were used to regulate the entry of Hutu students into high schools and colleges.¹¹⁴

During the late 1980s, the military regime initiated a national debate on ethnic divisions. Before that time, engaging in discussions about ethnicity in politics was considered a threat to national security.¹¹⁵ Even though Buyoya's regime supported the transition to a multiparty system after the 1988 conflict, the armed forces and the security services resisted change. Their objection could be demonstrated by coup attempts of February 1989 and March 1992. Even the November 1991 reaction by some officers proved that the military could not accept Buyoya's strategy.¹¹⁶ Buyoya further ventured into reforming the armed forces so as to promote equality in terms of composition. In essence, Buyoya could be compared to Gorbachev for "reforming the worst aspects of the system that produced him."¹¹⁷

Special envoys played a key role in Burundi's conflict resolution. When the peace talks seemed to be stuck in 1995, the special envoys and negotiators multiplied.¹¹⁸ By 2006 there were in Bujumbura more than 12 special representatives and at least 17 INGOs.¹¹⁹ Their presence had an impact on the process and the outcome of the negotiations. Sometimes even confusion emerged about the role of the international community. Ould-Abdallah notes that it was impossible to prevent the conflict due to the multiplicity of the

¹¹⁴ Ndikumana, "Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi" 451-452.

¹¹⁵ In an attempt to calling to the regime's attention on the inequalities in the distribution of national resources along ethnic lines several intellectuals were tortured and imprisoned. Ndikumana, "Institutional Failure and Ethnic Conflicts in Burundi" 32.

¹¹⁶ Reyntjens, "The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating" 564-565.

¹¹⁷ Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda" 261-262.

¹¹⁸ Some of them include a team assembled by Jimmy Carter, two U.S. negotiators, an EU envoy and a Belgian. See Evans, "Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes" 37-38.

¹¹⁹ They were from Belgium, France, South Africa, Kenya, US, Saint'Egidio, EU, UN and the AU.

actors.¹²⁰ Divergent interests, different interpretations of the nature of the conflict resulted in the adoption of varied conflict resolution strategies. Khadiagala concludes that although the presence of the special envoys was questionable, they indeed reflected an emerging pattern of the relationship between the actors in the resolution of the conflict.¹²¹

While some observers sought to influence the negotiations to suit their interests, the special envoys wanted “to dominate and control the process” by hosting “parallel peace talks” elsewhere.¹²² UNESCO, for example, hosted a conference in Paris from 30 June to 2 July 1997 and 26 September 1997.¹²³ Some participants, including Buyoya, questioned the credibility of the Tanzanian facilitators and raised accusations that Nyerere was biased. To some members of the Burundian delegation and the international community Nyerere was pro-the Hutus. To a certain degree, the conference empowered Buyoya to refuse Nyerere’s facilitation.¹²⁴

Women were important actors too. Besides the evidence that some actively participated in the conflicts¹²⁵ their experiences in conflict management were overlooked. Two major factors explain the reasons for the absence of women in the resolution of the conflict. Burundi’s peace talks (1996-2000) and the ceasefire negotiations were largely informed by “Eurocentric and masculinised” perceptions of national security. The process was influenced by

¹²⁰ Ould-Abdallah, *Burundi on the Brink 1993-95*, 131.

¹²¹ Khadiagala, ed., “Toward Peace, Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region” 9.

¹²² Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 208.

¹²³ Ahmadou Toumani Toure – then Malian president was among the Chairpersons. Several international observers, Buyoya, CNDD and Burundian political parties were invited.

¹²⁴ Evans, “Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes” 37-38. See also Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 208.

¹²⁵ Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 192.

patriarchy, which turned the negotiations into “a man’s domain.”¹²⁶ Most of the third-party interventions, including mediators, facilitators and arbitrators, have been men, hence unconsciously reinforced male hegemony. The other factor could be that in the Burundian society, like in most African societies, women’s needs are mostly perceived to be in the private sphere. As a result, the position and role of women and that of men in conflict resolution were not seen as impacting on each other.¹²⁷

In 1998 a delegation of women from Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania visited President Buyoya, President Museveni and later Nyerere enquiring about the exclusion of women and their representatives from the talks. Subsequently, it was agreed that the Burundian government and Frodebu appoint three women each to participate in the negotiations and the number was later expanded to twelve. Women representatives were allowed to attend as observers at Arusha III [12-22 October and 12-19 December 1998]. Even though the inclusion of women was a success, their views nevertheless were not different from those of the other delegates. Furthermore, some women representatives were wives of the colonels.¹²⁸ This situation raises questions on the modalities used to appoint the representatives to the negotiations.

Strategies adopted by Tanzania to resolve the conflicts

Tanzania had been hosting Burundian refugees since the late 1960s. Some exiles were escaping discrimination while others were victims of droughts.¹²⁹ Providing asylum to the refugees caused conflicts between the two

¹²⁶ Ibrahim Shao, “Gender and Civil Society Dimensions in the Burundi Peace Negotiations” in *Beyond Conflict in Burundi*, 280-281. See also Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 188.

¹²⁷ Reinmann, “Engendering the Field of Conflict Management” 103-104.

¹²⁸ Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 206-207. See also Shamil Idriss, “Who can Prevent Genocide? Ask the Women of Burundi” *Agenda* Number 43 Women and the Aftermath (2000) 57-58.

¹²⁹ Meyers, “Intraregional Conflict Management by the Organisation of African Unity,” 358-359.

governments. Burundi feared that Hutu refugees in Tanzania could form an opposition against the government. In 1972, during Micombero's leadership, Tanzania received a large number of Burundian refugees. Consequently, in March 1973 Burundian soldiers invaded Tanzania's border village, claiming that the refugees were organising hostilities against the Burundian government. Seventy four people lost lives, 33 among them Tanzanians. The government in turn imposed sanctions by stopping to buy Burundian goods. Confirming the absence of the conflict between the two countries, Nyerere warned Micombero during "good-neighbourly" talks that he should stop killing his own people. The conflict was resolved through negotiations and the Burundian government paid Tshs 3.4 million. The border agreement was signed in 1984.¹³⁰

To control rebel activities and minimise accusations, Tanzania opted to resettle refugees away from the border as well as holding regular meetings between border officials to discuss common security problems. In August 1974, Tanzania and Burundi signed an Anti-smuggling Agreement whereby the people living along the border were allowed to cross the borders without passports.¹³¹ Tanzania continuously warned the refugees about the effects of subversive activities on the country's relations with Burundi.

The Tanzanian government further supported Nyerere during the facilitation of the Arusha peace negotiations.¹³² From the beginning, Nyerere declared that he would work as a "freelance facilitator." It implied that his facilitation would not have to be controlled by one state or state organisations and that he would not be the official representative of any state or

¹³⁰ *Daily News*, 23 July 1973, 2; Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 155; Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 67; Kalley, Schoeman and Andor, *Southern African Political History*, 573-630. See also *Sunday Observer*, "Lift Burundi' meeting set for next week" 26 February 2006, 1; Translated from Taasisi ya Mwalimu Nyerere, *Kazi za Taasisi ya Mwalimu Nyerere* 24.

¹³¹ Weinstein, "Burundi: Alternatives to Violence" 18.

¹³² Maundi, "Conceptualising Conflict Resolution" 2. See also Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 12.

organisation. He wanted to be able to act with total independence. After the region, the UN and donors' approval, he delegated administrative, financial, legal and other technical issues to specialised institutions and experts. Tanzania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the MNF played this role.¹³³ Nyerere's uncompromising stand turned him an enemy to the West.

Tanzania's interactions with the other actors in Burundi's conflict resolution were at the summit and during the peace talks. The summit comprising of the Heads of State and Government provided the "political leadership" to the mediation. In other words, the summit intervened when the negotiations reached a stalemate.¹³⁴ For example, in 1997, Nyerere expressed his intention to withdraw from facilitation when the parties continuously questioned his partiality as the mediator. The regional summit adopted a declaration reinstating Nyerere's key role in Burundi's conflict resolution. Nyerere's legitimacy was thus renewed even though the FDD and the FNL exclusion were yet to be resolved.¹³⁵

After the 25 July 1996 coup¹³⁶ Tanzania examined different strategies to resolve the conflict. At first, the government asked Buyoya to return to constitutionally elected government but he refused. In response, Tanzania initiated a discussion about the military option. Dar es Salaam volunteered military assistance to the Burundian army to oust coup leaders and re-activate the negotiations. The Tutsis considered the proposal a Tanzanian agenda and consequently raised doubts about the country's impartiality. The support was

¹³³ See Bomani, "Foreword" *Beyond Conflict in Burundi* vii-viii.

¹³⁴ The MNF was created with three-related objectives of promoting Africa's unity, peace and development. See Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 78-79; translated from Taasisi ya Mwalimu Nyerere, *Kazi za Taasisi ya Mwalimu Nyerere* 6.

¹³⁵ Ramadhani, "The Utility of Mediators in Conflict Resolution in Africa" 55-56.

¹³⁶ It should be noted, however, that discussions about military plan were initially held in Arusha during May and June 1996. Officers from Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda participated.

seen as a direct threat to Tutsis' security,¹³⁷ hence the Burundian armed forces refused to cooperate with the committee.¹³⁸ The rationale for the refusal was that if the army and Buyoya removed the coup leaders, then the Tutsi influence would be dismantled.

Historical relations could be used to explain the manner that Tanzania has been involved in Burundi. Tanzania is more familiar with Burundi's conflicts than arguably other African countries. Having close relations which were established in the past by Prince Louis Rwagasore, a Pan-Africanist, Nyerere was concerned about the plight of Hutu refugees. Besides opposing unconstitutional changes of governments, Tanzania was against Buyoya's coup. Nyerere said herein that "... Africa is no longer willing to accept military regimes..." As a result, any initiative by Tanzania to assist Burundi to go back to a constitutional rule was interpreted by Buyoya and other actors as backing the rebels. Indeed, Nyerere and the Tanzanian government were interested in resolving the conflict and facilitating refugees' repatriation.¹³⁹

Tanzania's perception of the discrimination and victimisation of Burundi's Hutus was not different from its perception of the other movements that it had supported and fought for. Tanzania better understood the Burundi conflict because it had been involved in its resolution for almost five decades. The Buyoya coup was seen as a strategy to strengthen the Tutsi regime that Nyerere wanted to reform.¹⁴⁰ Indeed, the moral grounds and the promotion for the right of all the groups to be recognised and to participate in the economic

¹³⁷ Evans, "Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes" 36, 60.

¹³⁸ The committee was headed by Tanzania and comprised of officers from Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda. The objective was to evaluate the modalities for providing regional military assistance.

¹³⁹ Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 200-201.

¹⁴⁰ Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 86. See also Prunier, *From Genocide to Continental War* 65.

and political affairs informed Tanzania's involvement in Burundi's conflict resolution.

Although Mandela's facilitation was considered a success, it was Nyerere who laid the ground for a successful conflict resolution. Nyerere largely managed to restore hope and trust among the Burundians by bringing the conflicting parties to the negotiation table. Mandela confirmed, "Without his [Nyerere's] hard work, I doubt that we would have been able to make the progress we did."¹⁴¹ Moreover, Nyerere mainly succeeded in reducing the uncertainties that prevented the parties from resolving the conflict. He visited the refugee camps to hear their views on the peace talks as well as to remind them of the necessity of overcoming the factors that cause conflicts.¹⁴² International and domestic pressure, including Burundi's deteriorating economy, also compelled Buyoya's regime to negotiate with the opposition.¹⁴³

Tanzania seemed to have advocated the imposition of the sanctions in part due to the past success in South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s. According to Nyerere, "... economic sanctions succeeded even in South Africa, where the country is stronger than Burundi. The effects of the embargo are not that immediate as those of the bullets, but they [the sanctions] usually succeed..."¹⁴⁴ It should be noted, however, that 1996 was the third time when Tanzania imposed an embargo against Burundi. Unilateral sanctions were for the first time imposed in 1973. The second was the arms embargo on Burundi after Ndadaye's assassination in 1993.

¹⁴¹ Nelson Mandela, "Foreword" in *African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi* Kristina A. Bentley & Roger Southall (Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council, 2005), ix.

¹⁴² Ramadhani, "The Utility of Mediators" 73-74; translated from Nyerere's speech during a visit to refugees communities in Ngara (1998), aired by TBC television 13 October 2011, 16:00-16:30 hours.

¹⁴³ Ndikumana, "Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi" 435.

¹⁴⁴ Translated from T.L. Maliyamkono, *Changamoto Tanzania*, 183-184. See also Reporter "Nyerere Wants Political Solution to Burundi" *The Guardian* 26 September 1996.

Even if the effectiveness of Burundi's sanctions was questioned, they marked an important step in the resolution of the conflicts. Being less costly than military force especially when applied systematically, sanctions can resolve an intra-state conflict.¹⁴⁵ Indeed, without the embargo Buyoya could not have accepted mediation, re-opened the National Assembly and re-admitted the opposition parties.¹⁴⁶ At the international level, the sanctions had a symbolic importance. The move demonstrated that African countries could take initiatives to resolve conflicts without being backed by the West.¹⁴⁷ This differs from de Waals' argument that African countries could hardly impose sanctions on their neighbours. His claim, based on the wealth of the sanctions imposing countries, overlooked the fact that for a landlocked country like Burundi sanctions could effectively work, if systematically applied.¹⁴⁸

To advance the foreign policy objective of promoting peace and security in the region, Tanzania contested and won the Security Council seat in 2004.¹⁴⁹ In January 2006, the country demonstrated its commitment to conflict resolution by sponsoring the adoption of Resolution 1653 on the GLR. As a result, Tanzania broke a myth by preparing and tabling resolution 1653 (2006) on the situation in the Great Lakes Region. The resolution called on the UN to

¹⁴⁵ Elizabeth S. Rogers, "Economic Sanctions in Internal Conflict" in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown Centre for Studies in International Security, (London: The MIT Press, 1996), 412-413. For a discussion on Burundi's sanctions see Khadiagala, *Meddlers or Mediators?* 124-128, 131-135.

¹⁴⁶ Lemarchand, "Burundi at a Crossroads" 52.

¹⁴⁷ Ndikumana, "Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi" 446-447.

¹⁴⁸ Burundi depends on Dar es Salaam port. Before the imposition of sanctions in 1995 there were 133,970 tons, which dropped to 32,312 tons (1997) and 31,013 tons (1998). After the sanctions were lifted, imports rose from 78,197 tons (in 2000) to 100,998 tons (2001). Alex de Waal, *Who Fights Who Cares? War and Humanitarian Action in Africa* (Eritrea: Africa World Press Inc. 2000), 48; Rogers, "Economic Sanctions and Internal Conflict" 143. See also Ameer, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 75.

¹⁴⁹ Tanzania served as the UN Security Council non-permanent member from January 2005 to December 2006. The country received 187 out of 191 votes and was ahead of Japan and Denmark as well as other African countries such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and Sudan.

resolve the GLR conflicts so that the countries could engage in development activities. It was indeed a remarkable contribution given that the crafting of a resolution had been the sphere of the P5 and was largely determined by their strategic interests.¹⁵⁰

As a UN Security Council member, Tanzania was also involved in Burundi's post-conflict reconstruction in two ways. First, its diplomats managed to convince the UN to consider sending peacekeeping forces and an expert to monitor the implementation of the Arusha Accord. The motive behind this was that by January 2005 – when Tanzania joined the Security Council – the implementation of the Accord had been stalled and the parties were unwilling to stop the hostilities, hence elections could not be held.¹⁵¹ Second, Tanzania, supported by Denmark, advocated for and participated in the formation of the Peace Building Commission, thus becoming one of the 31 founding members. The aim of the commission was to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement, and therefore prevent the countries from relapsing into a conflict. The resolution to establish the commission was concurrently adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly.¹⁵²

Critics have raised concerns about the effectiveness of the UN Peace Building Commission. Their argument is that the commission's structure promotes liberal peace. In other words, it concentrates on holding democratic

¹⁵⁰ Ambassadorial Lecture, "Tanzania's membership in the UN Security Council" Ambassador Dr. Augustine Mahiga, 17 August 2006. See also *Daily News*, "Tanzania's reputation at the UN impressive" 18 January 2007, 13; Translated from Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, Hotuba ya Waziri wa Mambo ya Nje na Ushirikiano wa Kimataifa Mheshimiwa Dokta Asha Rose-Migiro akiwasilisha Bungeni makadirio ya mapato na matumizi ya Wizara kwa mwaka wa fedha 2006/2007, (Dar es Salaam: Mpigachapa Mkuu wa Serikali, Julai 2006), 14. See also Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, Presidential Speech during the inauguration of the 4th phase Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania, 30 December 2005, 50-51

¹⁵¹ *Daily News*, "Tanzania's reputation at the UN impressive" 18 January 2007, 13.

¹⁵² Ambassadorial Lecture, "Tanzania's membership in the UN Security Council" 17 August 2006. Also translated from Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, Hotuba ya Waziri wa Mambo ya Nje na Ushirikiano wa Kimataifa, Bernard Kamillius Membe akiwasilisha Bungeni makadirio ya Matumizi ya Fedha 2007/2008, (Dar es Salaam: Mpigachapa Mkuu wa Serikali, Agosti 2007), 9.

elections and on promotion of market liberalisation, rather than on addressing the factors that cause and sustain conflicts. As will be discussed below, the commission has also been criticised for not being influential to the IFIs, which have sometimes been considered to be undermining peacebuilding initiatives. Finally, right from its creation in 2005, the founding mandate has been limiting the commission's responsibilities. Working towards preventing conflicts from recurring, it does not prevent the conflicts that arise in the first place.¹⁵³

As part of the post conflict nation building, Tanzania and Burundi signed a cooperation agreement on 28 October 2008. The countries are to jointly work in military training and exchange of military-related activities; this would further enable Tanzania assist Burundi in establishing the national service. The two countries are to exchange military officers and information, and host sports. According to German Niyoyankana, Burundi's then Minister of Defence "...the partnership will help sharpen the skills of Burundi soldiers, majority of who were guerrillas and lacked formal training."¹⁵⁴ If used constructively the national service would promote national unity and solidarity in a seemingly highly divided society.

Tanzania largely succeeded in resolving Burundi's conflict even though the facilitation of the negotiations process had been complex and unpredictable. As earlier noted, the peace talks comprised of a large number of actors with diverse interests and constituencies. In addition to consulting the conflicting parties, the facilitators chaired all plenary sessions.¹⁵⁵ In turn, the mediators devised a formula suitable for all. Furthermore, the agreements took years to be debated before being signed; it was not guaranteed that the dialogue would bear positive results. In the end, the signing of the agreement was only a step,

¹⁵³ For a discussion on this see Centre for Conflict Resolution, "Africa, South Africa and the United Nation's Security Architecture" Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report, Cape Town: June 2013, 4.

¹⁵⁴ *Daily News*, "Dar, Burundi sign defence pact" 29 October 2008, 2.

¹⁵⁵ Ramadhani, "The Utility of Mediators" 73-74.

as there needed to be the mobilisation of resources and the willingness to implement the agreement.¹⁵⁶

Tanzania's domestic environment, foreign policy and its involvement in Burundi

Tanzania's relations with Burundi date to the pre-independence period. The TANU and Uprona exchange of contacts laid the basis for the post-independence ties. On his way back from Ghana's independence in 1957 Nyerere, who was then PAFMECSA's chair, met in Bujumbura the nationalist leader, Prince Louis Rwagasore. They discussed liberation struggles and the subsequent establishment of an East African Federation. Nyerere supported the creation of Uprona and as Burundi's independence was near Nyerere, through TANU, provided financial and other support to Rwagasore and Uprona. The party's structure resembled that of TANU. Some of TANU members possessed Uprona's membership cards and *vice versa*. Rwagasore's association with Nyerere, however, drew the West's attention, particularly the Belgians who objected to the idea of Burundi federating with Tanzania. The initiative could have in part resolved Burundi's conflict due to the reason that the country would judge its conduct in comparison to a bigger region.¹⁵⁷

Until 2000, Tanzanian foreign policy was guided by traditional principles.¹⁵⁸ Mkapa – the then President of Tanzania – reiterated that the same principles would guide the foreign relations. Domestic environment priorities would be on building a "modern" and "sustainable" economy that was to be

¹⁵⁶ *The East African*, 21-27 May 2007, 16.

¹⁵⁷ The Belgian's attitudes on Nyerere's nationalist struggles date back to 1955 when he visited the UN and subsequently the Belgian Ambassador to the UN questioned Nyerere on liberation movements. This largely convinced Nyerere to go to Bujumbura. Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 62-63, 65; also translated from Taasisi ya Mwalimu Nyerere, *Kazi za Taasisi ya Mwalimu Nyerere* 8. See also <http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/cafrica/reports/bu05> [Accessed on 09 February 1999].

¹⁵⁸ The policy was subsequently reviewed and by 2001 and the focus shifted to the promotion of economic diplomacy.

reflected in the country's diplomacy "...we will ensure that our diplomacy promotes tourism and Tanzania as an investment destination." The shift of focus from political to economic diplomacy implied that Tanzania's involvement in the resolution of the conflict in the neighbouring countries was informed by the need to create a favourable environment for trade and investment.¹⁵⁹ In reality, it has largely been a continuation of the country's traditional practice of resolving conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, using different strategies.

As the first multiparty elections of 1995 approached, Tanzanians' perception of the government's role in conflict resolution and on the refugees was gradually changing. Mwinyi's government was accused of prioritising refugees' affairs to the extent of not attending to domestic needs. Traditionally refugees arrived from the colonised territories or discriminative regimes such as South Africa. Since the early 1990s, the public considered the justification to host refugees was not watertight. This was despite the fact that the government was concerned about the predicament of Burundi's Hutu refugees. In this regard, the refugees were perceived as "political", not "humanitarian."¹⁶⁰ The concern featured in parliamentary debates when reference was made to the problems that the refugees caused in the host communities.¹⁶¹

Opportunities and the challenges facing Tanzania's diplomatic role

Tanzania's influence, and specifically Nyerere's, on Burundi's conflict resolution was evident. After the experience of the first disagreement, power sharing was considered a solution during the subsequent talks. Nonetheless, the challenge to the Tanzanian facilitators was how to craft in the agreement a stable coalition government in the growing political divisions, increasing rural

¹⁵⁹ Benjamin William Mkaapa, *Presidential Address on Inaugurating the New Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania*, (Dodoma: Government Printer 20 November 2000), 58-59, 61.

¹⁶⁰ Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 72.

¹⁶¹ Translated from Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, Majadiliano ya Bunge, Taarifa Rasmi, Mkutano wa 21 (Sehemu ya 5) 12-18 Julai 1995, Makadirio ya Matumizi ya Serikali 1995/96, Wizara ya Mambo ya Nje na Ushirikiano wa Kimataifa (Majadiliano yanaendelea) 2728-2729.

poverty, land shortages, hunger, violence and persistent disagreements about the legitimacy of Arusha.¹⁶²

Not all the parties to the conflict accepted Nyerere's mediation. Buyoya's government and Uprona boycotted the negotiations on the grounds that they were not consulted during the initial plans for the meeting. Uprona did not believe that Tanzania or Nyerere was neutral. Burundi's Tutsi army regarded Nyerere as partial and self-interested¹⁶³ and as the one who had drawn up the sanctions. Buyoya saw the embargo as Tanzania's strategy to dismantle his regime.¹⁶⁴

Buyoya and the Tutsi government devised a strategy to hold back the mediation after realising that it does not favour them. They accused Tanzania for being biased. In part, Buyoya thought that winning Nyerere's support would guarantee his Presidency. Banking on Nyerere's support, Buyoya endorsed Nyerere's appointment to mediation when he made his speech in New York. Realising later that Nyerere would not accord him any special treatment, Buyoya accused Nyerere of being biased. Indeed, prolonging the conflict was Buyoya's technique for making the regional leaders relax the sanctions.¹⁶⁵

There were also increased suspicions that Tanzania collaborated with South Africa to support the Hutus after it was learnt that a South African company was transporting ammunition to Burundi via Tanzania. Spoornet, a South African government-owned railway company, was involved in the transportation of the arms to the Hutu guerrillas. CNDD leaders travelled to South Africa to negotiate arm deals with private companies, particularly the Executive Outcomes. In one instance, South African arms were found hidden in Spoornet railcars which were transporting humanitarian consignment for the

¹⁶² Lemarchand, "Burundi at a Crossroads" 43.

¹⁶³ Evans, "Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes" 36.

¹⁶⁴ Ramadhani, "The Utility of Mediators" 54.

¹⁶⁵ Ameir, "Tanzania's Role in Burundi's Peace Process" 85.

World Food Programme. As a result, Nyerere's neutrality in the resolution of the conflict was further questioned.¹⁶⁶

During the Arusha talks PALIPEHUTU and the CNDD were engaging in a serious intra-party conflict that threatened paralysing the talks. The FDD – a CNDD breakaway – emerged, demanding representation in the talks. Nyerere perceived it as a threat to the facilitation and subsequently refused its admission to the talks. In turn, the FDD accused Nyerere of having a "hidden agenda" in collaboration with Museveni, that is, they accused of intending to install in Bujumbura a regime that they could control. Adopting a hard approach to the breakaways, Nyerere alienated crucial actors in the resolution of the conflict.¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless, the rules of procedure were the other setback with respect to the issue of representation.

Tanzania faced the challenge of illegal migrants and smugglers. There was evidence that approximately 30,000 Burundian citizens illegally lived in Tanzania during the 1980s. The government, therefore, repatriated about 2,800 Burundians. Even if President Bagaza sent a special message to Tanzania, following Tanzania's decision to repatriate the refugees, Mwinyi stressed that the country would not tolerate migrants who did not observe immigration regulations.¹⁶⁸ Some of the illegal immigrants not only committed crimes but also engaged in the SALW circulation.

Later, during the 1990s, Burundian officials said that Tanzania was providing camps to the Hutu guerrillas for organising raids inside Burundi. The Burundian government further accused Tanzania of hosting and training armed opposition groups in its territory. In response, Benjamin Mkapa, then the President of Tanzania, threatened to invade Burundi to remove its

¹⁶⁶ Madsen, *Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa* 228-229, 233.

¹⁶⁷ Ramadhani, "The Utility of Mediators" 55.

¹⁶⁸ *Daily News*, "Mwinyi warns in illegal immigrants" 4 May 1987, 1.

“undemocratic regime”, which caused the influx of refugees into the country.¹⁶⁹ After investigations on the allegations had been carried out, 15 people were tried under Tanzanian laws because of engaging in subversive activities. In October 1998, 11 of the 15 people were convicted of carrying out unlawful training and were imprisoned for 4 years.¹⁷⁰

To resolve the refugee problem, in 2010 the Tanzanian government naturalised 162,000 Burundian refugees who had entered the country in 1972. Most of them were Hutus who had run away from the war that was waged by the Tutsi-dominated armed forces. The UN commended Tanzania for the decision. Melissa Fleming, a UN refugees’ agency spokesperson said, “...the most generous naturalisation of refugees anywhere...” and Antonio Guterres, a UNHCR head, said that it was a historic moment and requested other countries with long-term refugee flows to follow Tanzania’s example.¹⁷¹

Tanzania’s uncompromised stance on the resolution of the conflict caused a misunderstanding between it and the West. Spearheading the imposition of the economic embargo on Burundi and the refusal to entertain interference in the resolution of the conflict brought Tanzania into conflict with the West. Nyerere once said, “We have to balance the significance of their financial contribution, the power of the governments... they represent and the amount of damage the pursuit of their own parochial interests can cause to the [negotiations] process...” In turn, the EU called for an audit of the peace talks funds and sought to provide the facilitator [Nyerere] with fewer resources. In addition, several Western countries decided to increase the amount of humanitarian aid to Burundi. Nevertheless, the regional governments and the

¹⁶⁹ Madsen, *Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993-1999* 234.

¹⁷⁰ Gerhard Weiher, *Der Friedensprozess in Burundi, Stiftung Wissenschaft UND Politik (SWP) Forschungsinstitut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Februar 1999.*

¹⁷¹ Until 2000 Tanzania had one of Africa’s largest refugee populations, 680,000 from Burundi and the DRC. BBC News, “Tanzania gives citizenship to 162,000 Burundian refugees” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8625429.stm> [Accessed on 17 April 2010].

OAU filled the financial deficit.¹⁷² Mandela's appointment to mediate the conflict re-introduced the donor's support for the Burundi talks.

Conclusion

Tanzania was involved in Burundi's conflict resolution in different instances and used varied strategies. The mid-1950s was the beginning of Tanzania's involvement in Burundi when Nyerere supported Rwagasore in the nationalist struggles to change the country's social, political and economic structures. Unlike Rwanda's conflict, Burundi's conflict was mainly between the minority Tutsis and the majority Hutus. The former strived to maintain their position by controlling the major institutions in the government and the armed forces. Leadership change transformed the nature of the conflict from inter-ethnic to intra-ethnic.

Being part of the GLR, Burundi is an influential security region with a high degree of security interdependence with the neighbouring sub-regions in Eastern and Southern Africa and in the international system. The country presents another case of a shift of conflict resolution strategies from Southern Africa to the GLR. The following theoretical and practical conclusions can be drawn:

The RSCT explains the influence of the international system on the Tanzanian foreign policy and Tanzania's participation in Burundi's conflict resolution. On the one hand, the international community's uninterested response to the country's problems in the 1990s compelled Tanzania and the region to find alternative solutions. Again, the Somalia experience and the United States' interests to other parts of the world partly explain the reasons for the international community's inaction. The 1993 Ndadaye's assassination and the 1994 Rwanda's genocide, however, made international actors participate in Burundi's affairs. Tanzania was compelled to resolve the regional crisis following

¹⁷² Daley, *African Issues, Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 199.

the outbreak of the Burundian refugees and the security threats in the GLR posed by the coup and the subsequent crises.

The role of the international community can also be explained in terms of the UN's involvement in the resolution of a conflict. While conflicts had been occurring in Burundi since the 1960s, it was not until the 1990s that the degree of the UN's involvement grew. Beginning 1990s the Secretary General worked with Tanzania and the OAU to find a solution to Burundi's conflict. Even though the deteriorating security in Burundi started to be reported in 1996, the Security Council could not take preventive measures. The West was unwilling to contribute troops for Burundi when the Security Council discussed the humanitarian situation in Burundi. The U.S. and France largely responded to the crisis in their own interests. France, for example, persuaded the other Security Council members to authorise a preventive force, which was deployed to Bujumbura. The U.S. responded to its public pressure by proposing the creation of a regional peacekeeping force.

More influential to Burundi's conflict resolution was the 1996 economic sanctions imposed by the regional leaders led by Tanzania. While Tanzania was leading the region in finding a solution to Burundi's conflict, Major Buyoya overthrew the democratically elected President. The region adopted the sanctions regime to demonstrate its intolerance to unconstitutional changes of government, to ensure that the negotiations got back on track and to prevent coups in the future. Tanzania's confidence on the impact of the sanctions was derived from the success realised by South Africa and Burundi in the 1970s.

Being part of the GLR, Burundi is an influential security region with a high degree of interdependence with the neighbouring regions and sub-regions. While Rwanda, Uganda and the former Zaire were identified as the regional influential actors in Burundi's conflict resolution, the security concerns in the GLR were connected to the post-apartheid South Africa. Mandela's appointment and later Jacob Zuma's, to some extent, extended South Africa's diplomatic and economic influence onto the GLR. South Africa's influence on the formation and

operation of AMIB demonstrates the region's importance to South Africa in terms of market and natural resources.

The relationship between the regional security structures and the multilateral organisations in resolving intra-state conflicts manifested itself in Burundi's situation. The UN could only authorise a peacekeeping mission when there was a comprehensive ceasefire agreement. AMIB, which later became ONUB, was created to oversee the implementation of the November 2003 ceasefire agreements. It was the AU's and the UN's first collaborative undertaking. AMIB comprised military forces, observers and civilians operating alongside some of the UN's agencies, NGOs and donors. It was transformed into ONUB due to economic and resource reasons.

Tanzania's support for Burundi's conflict resolution could be explained by the fact that the regional insecurity largely influenced Tanzania's domestic environment. The Burundi problem coincided with the change in the general public perception on the country's involvement in the resolution of the conflict. The parliament gradually began to play a role in Tanzania's foreign affairs. Concerned about the country's internal problems and the insecurity caused by the refugees, some parliamentarians questioned the government's continued practice of hosting refugees. The government on its part was concerned about the plight of Burundi's Hutu refugees and the problem that they posed to the security of the region.

Tanzania remained an influential actor, although multiple actors participated in Burundi's conflict resolution. The historical relations that existed between Nyerere and Rwagasore largely explain Tanzania's involvement in the process of seeking a resolution to the conflict. The country paved the way for the signing of the 2000 Arusha Agreement, which laid the ground for the country's long-term conflict resolution. The accord largely served as blueprint for the operations of both the transitional and the subsequent governments. Again, the signing of the cooperation agreement between Tanzania and Burundi further facilitated Tanzania's involvement in the post-conflict reconstruction

through the establishment of the national service and cooperation in the other sectors. Nonetheless, although the agreement principally resolved the conflict, some of the provisions are yet to be implemented by the government in power.

Tanzania's involvement in Burundi did not rule out the participation of the other actors. The multiplication of international actors and the rebel groups with different stakes in the process always made it difficult for a solution to the conflict to be attained. The exclusion and/or inclusion of the rebel groups also caused the conflict. As much as they struggled to be part of the process, they similarly wanted to uphold rather than harmonise their interests. In the end, different perceptions on the signing and the subsequent implementation of the ceasefire agreement developed.

Chapter 6

Emerging issues: Foreign policy and the current conflicts

Introduction

The end of the decolonisation movements and the Cold War has had both positive and negative effects on sub-Saharan Africa. One positive effect is that the East-West confrontation no longer characterises the international system. After the disintegration of the USSR, the chances of inter-state conflicts have largely been reduced. One negative effect is that a number of countries in the sub-region fell into civil wars.¹ Political and socio-economic reasons caused conflicts in some of the sub-Sahara African countries. Moreover, unconstitutional changes of government as well as the mismanagement of the political pluralism caused conflicts. In other countries, competition for resources caused by high population growth rates resulted in a high demand for resources such as land for grazing and cultivation, and water.²

This chapter is about the issues that are emerging after the Cold War has ended in terms of Tanzania's foreign policy and its participation in conflict resolution. The main argument is that Tanzania's regional role in conflict resolution has broadly remained the same while concentration seems to be shifting from mediation and support for peacetalks to the deployment of the peacekeeping forces. The changing nature of the reality on the ground has influenced the UN's, the region's and Tanzania's involvement in the GLR conflicts. Among others, the chapter revisits Tanzania's role in East Africa and the GLR after the conclusion of the Rwandan and Burundian conflicts.

The chapter is divided into eight sections. The first reviews the debates about the nature of the international system after the Cold War. The second

¹ Jonathan M.K. Lwehabura, "Security Situation in the Great Lakes Region: An Overview" presentation at the East African ASSN Meeting, Kampala, 28-29 June 2006, 21.

² Porto, "The mainstreaming of conflict analysis in Africa" 57. See also Khadiagala, "Building Society for Peoples, Societies and States" 189.

section provides an overview of Africa's foreign policy, security and conflict resolution. In the third section, relations between the international system, the regional and sub-regional actors are analysed, whereas the discussion about the Tanzanian foreign policy and the country's participation in conflict resolution is presented in the fourth section. The fifth section describes Tanzania's experience in peacekeeping. Section six focuses on Tanzania's domestic conditions and the regional diplomacy; followed by section seven that focuses on the discussion of opportunities and challenges. The eighth section gives the conclusion.

Post-Cold War debates

Post-Cold War debates have largely focused on globalisation, actors' interdependence and the role of the state. Some scholars argue that the increasing pace of globalisation and interdependence diminishes the role of the state as a primary actor in conflict resolution. It implies that as the interaction among the actors grows the role of the state has become lesser important. Other scholars argue that globalisation and interdependence have made the role of the state stronger than it was in the past. For the latter group, globalisation and interdependence have not dissolved the significance of statecraft; rather they have made it more complex. As a result, the citizens turn to the state as an important actor that could help them cope with the challenges of globalisation. Clark notes that to explain globalisation as an outcome of the end of the Cold War is to disregard the degree to which globalisation contributed to its end.³

Post-Cold War security discourses have increasingly centred on the relationship between security and development. Security is broadly perceived by the West as *a sine qua non* for development and *vice versa*. Since security

³ Ian Clark, "Globalisation and the post-cold war order" in *The Globalisation of World Politics: An introduction to international relations*, 3rd edition, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2005), 735-736. See also Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne, "Introduction" 2-3.

concerns have largely formed part of donor agendas, they have been integrated into development discourses. Underdevelopment is interpreted as a threat to both human and state security. Generally, it has been said that societies cannot develop without security and reforming the security sector is a necessary component of development initiatives.⁴

Other debates have focused on the relationship between security and democracy, that is, the relationship between democracy and peace. In this perspective, democracy is correlated with peace. The argument is that democracies hardly ever go to war with each other and are less likely to experience domestic conflicts. Nonetheless, in the African context, democracy has been differentiated from democratisation. Experience shows that if not managed properly democratisation may sometimes result in internal conflicts. The social aspect of democracy that could partly explain this is that without fairness in the distribution of socio-economic opportunities, democratisation will be unsustainable.⁵

Mpangala argues that democratisation defined from the Western liberalism perspective lacks the basic characteristics of being a process linked to conflict resolution.⁶ Despite post-Cold War expectations that democratisation could bring in a new wind of change, the process has in fact given rise to new forms of conflicts in Africa. The major expectation was that liberal democracy in

⁴ The reform includes improvement of governance, reallocation of the resources; formulation of a sound development framework and professionalisation of the security sector. See Gavin Cawthra, "Key Challenges for Southern African Development Community Security Cooperation" in *Proceedings of the 2006 FOPRISA Annual Conference*, Report 3, ed. Jonathan Muyuyuka Kaunda (Gaborone: Lightbooks, 2007), 88. For a discussion on the interface between security and development see Lars Buur, Steffen Jensen and Finn Stepputat, "The Security-Development Nexus" in *The Security-Development Nexus: Expressions of Sovereignty and Securitization in Southern Africa* Lars Buur, Steffen Jensen and Finn Stepputat, eds. (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2007), 9-33.

⁵ Cawthra, "Key Challenges" 89.

⁶ The characteristics entail a transformed multiparty system, people-centred democratic societies, society-centred state and democracy based on traditional African conflict resolution mechanisms.

Africa would eliminate authoritarian and dictatorial regimes, and therefore resolve the existing conflicts. The result was that multiparty democracy in several countries ended in violent conflicts,⁷ which, in turn, led to the creation of coalition governments or governments of national unity.

An intra-paradigm (the neo-neo) debate has emerged to explain foreign policy, the international system and [security] cooperation. The neo-neo debate is not between two opposing worldviews; rather it is an attempt by the neo-liberalists and neo-realists to offer an alternative description of the international system after the Cold War. As they do not advocate radical change, both discuss similar issues and agree on several assumptions such as the structure of the international system and its actors.⁸

Neo-realists, concerned about state's survival, focus on high politics issues such as military security and war. Basing on Waltz's theory of international politics, Neo-realists stress the importance of the international system as the primary factor in shaping state's behaviour. According to Waltz, the structure of the international system shapes most states' foreign policy choices.⁹ This means that foreign policies of most states are influenced by the events at the global level. In other words, most of foreign policy decisions are a reaction to the international system.

Neo-liberals or neo-liberal institutionalists concentrate on low politics, including the political economy, human rights and the environment. Neo-liberals acknowledge the importance of the other actors but they are concerned with cooperation in a competitive international system. Neo-liberal institutionalists

⁷ Mpangala and Mwansasu eds. *Beyond Conflict in Burundi* 21-22.

⁸ Steven L. Lamy, "Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism" in *The Globalisation of World Politics: An introduction to international relations* 3rd edition, John Baylis and Steve Smith eds., (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2005), 205, 207, 215. See also Nye, Jr. *Understanding International Politics*, 42-43; Kegley, Jr. and Wittkopf, *World Politics, Trend and Transformation*, 32-35.

⁹ Lamy, "Contemporary mainstream approaches" 205, 207, 208, 209.

identify institutions such as the UN, the AU, the EAC as means to achieve cooperation. States are seen as the key actors in international relations but not the only ones that are significant. Keohane, for example, suggests that the outcome of the 9/11 attacks was the mobilisation of a coalition against terrorism involving a large number of global and individual actors.¹⁰

Foreign policies, security and conflict resolution: An overview

African countries' foreign policies since the end of the Cold War can largely be categorised into two. First, there are those initiated by African countries individually or collectively mainly to address economic issues. These include issues such as the promotion of tourism, businesses, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa and scholarships. In this context, diplomacy as a practice has been shifting from the "old real politic" world to economic diplomacy.¹¹ Second, there are other foreign policies formulated by African countries as a response to U.S policies towards Africa. The policies prioritise the fight against terrorism, support the U.S's resources and military interests, and promote and protect human rights, good governance and democratisation.¹²

The content of the African countries' foreign policies seem to have shifted away from the traditional diplomacy and security to negotiations over economic reforms, debt relief and cancellation. In other words, Africa has become a "decision-taker" rather than a "decision-maker" in foreign policies. In practice, the foreign policy affairs seem to be shifting from the State Houses and ministries of foreign affairs to central banks, trade and finance ministries. Such changes intensified as the reforms in these countries had to go hand in

¹⁰ Lamy, "Contemporary mainstream approaches" 207, 208, 213.

¹¹ Nyang'oro, *A Political Biography of Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete* 115.

¹² Daniel Don Nanjira, *African Foreign Policy and Diplomacy: From Antiquity to the 21st Century*, Volume II, (California: Praeger, 2010), 441.

hand with political liberalisation. As a result, Africa's foreign and defence policy analysis has largely remained underdeveloped.¹³

Even though the IFIs' interventions seem to have created homogeneity in the economic policies, African countries' political economy largely differs from country to country. Most of the countries' foreign policies concentrate on the implementation of structural adjustment programmes and relations with the IFIs or development partners. Even though at the beginning African countries embarked on similar economic and political reforms, the countries have been increasingly becoming unequal. This could in part be explained in terms of unequal volume of trade, foreign assistance and investment between the developed countries and African countries.¹⁴

Somalia's experience resulted in the West involving itself directly in African conflict resolution. As the conflicts kept on affecting the continent, African states sought to develop a framework to permit interventions in specific circumstances. In other words, humanitarian reasons and the maintenance of international peace and security compelled the countries to consider such an intervention.¹⁵ As a result, developing an intervention framework made African countries be among the first countries to challenge the traditional perception on state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. During the 1994 Rwanda genocide, however, no state or actor argued that they couldn't intervene because they were observing the sovereignty principle.¹⁶

¹³ Timothy M. Shaw, "Africa in the Global Political Economy at the End of the Millennium: What Implications for Politics and Policies?" *Africa Today* 12 (4) The Politics of Economic Integration in Africa (4th Quarter, 1995): 17

¹⁴ Shaw, "Africa in the Global Political Economy" 17-18.

¹⁵ Bentley and Southall, *An African Peace Process* 7. See also Landsberg, "Willing but Unable" 48.

¹⁶ Bellamy, "Conclusion: Whither International Society?" 290.

The international system, regional and sub-regional actors' dynamics

The practice of imposing economic embargoes has increased after the Cold War. Since 1990, sanctions have been imposed eight times; six sanctions were imposed due to intra-state conflicts in Somalia and Liberia (1992), Angola (1993), Rwanda (1994) and Burundi (1996). This is different from the Cold War period when economic blockades spearheaded by Tanzania were imposed against the former Southern Rhodesia (1966) and South Africa (1977).¹⁷ Even though sanctions imposed by the developing countries against their fellow seem to be ineffective, in some cases they have played an important role in conflict resolution.

There has been a growing pattern of peacekeeping forces joint deployment between the UN and regional organisations like the AU. The practice has been considered a way of balancing between the West's reduced involvement and its direct participation in Africa's conflicts. In 2001, the UN and the OAU deployed peacekeepers to monitor the cease-fire between Ethiopia and Eritrea.¹⁸ The joint deployment could in part be interpreted as part of the U.S. policy option of empowering regional and sub-regional organisations in conflict resolution and the UN's attempt to rectify the image of responding to African conflicts. Nevertheless, the distribution of the responsibilities between the AU and the UN is yet to be established by the UN Security Council.¹⁹

China and the U.S. are increasingly competing to maintain their influence on Africa. Both have largely similar objectives for Africa but different priorities. The objectives include promotion of stability, support for development and

¹⁷ Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance, "Comparing Methodology" in *The Costs of Conflict: Toward a New Cure in the Global Arena* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1999), 15.

¹⁸ While the OAU sent a contingent of 11 soldiers, the UN deployed a mission of 4,200 soldiers. See International Peace Academy, "The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa" 26.

¹⁹ Centre for Conflict Resolution, "Africa, South Africa and the United Nations Security Architecture" 1.

reforms. Whereas China promotes stability as a prerequisite for development, the U.S. considers development as key to stability.²⁰ China and the U.S. compete to expand their influence on Africa as the two powers have turned to the continent for energy, raw materials and a market for their manufactured goods. So far, Chinese firms have invested about US\$ 200 million in the agricultural, construction, manufacturing, transport, service, tourist sectors, and the like.²¹

To promote trade and investment, China formulated a strategic partnership framework in 2006. Resources, oil, minerals and raw materials, were to be exchanged for low-cost consumer goods. China-Africa current relations seem to be informed by an interest in the economic affairs rather than political support²² as was the case during the liberation struggles. China has overtaken the US as Africa's largest trading partner. For instance, in 2010 China's trade with Africa was at US\$ 127 billion, making the country the top-trading partner followed by the U.S. Tanzania is at the moment China's third largest trading partner after Angola and South Africa.²³

Nonetheless, China's current role in Africa seems controversial. While Chinese companies have invested in Africa, their government sought to ignore the ethical principles that principally define the continent's relations with the West.²⁴ Critics question China's decision to fund the building of the AU's headquarters, saying that the country is "buying its way into the continent." The West considers China to be supporting oppressive regimes and maximising

²⁰ Barthélémy Courmont and Irving Lewis, "China-Africa: a strategy of fair exchange?" *défense nationale et sécurité collective*, current strategic thinking, January 2007:92.

²¹ *This Day*, "US monitors China's influence in Tanzania" 29 August-4 September 2011, 1-2.

²² Daniel Don Nanjira, *African Foreign Policy and Diplomacy: From Antiquity to the 21st Century*, Volume II, (California: Praeger, 2010), 385.

²³ See the *East African*, "US continues to worry about China in Africa" 9-15 April 2012, 2. See also *This Day*, "US monitors China's influence in Tanzania" 29 August-4 September 2011, 1.

²⁴ See also Courmont and Lewis, "China-Africa: a strategy of fair exchange?" 93.

the possibility of exploiting the continent's natural resources at the same time. Ideologically, China perceives the international system to be dominated by the U.S; that the Americans use the pretext of "care for another" to interfere in African internal affairs. Compared to the other countries, China could be said to be promoting human rights abuses and protecting undemocratic practices under the shield of observing state sovereignty and combating hegemony.²⁵

The U.S.-led campaign against terrorism intensified towards the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s. America's policy toward Africa is a "green menace," – green being the colour of Islam – may be replacing the "red peril" of the Cold War era.²⁶ After the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, the U.S. spearheaded the war on terror. The Clinton administration demolished what the U.S. described as "a chemical factory" in Sudan. America further bombed southern Somalia in January 2007 and March 2008, respectively. The actions were justified by the claims that the attacks were linked to *al-Qaeda* even though no evidence could be produced.²⁷

The U.S's war on terror poses new security challenges to Africa. Most African countries do not perceive terrorism as one of the major threats they are facing, although terrorist networks are rapidly expanding. Attacks have been carried out in West, North and East Africa. Moreover, to support the campaign against terrorism, African countries have been compelled to allocate their meagre resources to anti-terrorism initiatives. In reality, some of the anti-terror policies have provoked terrorism or insurgency and resistance to

²⁵ Ian Taylor, "China-Africa: Who's using whom?" *Jeune Afrique* The Africa Report, Africa Survey, Quarterly number 1, May 2005. See also the *East African*, "Peaceful, more secure Africa in China's interest: The Asian giant's non-interference policy should not be interpreted as indifference to the continent's peace" 30.

²⁶ Adebajo, "Africa, African Americans, and the Avuncular Sam" 100.

²⁷ Mwesiga Baregu, "The United States 'Global War on Terror,' Human Rights and the Responsibility to Protect in Africa" in *Africa's Human Rights Architecture*, John Akokpari and Daniel Shea Zimble (Cape Town: Fanele 2008), 266.

democratisation.²⁸ Concerns have also been raised that America's economic and political development assistance to Africa might be channeled to terrorism-related campaigns. The U.S. has thus been urged to address the root causes of terrorism – such as poverty, injustice and social inequalities – rather than launching military strikes against an “invisible enemy.”²⁹

The recent terrorist attacks in the East African region indicate a shift in the global anti-terror campaign and the impact of terrorism on Africa. Since the launch of the war on terror, terrorist acts have increased. According to the Global Terrorism Index, terrorist acts have increased from 982 in 2002 to 4,564 in 2012. In fact, even though the acts have increased, the death toll has declined. Moreover, terrorist acts have shifted from the Western capitals to African countries or elsewhere. One of the major reasons for this is that the West has made it difficult for the terrorists to penetrate by investing in strengthening intelligence, surveillance and border security.³⁰

The other trend that has emerged is the increase in the number of the terrorists. Two developments can be identified. First, terrorist organisations in East Africa such as *Al Shabab* are increasingly recruiting non-Somalis, especially unemployed youth, promising a better life and spreading religious extremism. The organisation is said to recruit Burundian, Rwandese, Ugandan and Tanzanian and Kenyan nationals. In Tanzania, for example, in October 2013 eleven people were found in a heavily guarded forest in Mtwara region, Southern Tanzania, receiving training from *Al Shabab*. They were also found in

²⁸ Cawthra, “Key Challenges” 91. See also Mikael Eriksson, Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg “Armed Conflict, 1989-2002” *Journal of Peace Research* 40 (5) (September 2003): 593.

²⁹ Adebajo, “Africa, African Americans, and the Avuncular Sam” 106.

³⁰ *The East African*, “Globally, anti-terrorism outlook likely to shift” 18; “ ‘War against terror’ was outsourced to the EAC” 8 both on September 28-4 October 2013.

possession of locally manufactured firearms and twenty-five digital video discs containing *Al Shabab* militants' training manuals.³¹

The second trend is that Western citizens increasingly join terrorist organisations for training. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), more U.S. citizens have moved to Somalia than to any other conflict-affected country. Some of these migrants are believed to be occupying terrorist organisations' top positions.³² The implication of both trends is the fact that it becomes difficult to profile terrorists as recruitment increasingly goes beyond the "traditional" terrorist nationalities. The other implication is that terrorists cells are expanding from the "war-torn," "failed states" to the other countries across the East African region.

The U.S. military established the U.S. Africa Command (Africom)³³ in September 2007, mainly to overcome China's challenge and to stabilise the Horn of Africa and the GLR.³⁴ Some African countries have expressed reservations about the command. They see the programme as an implementation of the U.S. policy shift from development and diplomacy to war capabilities; which would promote the militarisation of both diplomacy and the

³¹ Burundi, like Kenya and Uganda makes it vulnerable to terrorist attacks due to the countries' contribution to Amisom troops in Somalia. Rwanda has experienced several explosions and grenade attacks in different parts of Kigali (2012). Uganda has experienced bomb explosion in Kampala (2010) and several terrorist threats. Bomb explosion was experienced in Dar es Salaam (1998), acid and grenade attacks in Zanzibar (2012-2014) and in Arusha (2013, 2014). Kenya has experienced bomb blasts, grenade attacks and shooting in Nairobi (1998, 2011-2014), Mombasa-Kilifi, Lamu (2002, 2012-2014), Garissa (2011-2013). For a discussion on this see *The East African*, "Why East African countries remain vulnerable to terrorists" 23 September-4 October 2013); See also *The Citizen*, "11 suspected al-Shabab recruits arrested" 8 October 2013, 1,2.

³² *The East African*, "Why East African countries remain vulnerable" 8-9; " 'War against terror' was outsourced" 8.

³³ It is the institutional arm of the U.S military intervention on the African continent.

³⁴ Horace Campbell, "Remilitarisation of African Societies: Analysis of the planning behind proposed US Africa command" *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies* 3 (1) (July 2008): 15-16.

U.S-African relations. The presence of American bases in some of the African countries is said to contribute to the expansion of extremism targeting the Americans and their allies. Consequently, most African countries sought to disassociate themselves from Africom, fearing that they may be criticised for violating the regional stance on common defence and security. Nonetheless, plans are underway to develop a defence cooperation framework between Africom and the EAC.³⁵

Regional arrangements

The AU associates the influence of Africa's peace and security with the continent's socio-economic development. The AU Constitutive Act underscores the relationship between peace, security and development. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU responsible for ensuring continental peace and security was set up in July 2002 and launched on 25 May 2004. It is within this structure that Africa's approach to peacekeeping, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction could be analysed. The PSC can trace its origin back to the OAU's framework for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Nevertheless, the council emphasises the development of an early warning mechanism.³⁶

To further prevent and manage conflicts in Africa, the Chiefs of Defence Staff adopted a framework that establishes an African Standby Force (ASF) and Military Staff Committee in 2003. The standby force is to consist of soldiers from the five regional economic communities,³⁷ which are: Eastern, Southern,

³⁵ *The East African*, "US allies fears over new military body" 13-19 August 2007, 24-25; Juma V. Mwapachu, *Challenging the Frontiers of African Integration: The Dynamics of Policies, Politics and Transformation in the East African Community* (Dar es Salaam: E&D Vision Publishing, 2012), 323.

³⁶ Barbara Barungi and Karanja Mbugua, "From Peacekeeping to Peace Building: Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa," *Conflict Trends*, Issue 4 (2005): 30.

³⁷ Paul D. Williams, "The African Union: Prospects for Regional Peacekeeping After Burundi & Sudan" *Review of African Political Economy* 33 (108) North Africa: Power, Politics and Promise (June 2006): 352.

Western, Northern and Central economic organisations. The ASF is designed to undertake functions such as traditional peacekeeping, observer mission and carrying out post-conflict peace support operations. Each sub-regional standby brigade is expected to maintain a force of approximately 3,000 infantry soldiers. The ASF was expected to be able to manage complex peacekeeping operations by 2010, which is yet to be realised.

The AU³⁸ adopted the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as a framework for governance, economic recovery and foreign relations. African leaders devised the programme that would assist African countries in promoting sound leadership in order to attract aid and investment.³⁹ To this end, African countries adopted the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) as an important component to review and judge each other's performance. The major reason for instituting the APRM is that African countries' establishment of sound governance structures would determine development.⁴⁰

NEPAD, however, has been criticised for being influenced by neo-liberalism and for inadequately addressing the interests and aspirations of the African people. Also, questions have been posed about NEPAD's technical approach and institutional options that have been pursued since its creation.⁴¹ In other words, the NEPAD framework overlooks the international system structure, which places African countries in a disadvantaged position in terms of economic relations. In addition, human rights violations still exist.⁴²

³⁸ NEPAD was formed in 2001, at the same time when the OAU was transformed to AU.

³⁹ Nyang'oro, *A Political Biography of Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete* 115. See also Ali A. Mazrui, "Conflict in Africa: An Overview" in *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs* Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza eds., (Oxford: James Currey Ltd., 2008), 45.

⁴⁰ Mazrui, "Conflict in Africa: An Overview" 45. See also Cawthra, "Key Challenges" 90.

⁴¹ Samba Buri Mboup, "Conflicting leadership paradigms in Africa: A need for an African Renaissance perspective" *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies* 3 (1) (July 2008): 96-97.

⁴² Cawthra, "Key Challenges" 90

At the regional and international levels, mediation has not received as much attention as peacekeeping, peace building and peace enforcement have done. Mediation, which is an equally important conflict resolution mechanism, has been employed even when other conflict resolution mechanisms have been adopted. If one looks at the AU's official documents, a lot of emphasis has been given to peacemaking. Even the UN's major policy documents focus on preventive diplomacy as well as on early warning and peace operations. Given that mediation is increasingly becoming a specialised activity, Nathan suggests that the PSC establish a mediation unit as a component of the Panel of the Wise – a sub-structure of the Council. One of the major reasons is that an experienced mediator is better placed to resolve a conflict than someone with a lesser experience. The other reason is that most of the major conflicts in Africa have, at some point, been mediated.⁴³

Sub-regional organisations

Most of the existing regional and sub-regional organisations, whose objectives focus on political and economic issues, have been used as a framework for establishing security cooperation mechanisms.⁴⁴ The mechanisms concentrate on cooperation in conflict prevention, conflict management – particularly peacekeeping – as well as on the management of the SALW. The persistence of conflicts in Africa has resulted in the adoption of conflict resolution frameworks such as the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Frameworks of the AU (2006) and the NEPAD (2005) at the regional level. The UN Peace Building Commission (2005) was established at the international level to assist conflict-affected countries in post-conflict reconstruction.⁴⁵

⁴³ Laurie Nathan, "Mediation and the African Union's Panel of the Wise," Discussion Paper Number 10, Crisis States Research Centre, London, June 2005, 1.

⁴⁴ International Peace Academy, "The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa" 23.

⁴⁵ Devon Curtis, Concept Paper at the Botswana Policy Seminar Report, Gaborone: 25-28 August 2009, 11.

The multi-level analysis of conflict resolution has currently become particularly important at the sub-regional level. At this level, intra-state stability is largely related to inter-state stability. Porto observes that a combination of factors found at the state and inter-state levels offer an explanation of the conflicts at the sub-regional level.⁴⁶ The security of the state is also defined in terms of the security of the individuals and communities found within the state. Part of the reason is that conflicts cause insecurity to the individuals and the state in general and tends to spill over to regional levels.

After the Cold War, sub-regional institutions have increasingly been involved in conflict resolution through peacekeeping and peace-enforcement arrangements. The practice could be seen in the African countries' conducting joint training programmes to strengthen peacekeeping capacities for their forces. At the international level, the commitment by the international community to the sub-regional initiatives could be traced back to the world's summit authorisation of a 10-year programme for peacekeeping capacity building. The initiatives face two key challenges. They seem to be state-centred and neglect the role of the other actors in peacekeeping. This is partly due to the fact that the post-Cold War peacekeeping strategy has increasingly become multilateral in nature, with the involvement of more actors. Moreover, within the peacekeeping capacity building framework the West sought to train African defence forces so that they could participate in regional security, while in reality some African states cannot protect their own citizens.⁴⁷

A partnership between the Anglophone, Francophone and African countries in resolving intra-state conflicts has been established. The resolution of Rwanda's and Burundi's conflicts in the GLR demonstrates the manner that

⁴⁶ Khadiagala, "Building Security for Peoples, Societies, and States" 195. See also Porto, "The mainstreaming of conflict analysis in Africa" 57.

⁴⁷ Jakkie Cilliers, "Regional African Peacekeeping Capacity-Mythical Construct or Essential Tool?" in *From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa*, ed. Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (Johannesburg: SIIA and ISS, 1999), 133, 150.

the international community, especially France, Belgium and the U.S., were involved in conflict resolution. The approach was different from that of the period before the 1990s when the international community's involvement in Africa was largely informed by an antagonism between the Anglophone and Francophone countries.⁴⁸ France's interpretation of the RPF's invasion was in terms of the Anglophone-Francophone dimensions.

The role of regional hegemony in conflict resolution has increasingly become influential in the sub-region. Even if SADC or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) seemed to be undertaking peacekeeping missions, it was, in truth, the hegemonic position of Nigeria or South Africa that facilitated the peacekeeping operations. Such dominance could be explained in terms of economic and military capabilities that cannot be found in the other countries in a particular sub-region. Experience has shown that the countries' interests determine most of the hegemons' interventions in conflict resolution. South Africa's dominance in Burundi, for example, in terms of economic capability and arms sale, can be explained in terms of "hegemonic military-political role."⁴⁹

In the SADC sub-region, security concerns have been on trafficking of drug and humans, environmental degradation and on the proliferation of the SALW. Unlike the AU, SADC members consider defence, security and politics potential for economic development. Even so, one of the factors was overlooked; according to the structure of SADC, the Council of Ministers has to comprise the ministers of economic planning and finance, and not the ministers of foreign affairs. As Omari and Macaringue argue, the situation may, to some

⁴⁸ Khadiagala, "Building Security for Peoples, Societies, and States" 193.

⁴⁹ Alex de Waal *Who Fights Who Cares? War and Humanitarian Action in Africa* Eritrea: Africa World Press, Inc. 2000, 94, 97. See also Jakkie Cilliers, "Regional African Peacekeeping Capacity-Mythical Construct or Essential Tool?" in *From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa* Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills eds., (Johannesburg: SIIA and ISS, 1999), 144.

extent, create an obstacle to the merging of politics, defence and security with economic development.⁵⁰

The process of establishing a brigade-level standby force to support peacekeeping at the sub-regional levels as envisaged by the AU has apparently slowed down.⁵¹ Limited peacekeeping experience and insufficient financial and logistical resources are some of the reasons. Indeed, this has even impacted SADC's interventions, resulting in them being largely reactive rather than preventive.⁵² For example, despite the initiatives to launch SADCBrig and the Early Warning Centre, the DRC's recent M23⁵³ experience demonstrates the absence of a standby force; hence states have to volunteer troops and equipment on an *ad hoc* basis.

Tanzania was among the countries that deployed forces to the DRC to contain M23 rebels.⁵⁴ In response to the request by the AU, the Tanzanian government sent approximately 1,283 soldiers as part of 25,217 UN Intervention Force coordinated by SADC. The brigade was given the first ever mandate by the UN Security Council to use force against the armed groups whenever the situation dictates. The force was mandated to monitor the mineral-rich area and to assist in disarming and demobilising the rebels. Rwanda, Uganda and some human rights organisations, however, expressed

⁵⁰ Omari and Macaringue "Southern African Security in Historical Perspective" 53. See also Mwanasali, "From the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union" 209-210.

⁵¹ International Peace Academy, "The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa" 32-33.

⁵² Centre for Conflict Resolution, "Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)" Policy Advisory Group Seminar, Cape Town: South Africa 19-20 April 2010, 2.

⁵³ M23 is the rebel group comprising of approximately 4,000 soldiers named after the 23 March 2009 peace agreement with the DRC government. The group comprises of Tutsis who mutinied the DRC armed forces on April 2012 on the grounds that the government was not honouring the agreement reached. *Sunday News*, "Stop threatening Tanzania, Membe warns M23 rebels" 5 May 2013, 1,3; translated from *Mzalendo*, "Tanzania yakionya kikundi cha M23" 5-11 Mei, 2013, 1-2.

⁵⁴ Other contributing countries are South Africa and Malawi. The operations began in August 2013.

concerns about the force's role and mandate, saying that the armed peacekeeping force could have worsened the situation.⁵⁵

Rwanda's concerns about the armed intervention in Eastern DRC can be explained in two ways. The first is related to the allegations that Rwanda supported M23 rebels; Kigali constantly refuted the accusations. According to Edmon Mullet a UN Spokesperson in Kinshasa, there have been "consistent and credible" reports of Rwandan troops fighting against government forces and UN troops.⁵⁶ Tanzania's decision to contribute troops to the force that fought against Rwanda- and Uganda-backed rebel group implied that Tanzania was indirectly fighting against the Rwandan and Ugandan governments in the DRC.

The second, which is related to the first, had to do with Rwanda's interests and presence in Eastern Congo. Some UN reports indicate that Rwanda's manipulation of Congolese politics and security is aimed at plundering Congo's mineral resources. Rwanda has been trading in these natural resources in Eastern DRC, under the pretext of searching for *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR) rebels.⁵⁷ In other words, this implies that if the conflict in Eastern Congo is resolved, then there will be no justification for Rwanda's intervention in the DRC.

⁵⁵ The U.S. has also warned Rwanda to cease its support to the M23 rebels. See *The East African*, "U.S. Congress: Conflict minerals law fuels war in Congo" 25-31 May 2013, 13; *Daily News*, "U.S. tells Rwanda to stop supporting DRC rebels" 25 July 2013, 8; Also translated from *Raia Mwema*, "Kagame ni nani hadi amkejeli Rais Kikwete?" 26 June-2 July 2013, 5, 23; *Raia Mwema*, "Rwanda haiitaki Tanzania DR Kongo" 19-25 Juni 2013, 1, 3.

⁵⁶ Translated from *Mtanzania Jumapili*, "JWTZ kuikabili Rwanda ndani ya ardhi ya Kongo" 1 September 2013, 4; *The Citizen on Saturday*, "UN says Rwanda troops help DR Congo's M23 rebel group" 31 August 2013, 7.

⁵⁷ Mining is one of Rwanda's economy key sectors. See *The East African*, "U.S. Congress: Conflict minerals law fuels war in Congo" 25-31 May 2013, 13; *The East African*, "Rwanda pays price of link to conflict minerals" 16-22 November 2013, 3; *Daily News*, "U.S. tells Rwanda to stop supporting DRC rebels" 25 July 2013, 8. Also translated from *Jambo Leo*, "Congo hatarini" 17 November 2013, 4.

Like SADC, the EAC has developed a number of security cooperation and conflict resolution frameworks. A regional protocol creating a single defence territory has been tabled for ratification by member states. Among others, the protocol provides for joint military operations for the five member countries, fighting against terrorism and other international crimes. The protocol further requires the member states to assist each other when in conflict. Kenya plans to ratify the protocol, perhaps due to the security challenges it is facing. Despite the fact that Tanzania proposed the idea in 2006,⁵⁸ it has expressed reservations, seeking clarification on “assisting each other when in conflict.” According to Samwel Sitta, Tanzania’s current Minister for East African Cooperation, personal differences and interests might drive some of the member countries into regional conflicts. He once said, “Why should you help your neighbour when s/he is the aggressor?”⁵⁹ A similar stance could be seen with respect to Tanzania’s decision to train the Somali army instead of contributing forces to track *al-Shabab*, as Kenya has done. Nevertheless, Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda have sought to sign a MoU on defence and foreign policy affairs.

While the EAC and SADC are important to Tanzania, the challenge is how to balance the participation in either community without negatively affecting the other. Unlike Kenya and Uganda, for example, Tanzania did not support the idea of fast tracking the EAC federation.⁶⁰ Tanzanian diplomats argue that instead of rushing into a Political Federation the foundation of cooperation needs to be strengthened first. President Kikwete said in his address to

⁵⁸ During his visit to Uganda President Kikwete proposed the idea.

⁵⁹ *The East African*, “Dar’s reluctance to sign pact a sign of growing suspicion among members” 5-11 December 2011, 12; see also *The East African*, “Kenya plans to ratify defence protocol on regional security” 30 November-6 December 2013, 14; Mwapachu, *Challenging the Frontiers*, 297.

⁶⁰ In Kenya 64.9 percent, Uganda 56.3 percent and in Tanzania 25.4 percent of the interviewed supported the fast tracking of the federation. See Maundi “Tanzania” 205; *The East African*, “Why East Africa Political Federation is dead in the water” 5-11 September 2011, 6. *The East African* “Tanzania skips meetings, leaves EAC worried” 5-11 December 2011, 12.

Tanzania's Parliament that economic and financial mechanisms have to be allowed to take root by following all the steps that are stipulated in the EAC protocol.⁶¹ Dar es Salaam's cautious approach seems to be informed by the lessons taken from the defunct 1977 East African Cooperation and also seeks to ensure that East Africans become players in the process, rather than their presidents deciding for them.

The Tanzanian foreign policy and the participation in conflict resolution

Tanzania's experience in conflict resolution largely illustrates a trend away from the role of the President as a key mediator to other actors. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MFAIC), special envoys, the secretariat and elder statesmen have increasingly been involved in mediation. Rwanda's, Burundi's and, to some extent, Mozambique's conflict resolution demonstrates a shift of mediation from presidents to experts and institutions. The Arusha negotiations were delegated to a mediation team in MFAIC, led by Ambassador Ami Mpungwe and the President(s)/Summit intervened when the parties reached a stalemate. In this way, Mpungwe and his team could conduct the negotiations professionally. As a result, Nyerere and Mandela's Burundi mediation teams employed the Tanzanian mediators who developed their skills during the 1992-1993 Rwanda talks.⁶²

One of Tanzanian foreign policy strategies for promoting good neighbourliness is to maintain peace and stability. At the regional level, the intention is to create a peaceful environment to foster economic diplomacy, particularly trade and investment. If one goes through the strategies and actions for the New Foreign Policy implementation, one will find that Tanzania's involvement in conflict resolution is emphasised in terms of its participation and

⁶¹ The stages are customs union followed by common market, monetary union and ultimately political federation. See *The East African*, "After victory in DRC, a newly confident Tanzania emerges on the East African stage," 9-15 November 2013, 12; *The Citizen on Sunday*, "EAC integration-Are citizens players or spectators?" 27 October 2013, 14.

⁶² Khadiagala, *Meddlers or Mediators* ? 256.

training on peacekeeping, conflict prevention, peace building and conflict management.⁶³ Indeed, the training and support for mediation, negotiations and the facilitation of the peace talks in which Tanzania has registered success in the region are not mentioned. They are either overlooked or generally interpreted as being a part of the support for the prevention, management and resolution of intra-state conflicts.

Whereas the nature and causes of conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa vary and could be found at various levels, the proposed solutions appear to be fixed. Even where the conflict has been caused by political or socio-economic factors, most of the solutions are devised to address political issues such as power sharing, promotion of liberal democracy, economic and social reforms. The solutions further specify a timeframe for processes such as constitution making and holding elections to be undertaken. Moreover, the transitional institutions are structured in such a way that both the political parties and the rebels can share them. In reality, power sharing does not always lead to profound changes in the nature of the state sometimes; it encourages insurgent conflicts, instead of resolving them.⁶⁴

Recent conflict resolution developments in the DRC, the resolution that involved M23 rebels and the Kabila administration, suggest a shift away from “fixed solutions” to different types of conflicts. After the rebels were defeated, leaders called for peace talks that were facilitated by President Yoweri Museveni⁶⁵ – the ICGLR Chairperson. Given that the negotiations were concluded after the defeat of M23 rebels, the DRC government refused to sign

⁶³ United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, *Strategies and Actions for the Implementation of the New Foreign Policy* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, April 2004), 1-2, 12-13.

⁶⁴ Daley, *Gender and Genocide in Burundi* 189.

⁶⁵ Museveni persuaded the M23 senior officials in November 2012 to withdraw from Goma and resume negotiations with the DRC government on a peace deal. Museveni’s credibility in mediation was tested when General Sultan Makenga – former M23 rebel leader, together with the other rebels surrendered to Ugandan forces. The Kabila government has been charging them for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.

a “peace agreement/accord.” The government explained that signing an agreement would legitimise the fighters who mutinied from the national army and it would mean giving amnesty to the people who had committed war crimes. In the end, a declaration to end the conflict was signed whose provisions were non-binding to the DRC government.⁶⁶

Tanzania is a member of several regional economic and security organisations.⁶⁷ In 2001, the government withdrew its Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) membership. As Nyirabu argues, the decision illustrates conflicting concurrent memberships to the organisations with largely similar objectives. He suggests the harmonisation of the memberships due to the costs involved, which have a bearing on the deeper integration.⁶⁸ There are historical and strategic reasons for Tanzania’s multiple memberships. Belonging to SADC is a combination of historical and geographical reasons. As we have seen, Tanzania was more concerned about the liberation of Southern African than considering itself an Eastern African country. Historically, Tanzania has been economically linked to East Africa. Although there is an economic

⁶⁶ For discussions on this see *The East African*, “Museveni gets DRC, M23 to sign deal” 9,10; “Kinshasa, M23 sign ‘declaration,’ but will it herald peace in volatile DRC?” 8, both published on 14-20 December 2013. See also *The East African*, “Museveni’s dilemma as ex-rebel leader Makenga now runs into his arms” 9-15 November 2013, 16-17; *The East African*, “Which way forward for Uganda-led DRC, M23 talks?” 5-11 October 2013, 14.

⁶⁷ Among others they include, SADC, EAC, GLR, AU, IOR. In 2008 EAC, COMESA and SADC member states held a Tripartite Summit on the possibility of harmonising trade and the free movement of businesspersons. Also members explored the possibility of fostering cooperation and joint implementation of inter-regional infrastructure. At the end the Heads of States and Governments agreed to establish a common market, which would expand the market base for the manufactured and agricultural products (as the region will have more than 530 million people) and open up for employment opportunities. See Final *Communique* of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit of Heads of State and Government, Kampala-Uganda, 22 October 2008. See also *The East African*, “EAC, SADC and Comesa pursuing cooperation” 29 October-4 November 2007, 22.

⁶⁸ Mohabe Nyirabu, “Tathmini Kuhusu Ushirikiano wa Kimataifa Katika Serikali ya Awamu ya Tatu” Mada iliyowasilishwa katika Mkutano Mkuu wa Kumi na Tatu wa Hali ya Siasa Tanzania, REDET, Chuo Kikuu cha Dar es Salaam, 19-20 Julai 2005, 9. See also John D. Mitchell, “Cross-Cutting Memberships, Integration and the International System” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 14 (1) (March 1970): 50.

justification for the attachment to the North, one could conceive Tanzania as a “bridge builder” between Eastern and Southern Africa.⁶⁹

The proliferation and circulation of the SALW has become one of the long-term security threats. Weapons circulating from the conflict areas have found their way into Tanzania through illegal ways. Most of the illicit arms are transported into the region as licensed. The weapons that are transferred are either diverted into irresponsible end users or are stolen and then enter the illegal market.⁷⁰ Even so the role of the international community remains crucial in the management of the SALW at the regional and sub-regional levels. If the West continues to sale weapons to the rebel groups, the initiatives will remain unsuccessful. A member of Burundi’s CNDD-FDD maintained that whereas some Western governments urge African governments to fight against arms proliferation “yet they were supplying [arms]...to the illegal groups.”⁷¹

Tanzania also participates in the initiatives to control the conflict relating to mineral trade by facilitating constructing a laboratory in Dar es Salaam to analyse mineral traces and dealers.⁷² The ICGLR led the initiative whereby geo-chemical fingerprints would be used to identify those who trade in illegal minerals and their sources. One of the reasons for such an initiative is to comply with the international standards that require the traders to provide proof of origin of the minerals as well as regulating conflict minerals. In July 2010, for example, the U.S. passed the Dodd-Frank Act that requires the companies listed in America’s stock exchange to provide information on the extraction of and payment for oil, gas (natural) and minerals.⁷³ Since then, a

⁶⁹ Amon J. Nsekela ed., *Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation* (London: Rex Collings 1981), 64.

⁷⁰ Masanyika, “Foreign Policy Challenges for Tanzania” 87.

⁷¹ *The East African*, “Great Lakes MPs meet over small arms” 25 April-1 May 2005, 8.

⁷² Germany was to support the construction of the laboratory’s first phase.

⁷³ Section 1502 of the Act describes “conflict minerals” as those minerals containing tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold, that originate in the DRC and the neighbouring countries. See *The East African*, “Dar lab to boost war against blood minerals” 26 December 2011-1 January 2012,

number of American companies have stopped buying minerals from the DRC. Opponents perceive the law to be an externally imposed solution that negatively affects the local people who depend on the mineral trade. Yet, the escalation of conflicts in the GLR challenges the U.S.'s law.⁷⁴

Tanzania's peacekeeping experience

Tanzania has been participating in several peacekeeping missions in terms of contributing troops, provision of training and technical advice.⁷⁵ The country is among the prominent contributors to the UN peace missions. On 31 December 2011 Tanzania had a total of 1,195 soldiers in the UN peacekeeping missions and by 31 May 2012 it was among the top 20 contributing states of the uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. By September 2013 the country was Africa's 6th and globally 12th contributor of the military peacekeepers.⁷⁶ As of December 2011, the UN-AU hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was the leading mission to which Tanzania has contributed a total of 1,034 soldiers, 84 of whom were women. They included 131 police officers (45 women), 11 experts on mission (1 woman) and 892 contingent troops (38 women). The U.S. collaborated with the UK and Canada to provide equipment and to train Tanzanian soldiers who were deployed to Darfur.⁷⁷

37. See also *The East African*, "EU criticised for weak law on conflict minerals" 15-21 March 2014, 35.

⁷⁴ *The East African*, "U.S. Congress: Conflict Minerals" 13.

⁷⁵ Tanzanian soldiers have been sent to Lebanon, Darfur, South Sudan, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire and Comoro Islands.

⁷⁶ See the 2010/2011 Budget Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, July 2011, 16-17. See also <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/> [Accessed on 17 January 2013]; *Sunday News*, "UN Challenged to end attacks on peacekeepers" 29 September 2013, 1.

⁷⁷ A total of 47 nations have contributed officers to UNAMID Force, 26 among them are from Africa. See *Jambo*, "What are the Americans doing in Tanzania? Edition 22, August-October 2009, 32 (31-32); *The East African*, "Canada trains AU force for Duty in Darfur" 29 October-4 November 2007, 20; *The Citizen*, 19 July 2013, 8.

Tanzania's participation in UNAMID was tested on 13 July 2013 when unknown assailants attacked a convoy consisting of Tanzanian peacekeepers. Seven Tanzanian soldiers lost their lives while seventeen were seriously wounded.⁷⁸ It is the first deadly incident to occur in Tanzania's peacekeeping history and since the deployment of UNAMID in 2007. This action, in part, suggests Darfur's deteriorating security. Tanzania has in turn called for the UN Security Council to consider strengthening UNAMID and other peacekeeping forces' mandate so that the peacekeepers can effectively protect themselves when necessary. President Kikwete raised similar concerns while addressing the UN General Assembly in September 2013.⁷⁹

The first time when Tanzania was involved in joint peacekeeping led by ECOMOG mission in Liberia was in 1993.⁸⁰ Contingents from Tanzania (and Uganda) were called in to neutralise Nigeria's domination and professionalise ECOMOG. In January 1994, a joint force of two battalions with 773 soldiers from Tanzania and 796 from Uganda arrived in Liberia. It was the first time that the UN worked alongside sub-regional organisation's peacekeepers on the battlefield coordinated by the OAU. In 1995, however, the Tanzanian peacekeepers withdrew from the ECOMOG-led mission. The financial and material promises by the international community could not be met in time.⁸¹ In addition, the controversial nature of the force's mandate resulted in some Tanzanian officers losing their lives.

⁷⁸ *The Citizen*, "Darfur Tragedy: How they were attacked" 16 July 2013, 1-2, 8.

⁷⁹ *Sunday News*, "UN Challenged" 1.

⁸⁰ In September the same year the Security Council established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia, which was three years after the establishment of ECOMOG.

⁸¹ Adekeye Adebajo, *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa*, A Project of the International Peace Academy (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2002), 139, 149; Adekeye Adebajo, "Introduction" in *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*, A project of the International Peace Academy, Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid eds., (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2004), 9. See also Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* UNIDIR, ISS, (UN Institute for Disarmament Research, May 2000), 101, 102.

Tanzania's decision to send peacekeeping troops to Liberia was largely in response to a regional request and its commitment to promote peace and security. The peacekeepers were sent at the request of ECOWAS and were to be paid by the UN. Tanzania's motivation to deploy the peacekeepers to Liberia defies Masero's argument that it was some way of keeping the military officers busy, that it was out of economic hardships the country was facing and that it was some sort of a break from the country's involvement in the liberation struggles and local politics – following the introduction of multipartism.⁸² In reality, the period between 1991 and 1994, Tanzania did not deploy peacekeepers to any country. Furthermore, by August 1995, there were only 5 Tanzanian civilian police officers in the UN Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM) and these were reduced to 3 in 1996. Again, between 1997 and 1998, Tanzania had only 3 civilian police officers in MONUA.⁸³

On other occasions, Tanzania sought to train the defence forces. In Somalia, for example, Tanzania opted to train 1000 soldiers from the national defence force.⁸⁴ In response to the request by Kenya's President and the AU to contribute troops to the international peacekeeping force, President Kikwete said that Tanzania would train Somali soldiers. Even though the main reason given was that Tanzania had already sent its troops to Lebanon and that resources were insufficient,⁸⁵ there are other reasons. At the time, Somalia's prospects for successful conflict resolution were far from realistic. It was inopportune that the conflict would be resolved by sending the peacekeepers at that time. Furthermore, from the experience of the 1998 terrorist attacks in Dar

⁸² Kichonge Mahende Masero, "The Military and Political Pluralism in Tanzania" (M.A. dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam 1994), 165-166.

⁸³ See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml [Accessed on 17 January 2013]. See also Killian, "Factors Informing Changes" 40.

⁸⁴ Translated from the URT, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Budget Speech for the 2007/2008 financial year, 17.

⁸⁵ Translated from *Mwananchi*, "Tanzania kufundisha jeshi la Somalia: Kikwete ataka mafunzo yaanze haraka" 30 Januari 2007, 1-2.

es Salaam and Nairobi, it is likely that Tanzania believed that it would receive retaliation attacks from *al-Shabab* similar to those that Kenya is receiving.

For the first time Tanzania sent troops outside Africa, to Lebanon, in 2007. About 87 military police officers – 77 men and 10 women – were part of the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon. According to Colonel Mgawe, Tanzania's Defence Forces spokesperson, the decision to provide troops is determined by either the request of the respective country or of the UN.⁸⁶ It should be noted, however, that Tanzania's decision to send peacekeeping forces or to participate in mediation activities does not require prior parliamentary approval, as is the case for countries like South Africa and Uganda. Most of the decisions to participate in conflict resolution activities are made by the National Defence and Security Council and later are reported to Parliament. This practice seems to be a continuation from the liberation struggles' experience.

Tanzania's domestic conditions and the regional diplomacy

Tanzania adopted the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2003. There have been mixed reactions regarding Tanzania's decision to support the U.S.-led war on terror. The general criticism arose from the fact that the Bill was not debated in Parliament as was accompanied by a "certificate of urgency". The public interpreted the adoption of the Act as the initiatives to impress the U.S. Some felt that the law served more the U.S.'s interests than Tanzania's interests. Moreover, some Tanzanians, particularly members of the Muslim community, argued that the anti-terrorism law targeted them as a group. Even though the Act targets terrorists, in some way it constrains the basic rights and freedoms of the people.⁸⁷

Correlation exists between democratisation, national security and foreign policy. Tanzania's democratisation has influenced changes in the making and

⁸⁶ Translated <http://sabahionline.com/sw/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/12/04/feature-02> [Accessed on 10 January 2013].

⁸⁷ Baregu, "The United States 'Global War on Terror'" 278. See also Maundi, "Tanzania" 202.

implementation of foreign, defence and security policies. Although more actors are involved in the making and implementation of the country's foreign policies, they are not equally involved in the defence and security issues. The National Defence and Security Council discusses most of the defence and security issues. Depending on the nature of the issues, other actors may be involved. Nevertheless, Tanzania's current perception of the security of the nation has somewhat been influenced by real and potential conflicts within the country and in the GLR.⁸⁸

While Tanzania's democratic transition has largely been peaceful, domestic conflicts and insecurity exist in the sea and in land. Piracy, especially in the Horn of Africa, and illegal exploitation of the fisheries pose maritime security threats. In land, there have been recurrent disputes over resources between farmers and pastoralists. There have also been conflicts in the areas where gas/oil and minerals have been discovered. Moreover, intra- and inter-religious misunderstandings exist. The inability to promote religious and political tolerance, to some extent, contributes to the rise of religious extremism. Again, in the rural areas, old women and albinos have been murdered for witchcraft reasons. If the root causes of these conflicts are not addressed it is likely that they will intensify.⁸⁹ The conflicts will further threaten the country's security and credibility built on the conflict resolution activities it has participated in.

Tanzania supported the negotiations for resolving Kenya's 2007 post-election conflict. Unlike Museveni, who declared his support for the crisis, Kikwete worked behind the scenes by sending emissaries to Kenya. The strategy was coupled with the facilitation of the negotiations, which in the end succeeded and a power-sharing agreement was signed. Some Kenyans were happy with Kikwete's mediation strategy, as he urged the parties to the conflict

⁸⁸ Lalá, "Mozambique" 121. See also Maundi, "Tanzania" 202.

⁸⁹ Cawthra, "Key Challenges" 93; Maundi, "Tanzania" 201. See also *The East African*, "Aga Khan warns of rising extremism," 1-7 March 2014, 12.

to find a solution to the problem, rather than imposing a solution on them.⁹⁰ This approach was, to a large extent, similar to that used to resolve Rwanda's and Burundi's conflict.

This is largely Tanzania's approach to resolving conflicts in the GLR. During the 26 May 2013 AU Summit held in Addis Ababa, President Kikwete highlighted the importance of ensuring that peace existed in the GLR. He advised Kagame, Museveni and Kabila to initiate peace talks with the rebel groups fighting in the region, with the majority in the DRC.⁹¹ Tanzania's recommendation was based on the fact that the Rwandan government had not succeeded in resolving the conflict involving the FDLR,⁹² which has been launching attacks on the Rwandan people from inside the DRC and causing insecurity in the GLR for 20 years.⁹³ Even though Rwanda bitterly reacted to the suggestion, it has to be understood that Tanzania has traditionally been promoting negotiations. Indeed, it was Tanzania which forced Habyarimana to talk to Kagame's RPF at the time when the RPF was regarded as a "rebel group."

Tanzania's suggestion started some sort of a "Cold War" between Dar es Salaam and Kigali. Rwanda on its part maintains that as a legitimate

⁹⁰ Nyang'oro, *A Political Biography of Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete* 246-247.

⁹¹ Museveni was advised to resolve the conflict with Allied Democratic Force (ADF). It is Ugandan-led Islamist rebel group founded in 1995. It operates in the northwest of the Rwenzori mountains. Kabila was advised to talk to M23.

⁹² FDLR is the Eastern DRC-based rebel group opposing the Tutsi-led government in Rwanda. The group comprises remnants of the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda and some descendants of the *Interahamwe* militia. The group also comprises of some members who committed the 1994 genocide, some Hutu of the former Rwandan army and several displaced Rwandan Hutus. The U.S. has categorised FDLR as a terrorist group. For a discussion on FDLR's composition see *The Guardian* on Sunday, "We won't apologise to Rwanda-Membe" 2-8 June 2013, 2; *The East African*, "Kikwete's plea for peace talks angers Rwanda" 1-7 June 2013, II; Also translated from *Raia Mwema*, "Rwanda yafunguka kuhusu uhusiano wake na Tanzania" 10-16 Julai 2013, 31.

⁹³ See *Sunday News*, "Dar says no to Kigali demand for apology" 2 June 2013, 1,3; translated from *Raia Mwema*, "Kagame akoleza hasira" 12-18 Juni 2013, 3.

government it cannot talk to the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide whose leader Major General Sylvestre Mudacumura has been indicted by the ICC for war crimes.⁹⁴ While Rwanda has its own reasons, perhaps there is a need to re-define the current FDLR members and/or the *Interahamwe*. The reason is that those who really engaged in the genocide 20 years ago perhaps are very old now and maybe their children are the ones who are members of the FDLR. Moreover, for quite some time the Rwandan government has considered the FDLR militarily weak.⁹⁵

Whereas Tanzania seems to be guided by principles, it has sometimes displayed reactive foreign policy behaviour. This stance was evident in its non-recognition of the National Transition Council (NTC) government when it took power in Libya. Like the AU, Tanzania and Kenya declined to recognise the new government.⁹⁶ Rwanda declared its full support for the new government and Uganda maintained a neutral position. Rwanda's support could be explained by the RPF's background to power. Tanzania's reactive behaviour could further be seen in its inability to immediately condemn NATO's imperialist aggression and the violation of Libya's sovereignty. Tanzania recognised Gadaffi as a legitimate President. Possibly Tanzania was shunning away from direct confrontations with the West.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Following an announcement by Rwanda's opposition parties – such as Socialist Party Imbekuri and Rwanda Dream Initiative to form an alliance with the FDLR, Kigali has warned that they will be categorised as terrorists too. See *The East African*, "CoW moves to mend rift with Tanzania as mistrust festers between Rwanda and Dar" 25-31 Janary 2014, 16.

⁹⁵ Rwanda National Congress (RNC) – an opposition party comprising of former government officials is claimed by Rwanda's criminal investigation department to be cooperating with the FDLR. The Kagame government accuses RNC and the FDLR for carrying out grenade attacks inside Rwanda. For a discussion on this see *The East African*, "Kigali fears FDLR could be regrouping" 19-25 April 2014, 10.

⁹⁶ Tanzania's stance was that in order to be recognised the new government has to form an inclusive government and establish the national symbols such as the flag, national anthem and the coat of arms.

⁹⁷ Translated from Bernard Membe, Tanzania's Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, interview with the BBC, Swahili News 18-19 hours, 29 September 2011. *The*

In the East African region there have been tensions between Tanzania and Burundi on the one hand, and Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya on the other over the pace of integration of the five countries. Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya, together with South Sudan, caucused under the Tripartite Initiative for Fast-Tracking the East African integration dubbed the "Coalition of the Willing – CoW."⁹⁸ Justifying the reason for performing a two-track affair the members of CoW argued that Tanzania is "dragging its feet" in the process, which is an obstacle to the pace of the integration.⁹⁹ Apart from Tanzania's defensive approach to such issues as land ownership, free movement of labour, immigration and the use of common IDs, there are other reasons for this stance.

Taking the integration cautiously and the deployment of peace enforcement force in Eastern DRC could be interpreted by the other EAC partner states that Tanzania's strategic interests are elsewhere rather than in the region. Furthermore, judging from the time when the CoW became operational, that is, from June 2013 onwards one could argue that it was some form of revenge on the part of Uganda and Rwanda given that their interests were to some extent interfered by Tanzania's decision to contribute to the force that would assist the DRC government to fight back M23 rebels. The issue of timing added to the problem again in September 2013 when the Tanzanian government decided to flush out illegal immigrants. Dar es Salaam explained that the big number of illegal immigrants, for example 52,000 in Kagera region alone, made it difficult for the government to provide social services to the

Citizen, "Resource Wars threaten Africa" 31 August 2011, 23. See also *The East African*, "East African states take split positions on Libya" 5-11 September 2011, 11.

⁹⁸ The countries agreed to speed up the integration process in infrastructure – railway and road projects, establishment of a common visa and a common ID; a single customs territory and eventually political federation.

⁹⁹ Presidential Address to the United Republic of Tanzania Parliament, November 2013. *The East African*, "Dar is in EAC to stay despite isolation strategy by Coalition of the Willing" 14; "After victory in DRC, a newly confident Tanzania emerges on East African stage" both on 9-15 November 2013, 14.

citizens.¹⁰⁰ Even though the exercise was done to all illegal immigrants in the country, it was interpreted by the regional members that the exercise was targeting Rwandans and was against the spirit of the East Africanness.

An alternative explanation could be the struggle for regional economic dominance. The recent oil/gas discoveries and extraction in the East African countries, including South Sudan, could further pose a challenge to Kenya's dominance in petroleum products transportation in Eastern and Central Africa. It could also be seen that Tanzania is increasingly becoming a strategic and potential investment area in the region. This trend was demonstrated by a visit by the leaders of the economic powerful countries such as China and the U.S. Among others, the Chinese and Tanzanian governments signed a contract in March 2013 to construct a port in Bagamoyo, which after its completion will be Africa's largest port. This development in the long run would possibly accelerate Tanzania's economic dominance in the region.¹⁰¹

Opportunities and challenges

Tanzania has achieved most of the traditional foreign policy aims. The reason is partly that political interests determined most of the foreign affairs decisions, possibly because of the NAM, the liberation movements and the FLS. After the Cold War, the agenda and the concerns have changed. More actors have been involved and political interests play a lesser role. Tanzania's past success does not seem to support the current experience. The achievement, to some extent, left a vacuum in the Tanzanian foreign policy, which was, in turn, filled by shifting the foreign policy focus from political to economic interests.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ For a discussion on this see *The Citizen* "Three allies meet again without Dar" 08 October 2013, 1-2; *The East African*, "After victory in DRC" 12-13. See also *The East African*, "Dar defends move to expel Rwandans."

¹⁰¹ Translated from *Mwananchi*, "Rais Xi Jinping kuipatia neema Tanzania, 24 March 2013, 9. See *The East African*, "Kenya pipeline's dominance under threat" 13-19 August 2007, 3; *The East African*, "Looking East ushers in new diplomacy" 14-20 December 2013, 4.

¹⁰² Mahiga, Ambassadorial Lecture, Centre for Foreign Relations 2006. See also Masanyika, "Foreign Policy Challenges for Tanzania" 92.

But the challenge that remains is how to balance between pursuing economic interests and not jeopardising the political options.

Most of Africa's current conflicts are largely economically motivated. Conflicts arise when a group of actors struggle to control natural resources such as oil, minerals, while others feel threatened, or resist.¹⁰³ In the future, it is also likely that there will be conflicts in the resource-rich countries caused by the interventions by external actors at the regional or international level. Baregu interprets Libya's conflict in terms of its resources. He argues, "Libya's conflict is essentially a resource conflict...fought against a resource rich country and a resource nationalist leader...."¹⁰⁴ To overcome future resource conflicts institutions need to be created that would guarantee equality in resource redistribution and the protection of all groups.

Related to the above is leadership transition crises that result in intra-state conflicts. Even though leadership change is perceived to be an internal political affair, the external factors play an influential role. Some of the countries that have experienced leadership change conflicts include Tunisia, Mali, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Egypt and Guinea. Whereas ethnic, religious, cultural and age aspects have influenced domestic political transitions, external influences are related to the role of the West. Apparently, the current pattern of Western intervention in Africa has largely been through the use of force on humanitarian grounds; and military and arms supply under the pretext of "supporting regime change."¹⁰⁵ In turn, some of the African opposition groups turn to the West for financial and military support. This practice raises question on Africa's path to democratisation and the resolution of intra-state conflicts through peaceful means.

¹⁰³ Bertrand G. Ramcharan, *Preventive Diplomacy at the UN* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 191-192.

¹⁰⁴ See *The Citizen*, "Resource wars threaten Africa" 31 August 2011, 23.

¹⁰⁵ *The East African*, "African leaders need internal reforms to keep the West away" 24-30 October, 8.

Energy is becoming an important aspect of the foreign relations particularly after the Cold War. The recent oil and gas discoveries in Tanzania suggest some form of a paradigm shift in the formulation and implementation of the country's foreign policy. In view of the role of energy in foreign policies, Tanzania may become an energy actor, that is, an importer, exporter or transit state, as has been Russia's case.¹⁰⁶ Geographically Tanzania is placed as a gateway to East Africa. In eastern, southern and central Africa, the country is located as a transit centre and is bordering five landlocked countries. Tanzania could strategically use its geographical location and serve as an exporter, transit and investment destination of energy goods. The factors could lend the country additional advantages, which could be used to enhance foreign policy and economic development.¹⁰⁷

There is also the challenge of the compatibility between economic and security cooperation at the regional and sub-regional levels. It is not always guaranteed that where the regional economic integration exists, security cooperation would automatically succeed. In other words, security cooperation and regional economic integration are not directly related. This can be seen in two ways. The community's members can work towards economic cooperation without necessarily trusting each other. In Southern Africa, for example, the national interests influence more the perception of SADC members on trade, economic growth, security and stability than the common regional interests.¹⁰⁸ The other way is that regions such as the GRL have been defined in terms of geographical-security terms, rather than the economic cooperation. The challenge, however, is how to promote human security.

¹⁰⁶ Amelia Hadfield, "Energy and Foreign Policy: EU-Russia energy dynamics" in *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 335, 336-337.

¹⁰⁷ Msabaha and Hartmann, "Tanzania After the Nkomati Accord" 131.

¹⁰⁸ Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, "Southern African Security Governance: A Cautionary Tale" in *African Security Governance: Emerging Issues* Gavin Cawthra ed. (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2009), 99.

Conclusion

This chapter was concerned with the trends that are emerging after the Cold War. The discussion focused on the Tanzanian foreign policy and its involvement in conflict resolution in the GLR, especially after supporting the resolution of Rwanda's and Burundi's conflicts. The main assumption is that Tanzania's regional role has largely remained the same, with a focus on promoting negotiations and deploying peacekeeping forces. The following conclusions can be drawn:

Terrorist acts were generally found to be expanding in Africa compared to the countries in the West before the 9/11 and shortly afterwards. Strengthened security control measures in the countries in the West have largely reduced terrorism. The East African region has largely turned one of the African regions prone to terrorism. Somalia's conflict largely contributes to the recruitment and multiplication of terrorist cells across East African countries. Part of the reason is the interconnected nature of the EAC region and the Horn of Africa. Kenya borders Somalia; thus the criminals can easily cross the border into Kenya and the other countries. The role of the state remains important especially in mitigating and tracking down the terrorists who cause insecurity in the region and in the Horn of Africa.

The establishment of the AU's Peace and Security Council depicts the relationship between Africa's peace and security and the socio-economic development. The PSC formalises African countries' approach to peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. Africa's development is, therefore, largely determined by the existence of peace and security. Nonetheless, the establishment of the standby forces in the regions as envisaged by the AU has not taken place.

The influence of the neo-liberal institutionalism could be demonstrated by the AU's decision to establish NEPAD. The APRM was subsequently established as one of NEPAD's institutions to foster greater cooperation among African countries on low politics issues. The countries are to review and judge

each other's performance on issues such as promotion of good leadership so as to attract aid and investment. In this way, sound governance structures would be established. It remains, nevertheless, challenging for the AU to compel African states observe the Constitutive Act provisions especially with respect to human rights issues.

Cooperation in the SADC sub-region depicts the relationship between politics, security and defence on the one hand, and development on the other. SADC members, for example, see economic development to be facilitated by the promotion of defence, security and politics. The sub-region's security concerns have been on drug abuse and human trafficking, environment protection and the SALW. Security has further "focused" on conflict prevention and management through deployment of peacekeeping forces and post-conflict reconstruction. Political concerns have been on the democratisation and democratic transitions such as elections management and democratic changes of government. Development could therefore be promoted and achieved when politics, security and defence have properly been managed.

Tanzania's participation in both SADC and the EAC could be explained in terms of historical and geo-strategic reasons. The support for Southern Africa's liberation can be explained in terms of facilitating Africa's liberation and the need to promote pan-Africanism. Tanzania served as a gateway to the Southern African countries that are landlocked in terms of transporting the amunition and other pieces of equipment. Economically, Tanzania has been linked to the East African region since the colonial time.

The Tanzanian foreign policy and the country's involvement in the GLR conflicts seem to combine the support for the negotiations between the conflicting parties and the contribution of the peacekeeping forces. The support for the negotiations has not been much different from that given to Rwanda and Burundi. Participating in the multilateral peacekeeping forces has been an increasing trend as demonstrated by the rising number of the officers involved and the number of the missions. Tanzania's emphasis has increasingly been on

authorising the peacekeepers to use force when necessary. Increased attacks on the peacekeepers and the nature of the weapons used by the rebels explain part of the reason.

In addition to Africa's democratisation is perceived to have given rise to new forms of conflicts in Africa, Tanzania's experience shows the relationship between democratisation, national security and foreign policy. The country's democratisation process has opened up the region for the involvement of more actors in foreign policy making and implementation. In terms of the national security issues, the National Defence and Security has largely been involved. Depending on the nature of the issue, other actors are also involved.

Chapter 7

Conclusions

This thesis sought to evaluate Tanzania's foreign policy and the country's participation in conflict resolution in sub-Saharan Africa from the liberation struggles to the post-Cold War period. The main argument was that the Tanzanian foreign policy embeds long-standing conflict resolution strategies, which suggest an extensive understanding of the domestic, regional and international contexts. In the post-Cold War the strategies have not profoundly changed. During the first phase, that is, from the mid-1950s to the late 1980s, Tanzania largely supported the liberation and anti-apartheid movements in Southern Africa. In the post-Cold War period, which constituted the second phase, Tanzania's concentration shifted from the liberation struggles to the resolution of the intra-state conflicts in the GLR. The study's objective has been to bridge the gap between the two phases by examining the patterns of change in foreign policy and conflict resolution.

The period that this study has covered is important in the nation's history and trends in foreign policy and conflict resolution because Tanzania has been resolving conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, recently in Mozambique, Rwanda and Burundi. Two factors explain the shift of emphasis from Southern Africa to the GLR. First, by the late 1980s the objective of supporting the struggles had already been achieved; hence most of Southern African countries were already liberated. Second, the immediate impact of the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi on Tanzania compelled the country to intervene so as to prevent the conflicts from escalating.

Mozambique, Rwanda and Burundi have been examined largely because they are among the eight countries bordering Tanzania. While Rwanda and Burundi are in the GLR and Eastern Africa, Mozambique is a Southern African country. The conflicts in these countries have had an immediate impact on Tanzania. Furthermore, Mozambique is one of the exceptional cases where Tanzania's role in the resolution of conflicts ranged from the liberation struggles

to the post-independence civil wars. The country supported Mozambique's conflict resolution by maintaining some military officers until the late 1980s when profound changes were taking place at the domestic and international levels.

Rwanda and Burundi were studied because Tanzania largely mediated and facilitated the peace talks from the early 1990s onwards, although to different degrees. In addition, the nature and the causes of the conflicts in the two countries were more or less similar and linked. Both countries have similar ethnic composition of the Hutus, the Tutsis and the Twas. The Rwandan majority Hutus dominated leadership positions excluding the minority Tutsi, while in Burundi it was the minority Tutsis who were holding the reins of power discriminating the others. Nevertheless, in both countries elements of intra-ethnic and clan-based discrimination existed.

Focusing on Tanzania's involvement in conflict resolution in Southern Africa and subsequently in the GLR, the study examined how the drivers at the international level influence the Tanzanian foreign policy and the country's involvement in conflict resolution in the region. The study also examined the manner in which Tanzania's domestic environment informs the country's foreign policy and its involvement in conflict resolution. Guided by aspects of the RSCT the study sought to answer the following specific questions. What were the drivers of the Tanzanian foreign policy relating to conflict resolution in sub-Saharan Africa? How have the regional cooperation frameworks complemented Tanzania's participation in conflict resolution? What have been the successes and/or failures of the country's foreign policy and the country's involvement in conflict resolution in sub-Saharan Africa? What did Tanzania gain from its involvement in the resolution of the conflicts in the region?

In this study Southern Africa and the GLR have been identified as security regions. In the Mozambican case, Southern Africa as a security complex was analysed in relation to other sub-regions such as East Africa, the Horn of Africa and the IOR. Part of the reason is that security concerns are

trans-national in nature to an extent the country's national security cannot be explained without considering its neighbours or neighbouring regions. The GLR was identified as the other security region on which the analysis of the Tanzanian foreign policy and the country's involvement in the resolution of Rwanda's and Burundi's conflicts was based. Besides geographical explanation, the GLR was chosen because the RSCT's primary focus is at the regional level since most security threats travel more easily over short distances than long distances. The GLR's security was, thus, analysed in relation to the security of eastern Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa.

The theoretical significance of this work is that it has been able to offer a multi-level framework for analysing the Tanzanian foreign policy and the country's involvement in conflict resolution beyond the commonly applied frameworks. The major reason is that most of the conflict resolution methods and theories mainly focus on either the causes or the processes involved in resolving a particular conflict. On the one hand, the perspectives tend to correlate the assumptions on the causes and their resolution approaches, which do not sufficiently explain African and sub-regional contexts such as the GLR or Southern Africa. On the other hand, the theories provide an analysis of specific processes such as negotiations, mediation or other forms involving third party interventions such as peacekeeping or peace enforcement. The theories specify the right time to intervene in a particular conflict and the skills that a mediator or negotiator is required to have.

The application of the RSCT has revealed that Tanzania's involvement in conflict resolution dates back to the pre-independence period. Nyerere, through TANU, invited to Mwanza fellow nationalist leaders from Uganda, Kenya, Malawi, Zanzibar and Zimbabwe and formed PAFMECA in 1958. The major goal was to find a way of joining efforts for the different movements across the region in carrying out the liberation struggles. The other related goal was to establish a sub-regional entity that would pave the way for the African unity after the attainment of independence.

The study further found that Tanzania's post-independence domestic strategies, like those of the liberation struggles, were geared towards forging the unity of the people. They are aimed at preventing conflicts, promoting people's development and strengthening the national unity. Even though programmes such as self-help, the national service and the promotion of socialism and self-reliance could be interpreted as promoting development; to a larger extent they worked towards domestic conflict prevention. Among others, the major initiatives to promote equality between the people were the introduction of the quota system in education and the nationalisation of the major means of production. Nonetheless, the nation-building project faced challenges, particularly in the education and agriculture sectors.

Nyerere's role was influential in designing and shaping the conflict resolution approaches, particularly at the national and continental levels and in the promotion of a more equitable global community. In addition to Nyerere's family and educational backgrounds, individuals such as Ghandi and Nkrumah moulded his charisma and leadership role. Nyerere learned from Ghandi, for example, the values of setting and employing principles in the struggles. Moreover, Nkrumah's release from prison in 1949 and the subsequent Ghana's struggles for independence further inspired Nyerere. Nyerere's close allies, Rashidi Kawawa and Oscar Kambona, who had similar vision in conflict resolution, largely supported his initiatives.

The study further found that the liberation struggles' experience and the subsequent nation-building strategies informed Tanganyika's support for conflict resolution and the promotion of pan-Africanism. This was described in terms of building a pan-African nation through the elimination of boundaries. Promotion of pan-Africanism at the regional level was built on the belief that African societies were divided into the territories that did not consider the traditional settings. The issue was that most of the independent African states went into conflict with their neighbours re-claiming part(s) of the territory which were re-drawn to suit the colonialists' interests.

Domestic policies principally informed Tanzania's post-independence foreign relations. To promote independence in the foreign affairs decisions, the country joined NAM and the Commonwealth. Dar es Salaam was also a key player in the formation of the OAU. Tanzania attached special importance to these organisations; it could use them to push for the recognition and protection of the interests of African countries. Moreover, Tanzania could use the organisations as a platform to mobilise the international community to resolve the liberation conflicts. The country further believed that it could use institutions such as the Commonwealth to advocate for the reforms of the relations between rich and poor countries.

Tanganyika's union with Zanzibar influenced Tanzania's legitimacy and credibility in conflict resolution. In addition to overcoming the security challenges brought about by the Cold War, the union was an attempt by the Tanganyikan government to set ground for Africa's federation. It was some form of a response to the pre-independence setback of integrating the East African countries. The Union strengthened Tanzania's credibility in conflict resolution as it enabled Zanzibar to overcome racial and ideological divisions that had dominated the island's history and politics.

The study found that Tanzania used various approaches to support other movements in resolving conflicts with the colonial regimes. The tactics, however, varied according to the nature of the regime in power and the attitude towards independence. For example, while the British felt that they could alone determine the date for majority-rule in their colonies, Portugal and South Africa rejected granting independence and sought to impose artificial regimes on Africans. Realising this setback Tanzania sought to combine negotiations with the colonial regimes while at the same time supporting the movements' armed struggles.

The success of any strategy adopted by Tanzania was mostly determined by the other actors' support, the capacity to negotiate and convince others to take actions. Tanzania's moral and principled stand and the ability to mobilise

the world opinion were influential in convincing the international community to recognise the movements. One of the notable techniques was the termination of diplomatic relations with some countries in the West and advocacy for the colonised territories' interests in the international institutions. Indeed, the success of the strategies was largely complemented by the country's credibility.

Forcible measures were supported by Tanzania when necessary as an alternative to diplomatic strategies. The study found that with the exception of Uganda, the armed struggles option had to firstly be initiated by the respective movements. Indeed, the armed struggles were adopted after proving that the pacific measures were unsuccessful. Given that most of the territories attained independence in the early 1960s, Mozambique and Angola resorted to the use of arms to speed up liberation. In Mozambique's case, after Frelimo had decided to employ armed struggles Tanzania opted to provide weapons and military training to the guerrillas. In reality, even though the military strategies were used, negotiations were still carried out between Tanzania and the colonial regimes.

Since the late 1970s, the focus on conflict resolution began to gradually shift from supporting the liberation struggles to managing domestic affairs in response to the changes at the regional and international levels. These changes coincided with the evolutions within Tanzania such as the change of presidents and the adoption of economic liberalisation policies. Both had implications for the country's foreign policy and its participation in conflict resolution. IFIs intervened in Tanzania's policies after the late 1970s economic crisis through economic recovery programmes. Consequently, the government's concentration shifted to economic management programmes, which in the end compelled the government to place less emphasis on the international and regional issues.

The study found that the change of presidency from Nyerere to Mwinyi mostly influenced Tanzania's involvement in the resolution of conflicts. While Nyerere tended to balance between internal and external issues, although more weight was placed on the regional and international affairs – the latter focused

on domestic economic management. Mwinyi's approach further shaped Tanzania's foreign policies. The ruling party, CCM, gradually moved away from dominating foreign policy decisions. More actors including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Cabinet, the private sector assumed an influential role in foreign affairs. The formation of the TCCIA in 1988 to safeguard the interests of the businesspersons extended the influence of the private sector, especially in trade and investment policies, which increasingly began to be a part of foreign affairs.

The application of the RSCT in Mozambique's conflict resolution has revealed that Tanzania was a key player in Mozambique with more engagement during the liberation struggles, followed by limited participation during the civil wars. The Mozambican nationalists were initially influenced by the Tanzanian leaders to adopt similar strategies to those employed by TANU. To forge the unity like that of TANU, Tanganyika leaders encouraged Mozambique's nationalist movements to merge and form one united and strong movement. Consequently, Frelimo was formed in Dar es Salaam in 1962 and the headquarters remained in Tanzania until Mozambique's independence in 1975. Tanzania's engagement in post-independence Mozambique was then reduced to the deployment of forces to protect the Mozambicans against Renamo.

The study further found that Mozambique's case has bridged the knowledge gap between Tanzania's support for liberation struggles and the emerging post-Cold War strategies to resolve intra-state conflicts in the GLR. Mozambique's experience suggests a shift of trends in two ways. The first is the emergence of the non-state actors in conflict resolution such as individuals, terrorists (Renamo) and the INGOs (Saint'Egidio). In the absence of the regional and sub-regional actors taking the lead role, Saint'Egidio successfully mediated Mozambique's post-independence civil wars. This was unlike before when the main actors were the liberation movements and the colonial regimes. Second, the degree of Tanzania's participation in the resolution of Mozambique's post-independence conflict was lesser largely because other actors had taken the lead role. Rather than deploying the military troops

through a bi-lateral agreement, the Tanzanian government worked behind the scenes to encourage greater reconciliation.

The regions' participation in Mozambique's civil wars spoke a different dimension of the RSCT. It was found that the roles of the regional and sub-regional organisations in resolving intra-state conflicts were still underdeveloped. Organisations such as SADC focused much on economic cooperation. The OAU, for example, guided by the non-interference principle, characterised Mozambique's civil wars as internal affairs and was to be resolved by the respective parties. Moreover, individual countries such as Tanzania were largely guided by the OAU's principles. The Tanzanian foreign policy was clear about the support for liberation struggles, although it did not provide for the involvement in any country's conflict resolution after the liberation struggles.

The RSCT has revealed the influence of the international system on the Tanzanian foreign policy and the country's participation in conflict resolution. This was identified in two ways. First, the collapse of the Salazar regime in 1975 resulted in the U.S. and the USSR increasingly playing an active role in the Southern Africa. This was informed by the U.S.'s strategy to contain Communism. Washington supported apartheid South Africa, for example, by devising the constructive engagement, which consisted of military and political exchanges between the U.S. and South Africa. The policy empowered Pretoria to attack its neighbours. Second, the end of the Cold War and the imposition of SAPs were the major factors that compelled Tanzania to withdraw from international commitments and concentrate on domestic economic and political reforms. The return of The Tanzanian troops from Mozambique in the late 1980s could be explained in terms of cost reduction on unproductive ventures as prescribed by the IFIs.

Tanzania's support for Mozambique's conflict resolution could be explained in terms of a stable domestic environment, a strong belief in national unity and the fact that regional insecurity largely influence Tanzania's domestic environment. The country's ability to resolve the conflict within Frelimo helped

the organisation to remain focused and united in the struggle against colonialism and the subsequent national development. Since Tanzania was promoting *Ujamaa* internally, to some extent, the ideology influenced Mozambique's post-independence nation-building policies. Although Frelimo chose Marxism-Leninism, it was nevertheless not much different from *Ujamaa*.

In Rwanda's case, the RSCT has revealed the interplay between domestic and external factors. Declining coffee prices – the main cash crop – from 1989 onwards contributed to economic hardships. The public's dissatisfaction with the situation complemented by donors' pressure on political "opening", paved the way for the increased pressure for change. While the President resisted political changes, the RPF's invasion from Uganda in 1990 forced the opening up for the negotiations.

More important to Rwanda's conflict resolution was the regional dimension of the Rwandan exiles. Since the 1970s exiled Rwandans across the region, especially in Uganda, had been pressing for their right to return to their homeland. While Habyarimana's government resisted their return, the RPF's invasion changed the regional perception on the Rwandan exiles. While some leaders at the beginning described the RPF as a rebel group, the group was later included in the negotiations. After being appointed to mediate the talks, Tanzania sought to facilitate the talks between the Habyarimana administration and the RPF. The essence was not to impose the solution, but rather to set the ground for the parties to discuss the problem until they find a solution.

Rwanda's experience illustrated the influence of the international system on foreign policy and the participation in conflict resolution. Rwanda was among the countries that received a lot of multilateral interventions between 1990 and 1994. Even so, the international community could not prevent the genocide although the information about the indicators that the killings would take place was communicated well in advance to the UN and the international community. The U.S. was among the actors at the international system who responded late to Rwanda's problems due to two reasons; the country was recovering from the

Somalia debacle. The U.S. public opinion was the other reason, that is, the public favoured humanitarian support, rather than conflict prevention.

The findings demonstrated the improving role of the regional and sub-regional organisations in resolving intra-state conflicts. During Rwanda's conflict resolution, the ability of regional organisations to resolve conflicts was largely transformed. While Tanzania adopted mediation initiatives for Rwanda right from the early 1990s the OAU's mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution was still new. Nevertheless, it was found that the mechanism was strengthened during the 1994 genocide. The organisation was the first to assemble military observers to monitor a ceasefire in 1991. The OAU was ahead of the UN in the analysis, in issuing public statements and taking action throughout the period of Rwanda's conflict. The organisation participated in the negotiations from 1991 to 1993. Rwanda's conflict resolution was the first experience of collaboration between the OAU and a UN peacekeeping force.

Tanzania's domestic environment was instrumental in Rwanda's conflict resolution. Some aspects of *Ujamaa* influenced Habyarimana's regime as exemplified by the adoption of Tanzania's ten-cell local government structure headed by a leader back in the 1970s. From 1991 onwards this local setting was armed and trained in self-defence. Rwandan government did this largely to counter RPF's attacks and to prevent the movement from conquering more territory. In Tanzania, unlike in Rwanda, arms and training on self-defence were provided to the Southern regions bordering Mozambique.

In terms of the foreign policy, the application of the RSCT has revealed that Tanzania's public opinion was not influential. While Parliament was expected to be responsible for foreign policy formulation and for taking major decisions, it did not play this role at the beginning. Although it was formed in 1972, the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs began to table its reports during the Ministry of Foreign Affairs budget speeches in 1992.

Burundi's case, like Rwanda's, demonstrates Tanzania's shift of its involvement in conflict resolution from Southern Africa to the GLR. Although

multiple actors participated in Burundi's peace process, Tanzania was an influential actor. The historical relations dating back to the pre-independence period, between Nyerere and Rwagasore, influenced Tanzania's involvement in Burundi. As was the case with Mozambique, Tanzania supported the creation of Uprona; and as Burundi's independence approached Nyerere, through TANU, provided financial support to Rwagasore and his party. Again, as was the case with the other territories, the collaboration between Uprona and TANU was aimed at establishing an East African federation after independence.

Burundi's study findings demonstrate the influence of the international system on the Tanzanian foreign policy and the country's participation in the resolution of Burundi's conflict. The international community's responsibility in Burundi was in different dimensions. The first was the role of donors in sustaining the Burundian regimes. Donors provided aid to the government from the 1970s to the 1990s, even when the military was killing civilians. The other dimension is the degree of the international community's involvement in Burundi. It was found that the international community was seriously involved after Ndadaye's assassination of 1993. The increased international intention to promote and protect human rights was the major reason. Finally, after 1994, Burundi's conflict resolution received mixed reactions from the international community – as a way of re-painting its image after failing to prevent Rwanda's genocide.

The RSCT application has revealed the relations between regional actors and events. South Africa's entry into Burundi's negotiations beginning with Mandela's appointment brought Pretoria's influence into the GLR. Deployment of troops to Burundi, on behalf of the AU, for example, strengthened South Africa's economic and diplomatic influence on the region. To some extent, Tanzania's diplomacy was influenced as already demonstrated by an approach different from the one used by South Africa. Whereas, Tanzania preferred negotiations, South Africa sought to be tough on the parties. South Africa's approach, however, in the end culminated in the signing of the 2000 Arusha

Agreement. In reality, Tanzania's role was significant in paving the way for the successful conflict resolution.

The study also revealed a gradual growing of public influence on Tanzania's foreign affairs. This was confirmed by the parliamentarians' concerns about the government's continued determination to host refugees. The issue here was that there were much more pressing domestic problems that the government was supposed to resolve than hosting the refugees. The evolving status of the refugees over time from humanitarian during the liberation struggles to political during the civil wars in the 1990s was the reason for the public's concern. Nevertheless, even though President Mwinyi and later Makapa sought to concentrate on domestic affairs, the nature of the Burundian problem compelled them to continuously resolve it.

There are some aspects of the RSCT that speak of different dimensions of the analysis. Besides states, regional players, statepersons/individuals and international actors, women were important in conflict resolution. In Mozambique's conflict, besides being guerrillas and porters, women were important in mobilising the youth. During the post-conflict reconstruction they were instrumental in rising awareness about women empowerment and in the campaign against gender discrimination. In Burundi, women were not involved in the negotiations largely due to the reason that the process was influenced by patriarchy. Moreover, the societal perception on women's needs also contributed to women's exclusion. Women's needs were considered to be in the private domain.

One major theme that will continue to dominate the Tanzanian foreign policy is that Tanzania will largely continue to resolve regional conflicts through diplomacy, that is, mediation or facilitation of negotiations. Tanzania's past diplomatic achievements will continue to be used as reference for the present and future diplomatic behaviour. This trend was clear during Burundi's negotiations when a team of Tanzanian experts facilitated the negotiations. This will continue to feature in Tanzania's diplomacy.

Tanzania's involvement in peacekeeping in the GLR and sub-Saharan Africa is a trend that will change the Tanzanian foreign policy. The country will be more involved in peacekeeping missions, particularly in those with peace enforcement mandate. One of the major reasons is the country's participation in the missions that have been successful, such as the recent operation in the DRC. Moreover, the attack on Tanzanian soldiers in Darfur, coupled with the nature of the weapons used by the [rebel] groups – such as those of M23 rebels in the DRC, provides another justification for the country's emphasis on peace enforcement.

Energy resources are part of the themes that will likely emerge in Tanzania's foreign relations. Besides its concentration on conflict resolution, Tanzania's relations with the regional neighbours will be influenced by the recent oil and gas discoveries in Tanzania. This trend is evidenced by the increased initiatives to strengthen economic relations with the neighbouring countries, especially the landlocked. Infrastructure construction and improvement is one of the indicators of this trend. Likewise, Tanzania's relations with the international actors will focus more on the promotion of investment in resources extraction, including the resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and in the continental shelf than on investment promotion in manufacturing industries.

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